by Vegetius
Download the full article: Needed: An Exorcism in Kandahar
It is said that President Obama is looking for a proof of concept for General McChrystal's proposed strategy in Afghanistan. Kandahar is probably is an excellent place to start. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal by Michael Phillips, NATO forces will soon attempt to retake Kandahar from the Taliban who are in de facto control of Afghanistan's second city.
Kandahar is critical on a number of levels. Most importantly, it is the heart of the Pashtu dominated portion of Afghanistan; the Pashtu led Taliban movement was born there. Second, Kandahar sits at a key crossroads on the ancient Silk Road between the west and Asia; it is strategically vital to control of Afghanistan. The Afghan government never lost Kandahar in a military sense, but the Taliban dominates its soul; its shadow government dispenses a rough form of governance and justice that competes favorably with the warlord dominated kleptocracy that pretends to run the city.
A few hundred American and Canadian trainers are allowed to be billeted in the city by the Taliban because they pose no real threat and chasing them out would bring unwanted attention to the cadres of the Taliban who are the real rulers of the city.
If the Phillips article is correct, the first phase of NATO plan for wresting control of the city from Taliban domination is sound. The coalition commander will attempt to isolate it and control all traffic in and out. This is a good strategy for laying siege to any city in conventional or irregular warfare. Where the plan breaks down is in its second phase.
Download the full article: Needed: An Exorcism in Kandahar
The author is a government employee who is a former infantryman.
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"...we will use the surge forces to build a ring around Kandahar".
On the face of it, I think this is the COIN equivalent to the infamous Maginot Line. Population control measures are PART of the solution; however, they are not THE solution.
Vegetius correctly states that the real battle is for the 'soul of Kandahar' and not the physical terrain of the city. The point that I thought was not sufficiently addressed in this essay is the importance of the 'narrative' in winning this battle. Using existing informal Afghan institutions vs western derrived Community Development Councils (which I wholesale agree with his view) is discussed. However, this is most likely not sufficient to gain the advantage and eventually win the narrative. I believe we need a couple dynamic Afghans who are credible with the populace and COMMITTED to 'leading' (appear to be leading anyway) the effort to supplant the criminal and enemy forces in this area. Note my emphasis on the word committed. This type of committment is built through a variety of means but it comes down to personal realtionships, trust, influence, and accountability.
The Anbar Awakening was successful because of the genuine support of a couple key credible Iraqi leaders in Ramadi and Fallujah. It was these leaders that conveyed the message and made the 'Awakening' viable for the Anbar populace. They committed to the point where no amount of backroom deals could be made to garauntee their safety if 'we' failed to win the battle for the soul of Anbar. Building this type of relationship with the right local leaders is truly an art and cannot be accomplished in one deployment. The success of 2007 in Anbar was the result of the treasure, blood, and sound COIN practiced in key areas during 2004-06.
Unfortunately, many confuse the 'Sons of Iraq' with the 'Anbar Awakening' and are missing the real lessons we should be taking from our success in Iraq.
The article posted by davidbfpo shows just how lame Gen McChrystal - and other western leaders - are in leading the narrative against the 'Taliban'. They have the same credibility with the Afghan populace that Vice President Cheney would have at a rally against Global Warming.
First, our words and deeds must match; second, these words and deeds must be successful; lastly, these words and deeds need to be actually believed by the local the populace. FWIW, putting an 18 month timeline on the surge placed an almost insurmountable obstacle to gaining the committment of the Afghan leaders we need to carry the day against the Taliban.
A slightly contrasting view after a visit by a UK journalist: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6736766/US-s…
Some comments based on a year of living in Kandahar City from 2007-2008:
Deploying coalition troops into Kandahar City for clear and hold operations is not a good idea. Such a deployment would greatly disrupt the life of Kandahar residents and provoke great antagonism. Nor do coalition troops have the requisite knowledge to effectively operate in Kandahar City. Finally, and most importantly, it is highly unlikely that the Afghan Government would permit such a deployment.
What ISAF should do is provide support to the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in order to enhance Afghan efforts to identify and neutralize the Taliban infrastructure in Kandahar City. NDS appears to have an effective counterintelligence capability, what is missing is cooperation with ISAF due to mistrust on both sides. ISAF needs to build a relationship of trust and confidence with NDS beginning with a partnership that has NDS in the lead. ISAF should establish a joint intelligence fusion center in Kandahar City, not KAF, to support NDS. The U.S. should get rid of NOFORN designations for intelligence disseminated in Afghanistan; a product is of limited utility if it cannot be shared with Afghan officials or our coalition allies. We also need to limit our urge to look for technological fixes and focus more on HUMINT.
In 2008 then Provincial Governor Assadullah Khalid and Provincial Council Speaker Ahmed Wali Karzai made it clear to everyone that the most important development priorities for Kandahar City were a city-wide potable water distribution system and increased electrical capacity (to decrease the gap between 13 MW availability and 60+ MW demand). For various reasons, the international donor community was not able to satisfy these requests. That they are now being addressed is a positive development. The international donor community still needs to get over its fixation with bureaucratic constructs such as Provincial Development Plans, Community Development Councils, District Development Assemblies, etc. What counts are results, not plans.
Although working with tribes seems to be the current fad, Kandahar City is not a particularly promising environment for such an approach. The only readily identifiable tribally distinct zones are a Barakzai enclave in Dand District on the southern outskirts of the city and the Alokozai zone that covers most of Arghandab District adjacent to the city on the north side. The rest of the city tends to be mixed and, as other commentators have pointed out, the Pashtun tribal identity does not readily lend itself to engagement a la Iraq. Tribal reconciliation has been attempted before, most notably in a series of grand Iftar (Ramadan-period) dinners in Kandahar City in 2008. After a promising start, this effort petered out in follow up meetings. Any restarting of this initiative is a role for Kandaharis, not ISAF.
The position of Governor of Kandahar has to be one of the most difficult in Afghanistan. Incumbents have included both Kandahari insiders and outsiders from other provinces, with neither formula achieving great success. My fix would be to abolish the position and replace it with a multi-member (3-5 persons) board representing the principal tribes and other interest groups. Alternatively, maybe Provincial Council Speaker Ahmed Wali Karzai should be appointed as governor and challenged to increase government efficiency and effectively represent all Kandaharis. Whatever the answer for more effective governance, it has to come from the Afghan Government, not from the international community.
I have a column on RT news and often write about Afghanistan. The subject of this region is very interesting and complicated. My response to the above article is in my latest article http://rt.com/About_Us/Blogs/With_words_we_govern_men___Disraeli.html
US, in order to win, needs MORE troops. Yes, more. Read the article and find out why I think so.