Bounding Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
by Dr. Tony Corn
Download the full article: Toward a Kilcullen-Biden Plan?
At this particular juncture, the U.S. simply cannot afford a 500 billion dollar open-ended escalation. Nor can it opt for an incremental ("middle road") strategy which would fail to create the psychological effects required in both the West and Afghanistan.
A temporary 40,000 surge is doable, but only if the core of the Obama strategy is a "Kilcullen-Biden" plan combining convocation of a loya jirga domestically with a regionalization of the Afghan question diplomatically. Let's go massive for a limited time, and "clear, hold, and build" as much as we can. If it does not work, a regional negotiation provides ample cover for a drawdown.
COIN diehards will argue that in the absence an explicit long-term commitment, large segments of the Afghan population will continue to do fencing-sitting. Guess what: if the West is "the West" rather than just another Bananastan, it is because, from the British in 1688 to the Americans in 1776, and from the French in 1789 to the Romanians in 1989, Westerners decided that to "live free or die" was a more honorable option than forever "fencing-sitting." At the end of the day, if 30 million Afghans want to be known as a nation of fence-sitters un—to stand up to 15,000 insurgents, it is their problem first, that of their immediate neighbors second, and only third that of the West itself.
COIN Maximalists and Minimalist can at least agree on one thing: whatever the option chosen, McChrystal is the man for the job. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, the ISAF Commander has a grasp of tribal politics worthy of a professional anthropologist. On the other hand, reading between the lines of the report, it is not hard to see that General McChrystal has the kind of quiet determination that led a General Foch, on the eve of the Marne offensive, to defiantly report:
Hard pressed on my right. My center is yielding. Impossible to maneuver. Situation excellent. I shall attack.
Download the full article: Toward a Kilcullen-Biden Plan?
Dr. Tony Corn is the author of "World War IV as Fourth-Generation Warfare" (Policy Review, January 2006). He is currently on leave from the State Department and writing a book on The Long War. This article is a follow-up to "The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home: Strategic Communication and the Management of Expectations" published in Small Wars Journal on September 18, 2009 (before the release of the McChrystal report). The opinions expressed in this essay are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the U.S. State Department or the U.S. government.
About the Author(s)
Comments
Robert C Jones - "it simply calls for being a good world citizen and living up to the expectations of our history and prinicples as a nation, and our duties as the big kid on the block."
Excellent. as someone just getting their head around COIN, Small Wars etc from a previous focus and study on CT I have seen a lack of acceptance of America's role in global affairs.
As someone watching from Australia I hear a lot of rhetoric about the US as bastion of all that is good and true but see a reticence to act as that big kid. I'm not asking for continual nation building, not a global cop but a recognition that a secure world is itself a benefit to the US. More security , more trade, more money.
That being said, I'm not sure exactly what a secure Afghanistan will have to trade.
The key to the SF motto is to not make any assumptions about who is doing the "Oppressing" based simply on previous government relationships, treaties, etc.
But "The Oppressed" is always the same, it is the populace. One more justification for my version of populace-centric engagement. Do we go for broke on some other state's problems? No. But if an oppressed populace believes that their oppressor is an agent of the US, it is in our interest to help resolve that perception as quickly as possible. Regardless of if the Oppressor is the existing government or some outside government, or some empowered organization outside of the government construct.
So focus on the oppressed, and target any real or perceived US linkage to the oppression. None of this calls for conducting "wars" or "regime change" or "nation building" per se; it simply calls for being a good world citizen and living up to the expectations of our history and prinicples as a nation, and our duties as the big kid on the block.
Col Jones,
As I've stated before, I like your style.
Ken White's objections are sound, and Jeremy's words are valid even in the role of the protagonist.
You end with,
"De Oppresso Liber." My mantra is Facta Non Verba. Today, I question if we can liberate the oppressed with our deeds not our words.
In a selfish sense, after eight years of intervention, I suppose I'm asking,
"What's in it for us?"
Do we go broke trying to help those that cannot help themselves? I think not.
v/r
Mike
Ken, I understand your position, won't try to change your mind, but will not change mine.
I believe that "Irregular Warfare" is actually much more accurately "Regular Peacefare," but that dog won't hunt in the halls of the Pentagon, particularly when the Services are all digging in and looking for every edge to defend their budgets and avoid force structure changes driven by anything other than their own respective positions on what they think they should look like an do.
There will be many dangerous places that our service members will be sent in this post Cold War world to represent and preserve US national interests. We empower our opponents when we hang the associated strategic risk of "must win"/ "can't lose" warfare on these engagements. Doubly so when it is someone elses war and we are just there because of some shared interest that while vital for the allied party, is "merely" important to us.
Time to be quiet professionals. Go out, do our duty, come home, repeat as necessary. Don't brag in the headlines over every "HVT" we take down, nor demand "war" status for every battlefield. The military is perhaps the most respected and appreciated of all US Government institutions, none of that will be lost if our political bosses and the media tone down the rhetoric a bit.
De Oppresso Liber.
Jones
Robert C. Jones:
You bring up allegories that have little bearing. Custer and Smedley have little to do with the fact that if there's a whole lot of shooting going on, it's a war in the eyes of those that are in it. Those getting fired upon have a right to call it what they wish.
Smedley's"big ones" as you put it show the sham that can occur: <i>"The first award...Veracruz, Mexico in 1914. But the large number of Medals of Honor awarded during that campaign--one for the Army, <u>nine for Marines and 46 to Navy personnel--diminished the medal's prestige</u>. During World War I, Butler, then a major, attempted to return his Medal of Honor, explaining that he had done nothing to deserve it. It was returned to him with orders that not only was he to keep it but that he was to wear it as well."</i> (emphasis added / kw) from the Wiki. It is noteworthy that Smedley had hero badges from several police actions including the Boxer Rebellion but he made no move to return the fraudulent ones until his then beloved Corps started losing people.
Wars come in all types and sizes. Careful you don't get so hung up on semantics that you lose sight of what you're trying to do. Tell some guy with a PH or a CIB from Afghanistan (or something similar) he wasn't in a war and he may smile politely but I suspect he'll be thinking unfriendly thoughts -- you may have developed an adversarial relationship without knowing it. You can wave that away as childish and it is -- it is also reality.<blockquote>Point being, of course, that the military has always had hard, dangerous duty to pull on the edges of the "empire," and we did not feel compelled to declare them wars.</blockquote>You can call it anything you wish; I'm simply suggesting that your good intentions do a perhaps inadvertent disservice to those who have to fight in whatever you wish to call it and suggest you should be less unintentionally dismissive of their service and what they wish to call it. Dismiss as you please but don't be surprised when you find little receptiveness for a good idea from someone who rightly or wrongly perceived a slight.<blockquote>"...The fact that the military is in combat does not of it self create that necessity."</blockquote>Of course it does not -- it does however complicate the political aspects. Aspects which you routinely dismiss as beneath your dignity to discuss. Your prerogative but the SecDef, the Service Chiefs and the President do not have that luxury.<blockquote>"...but don't create a fiction that compels one to drag the entire nation into a state of war in order to do so."</blockquote>If you think this entire nation is in a state of war or has been at any time since 2001 (0r 1945 for that matter), you and I have quite different concepts of what constitutes that state.
As I've said before, I admire the idealism emanating from MacDill; I agree with you all on many things but I'm afraid continually ignoring political realities and getting unduly perturbed about terminology does not bode well for your good ideas...
<i>"3. The Taliban isn't AQ. They are not our enemy and they do not threaten US national interests. Better we look at how we can address the legitimate concerns of the Pashtu people as a whole in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and then use those tribal leaders to reel in the militant arm of the Taliban once we actually perform on our end of the deal. "</i>
I agree with this for the most part, but am still having reservations. I think that the Taliban has evolved to a large extent, with considerable assistance from AQ. I think that the two organizations have vastly different viewpoints, but I think that the new Taliban has incorporated many elements of AQ. Although I'm not certain that they would turn towards the United States, should NATO withdraw--they might be completely happy just to have Afghanistan.
Custer lost his entire command in combat fighting for a nation that was not at war.
Smedley Butler earned the big one, twice, fighting overseas for a nation that was not at war.
Point being, of course, that the military has always had hard, dangerous duty to pull on the edges of the "empire," and we did not feel compelled to declare them wars.
There is strategic risk in fighting wars, that is best avoided unless absolutely necessary. The fact that the military is in combat does not of it self create that necessity.
Take care of the soldiers, give them the credit, the pay, the recognition for their duty; but don't create a fiction that compels one to drag the entire nation into a state of war in order to do so.
Robert C. Jones:
You may have a minor point with this statement:<blockquote>"In other words, people are debating the wrong issues because they do not understand the strategic nature of the problem."</blockquote>However, I suggest some strategists obviously do not understand the political, tactical and operational nature of the problem.
I would not advise telling Joe or Jane, be they Active Army, Marine, National Guard or Reserve that they are not in a war.
I also suggest you might consider the political rather than the practical aspects of your prescriptions. You do not, of course have to do that -- OTOH, the actual senior leaders you so blithely denigrate must do so.
I won't lay down another opinion on "how to win" in Afghanistan, but I will offer a couple of points worth keeping in mind when thinking about such things:
1. We are not "at war" in Afghanistan. Thinking of this AOR where we went to wage efforts to defeat AQ as a separate war is amateuristic media/political speak. It also places a tremendous credibility burden on decisions that simply does not need to be there. It is all burden and little gain by classifying this particular AOR as a "war."
2. Denying Sanctuary. We really must assist our senior leaders to evolve past their briefing note depth knowledge and understanding of such key concepts. Certainly sanctuary is often found in "ungoverned spaces," but it does not derive from the space, but rather from a legal status (behind a sovereign border, or as a non-state actor outside the constraints of laws, etc) and the support of a poorly governed populace (i.e., a populace that is dissatisfied enough to remain neutral or even support such movements), coupled with some favorable cover (terrain, vegetation, or urban). Point being, that creating "effective" government in Afghanistan won't deny the sanctuary of this populace; nor does AQ need Afghanistan for the sanctuary it requires to continue its sophisticated, regional UW campaign to remove overt Western influence from the Middle East and to leverage local insurgencies to create long overdue changes in local governments that are too tied to these Western influences. (Note to policy makers, these are actually two excellent points that Bin Laden makes, and we would do well to adopt them as our own. It would disempower his movement, and allow us to modify our role in the ME to one more appropriate to today, rather than the Cold War).
3. The Taliban isn't AQ. They are not our enemy and they do not threaten US national interests. Better we look at how we can address the legitimate concerns of the Pashtu people as a whole in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and then use those tribal leaders to reel in the militant arm of the Taliban once we actually perform on our end of the deal. (Another note to policy makers, quit staring at the map. You see borders and capitals and assume that Kabul and I-bad actually exerted governance over the entire regions contained within. I strongly suspect they never have, and to attempt to enforce a Western perspective as to "rule of law" on border enforcement, and the extension of centralized governance into these long, informally governed, tribal regions is probably even more inflammatory than when King George sent the Army into Boston to enforce the rule of law there...)
In other words, people are debating the wrong issues because they do not understand the strategic nature of the problem.
Say what you will but I believe Dr Corn grasps the larger cultural dynamics in Afghanistan and makes many good points in his essay (unfortunately it took 19pgs). I concur that USG should push for a new Loya Jirga in an attempt to undo what U.S. meddling did during the 2002/3 Loya Jirgas. Specifically, Afghans simply do not grasp the concept of a run-off election. I believe USG's insistance on these run-offs is yet another example of detached policy makers who live in walled compounds in both DC and Kabul.
"COIN is 80% politics and 20% military". Whoever said this has never operated in a third world country where local politics is largely defined by who controls the ability to project violence...err...security. This truism makes COIN much more reliant on a competent security force that is able to deliver security in a way that exploits the local dynamics to achieve stability.
Finally, attempting to count the # of insurgents in Afghanistan is...idiotic. This effort is akin to counting the # of Cowboys fans at a Dallas Cowboy game by counting those who are cheering. When the Cowboys give up a sack, very few cheer. However, after a touchdown, almost everyone in the stadium cheers. Hopefully you can follow the logic...potentially everyone is an insurgent. The only variable is the situation. To think otherwise leads Commanders to putting small units 2hrs away from support of any kind because there are only '20' insurgents in that area.
In March, the President unveiled his Afghanistan strategy and stated, "I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future." The United States arguably achieved the first objective of this strategy, "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda" by 2002 and has effectively maintained a lid on al Qaeda since. The second part of this statement, "prevent their return" has become the sticking point. There are basically three options to achieve this objective. The first option is to fix Afghanistan, creating a western friendly democratic like government both willing and capable of independently countering the Taliban and al Qaeda. The problem with this option is the requirement for a large number of troops for a protracted period of time. The Soviet Military initially estimated that it would require 40 divisions 25 years to create a workers paradise in Afghanistan. While I am not arguing for 40 divisions and 25 years, it is clear that a large force structure and long period of time is required to affect the type of changes required to "fix" Afghanistan. The second problem with this option is that it assumes that the US can change the cultural and societal norms that have shaped Afghanistan into the country it is today. The second option is to drastically reduce force structure and buy off the warlords and local leaders to deny al Qaeda sanctuary. There are multiple problems with this option. First, we would have to continually "rebuy" local leaders. Second, we would have to accept the return of Taliban or Taliban like governance with all of the human rights, poppy trade, and corruption problems. This of course is a politically untenable position. The third option is to continue what we are currently doing indefinitely and continue to keep a lid on the situation. The problem with this option is that it does not provide an enduring solution and requires an ill-defined long term commitment of troops.
The bottom line is that there are no easy solutions for Afghanistan. There is no silver bullet that is going to easily solve this problem. If you maintain the requirement to "prevent their return", the administration is faced with a choice of extremes. There is no middle of the road solution. You either fix Afghanistan with a large and protracted commitment of forces or you accept a return to the pre-9/11 Taliban days and buy off the warlords and local leaders. Anything in the middle just keeps a lid on the situation and lasts only as long as US troops are present. In 2005 a commentator described US operations in Iraq as "Not to hard, not to soft, just plain wrong." We risk the same situation in Afghanistan.
Of course the other option is to change the objectives and eliminate the requirement to prevent the return of al Qaeda to Afghanistan and find alternate methods to contain al Qaeda. None of the choices are easy
militarily, diplomatically, or politically. The administration must make some hard choices.
Let's see if I can get this straight. The Administration said last year and in March of this year that Afghanistan is the necessary fight, that it was ignored (not resourced or focused with a strategy), and that what we were/are doing was/is wasting money and soldiers' lives. Now we are told that Afghanistan isn't worth the money or the time to do what needs to be done, primarilty because what needs to be done is expensive and will become a long term commitment--and the Afghan government isn't worth it. If that is correct, then one would expect a withdrawl order to come from the White House. To do anything else is akin to "taking a stab" at something cheaper and easier and seeing if might do something. Hmmm? Not sure that is something I would sign up for myself. I am not sure GEN McCrystal would either. So, maybe that super Marine Donna Uetz refers to can take charge and see what happens. For sure our enemies in the region will smile and say, "Yeah, I thought so".
Jeremy:
Agree completely with your assessment of Exum's happy piece. It reads like the simplistic enemy courses of action we used to develop when I was a Division planner a number of years ago. They were constructed purely and simply to fit the plan into the track it was already on by constructing scenarios that made folks feel good about consideration of alternatives, yet the choice was so stark that in no way was that consideration substantive or real.
I am skeptical of what Dr Corn writes since I came across another piece that he wrote recently where he stated something like this:
"Amateurs do strategy, professionals do anthropology."
Is this the kind of thinking that we have devolved too in defense circles? More frightening today is to hear senior army officers talk of being at a place now where we can finally move beyond "combined arms" toward the "interagency approach."
Our Army and its fighting capabilities are being eviscerated by sloppy, half baked theoretical thinking combined with Crusaders (to use Bacevich's term) who want to propel the United States from one nation building adventure to the next, and a compliant Army with its senior leaders who sit back and can do no better than nest themselves with their higher headquarters which in each case are mired in this crud.
If nation building and coin are the operations de jour for the near future so be it, that is what we must do, but good gravy, we better be able to do combined arms surrounded by reasoned strategy when we do: The idea that concepts like cultural awareness, anthropology, learning and adapting, etc can replace the basics like combined arms, the ability to fight for information, and strategy is mind-boggling.
may be we in India can help. We have a standing army thats 1.4 mn strong. We are already in Afghanistan and have spent 1.5bn dollars there in humanitarian assistance. we have a good working equation with the northern alliance. Afghans are culturally aligned to us, in many ways.
But then your best allies the Pakistani`s would never like this. if you can convince them, it would be better.
Dr. Corn's point is well made with the primary message being there's no point to winning Afghanistan if America crumbles in the process. But there are ways to win without it costing everything last thing we have. (Don't Try to Arrest the Sea - by Kahn)
With that said, I don't think McCrystal is the best man for the job, but he is indeed getting a very bad rap.
The best man for the job is currently heading JFCOM. His vision is clear, his mind is open to adapting to the means of winning, be it tradional or something new. Unfortunately other services have a tough time letting a Marine be in charge. Especially one who finds no offense in being called a grunt.
yup -- that statement is almost as bad as the '3 Futures' document from Exum at CNAS. Tidy little strawmen that lead the reader to a preferred conclusion. Too bad their conclusion is a leaking sieve that can't hold water due to their overwhelming assumptions of what it would take to make a massive pop-centric COIN op work.
<em>"At this particular juncture, the U.S. simply cannot afford a 500 billion dollar open-ended escalation. Nor can it opt for an incremental ("middle road") strategy which would fail to create the psychological effects required in both the West and Afghanistan."</em>
False dilemma. And it's getting tiresome.