by Bing West
Download the full article: Afghanistan Trip Report
Having recently returned from Afghanistan -- thanks to the hospitality of Generals Petraeus and McChrystal - I'd like to share a few thoughts. By way of context, let me state my frame of reference. As a former assistant secretary of defense for international security, I am familiar with Washington dynamics; but I believe COIN is decided at the small unit level, not in national capitals. I was 18 months in Vietnam, have written five books on COIN and made 20 trips to Iraq and Afghanistan. This was my third Afghanistan visit in quick succession (April-May, June-July and October). My observations are based on forty to fifty shuras and patrols -- several on extended missions -- that included numerous small-arms engagements and fire missions. I talked with about 500 Marines and Afghan security forces of all ranks. The observations here are derived from that sample.
Download the full article: Afghanistan Trip Report
Francis J. 'Bing' West is a Correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration. In Vietnam, he was a member of the Marine Force Recon team that initiated Operation Stingray - sustained attacks behind enemy lines. He also saw action in the villages with a Combined Action Platoon and wrote The Village , a narrative of a Marine squad that lived for 485 days in a Vietnamese village. During the Vietnam time period, he wrote a series of monographs for The Rand Corporation on counterinsurgency and the nature of small unit combat. West is also the author of Small Unit Action in Vietnam, Naval Forces and National Security, The Pepperdogs: A Novel, The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah and The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq.
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What wonderful things will happen when the 90 cadets graduate from the military academy? There is a problem equating leadership to influence.
If these new butter bars aren't connected to the powers that be, they might not accomplish all that much. The idea of cashiering everyone above LTC and building the remaining junior officers did come to mind.
I had a Corps S3 tell me of the problems he had with Kabul promoting someone without the schools, sending them out, and now he had to train them as well as his Brigade officers. That is assuming these "Kabul commandos" actually wanted to be productive.
Having said this, let me state that with proper training, sufficient equipment, and leadership, Afghans would make some damn fine light infantry. I think the outcome with the ANA shows that the system is not there to come up with units operating at high levels of performance.
Col Gentile stated,
"I especially liked his appreciation for the need for conventional combat units to kill the enemy thereby regaining the initiative at the tactical level."
Sir, honestly, I don't think any serious practisioner would disagree with that assessment- it's just good ole common sense. The only disagreements that I've seen are in the false arguments of CT v/s COIN and the constant debates between academics, think tanks, pundits, and the beltway.
What I like best about COL Peters' work is his ability to capture the operational and tactical level and blend it into a coherent voice although I was left wondering if we can actually pull off some semblance of a victory.
Mike
One comment caught my eye, in part, "the enemy does not perceive that he confronts a superior, implacable adversary when he encounters our conventional units. We should change that."
Indeed we should change our enemy's mindset!
If this is due to higher headquarters risk aversive attitude, lack of enthusiasm and/or imagination for what constitutes meaningful offensive operations...then we should change that also!
An editorial comment: staff officers can be worth their weight in gold, but those in the rear, second guessing those out forward, need to be found alternate duty assignments.
Charlie S-P:
While you're definitely right on that, one effort to "Americanize" the ANA I'd be interested in is Afghanistan's military academy. They go through 4 years of civilian/military education, and the first group of something like 90 Cadets graduated this spring, and graduating classes are supposed to be bigger in the future.
I think this effort could be extremely valuable considering leadership has been such a problem, let alone leadership with actual skill sets. It's a bit of a long time to wait 4 years for these guys to finish, but I think it'll be worth the wait.
Brilliant assessment and recommendations. Colonel West articulates just about everything that I observed undermining our efforts in Afghanistan (except he managed to do it without any expletives :P).
Something that doesn't get brought up a lot but that is causing manpower inflation for routine missions:
<i>Insisting upon 16 US and four vehicles per trip outside the wire guarantees episodic contact with the people. ETTs are often marooned on their bases. If a platoon wants to conduct a 36-hour patrol, it shouldnt require a power point brief to brigade, etc., etc. Eventually, companies stop trying to evade restrictive rules and settle into status quo routines. In theory, we endorse small-unit initiative; in practice, we prevent it.</i>
<blockquote>It is not self-evident how winning the hearts of village elders or linking villages to Kabul wins the war. Our Soldiers believe that Afghans accept what we give them without reciprocating by turning against the Taliban. The elders dont raise militias or recruits for the army, or drive out the Taliban. No movie scene like the uprising of the Mexican village in "The Magnificent Seven" has occurred. Instead, villagers - fearing the bombing that we are (rightly) trying to curtail - plead with migratory Taliban gangs to move on. A rural population - no matter how content with its government - cannot stand up to a tough enemy.</blockqote>
<a href="http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/category/tribal-chief/">Chief Zazai's Zazi Valley, Paktia Tribal Police Force</a> reinforced by half an ODA might make a good movie.
<blockquote>The theory of counterinsurgency is that villagers, once given security and services, will inform on the insurgents. In reality, the Pashtun Taliban arent oppressing the villagers, and the coalition doesnt have the troops to provide security in many areas. So villagers hedge their bets-accepting projects from the coalition while keeping their mouths shut as the Taliban move about in small gangs.</blockquote>
If the Taliban <i>aren't</i> oppressing the villagers and the military, police and intelligence forces of the Karzai regime <i>are</i>, perhaps we need to reevaluate which side we ought to be on.
Corruption is a significant issue in COIN. The ANP has the responsibility to protect and serve local populations 24/7, but no matter the training, if your pay is late, fuel siphoned off, and your food is shorted, checkpoints look awful good.
Is the US-centric tone of the trip report tacit acknowledgment that the ANSF are not being depended on to be a significant part of security? At this rate, let's cut our losses, and allow the tribes to form tribal militias. Switzerland in the Himalayas...
Agree, excellent report by Colonel West. Thanks, Sir, for providing it.
In it there are many, many valuable insights that point to important considerations and debates and possible adjustments in action on the ground. I especially liked his appreciation for the need for conventional combat units to kill the enemy thereby regaining the initiative at the tactical level.
v/r
gian
Great trip report - Thank you!
A damning observation at the end: "We are training Afghan security forces in our image...."
Why is this being done? No other country, literally, should build up their armed forces as an image of the U.S. military. The U.S. military has responsibilities and resources that are globally speaking unique. Would it not be far better to look at what kind of security forces Afghanistan can support in the mid-long term, and build based on that?