Download the full article: Developing Foreign Security Force Capabilities
Developing the capabilities and capacities of FSFs (foreign security forces) has become a significant tenet of U.S. strategic dialogue on how to safeguard its interests at home and abroad from terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, criminal organizations with global reach or third party states which sponsor non state organizations. The United States recognizes that the destabilization of, and security threats to other states and political bodies are relative to its own interests as they may involve mutual enemies, or give rise to conditions in which its enemies may find beneficial. As such the U.S. may promote a cooperative "venture" where interests are identified as beneficial to both the U.S. and another entity, but which may be limited in nature and may not signify and enduring partnership.
It is important to understand that these cooperative ventures may be pursued for different reasons to support different ends; ends which may not always align with the long term goals of the U.S., but may support limited cooperation. These mutual interests may not always be apparent while in the making, and may only come forward as objectives and conditions change; for example when another state or organizations realizes that its previous policies no longer promote, but may in fact inhibit or work against the realization of its own objectives. The term venture itself implies a certain level of existing risk where one's membership is based more on conditions than certainty and long term commitment.
Ventures that involve the provision of security may require the U.S. to support the development of the capabilities of foreign security forces of other venture members. This concept of developing capability and capacity assumes that, based on mutual interests, the capabilities developed in a FSF will be employed in such a manner that they will support member objectives in the venture. However, it should not assume that those capabilities will not be employed otherwise at the conclusion of the venture. Capabilities once they are developed may have a life that extends beyond the original purpose. Understanding the nature of the venture is important for its members as it defines how much equity and effort a given member may assume relative to the expectations of the outcomes.
Download the full article: Developing Foreign Security Force Capabilities
Major Rob Thornton is assigned to the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) as an Army FA 59 Strategic Plans and Policy officer. The opinions and thoughts expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of JCISFA. Major Thornton was a contributing writer to the recently published the JCISFA SFA (Security Force Assistance) Planner's Guide to FSF (Foreign Security Force) Force Development.
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Rob,
This was a good article that I hope is read and discussed by those involved in developing and operationalizing SFA plans as part of the larger strategy.
SFA includes developing a nations security forces to defend themselves against: (1) hostile states (such as we did over the years in Europe, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, etc.); (2) internal threats (lawlessness, insurgency, and subversion); (3) develop forces to participate in multi-national peace keeping efforts, etc.. My point is that SFA is normally a component of FID, but it is not restricted to FID. The cut and paste below from the JCISFA website clarifies the intent of developing SFA doctrine. It is not to replace existing doctrine.
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/jointtext.aspx
Historical Context and Contemporary Undestanding of SFA
"While doctrine is full of terms that are similar to SFA, these terms have been defined over the years to meet limited political purposes and not to support the personnel or units that must carry out the activity. There is no taxonomy here. All DOD terms were not defined by the same set of discriminators so they will not nest.
SFA was coined to fix this problem by including all the activities done to support FSF development yet avoiding a complete rewrite of existing doctrine. It does this by focusing on the developmental activity rather than tie the term to a single purpose like FID, a single funding source like SA, or a single agency like SC. Since operations often have multiple purposes, multiple sources of funding, and are conducted by more than one agency or nationality, it only makes sense to have one term for the same activity.
SFA then becomes a task or a capability that can be: paid for by multiple sources, done by multiple organizations, part of any type operation, for whatever purpose the U.S. intends it. The developmental activities are the same. The environment may change; the funding restrictions may vary, but preparing for and executing the developmental tasks is essentially the same."
However, as COL Dave Maxwell alludes to, you have to put SFA back into a context where it is a component of a much larger whole, which ideally would be a synchronized strategy. Outside of designated war zones the State Department is normally in the lead for developing this strategy, but they have a poor track record largely due to having a sufficient shortfall in human and financial resources. The Geographical Commandant Commands should and have stepped up and assisted the State Department by leading the interagency, and possibly multinational, planning effort in support of State. In a perfect world we would bring in the right experts who could "correctly" define the nature of the problem(s), which would allow us to focus on what actually needs to be done, and then we would develop a holistic plan in support of the host nation(s), and only if needed then plan to conduct SFA to achieve specific objectives identified during the planning process. SFA planning will not be accomplished effectively in one session of MDMP, but rather through numerous interactions with the host nation and interagency.
The critic in me comes out though because I believe the bulk of our SFA efforts have been largely ineffective and our military culture is resistant to self criticism, so we do not seriously explore the reasons why. If the efficacies of our SFA efforts are not comparable to our investment in dollars, time and manpower, then we have developed an ineffective strategy.
Once we transition this to the SWJ council we can discuss strategy and how SFA nests within that strategy in greater depth. Especially when were discussing transnational threats that form parasitic relationships with insurgencies, host nation governments, or criminal organizations and are not restricted to national boundaries. These threats are not 10 feet tall, most nations already have sufficient skill do defeat them if they had the intelligence and the material resources. We dont need to try to evolve them into mini-American military units or police units, where our doctrine is at best inappropriate for them, and at worst counterproductive. Many nations have defeated terrorist threats with organizations that we would deem to be substandard by U.S. standards, but the bottom line is that theyre good enough.
Libertariansoldier: Okay. I understand where you are coming from. We are kind of talking past each other. Per the article I posted we are already doubling security assistance funding. There is already a DoD role in Yemen. But I agree with you and I think you reinforce my point when you say "that doctrine service or joint doesn't make us the only game in town." There has to be a holistic approach using all the right tools from across our government (assuming of course we make the determination that it is US policy and in the US national interest to help a friend, partner, or ally in need in the first place). And, if we determine that we should help (as we apparently have based on open source reporting) then we need to bring the right tools to bear.
But in my opinion neither the military nor the title 50 guys are likely to be successful on their own acting unilaterally.
And lastly FID is not just about employing ODAs or SOF. Yes, it is a SOF core activity but it is not a SOF only or exclusive mission. I think the association of FID and SOF is what has led us to the perceived requirement for the development of SFA (as well as the desire to try to fix our complex and outdated and unresponsive security assistance process - but unfortunately only Congress can undo what it has legislated in that area!!). The doctrine has always been there from Joint FID doctrine to Low Intensity Conflict doctrine in the Army (FM 100-20). But we decided to create something new (without directing the deletion of the old) and now we have FID and SFA which I think is counter-productive. I was hoping the QDR might recommend fixing that but so far in the drafts reports I have read they have not chosen to explicitly do that (though they use SFA and not FID in the last draft I read - but they have made no recommendation on fixing redundant, overlapping and counterproductive terminology.)
Dave Maxwell,
When I wrote that it "may be that a case such as Yemen involves very little "classic" FID, per se", my point was it might be a case where the C/T component was not "interagency" at all. Instead of using some ODAs on long term rotation and section 12xx funding, an alternative might be strictly Title 50 funding and Sith Lords, and no one but the COM and the Dark Side knowing what is going on. No DOD participation, no execution of a military FID mission. On the other hand, the small maritime piece could be done by DOD in a "classic" FID fashion. The more general point being that our doctrine--joint or service--doesn't make us the only game in town.
Rob,
Excellent response. Thanks. I agree with you much of your overview response. One of the things I was trying to get at is that the process for strategy development and execution is complex. No doubt the strategy has to flow from National level. But it flows through multiple channels to get to the point of execution and in the case of Yemen execution of US strategy is at the US Country Team in Yemen. Yet the different bureaucratic chains cause for disconnects in development of support strategies and operational execution.
We have the state chain from the SECSTATE through the regional desks in DC to the Chief of Mission. We have like linkages for the other agencies - Justice to the LEGATT; and the others such as Treasury. We have the Security Assistance officers executing Title 22 foreign military sales; international military education and training; etc. and then we have the Joint military forces executing title 10 operations for the GCCs (and of course the military strategy comes from the national level to the GCC to the operational and tactical units that have to be deployed into country.
I mention the above tortured paragraph because we can have the best doctrine (I incorrectly used theory in my original post) but unless all of the above (and much more than I mentioned) is properly synchronized and orchestrated and everyone of these disparate agencies are marching to the beat of the same drummer we are not going to be able to develop and execute a coherent effective strategy. We cannot look at SFA in a vacuum. And of course before we can develop any strategy we have to understand the nature of the problem and what can and cannot/should not be done. (I do like the concept of design in the planning process though I dislike the term "design" but that is for another debate!!) When we talk about judging our strategy by the FAS test we have to judge the holistic strategy and not just the security component especially when in fact the left hand does not always know what the right hand is doing and we can work at cross purposes. The real issue for me is that SFA or whatever we are going to call operations to help our friends, partners, and allies, has to be in synch with a whole of government/interagency approach.
For Libertariansoldier: I am curious as to what "classic" FID is? Right now in existing Joint Military Doctrine FID is the only mission area that recognizes and calls for an inherently Joint military and interagency approach to aiding a friend, partner or ally. FID: "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." Sounds like this is what needs to be done in Yemen. This is an inherently joint and interagency approach to a problem(s) that hopefully we have identified - e.g., AQAP, the Huthis,Iranian influence, socio-economic problems, etc.
I mention all of this for two reasons. First, we have to understand the problem and get the strategy right and get synchronized, orchestrated execution. Second, we have spent a lot of time developing new terminology and concepts since 9-11. A lot of intellectual energy has going into, in my opinion, reinventing the wheel. And the debates between COIN and CT and the like are counter-productive. All these new terms have hamstrung us and actually short circuit the process of strategy development and operational execution.
If we note from Rob's paper and his response he describes what needs to be done and does not use a lot of new terminology (except for SFA and FSF) - every other acronym he uses is standard and has been around for a long time NCR, FAS, etc. He describes in detail what he thinks needs to be done (of course we should expect this from a strategist). We should take a lesson from that.
Good article and excellent answers. It may be that a case such as Yemen involves very little "classic" FID, per se. Perhaps building a C/T only capability (a small number of shooters, a larger number of supporters, and an even larger number of intel collectors/analysts) would better answer USG needs for increased Yemeni capability, along, perhaps, with some increased maritime interdiction capability--given Yemen's location. So, one or two ODA's on long term rotation, augmented with some HUMINT/collection management/analysis trainers, could possibly fit the bill, with some USN types to deal with the maritime piece.
Which I believe is Rob's larger point--the USG needs to sort out what results it wants, get an agreement with the HN on the way to achieve it, then tailor the SFA package to accomplish it, and then go to work.
COL M, here goes:
"What should the SFA strategy be and what the results be for the FAS test as applied to an SFA strategy for Yemen?"
I think it has got to be nested in the broader ends that are identified - what capabilities we support the development of in their (or anybodys) security forces has to be part of that - and that has to be reconciled against what Yemen will support development of. The article you put up tells you allot about the FAS prospects in conditions where both the means and will may require the one most interested in seeing their objectives achieved to accept the most risk. In my view conditions like these would be more of a cooperative venture, unless the conditions changed (I suppose they could) in which case their may be a requirement for more development than just the security forces. In such conditions, limited objectives with a small foot print that could maintain consistency over a long duration might be the best call. There might be compelling political reasons to do more, but there are consequences as well.
"Also, what I do not see addressed in your paper is who should be responsible for developing this strategy and who should be synchronizing all the stakeholders?"
I think the development of the any strategy is probably an evolutionary one that reconciles what is desired out of our NCR with what may be achievable by those tasked to implement / carry it out. Even the ends have either had to be made sufficiently broad and ambiguous as to support changes between what is and what is desired, or the ends have had to be reconsidered over time as the truth gets sorted out (sausage). While certain elements are directly responsible for given areas or their part of the resources (be it capability providers, or capability employers), the reality of the larger picture seems to require allot of work and dialogue between folks - some of this may be due to legal code, time, geography; some may be due to roles and responsibilities, some due to functional requirements (executive, generating and operating) and there are probably other reasons. Creating a framework where this can take place and with the minimum amount of friction and misunderstanding may be the best we can do.
"Given the challenges of Yemen that are beyond security assistance how is an SFA effort synchronized with the host nation's internal defense and development programs as well as the other US or foreign assistance to those development programs? Seems like SFA is a security forces only approach to the problem - e.g., as in a military/security component of a holistic Foreign Internal Defense effort."
Yes, SFA does only consider the development of FSF capabilities and capacities, but it should be done in the context of other developmental objectives since goal is to develop capabilities the legitimate political authority can and will sustain the generation and employment of. Depending on the scope of the capabilities to be developed, this may require complimentary development in other areas (political or economic). With respect to the synchronization of other lines of effort, I think that is something that should be done anywhere we are pursuing a political end since this gets at our effectiveness and by way of that effectiveness our efficiency and flexibility to pursue other ends. Ultimately that development has to be seen in the context of the reason we committed to developing those capabilities in the first place (and also in the context of whatever new ends have emerged as a result).
"Some specific questions - would you see an advisory role, a partnering role, or an embedding role in Yemen for US forces? How would you envision an Army Advisory Assistance Brigade or other Brigade Combat Team being employed to support a Yemen strategy? I would be curious to see how the emerging theories of SFA would be applied to a very real current situation."
I think it comes back to objectives and conditions as to what is possible and the best choice. It may be the environment supports one and not another - and that environment may change based on what is introduced into it. That does not mean the introduction of something that made one thing more possible or better than another may have been the best choice - just that as the conditions change so does what is possible. I think how a given element is employed should be subject to the capabilities that it there to support development of in the FSF. Allot of that may depend on the scale and perceived immediacy of the policy objective. While even an augmented BCT (and every type of unit) still has a limit to its capabilities and capacities there are probably other ways to employ it than just as a whole. How services and other force providers package their capabilities is something that is subject to more than just the operational requirement, however, there may be flexibility in how those packages are employed - if one is willing to accept the associated risk.
Im not sure there is any emerging theory specifically associated with SFA. I think no matter how we look at developing capabilities of someone else there is just hard work. We are not perfect at identifying our own requirements and developing then fielding the capabilities required to meet them. In our own processes we benefit some from rotating our own folks between the various function of generating and operating, and we benefit greatly from relative capacities that allow us to overcome capability gaps in the mean time. The only theory weve advocated in the new PG is not really specific to developing FSF capabilities, rather its a broader problem solving framework that weve adapted and I suspect has been used by many other folks - just maybe not depicted that way. The problem that will be hard for folks in a constrained timeline to accept though I think is that in order to get someone else to take on sustaining a capability youve supported development of, there has to be something in it for them - its got to support the political purpose to which the legitimate authority is going to employ that capability. If the person/organization/government cannot reconcile that, it probably will not pass the FAS test.
Whatever the current and future identified ends wrt Yemen are, I suspect CENTCOM and the USG will have to account for a broader approach than just developing its security forces. My thoughts in writing the article were to start a discussion about not only where and when developing FSF capabilities might be desired or appropriate in support of an end, but to think some about why. The development of capabilities and capacities needs to be placed in the context of U.S. ends and scrutinized with the FAS test each time its considered as a way (or as a component "way") to achieve some objective. Even when done on a more limited (and sustainable) scale it has been subject to constraints and limitations. When done on a broader scale, there is a significant amount of risk and commitment required (however, doing so may be a requirement depending on the ends we desire and the ways weve constrained ourselves to) - if chosen, policy makers, leaders and planners should have some idea of the pitfalls and challenges associated with trying to develop capabilities in somebody else.
Best and Happy New Year, Rob
Rob,
Nice paper. I would be interested in seeing an SFA strategy applied to Yemen given the following article and the current situation in Yemen. What should the SFA strategy be and what the results be for the FAS test as applied to an SFA strategy for Yemen?
Also, what I do not see addressed in your paper is who should be responsible for developing this strategy and who should be synchronizing all the stakeholders?
Given the challenges of Yemen that are beyond security assistance how is an SFA effort synchronized with the host nation's internal defense and development programs as well as the other US or foreign assistance to those development programs? Seems like SFA is a security forces only approach to the problem - e.g., as in a military/security component of a holistic Foreign Internal Defense effort.
Some specific questions - would you see an advisory role, a partnering role, or an embedding role in Yemen for US forces? How would you envision an Army Advisory Assistance Brigade or other Brigade Combat Team being employed to support a Yemen strategy? I would be curious to see how the emerging theories of SFA would be applied to a very real current situation.
U.S. to double security assistance to Yemen. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6000US20100101
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - A U.S. military commander said on Friday the United States will more than double its nearly $70 million security assistance program for Yemen, where a crackdown is underway on al Qaeda militants believed to be behind a failed plot to blow up a U.S. airliner.
World
U.S. officials have said they were looking at ways to expand military and intelligence cooperation with Yemen, the Arab world's poorest state, to root out al Qaeda leadership in the country.
"We have, it's well known, about $70 million in security assistance last year. That will more than double this coming year," General David Petraeus, the head of the U.S. Central Command, said at a news conference in Baghdad.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the attempted Christmas Day bombing of a Northwest Airlines plane as it approached Detroit with nearly 300 people on board.
Washington has sharply increased training, intelligence and military equipment provided to Yemeni forces, helping them carry out air raids against suspected al Qaeda hideouts last month.
The Pentagon's main publicly disclosed counter-terrorism program for Yemen grew from $4.6 million in fiscal 2006 to $67 million in fiscal 2009. That figure does not include covert, classified assistance that the United States has provided.
Petraeus noted the Yemeni government's efforts against al Qaeda and said the United States had enabled them through the security assistance program.
"Indeed there has been sharing of intelligence and information and so forth," he said. "(It's a) two-way street because the intelligence sources of Yemen are very, very good."
Petraeus said one of the operations carried out in December forestalled an attack of four suicide bombers on Sanaa, Yemen's capital, and others targeted militant training camps and senior militant leaders who were "believed to have been killed or seriously injured."
Yemen, which borders Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest oil exporter, is battling a Shi'ite rebellion in the north and separatist sentiment in the south. The United States fears al Qaeda is exploiting the country's instability to turn it into a launch pad for attacks.
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown on Friday called an international meeting in London on January 28 to discuss Yemen.
It is great to think about short and long term security force capabilities that have joint ventures with other foreign forces. However, if we are thinking about Muslim extremists like El qaada, we have to acknowledge that the key is with Israel. if Israel agree and help with a true lasting peace with the Palestinians and we have to equal states live in peace side by side,we can defeat the ideological and religious groups who are anti US and Israel. so we can spend billions of dollars and tens of years along with thousands of American soldiers, we will still help the growth and evolution of terrorist groups that attacks American interests every where. so I guess military thinking is great for business and only business.
Developing an SFA strategy begins (IMHO) with the NSS. Several recent national strategic documents have touched on the issue, but it is time to be much more specific. At the theater level, each geo Theater Campaign Plan should reflect SFA requirements based on the GEF guidance.
This really isn't "rocket surgery", and we came pretty close in the past to developing some coherency, but fragmentation always won out in the end. In the theater where I used to operate, there was chronic lack of internal cooperation: The security assistance guys didn't want to work with with the policy and plans folks, and TSOC was nowhere to be found. Hopefully the new planning rquirements outlined in the GEF will help overcome some of the issues. (That and a little adult leadership).