Why Buy Something We Hate?

The short answer is yes, there have been hort projects in Panshir that restored orchards and vineyards. How many and how well and whether the plantings were of the most competitive varieties or whether the participating growers represent a good cross-section of the population and represent the most entrepreneurial subgroup of locals, I can't say.

It may be helpful here to revisit my earlier piece: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/06/poppy-is-not-the-most-profitab/

There cannot be a licensing system where there is anarchy and if there were no anarchy there would be no poppy, so there is no need for a licensing system. Instead, spend the money directly on securing access to local markets and supporting new agriculture and processing ventures.

It cannot be stated too often or too loudly: Afghanistan has no comparative production advantage in poppy whatsoever. The cost of labor and other ag inputs in Afg is up to three times higher than in surrounding countries and in other poppy production areas worldwide. In a free market, Afghanistan would not be growing poppy.

I have tried to make it clear, in all of my poppy pieces for SWJ, that poppy is not especially profitable for Afghan farmers. If it were, they would be growing it year round as farmers do in Europe.

It is external harassment, in particular unsafe roads and informal toll systems, that push farmers toward poppy. (Currently, for example, informal tolls are around $400 per truckload to carry produce from Shamali to Peshawar). When harassment is reduced to acceptable levels through effective local governance, poppy goes away, as has largely happened in the north.

We have a moral and political obligation to try to improve income levels and the balance of the Afg economy. The country is desperately short of food and imports millions of dollars of mundane fruits, vegetables, flowers and meat every year because local production does not meet demand. Supporting poppy production is an unnecessarily indirect approach to meeting the country's food and employment needs.

There are many profitable crops in Afg, depending always on the farm's location. If we want poppy to dwindle in importance, we should support diversified agriculture ventures, especially those, like wheat and rapeseed, that crowd poppy out of the winter crop cycle. At the same time we must focus on securing domestic market access and on creating year round, town-based jobs. Get markets functioning and get workers earning paychecks and there will be no poppy problem.

I appreciated your thorough and concise paper. It seems the poppy issue has receded considerably in the face of an emphasis on troop contributions and Afghan strategies. The poppy problem however is intricately linked to the issue of security and likewise to the economy, development, corruption and a host of other issues for which a strategy must be applied.

I must say that I agree strongly with the majority of your conclusions and have been an advocate against the counter-narcotic strategies of eradication and the recurring issue of buying opium crops.

I have a couple of points to add to your arguments and would like to 'plant' a seed for another counter-narcotics strategy that I believe would be complementary to your conclusions.

The first is there are a number of urban myths surrounding the poppy issue, the main one being the heavy involvement of counterinsurgents and the associated poppy and fighting seasons. The UNODC has documented, over the course of several years, the proportion of crop directly supporting counterinsurgency is of the order of less than 20 to 25%, with the majority of those involved doing so for financial gain (cash crop value, gate price, crop viability versus other choices, marketability, and ease of distribution). So a large majority of food insecure Afghans (said to be over 9 million) are involved to some degree in the poppy industry because it is profitable and represents one of the few choices for providing for their families. (Another interesting point is the number of Afghans that cite poppy as a means to improve their self-esteem through high profits to purchase high value items, pay for marriages and facilitate families attending the pilgrimage to Mecca.) Related to this, seasonal fighting season fluctuates with the poppy cultivation not simply because fighters are working the fields, but also because the Taliban recognise that not disturbing the poppy production process is in their best interest and facilitates their relationship with the local population (hearts and minds). There is an intentional decrease in insurgent activity in and around the poppy production areas due to this issue.

A second issue pertains to potential alternative crops for cultivation. The problems associated with alternatives are the lack of foreign markets, lower prices, poor or non-existent transportation, processing systems and distribution networks. More importantly, poppy production involves significantly more labour than the alternatives by as much as five times, when compared to wheat for example. So comprehensive strategies must provide alternative livelihoods for both farmers and labour markets.

I would like to propose one such strategy that on the surface is highly controversial, however if adopted, could mitigate and complement current counter-narcotics programs.

I suggest implementing a ten year poppy eradication strategy consisting of a marketing board-like system, similar to the Tobacco industry in Canada. Essentially, poppy farmers would require licenses, purchased from the Provincial Government, to grow poppies on their land. The Government however would enforce full eradication in all non-licensed areas. Such a strategy would commence with a defined quoto (say set at 2006 levels of poppy production) for the first year with the intention of reducing the number of licences by 10% annually over ten years. This system would therefore offer poppy farmers a defined plan to wean them off these illicit crops over a reasonable period of time. In concert with this, alternative crops and livelihood programs would be implemented to facilitate the transition, funded through current counter-narcotic programs as well as the licencing revenues.

The Government would regulate this system by establishing the number of licences for each parcel of land (eg. by acre), ensure open and equitable access to them, and document fully the areas of cultivation.

Corruption problems would be alleviated by the publication and verification of the number and location of approved growing areas, the 100% eradication of all non-licenced areas using local population labor and police to conduct, and the ability to externally monitor the process.

On the controversial side, I do not advocate making opium production legal, only recognising that current counter-narcotic efforts have only made the problem worse and have increased insecurity. I am simply advocating a defined strategy to coordinate the elimination of these crops over the longer term. Such a strategy co-opts current growers and producers, regulates the industry, ensures government involvement and oversight and establishes a defined poppy reduction plan with realistic and achievable goals.

Regards,

David

I would disagree with you on any attempt at eradication. Such programs are eco-damaging, never implemented equally, create hate and discontent, and only encourage alternate crops such as marijuana.

The very appeal of the product is that once harvested, it has an indefinite shelf life, and is easily transportable in an exceptionally rural-centric country lacking security for the farmer to the market place with more traditional agrarian products.

Perhaps approaching it as a fungible and or liquidity agriculture product is precisely what is needed, by, as you say, licensing and requiring delivery of the poppy to a state run and regulated processing plant as Turkey implemented, starting in the 70s. Turkey also produces an often forgotten about secondary commodity from the poppy - poppy seed oil.

Unfortunately, any such program requires a strong central government to oversee and regulate, as Ankara displays, but which Kabul probably never will.

Excuse me Seahorse, I meant to say agree with you, and the author, on policies involving eradication.

In addition, it appears a great effort will be now toward interdiction. Frankly, I've found shoveling sand against the tide safer, and just as physically challenging.