Small Wars Journal

Assessing Russian-Chinese Military Exercises

Wed, 09/30/2009 - 6:38pm
Assessing Russian-Chinese Military Exercises

by Dr. Richard Weitz

Assessing Russian-Chinese Military Exercises (Full PDF Article)

The modern Russian-Chinese relationship has most often been characterized by bloody wars, imperial conquests, and mutual denunciations. It has only been during the last twenty years, when Russian power had been decapitated by the loss of the Soviet empire and China had found itself a rising economic—but still weak—military power that the two countries have managed to reach a harmonious modus vivendi. According to various metrics, China now has the world's second or third largest economy, while Russia lags in approximately eighth place and, due to its slower growth rates, is falling further behind. Nevertheless, Russia still has a much more powerful military, especially in the nuclear realm.

Now the relationship is becoming better institutionalized and integrated. As befits two large and powerful neighbors, the senior military leaders of Russia and China now meet frequently in various formats. Their direct encounters include annual meetings of their defense ministers and their armed forces chiefs of staff. Since 1997, they have also organized yearly "strategic consultations" between their deputy chiefs of the general staff. The most recent session occurred on November 24-25, 2008, in Beijing, and included Russian Deputy Chief Alexander Burutin and PLA Deputy Chief Ma Xiaotian. In March 2008, the Chinese defense minister established a direct telephone line with his Russian counterpart, the first such ministerial hotline ever created by China and another country. In December 2008, the chiefs of the Chinese and Russian general staffs created their own direct link.

Assessing Russian-Chinese Military Exercises (Full PDF Article)

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Comments

OccamsRazor

Tue, 10/06/2009 - 9:38am

I enjoyed the article, and generally agree with it's analysis, but the author has discarded a significant potential motive for the joint operations - <em>holding</em> Taiwan. Am I the only one who thinks it's suspicious that first they practice amphibious assaults/invasions, then they spend the subsequent operations practicing anti-insurgency tactics (including the use of surface to air missiles to guard against potential liberation attempts)?

I certainly cede that it is only a possibility, but I do think the author dismissed this motivation far too quickly.