On the night of December 1, shortly after Barack Obama announced plans to send 30,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan, retired Lt. Colonel John Nagl appeared on MSNBC's "The Rachel Maddow Show." Maddow was dismayed by Obama's new plan, which she called "massive escalation," but, when she introduced Nagl, a counterinsurgency expert who has long called for a greater U.S. commitment to Afghanistan--even if it means raising taxes and expanding the military--she was surprisingly friendly. And, after Nagl spent the segment praising Obama's plan, which he said would throw back the Taliban and enable more civil and economic development, Maddow may have remained skeptical--but she was also admiring. "It's a real pleasure to have you on the show, John," she said.
Had someone like Bill Kristol given that same assessment of Obama's speech, Maddow might have tarred him as a bloodthirsty proponent of endless war. Which is why Nagl is one of the administration's most important allies as it tries to sell the United States on a renewed commitment to Afghanistan. A former tank commander in Iraq and co-author of the Army's landmark 2006 counterinsurgency manual, Nagl has become a fixture on television and in news articles about Afghanistan; he's even made an appearance on "The Daily Show." With the authority of a man who has worn a uniform in combat, and the intellectual heft of a Rhodes Scholar, he has helped to persuade many liberals that pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan is the only viable path to success...
Much more at The New Republic.
Comments
Let me propose two answers to my own question:
"... what new factor requires the United States to act so differently today?"
1. The New Factor: Learning: The United States wishes to learn from the mistakes that it made during the Cold War -- which allowed certain gains by the enemy -- and take appropriate action to preclude the recurrence of these losses in our current and future conflicts. Lacking a great power enemy -- today and for the near term -- the United State has the luxury (and, due to Al Qaeda, the incentive) to be make and implement these new changes now; so as to better deal with current and future large, small and hybrid war problems.
2. The New Factor: A New Requirement and a New Initiative: During the Cold War, the United States was acting in a "defensive" mode (to contain communism). Since the end of the Cold War, however, the United States, inspired by its success and motivated by the need re-configure the world -- such that it might better accommodate the successful transition of the former communist great powers (to a market-economy) -- has determined that it must go on "offense" in order to do this. It is believed that this new initiative will require a somewhat new and different force structure (more irregular warfare/COIN/whole-of-govt capabilities); these, so as to better be able to "transform whole societies" and deal more effectively with the resistance that has and will come with this new American foreign policy focus.
Bill -- You may be proving Ken's point: despite the success of several of these insurgencies and/or U.S. apathy towards some, it had little effect on the overall struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. (One could even suggest that the places where the superpowers were goaded into a counterinsurgency response -- Afghanistan for the Soviets, Vietnam for the U.S. -- to what seemed like proxy encroachment by their rival marked the most significant geopolitical setbacks for those states.)
Ken White:
I was (poorly) referring to the global insurgencies associated with the Comintern; (wherein, this entity sponsored and supported local revolutions and insurgencies throughout the world before and during the Cold War).
(Me, taking this thought from your earlier reference to the Comintern seen at your comment at Jan 6, 2010PM above.)
<b>Bill C:</b>
Hmmm. I served throughout the entire Cold War from 1948 to 1995, military and civilian. Somehow, I missed that large, etc. insurgency.
I totally agree with your premise, the force structure does not require a lot of tinkering outside of smarter equipment purchases but I'm unsure how you got there with the large etc. insurgency reference that I apparently slept through...
For consideration:
During the Cold War, the United States arguably faced the largest, most potent, most dangerous, best led, best organized and best resourced insurgency threat the world has ever seen -- or is ever likely to see(.)(?)
Yet (none)(few) of the significant force changes we see being considered and taking form today were considered necessary and implemented at that time(.)(?)
With (no)(little) adverse result(.)(?)
If the above is true, then what new factor requires that the United States to act so differently today?
<b>Gulliver:</b>
I know and I'm a fan -- I applauded the idea when it was announced. My concerns are three and I've stated all before:
- The desired experience and grades are going to be difficult to produce.
- The GPF can do COIN. However, they will not ever do it really well nor should they be able to do so.
- Any capability that exists will seek to be used -- even if it should not be...
We'll see. In any event this plan is the best of several bad ones -- and I say that as a once upon a time 508 PIR person ;) .
Ken -- <em>However I believe that while essentially smarter than many options it really does not address the long term problem. That is; Should we, can we, do this stability thing often? With 'can we' being perhaps more important than 'should we'...</em>
Interestingly, I think the SFA concept is designed -- at least in the long term -- to help avoid the sort of "massive interventions" that you later decry. It's not just for the current fight, but for Phase 0 security cooperation around the world (or what we're now calling "Building Partner Capacity").
<b>Surferbeetle:</b><blockquote>A comparison of the solution developed in the 60's, which you reference, with today's COIN TTP's would be helpful...<i>"We confronted the issue in the early 60s and we solved it then. The fact that the solution later was abandoned due to overcommitment of the force by policymakers does not negate the fact that orienting the light forces to the lower end of the spectrum and the heavy forces to the upper end worked quite well."</i></blockquote>You asked for a comparison of 60s solutions and today's TTP. The TTP in the 60s were essentially similar to today's with the obvious exceptions for equipment changes. Very little difference there.
What is different and the issue I was referring to in that quoted italicised comment is what I said in the full paragraph from which you extracted the item you quoted:
""<i>Both COIN theory and "we only do the nation's big wars" are fallacious concepts that are dangerously short sighted. We have to be able to do both and I don't think anyone commenting here disputes that fact. <b>What's disputed is who does what. We confronted the issue in the early 60s and we solved it then</b>. The fact that the solution later was abandoned due to overcommitment of the force by policymakers does not negate the fact that orienting the light forces to the lower end of the spectrum and the heavy forces to the upper end worked quite well.</i>(emphasis added /kw)""
The issue we confronted was 'who does what' and the solution was that light units (read all of XVIII Abn Corps, 24 ID, 82 and 101 Abn Divs) trained for all combat scenarios but accorded over 50% of their training time to counterinsurgency with <u>some limited</u> area and cultural specialization (24 Africa, 82 South America), 101 Asia while the heavy units, III, V and VII Corps focused on MCO with a European orientation. PACOM owned the 25th ID and it was tabbed to Asia. The 1 ID and 1 Cav, IIRC, were swing units who trained for MCO but with knowledge they could be assigned most anywhere in a reinforcing role.
What then occurred was commitment to Viet Nam and the initially committed Army units, 1st Cav, 1 ID, 25th ID, 1/101 and 173d Abn Bdes were fairly adept at counterinsurgency and were able to do the mission quite well -- until the MACV staff, heavily populated with European focused Field Grades and GOs changed the rules and went in for massive, unproductive sweeps. Then the one year individual tour and 'infusion' hit and units were destroyed by the personnel system that was supposed to be supporting them.
The moral of that story is that poor personnel practices can destroy even good planning.<blockquote>In summary, for me, the lessons of OIF and OEF are that full spectrum capabilities were not appropriately resourced going into the fight...</blockquote>The lessons I take are quite different. They are that a lack of decent intelligence led to extremely poor decisions at the US national level (and the Armed forces were a part of those decisions); that lack of doctrine and training for full spectrum operations created several vacuums that had significant adverse impacts and that a workable strategic ploy was <i>almost</i> negated by said lacks and errors. Only hard work by the Troops in spite of the Generals (all too often...) pulled it out.<blockquote>...and that the current USG structure pins the rose for executing the bulk of COIN warfare on DoD</blockquote>That may be true -- the question is not whether that is true -- it is; or whether it is achievable -- it is; the question rather should be is that the best way to do it -- I suggest it is not, YMMV. A further question is should we look forward to or seek 'COIN' operations...<blockquote>...thus the current (needed) experiments with COIN structures - MTT's ETT's, AAB's, etc. and Conventional structures DIV or BCT (this seems settled on BCT but recall I went in with a DIV in OIF1). Perhaps we are indeed going were no man has gone before...but haven't we successfully blazed trails more times than not?</blockquote>I agree the current experiments are needed, I further agree that DoD will likely pick up the tab for COIN operations at least in the near term. Where you and I differ is in the need for such operations. My observation is that most can be <u>easily</u> avoided -- and they should be.
Yep, we have indeed blazed trails in spite of the many who want to cling to rice bowls and place the institution ahead of the national interest.
<b>Gulliver:</b><blockquote>As many here know, the Army already has a concept for building modular brigades augmented for security force assistance...This is sort of off topic, but I wanted to clarify.</blockquote>Not off topic at all and as I for one knew. However I believe that while essentially smarter than many options it really does not address the long term problem. That is; Should we, can we, do this stability thing often? With 'can we' being perhaps more important than 'should we'...<br><br>
<b>Carl Prine:</b><blockquote>...how anyone can take early doctrinal or historical versions about Malaya seriously without mentioning Chin Peng's memoirs is beyond me.</blockquote>It's not that difficult. What Chin said is material to the issues of Malaya and that insurgency. However, what he said or believed is pretty irrelevant to the outcome of that insurgency. The broader lesson is germane militarily and policy wise, that more narrow focus is of real interest only to the anthropologists and social scientists. That is not a dismissive comment, merely one that reflects the harsh reality that is international politics and policy. Cultural issues and even history, regrettably, get little traction.<br><br>
<b>Bill C:</b><blockquote>With the massive disruptions that have already been caused -- and which will continue to be caused -- by the new world order, the United States and its allies must, indeed, learn to focus on teaching other nations how to better take care of themselves.</blockquote>Most of those disruptive items you cite have been with us in broadly similar form for many years. The importance or impact of one or another of them varies from time to time and from place to place but essentially, there is nothing really new.
In fact, I suggest that most difficulties and conflicts today are occurring in former Colonies where the British and French drew arbitrary lines on the map -- fault lines, those; along which the Comintern and its successors, heirs and assigns played disruptive games from the 1920s until the 1980s.
The US and its allies have not done at all well in "teaching other nations how to better take care of themselves." Certainly not since 1947 when I started paying attention to our penchant for doing that. Perhaps the alternative of not interfering in other nations might be better pursued. At the very least, and alternative to massive interventions should be pursued.
David, et. al:
Addendum:
As noted above, in the 21st Century:
a. The new world order (China, Russia and India come over to the market-economy side) results in
b. The new conflict scenerio, to wit:
(1) Those individuals, groups, nations and enterprises that are able to adapt or who otherwise seek to accommodate the new world order
-- versus --
(2) Those similar entities who are unable to adapt and/or who otherwise resist the requirements and demands of the new world order.
(With a third category being those who are not yet committed one way or the other.)
If one looks closely enough, one can discern that nearly all difficulties and conflict today -- whether of the realm of domestic or in the arena of international affairs -- can be traced, in one way or another, to this new world order/new conflict scenerio paradigm.
(Examples: Labor problems, economic problems, jobs problems, infastructure problems, resource problems, ethnic problems, religious problems, "lawlessness, subversions and insurgencies," civil wars [what tribe or other political group will control and, thereby, profit from the allocation of now much more scarce resources and now much more available and abundant development funds and aid]).
With the massive disruptions that have already been caused -- and which will continue to be caused -- by the new world order, the United States and its allies must, indeed, learn to focus on teaching other nations how to better take care of themselves.
Carl proposes this important angle of analysis about the effectiveness of Coin operations. He asks:
"What would be interesting would be an analysis about population-centric COIN that actually listened a bit to the target populations, perhaps even asking what they perceived before, during and after the occupation -- not to mention testimonies culled from the memories of the insurgents."
Anybody wanting to get a sense of the effects of Coin operations by a foreign occupying army from the angle of the insurgent and the local population ought to consider reading this recent and hugely important scholarly work:
David Elliot's "The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975" vols 1 and 2. It is based on Vietnamese primary documents and the scholar David Elliot reads the language and has done the research in Vietnamese sources.
"A greater preparation and familiarity with COIN at that point would, in my mind, have had a great difference on subsequent events."
Only if we make the assumption that we're right about the causative forces that created the many insurgencies and how these forces were mitigated or addressed by dominant US power and suasion.
Some might suggest that the US might have been the strongest tribe in the fight, but it wasn't our fight that broke the will of the Sunni Arab militias and their supporters.
Quite possibly, future historians reading the Iraqi literature, talking to Iraqi people and reconciling all of this with Syrian, Iranian and other perspectives might come to quite different conclusions than what has been manufactured as a dominant narrative.
I don't believe that "in my mind" is a data point, or, at least, one of great importance. What would be interesting would be an analysis about population-centric COIN that actually listened a bit to the target populations, perhaps even asking what they perceived before, during and after the occupation -- not to mention testimonies culled from the memories of the insurgents.
This has greatly broadened our understanding of Malaya, Vietnam and other conflicts so that earlier narratives about these wars, often taken directly from the pages of counter-revolutionary officers' memoirs, seem a bit dubious today.
For example, how anyone can take early doctrinal or historical versions about Malaya seriously without mentioning Chin Peng's memoirs is beyond me.
<em>I also suggest your math re: the AC Advise and Assist Bns is correct but the personnel aspect is terribly flawed. The number of E1-E5 and O1-O2 in those BCTs vastly outnumbers the quantity of those grades in any kind of Adivsory element. Yes, I understand the current process but I'm unsure that's where you're headed with the ARNG units...</em>
As many here know, the Army already has a concept for building modular brigades augmented for security force assistance. It's being done at the brigade level, not battalion, and the shortage of field grades necessary for the advisory mission is being made up through the augmentee package. These brigades are not purpose-build and permanently tailored for security cooperation -- that idea has been rejected at the four-star level -- but are augmented during the ARFORGEN cycle for a nine-month SFA tour.
This is sort of off topic, but I wanted to clarify.
<b>Surferbeetle:</b>
I'm with you until this:<blockquote>Perhaps we can agree that GPF can/should do most work and SOF should be (mostly) applied to niche or specialty work. "</blockquote>I'm unclear on your intent. If you apply that to mid or high intensity conflict to include so-called hybrid warfare, then I agree. If you apply it to include SFA and FID or Stability Operations then I do not agree. In my view those should be generally avoided and commitment of the GPF to them should be diligently avoided. That is not to say it cannot and will not occur, just that it should be a choice of last resort. I also suggest that if the so-called capability to do those interventions is increased, we will, by default, be forced into some that will not be advantageous for the US.<blockquote>"I am probably pushing my luck by referencing this eBook by Frederick Winslow Taylor ( http://books.google.com/books?id=Am4I-N4XN2QC ) but I am curious if this is where you see the beginnings of task/condition/standard originating?</blockquote>Yes. the Army hired a slew of Civilian Educators post Viet Nam and got sold Taylor's methodology which worked okay for the training of civilian Assembly line workers but failed miserably at training Soldiers and Officers. A number of us then military types in TRADOC tried to stop the move but were unsuccessful as a TRADOC DAC got the ear of the Deputy CG IIRC. The only reason we're as well trained as we are today is tha most went the extra mile and ignored the flaws in the TCS process.<blockquote> Where does the the theory/practice of outcome based training come from?</blockquote>Google has tons of info. However, for Army purposes the folks in ArSOF realized that the task condition and standard model was deeply flawed due to the allied facts that tasks vary widely (e.g. Desert Storm vs. OIF 1), that conditions vary even more widely (e.e those same two operations plus 'Clear a building' NYC? Iraq? Gramercy Hall? a mud hut?) and that the major flaw was that the process produced people who could do discrete tasks well but were unable to integrate them to reach successful conclusion of or in an evolution (see the same two operations, plus meld 'Navigate using a map' and 'Replacing a thrown track' -- one done poorly (or poorly trained...) will lead to the other). The ArSOF guys adapted outcome based training for themselves and later, through the AWG, migrated that to the rest of the Army. Thankfully.<blockquote> Can these two types of methods really be separated in the process of training/educating the full spectrum soldiers we need?</blockquote>They can be but probably won't be and that's okay, there was and is a need to define the tasks that contribute to 'outcomes.' Thus we'll end up with a meld and will essentially, be doing what most Army training did from 1945-1975, it's just that no one hung those names on it. Back then there were Army Subject Schedules (T,C,S) and Army Training Programs (OBT) and Army Training Tests (ARTEP, the 'E' in OBTE, evaluation). We train better today than we ever have but there's still much, much room for improvement.<blockquote>...we seem to disagree when I say that today's resourcing realities mean that DoD has to be staffed/resourced to pick up the resulting slack and this means more SOF (SF, SEALs, PJ's, CA, CAG, PSYOP, etc)... </blockquote>Indeed we do disagree. I strongly believe that what's needed is better, not necessarily more SOF -- I know that the pool of capable people for that job is quite finite and I know there are people there now who probably should not be there. I believe that SOCOM needs some CA and PSYOPS types but I also believe that most CA and PSYOPS elements should be in the Army or the Marines, the GPF. IOW, I do not think either of those elements are SOF -- and I suggest that is part of the problem. One <i>should</i> wonder what might have happened in OIF1 had there not been a SOCOM that wanted nothing to do with 'Big Army' -- who returned the favor. I contend both sides lost something...
I will answer, later, your request for a 60s - today comparison and your final paragraph. However, now I have to leave the computer and will not return until later tonight.
<b>Cole:</b>
US Army warfighting has always been ad-hoc. The ARFORGEN process may be the way it is now done -- but how much of that 'process' exists to justify FORSCOM (a Command that never needed to exist and contributes little -- trust me, I've been there...). My prediction is that such bureaucratic processes may continue for a while but we will soon not be able to afford the waste.
Think tanks and COINdinistas are a part of that bureaucracy and none of them are much help but they do 'justify' their own existence by providing 'advice' -- the majority of which is nonsensical.
Spare me the math -- all those numbers will change at two to five year intervals as the leadership at DA changes. The penchant for not being willing to change and adapt -- distaste for ad-hocery -- is a contributor to the bureaucratic mindset. That really needs to disappear.
I also suggest your math re: the AC Advise and Assist Bns is correct but the personnel aspect is terribly flawed. The number of E1-E5 and O1-O2 in those BCTs vastly outnumbers the quantity of those grades in any kind of Adivsory element. Yes, I understand the current process but I'm unsure that's where you're headed with the ARNG units...
I would prefer to go to war with 42 combat focused BCT. I would also prefer -- and the Nation should prefer to avoid to the extent possible going into any stability operations. In the US, if the Army has a capability, it is guaranteed to be used, even if it is not in our interest. IOW, to plan for such operations is certain to cause them to occur. That's just dumb.
Spare me also on the subject of MRAP. Those are overpriced, over Armored wastes of taxpayer money foisted on the Armed Forces by an ignorant media and a venal congress. To discuss using them in a civilian support or disaster situation is, I believe, unwise. To use them for transport of patrols is equally unwise. In both cases on psychological grounds applicable to both the local civilian populations and the Troops who are in a debilitating cocoon and due to expense, mobility and other capabilities issues.
We are unlikely to agree on any of that and that's fine.
David Maxwell: I argee. Recognizing the problem of the 21st Century is the first step in understanding how to proceed.
This problem is (1) the rise/resurgence of the now market-economy-based/nuclear-armed great powers of China, Russia and India and (2) the understanding that the entire rest of the world (to include the USA and the "bad guys") is trying to adapt; so as to better be able to deal with the massive difficulties this tectonic change is bringing to the world stage.
Herein, one finds an understanding of both of our recent conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan).
a. In Iraq, our invasion was all about our trying to act proactively to change the Middle East; such that it might better accommodate this new world order (described at the second paragraph above).
b. In Afghanistan, likewise, the conflict is all about trying to act proactively to change the Middle East/Muslim World. In this instance, however, it is Al Qaeda who acts (9/11, et. al.); not to better accommodate the new world order but, rather, to better resist it.
Thus, the new conflict scenerio of the 21st Century: (1) those who would seek to accommodate the new world order (at least initially), (2) those who would seek to resist it and (3) those nations/groups/individuals who, at present, are not yet capable or committed.
And, thus, an acknowledgement that we must move from dealing -- directly, ourselves -- with the masive problems this new world order and new conflict scenerio provides (as you noted at your comment above) and, instead, move to help other nations be able to, themselves, deal with these problems.
Ken,
It's my observation that different types of warfare are effective only as a function of METT-TC (to include Conventional and COIN warfare). So let's try and narrow that broad path a bit for as noted by some, descriptions of COIN warfare are 'broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces.'
Dave Maxwell is correct about emphasizing the importance of resouring strategy & campaign planning for war and Schmedlap is providing an excellent discussion as to how war plans do not survive first contact - with the result that soldiers must always be prepared (and resourced) to adapt.
We also agree about the need for careful deliberation prior to committing our forces, and that Desert Storm is an example of successful conventional operation structured for the given situation at that time and place (METT-TC).
<blockquote><i>"The conclusion I draw from all those operations is that they are expensive, tedious, constraining and generally do not provide satisfactory results and they should therefore be avoided if possible. Desert Storm is of course the exception -- I wonder why that is..."</i></blockquote>
We both seem to be proponents of structuring and resourcing the force for full spectrum operations. My interpretation is that it's because we both recognize that although the nature of war is constant (man's inhumanity to man), warfare (TTP's) constantly changes. I would also state that not everybody contributing to this thread agrees with/understands the need for structuring the force for full spectrum operations.
<blockquote><i>"Both COIN theory and "we only do the nation's big wars" are fallacious concepts that are dangerously short sighted. We have to be able to do both and I don't think anyone commenting here disputes that fact."</i></blockquote>
Perhaps we can agree that GPF can/should do most work and SOF should be (mostly) applied to niche or specialty work. I am probably pushing my luck by referencing this eBook by Frederick Winslow Taylor ( http://books.google.com/books?id=Am4I-N4XN2QC ) but I am curious if this is where you see the beginnings of task/condition/standard originating? Where does the the theory/practice of outcome based training come from? Can these two types of methods really be separated in the process of training/educating the full spectrum soldiers we need?
Going further, we have previously agreed upon the need for USG OGA's (DoS, DoJ, etc) to be resourced robust expeditionary specialty work outside of DoD's core competencies...we seem to disagree when I say that today's resourcing realities mean that DoD has to be staffed/resourced to pick up the resulting slack and this means more SOF (SF, SEALs, PJ's, CA, CAG, PSYOP, etc) Thus...
<blockquote><i>"What's disputed is who does what."</i></blockquote>
A comparison of the solution developed in the 60's, which you reference, with today's COIN TTP's would be helpful... warning...elephant analogy...keep in mind those were the early days for some of us, so a long memory is a necessity ;) - groan
<blockquote><i>"We confronted the issue in the early 60s and we solved it then. The fact that the solution later was abandoned due to overcommitment of the force by policymakers does not negate the fact that orienting the light forces to the lower end of the spectrum and the heavy forces to the upper end worked quite well."</i></blockquote>
In summary, for me, the lessons of OIF and OEF are that full spectrum capabilities were not appropriately resourced going into the fight and that the current USG structure pins the rose for executing the bulk of COIN warfare on DoD...thus the current (needed) experiments with COIN structures - MTT's ETT's, AAB's, etc. and Conventional structures DIV or BCT (this seems settled on BCT but recall I went in with a DIV in OIF1). Perhaps we are indeed going were no man has gone before...but haven't we successfully blazed trails more times than not?
Ken,
As far as I know there is no intent for future Army warfighting to be "ad hoc" at all. Just as you once were part of an airborne ready brigade, the ARFORGEN process will have many BCTs prepared to deploy at any given time. Active and National Guard Advise and Assist Battalions would be part of that ARFORGEN rotation.
The difference is, think-tank COINistas like Dr. Krepenivich would have 15 active Security and Cooperation BCTs with 3500 troops in each depriving our nation of 15 active warfighting BCTs. Five of those SCBCTs would be prepared at any time to deploy. That would leave just four active HBCTs, two Stryker BCTs, and two or three active IBCTs ready as well...8 or 9 warfighting BCTs.
Conversely, with Advise and Assist Battalions, you would have 14 such battalions prepared to deploy or about 5,600 dedicated COIN Soldiers to augment 14 warfighting BCTs. Would you prefer to go to war with just 8 or 9 warfighting BCTs or 14? Forty-two active BCTs each requiring 400 Advise and Assist personnel would require just 16,800 active and guard troops dedicated to COIN and stability/civil support operations.
Thus, foregoing just 3 active warfighting BCTs (42 instead of 45) would pay 10,500 of the Advise and Assist active duty Soldier bill for 26 active duty Advise and Assist Battalions. Sixteen National Guard Advise and Assist Battalions supporting active warfighting BCTs might cover the remaining force structure bill.
Envision columns of National Guard MRAPs driving down flooded streets rescuing stranded civilians off roof tops and bringing supplies to high ground and refugee centers? If a nuclear device goes off in a major city, suspect that the sight of MRAPs would be the last thing panicking civilians. But armor and height away from fallout are keys to surviving radiation dangers.
Picture an Advise and Assist Battalion with its 90 MRAP and 30 M-ATVs. The BCT it was task-organized to would deploy initially with an air-deployed company team with tanks, Bradleys, and M-ATV from its CONUS location to link up with prepositioned MRAP/M-ATV flown in if necessary from Diego Garcia. Most BCT equipment would sea deploy, but Joint High Speed Vessels would also speed that process from nearby forward deployed bases.
Once primarily sea-deployed to theater, the BCT commander might form 3 battalion task forces (TF):
- one TF with 30 MRAPs in one company and 30 M-ATV in another company, plus a tank company, and mech company
- one TF with two mech companies, a tank company, and a MRAP company with 30 MRAP
- one TF with two tank companies, a mech company, and a M-ATV company
Now you have a warfighting BCT capable of full spectrum operations to apply efforts to simultaneous offense, defense, and stability operations with the latter including civil-military and other COIN and community-building pursuits. The field grade specialists in the Advise and Assist Battalion would be split between the three TFs as well to allow young lieutenants and company commanders to concentrate on patrolling, securing the population, and interacting.
The MRAPs and M-ATVs would get troops safely to dismounted patrolling locations to allow coverage of a broader AO. Tanks and Bradleys would eventually support static COP and OP strongpoints to conserve fuel and exploit long-range sensors.
<b>Gulliver:</b><blockquote>"Shaping operations like "detain a financier" simply have not been a part of our understanding of combat operations, historically speaking. (Conducting area reconaissance is obviously a different story.)"</blockquote>Not true. It probably was true for most units in the post-1975 until 2005 Army which dumbed down training to the lowest common denominator but it was not true in the Marines or the Army in the 50s and 60s.
Speak to the senior leaders of that time period about the shortfalls in doctrine and training -- which a few units transcended.
<b>Cole:</b><blockquote>Advise and Assist Brigades or proposed battalions do not happen on an ad hoc basis...</blockquote>Why not? we do ad-hoc quite well; it's the pro forma stuff the bureaucracy screws up.<blockquote>"MRAPs and M-ATVs will be paid for already and Sec of Defense Gates has made it clear he wants them integrated into the future Army. Such vehicles are ideal for National Guard units to use in disaster assistance whether natural floods or man-made terrorism (civil support).</blockquote>The MRAP is a sorry answer to a non-problem precipitated by a venal Congress and accepted by armed forces that had not though of a better idea -- that bureaucracy and pro forma stuff again. You want ad-hoc MRAPs; your prerogative but IMO they're overly expensive, unmaneuverable, armored boxes that breed tactically bad habits. I can see them on disaster response; way to put fear into those your trying to help...<blockquote>National Guard troops are also ideal for COIN and Stability Operations because their daily jobs often prepare them.</blockquote>We can agree on that. I suspect we disagree on the validity of 'stability operations' as a methodolgy. To me, they are something to be diligently avoided. Mayhap you can name one that worked; I can think of none.<blockquote>So if we know that 45 active BCTs is about it,... The alternative is excessive dilution of active and guard combat arms units to form new Security Cooperation BCTs.</blockquote>Why? Why is that "<u>the</u> alternative?" I can think of half a dozen others, all cheaper and better use of manpower and avoiding overpriced, overarmored marginally mobile vehicles of limited use and creating units which have only one function that may or may not be useful.
Schmedlap: "institutional/organizational change"
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Advise and Assist Brigades or proposed battalions do not happen on an ad hoc basis. MRAPs and M-ATVs will be paid for already and Sec of Defense Gates has made it clear he wants them integrated into the future Army. Such vehicles are ideal for National Guard units to use in disaster assistance whether natural floods or man-made terrorism (civil support). National Guard troops are also ideal for COIN and Stability Operations because their daily jobs often prepare them.
So if we know that 45 active BCTs is about it, wouldn't you prefer a skeletal 400-man Advise and Assist Battalion with 120 National Guard and Active MRAPs/M-ATVs with skeletal 2-man crews and an HHC filled with field grades civil-military types? The alternative is excessive dilution of active and guard combat arms units to form new Security Cooperation BCTs.
Schmedlap admitted:
"Most of us took the initiative to do much more - not because of any training, but because of common sense and a determination to make things work in spite of the obvious lack of planning and resources. Those things included reopening schools and providing security for them; targeting gangs that were sprouting up everywhere that ran kidnapping and extortion rings; and setting up elected neighborhood councils to mediate disputes, organize neighborhood security watches, and provide POCs to provide us with info/intel."
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Common sense is not always common. Planned resources applied to an OPLAN remove the option to lack common sense.:)
Would guess you probably lacked sufficient personnel to complete all tasks just described all the time. Furthermore, you were probably doing it from a FOB which meant greater mounted vulnerability to get to your AO as well as less constant surveillance and presence.
You didn't have MRAPs or M-ATVs. That meant needless exposure of your troops to HMMWV injury and/or loss of high dollar tracked armored assets perceived as more threatening and an occupation force. Using such tracks forced lots of PFC Younguns to risk life and limb bringing you lots of fuel for your 2 mpg Bradley and 2 gallon per mile M1A2.
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Schmedlap continued:
"Most such initiatives fell flat because we were shipped to a different AO halfway through the process or because there was simply no money available to pay teachers, security grounds, caretakers, no resources to push medical supplies to overburdened local clinics, not enough Soldiers to provide security, not enough weapons to arm locals, not enough money to pay anybody for anything (to they resorted to crime)."
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Once again, planned CERP dollars, civil-military personnel organic to the Advise and Assist Battalion, and state department workers would have reduced your burden and financed your (their) projects.
Surmise that you were sent to a different AO to put out new fires caused by insufficient personnel in the AOR. With a plan, and available force structure such as an MRAP-equipped Advise and Assist National Guard Battalion task-organized with your and other BCTs, the need to divert assets may have been averted.
Smart arse comment coming:;)
If Marines had planned year long tours like the Army, then they wouldn't have had entirely new companies and command teams learning a new AO and its people twice as often as the Army.
Gulliver:
<em>Shaping operations like "detain a financier" simply have not been a part of our understanding of combat operations, historically speaking.</em>
There were sting operations to nab drug dealers in Bosnia who were dealing drugs for the sole purpose of (it was believed) funneling money to AQ. In the Civil War, the Union strangled the south's cotton trade which, in turn, resulted in a plummeting of value for the cotton-backed bonds issued by the South to fund their effort. I have a hunch that some history buffs can drag out far more examples than my off-the-top-of-my-head "one time in Bosnia" and "the book I just read about finance" tales.
I don't understand how any of the following are "organizational or institutional change": <em>allocation of resources, the forward planning, the cultivation of networks, [or] the shaping operations</em>.
There were more resources because we had 4 years to haul stuff in. Having "A" plan rather than "no" plan also strikes me as not particularly innovative. Cultivation of intelligence networks was a function of time and not something that we learned recently. Shaping operations (to include examples mentioned) are not particularly new or novel, either.
I don't see how having more stuff, more time, being forced to come up with a plan, and having advance preparation for a second chance gets rationalized into an institutional/organizational change. We certainly honed our ability to apply our skills to a theater-specific contingency. But that is not organizational or institutional change according to any definition that I am familiar with.
Bill C:
Or perhaps another way to look at this is that we should not be conducting COIN ourselves but instead helping others through advice and assistance to conduct security operations and development to defend their country against lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. If we have to conduct COIN in another's sovereign territory then we are more likely conducting pacification as an occupying force (at least we are vulnerable to the perception and enemy propaganda that we are an occupier and of course one of the purposes of an insurgency is to rid a nation of an occupying power).
An alternative conclusion:
The central problem for the United States, post-the Cold War, has, indeed, been (1) a fascination with societal liberation/transformation ideals and (2) a belief that such objectives (a) could easily and quickly be achieved, (b) would be to our strategic advantage and (3) would require a minimal expenditure of blood and treasure.
We are, now, no longer under such illusions.
Today we use COIN -- not to liberate and/or transform whole societies -- but rather to get us out of our present messes; in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
Thus, it would be wrong to think that the current "cult of counterinsurgency" actually has any "legs" -- at least as this relates to societal liberation/transformation objectives.
Rather it (the cult of COIN) derives its calling, today as in the past, as a measure that must often be used to deal with errors that have been made in foreign policy thinking.
<em>How are shaping operations part of organizational/institutional change? If I go out and conduct an area reconnaissance or detain a financier, have I just changed the organizational/institutional culture of the force?</em>
We're talking about the <em>decision</em> to perform those sorts of shaping operations. As you've detailed in recent posts on your own blog, the sort of adaptation we're looking for is more a matter of determining when to employ various skills and/or TTPs than simply teaching new content. Shaping operations like "detain a financier" simply have not been a part of our understanding of combat operations, historically speaking. (Conducting area reconaissance is obviously a different story.)
I said "let's be clear" and then wasn't clear at all. What I'm saying is that the allocation of resources, the forward planning, the cultivation of networks, the shaping operations and so on that helped (and note that I'm saying <em>helped</em>) to create an environment conducive to progress in Iraq constitute the remainder of the organizational or institutional change, alongside new training, TTPs, doctrine, and so on. Getting our head around COIN is and was about more than teaching lieutenants to drink tea and build schools. That's why COL Gentile's argument about the pernicious effects of the "COIN revolution," the "COIN epiphany," the "artificial construct of learning and adapting toward better population centric Counterinsurgency" strikes me as hollow; it's not about learning and adapting to do perform a set of tactical or operational measures, but about reforming the institution to be more supple and capable of tying means to ends in a way that incorporates something more broad than just fire and maneuver.
<em>Most of the initiatives that were hailed as some kind of new doctrine, new TTP, fresh new institutional knowledge, or epiphany in 2007 had been attempted in 2003. The difference was the situation, the resources, amassing theater/AO specific knowledge through 4 years of operations, the cultivation of human intelligence networks, and the amount of planning by people who have large staffs to plan for them.</em>
Schmedlap, let's be clear about the fact that these institutional changes are part of what we're talking about when we say "organizational/institutional learning," as David Ucko highlights above when he says he's not just referring to operational conduct. The organization had to learn how to wage this type of war. Part of that process is institutionalizing individual conduct through training, doctrine, new TTPs, and so on, but that doesn't constitute the entirety of Ucko's "great amount of conceptual learning." The Army is still learning as an institution, as you can see if you read the COIN Center SITREP just above this post.
Dave Maxwell nailed it. In 2003, higher echelons had no ISR assets, no intel about the AO, minimal understanding of the culture, and no clear mission. Leaders were in denial over the fact that a military presence would be necessary for a prolonged period. Supplies were being retrograded back to Kuwait while we were conducting daily reconnaissance and launching missions to nab people in the deck of cards. My situation was typical of most of my peers. I had 43 Soldiers, no repair parts, and no money. I was taking out casual pay advances from the BDE finance office to buy batteries for our night vision, IR lasers, and flashlights on the local economy. The only instructions from BDE (according to my CO and Bn Staff) were to "maintain a presence" and ensure security at gas stations.
Most of us took the initiative to do much more - not because of any training, but because of common sense and a determination to make things work in spite of the obvious lack of planning and resources. Those things included reopening schools and providing security for them; targeting gangs that were sprouting up everywhere that ran kidnapping and extortion rings; and setting up elected neighborhood councils to mediate disputes, organize neighborhood security watches, and provide POCs to provide us with info/intel.
Most such initiatives fell flat because we were shipped to a different AO halfway through the process or because there was simply no money available to pay teachers, security grounds, caretakers, no resources to push medical supplies to overburdened local clinics, not enough Soldiers to provide security, not enough weapons to arm locals, not enough money to pay anybody for anything (to they resorted to crime).
Most of the initiatives that were hailed as some kind of new doctrine, new TTP, fresh new institutional knowledge, or epiphany in 2007 had been attempted in 2003. The difference was the situation, the resources, amassing theater/AO specific knowledge through 4 years of operations, the cultivation of human intelligence networks, and the amount of planning by people who have large staffs to plan for them.
David Maxwell
Bullseye--all across the board.
Concerning: "And I am afraid the era is going to continue to bring many forms of conflict that we will have to be prepared to face"
I have the same fear, hightened by the fear that the decision- and policy-makers will make the military face those situations whether that would be in our national interest, or not.
<b>David Ucko:</b><blockquote>"3) I don't buy the idea that COIN is an evolutionary impasse that will stifle further innovation. Again it comes down to what the strategic objectives are. If it is to stabilize a war-torn country, which I am not saying is always a wise or even possible end-state, some of the core principles and actions of COIN seem necessary. "</blockquote>Valid statement. The issue, I believe, becomes when those principles should be applied and by whom. While the GPF <i>have</i> to be able to apply them in quantity, ideally, that would be avoided by earlier intelligence, diplomatic and low key SFA efforts by people truly competent in those fields.
The terrible flaw with COIN as a theory is that it postulates the GPF can and should do this mission. In a nation with our terribly flawed budget allocation process, this is an invitation to disaster. The GPF will never do that job well -- nor should they be able to do so.
As <b>Dave Maxwell</b> said, COIN theory is a possibly unnecessary attempt to:<blockquote>"...try to "fix" our tactical units <i>[while]</i> we forget that <b>the key is strategy and campaign planning (and of course we cannot forget that ultimately it is policy that drives them)</b>. In that I agree that we need better institutional training (and more importantly education) to be able to prepare our planners to deal with the complex realities of the 21st century era of persistent conflict. And I am afraid the era is going to continue to bring many forms of conflict that we will have to be prepared to face." (emphasis added / kw)</blockquote>Just so. Thus <b>Surferbeetle's</b> comment <blockquote>"Arguing that conventional war (as currently know/defined) is the extent to which the force should be designed for is akin to arguing that an elephants leg is a whole elephant."</blockquote>I believe misses the issue which is simply that legs are used for motive effort and stepping on things while the wonderfully capable trunk is used for more delicate work. The Elephant is smart enough to use the right tool for the job...
The argument is -- or should be -- not that we do not need full spectrum capability, we unarguably do. Rather the argument should be what part of the force should be tasked to do what mission as a primary focus.
Both COIN theory and "we only do the nation's big wars" are fallacious concepts that are dangerously short sighted. We have to be able to do both and I don't think anyone commenting here disputes that fact. What's disputed is who does what. We confronted the issue in the early 60s and we solved it then. The fact that the solution later was abandoned due to overcommitment of the force by policymakers does not negate the fact that orienting the light forces to the lower end of the spectrum and the heavy forces to the upper end worked quite well.
**Sigh*** this inability to edit is just frustrating
And so it came to pass that all of the blind men insisted that their description of the part of the elephant that they were touching fully described the elephant.
Sun Tzu says it well when he states: 'And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.
It follows that both COIN and conventional operations, although chameleon like, are nonetheless no freer from the presence of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity than are any other type of warfare nor are the associated efforts of warfare isolated from the people, the commander/army, and government.
Our Nation would benefit from a force structured to work across the full spectrum of war. Arguing that conventional war (as currently know/defined) is the extent to which the force should be designed for is akin to arguing that an elephants leg is a whole elephant.
And so it came to pass that all of the blind men insisted that their description of the part of the elephant they were touching fully described the elephant.
Sun Tzu says it well when he states: 'And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.
Its follow that both COIN and conventional operations, although chameleon like, are nonetheless no freer from the presence of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity than are Conventional operations nor are the associated efforts of either type of warfare isolated from the people, the commander/army, and government.
Our Nation would benefit from a force structured to work across the full spectrum of war. Arguing that conventional war (as currently know/defined) is the extent to which the force should be designed for is akin to arguing that an elephants leg is a whole elephant.
A possible conclusion to my earlier arguments:
The central problem facing the United States in the 21st Century is its failure to acknowledge that people in certain foreign lands (inspite of our winning of the Cold War): (1) do not wish to be transformed by the United States and people of our ilk and, thus, (2) are not waiting for the United States and its allies to come to liberate them from what we believe to be oppressive leaders and outdated cultures.
Failure to acknowledge and accept this reality in 2003 caused the United States to go into Iraq with inadequate numbers and types of initial and follow-on forces; and failure to acknowledge and accept this reality today causes the United States to look to COIN in Afghanistan -- rather than address the more central and fundamentally controling issue of erroneous "transformation/liberation" thinking (described above).
Only if we acknowledge that people in certain foreign lands may not wish to be "transformed" by the United States, et al, will we be able to properly access the feasibility of our 21st Century transformational objectives, and be able to develop and deploy an adequate strategy and forces (often needing to be numerous, heavy and harsh) in order to achieve our "societal transformational" goals (should these goals, now with this more realistic accessment [expect resistance -- not "flowers"], still be considered do-able and warranted).
Quote from David Ucko:
"A greater preparation and familiarity with COIN at that point would, in my mind, have had a great difference on subsequent events."
I would agree with that if you make the argument that it would have led to a campaign plan that dealt with the realities of the situation on the ground (and was able to be adapted over time as conditions evolved).
I think many of us are talking past each other. Yes there is a lot of evidence that units "got COIN" - in fact I am confident that at the Battalion level and below a great many of our LTCs, MAJs, company grade officers and NCOs were very effective and without training or doctrine many intuitively knew what needed to be done and in many cases got it done in their area.
But I would trace all our problems back to strategy and campaign planning. Our units will execute the missions they are given even if they are non-standard or not what was trained for at the NTC. But it is up to the higher level commands to lay out and resource the strategy and campaign plan. We need a military that can accomplish the missions assigned to it (whatever mission); that can figure out and understand the problems that it faces in order to accomplish the missions given to it and that requires the ability to develop and resource strategies and devise campaign plans to accomplish those missions whether they be in a "conventional" (whatever that is??) state on state conflict, assisting a friend, partner or ally against lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency, or conducting stability operations. I think we have tactical units for the most part that can do that but we have the operational and strategic level HQ (and national policy makers) who can?
If having doctrine for COIN would have helped in developing the strategy and effective (feasible, suitable, and acceptable) campaign plans then we were remiss. But most of our doctrine development I think is too focused on our tactical units (who get it for the most part - and those that did not get it if they had been given the correct missions and resources then would have got it by direction). But while we try to "fix" our tactical units we forget that the key is strategy and campaign planning (and of course we cannot forget that ultimately it is policy that drives them). In that I agree that we need better institutional training (and more importantly education) to be able to prepare our planners to deal with the complex realities of the 21st century era of persistent conflict. And I am afraid the era is going to continue to bring many forms of conflict that we will have to be prepared to face.
1) Schmedlap (and Gian): Perhaps I was not clear: I was talking about institutional learning, not operational conduct or even operational outcomes. So my evidence is not what happened in Iraq (which hinges on much more than the actions of U.S. troops) but on my research into DOTMLPF of the U.S military as an institution. I am not married to 2005 as a turning-point, but it does seem justifiable-enough from my research. Compare, say, the interim COIN manual of late 2004 with the feel of the many COIN-related articles in, say, Military Review in 2005. Humble beginnings for sure, and not doctrine, but stuff that would later inform doctrine directly. This is just one example of many.
2) Operationally, in Iraq, it would seem to me that learning was patchy and cannot be divided into pre- and post- a certain date. Gian, you cite On Point II to suggest everyone knew what they were doing right from the start. I think there are many other credible sources that argue otherwise. Why is Point II held up as Gospel and those other sources dismissed as "dominant narrative COIN porn"?
3) I don't buy the idea that COIN is an evolutionary impasse that will stifle further innovation. Again it comes down to what the strategic objectives are. If it is to stabilize a war-torn country, which I am not saying is always a wise or even possible end-state, some of the core principles and actions of COIN seem necessary.
4) Schmedlap: I am not so certain that a different approach earlier on would not have produced different results. I think that there were identifiable groups and leaders even in the initial years of 'post-conflict operations', but much of the talk back then was of a 'hydra-headed network' of 'cells' without structure, something that meshed with the transformation-dominated lexicon of the time. Yet from the very outset of 'post-conflict' operations, individual units were able to apply approaches similar to those encouraged under the surge and obtain greater levels of stability in their AO. That's not to say that particular opportunities were not also there in early 2007, but maybe it is also the case the opportunities could have been spotted and exploited earlier on, but were not. Of course, the greatest such opportunity would have been to work things differently from the very outset. A greater preparation and familiarity with COIN at that point would, in my mind, have had a great difference on subsequent events.
<blockquote><em>Schmedlap, thought you were making a superb argument for how COIN transitioned the FOB-oriented force incapable of securing or stabilizing a deteriorating situation into a more effective stability operations force.</em></blockquote>
I guess I need a remedial course in English composition because that is the exact opposite of what I was getting at. It is doubtful that if our 2007 operations had been attempted in 2005 or 2006 that they would have worked. The situation was not amenable to that solution. The big issue in 2007 was "ending the cycle of violence." We were only able to do that because the warring factions segregated themselves into ethnic/sectarian communities. It is easier to step in between two groups of 100 people facing off than it is to break up 100 individual one-on-one fights occurring all around you. It is easier still if those people are already weary from fighting and are not so determined duke it out. In 2005/6, they had not fully separated into Sunni/Shia and the real bloodshed didn't begin until early 06. They were neither separated, nor weary. I don't care how many flaming tongues descend from the heavens to spread the COIN gospel or how many Hail Nagls you say - you're not stopping that fight until the belligerents coalesce into manageable groups and get worn down.
<blockquote><em>If we really care about recent history related to U.S. forces being able to close the strategic deal...then Viet Nam, Desert Storm, the Balkans, OIF, and OEF indicate far greater need for more training and resources for Stability Ops.</em></blockquote>
I think that's the wrong way to look at it. If I jump off my roof three times and each time I break an arm or leg, the conclusion that I draw is not that I need to improve my landings or invest in something that breaks my fall. The proper conclusion is that I need to stop jumping off the roof. (And as I preview this comment, I see that Ken White beat me to the punchline - ditto his comment).
<b>Cole:</b>
I draw a quite different conclusion from the same operations:<blockquote>"If we really care about recent history related to U.S. forces being able to close the strategic deal...then Viet Nam, Desert Storm, the Balkans, OIF, and OEF indicate far greater need for more training and resources for Stability Ops. Combined arms operations have been far more successful, yet even with half a million air/ground/sea combatants in Viet Nam losing nary a battle, we could not achieve our strategic goals there using primarily kinetics."</blockquote>Not least because Viet Nam and "primarily kinetics"( kinetics is a silly word to apply to combat...) is somewhat of a misnomer. IOW, it was far more nuanced than that. We also lost some battles -- and we initiated very few of the ones we won or lost, Clyde tended to be more flexible than we were.
The conclusion I draw from all those operations is that they are expensive, tedious, constraining and generally do not provide satisfactory results and they should therefor be avoided if possible. Desert Storm is of course the exception -- I wonder why that is...
I also suggest that we are not going to have the resources or the time to devote to 'stability operations.' That doesn't address the fact that the voting public doesn't like them and will not support them to an adequate degree. Nor does it address the fact that one cannot win such a conflict, the best that can be obtained is a 'satisfactory' conclusion -- I put that in quotes because my observation in all those operations you named was that the satisfactory part was defined downward on a rather steep slope as time passed in the operation.
COIN theory (and it is a theory, an effectively unproven one at that) is a dangerous illusion...
From the Conclusion of On Point II (additional paragraphs added to break it up and my CAPS added for emphasis):
Chapter 14
Implications
"Phase III and Phase IV Operations*"
"While planning and preparation for what in 2003 was called Phase III, Decisive Operations, of a joint campaign will always tend to have primacy for Joint and Army planners, it is time to increase the importance of what is now known as Phase IV, Stabilize. Sustained and decisive ground combat is the sine qua non of the US Army. The Armys operational record from Phase III of OIF, though not without flaws, is superlative. Phase III military operations may be the most intense and dangerous within a campaign, and without a military victory in Phase III, strategic success is impossible."
"At the same time it must be remembered that THE PURPOSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IS TO ACHIEVE A SPECIFIC STRATEGIC OR POLITICAL OBJECTIVE. AS OIF HAS SHOWN, THIS PHASE OF OPERATIONS IS ULTIMATELY MORE IMPORTANT THAN PHASE III IN SECURING THE END FOR WHICH MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE INITIATED. In spring 2003, however, the DOD and the Army lacked a coherent plan to translate the rapid, narrow-front attack that avoided populated areas whenever possible, into strategic success. Soldiers and commanders at nearly every level did not know what was expected of them once Saddam Hussein was deposed and his military forces destroyed."
"Clearly the Coalition lacked sufficient forces on the ground in April 2003 to FACILITATE, MUCH LESS IMPOSE, FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC CHANGES in Iraq. Troop density ratios were on the low end of previous US occupation experiences, much lower than many of the prewar plans for the invasion of Iraq and far lower than previous US and Western counterinsurgency campaigns. These factors were in line with prewar planning for a quick turnover of power to Iraqis and a quick withdrawal of US forces, leaving Iraqis to determine their own political future--options that proved impossible to execute."
"While CENTCOM and the US Army might not have been expected to plan for a full-blown insurgency of the type that emerged by late 2003, the historical record should have indicated that many more troops would be needed for the post-Saddam era in Iraq. Key decisionmakers ignored cautionary warnings about the paucity of troops, both official and unofficial, without giving them sufficient review. The Coalitions inability to prevent looting, to secure Iraqs borders, and to guard the vast number of munitions dumps in the early months after Saddams overthrow are indicative of the shortage. US commanders found it difficult to balance increasing requirements with the units available throughout 2003 and 2004."
"Furthermore, by the time the Saddam regime fell, most Iraqis had yet to see a Coalition soldier. Unlike Axis military forces and their citizenry in 1945, who had no doubts about their utter defeat and who accepted the imposition of far-reaching political and social changes by the victorious Allies, Iraqis not favorably inclined toward the Coalitions postconflict goals had much less reason to passively accept fundamental change."
"It is too early to pass definitive judgment on the wisdom of the strategic decisions in mid-2004. In that period, the Coalition decided to rely on the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) to implement a federal solution to Iraqs political and economic problems and to keep US force levels relatively steady while rapidly building up Iraqs security forces so they could tackle the internal security problems."
"By mid-2006, however, it appeared that the dysfunctional qualities of the nascent Iraqi political process, the chronically slow rise in effectiveness by Iraqs security forces, and the incredibly violent sectarian strife undermined the hopes generated by the success of the Iraqi elections of January 2005 that serve as the end point of this study. What IS NOT OPEN TO DISPUTE IS THAT DEPOSING THE SADDAM REGIME WAS FAR EASIER THAN IMPOSING OR FOSTERING A NEW POLITICAL ORDER IN IRAQ. One simple explanation is that the Coalition directed far more resources and energy into planning for the former objective than it put into planning for the latter goal."
"The concepts concerning postconflict operations are not new to military history or to US military doctrine. Joint and Army commands, nevertheless, have over recent decades rather consistently shown a tendency to ignore them in practice. Joint and Army planning doctrine and processes must be changed to more specifically include planning and preparation for the inevitable transition to Phase IV and the ACHIEVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES."
"The transition to stability operations should begin before the end of major combat operations. Thus, planning must occur nearly simultaneously. Force level or troop density calculations must not simply be an exercise in minimalist thinking based on an alleged revolution in military affairs. PLANNING MUST ALSO INCLUDE AN ANALYSIS OF PHASE IV FORCE LEVEL REQUIREMENTS AT EVERY PHASE OF A CAMPAIGN. The doctrinal military decision-making process (MDMP) should make this explicit and prevent the sharp division between those phases that allow commands to relegate Phase IV planning to another day or to a follow-on command."
"Planners must also take into account the historical, cultural, and political factors that will affect national strategy and military operations, particularly Phase IV operations. The Armys education system must emphasize these principles beginning at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and continue it through the Army War College. Army training programs, such as the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), should include Phase IV planning and operations in their exercises and simulations--not as an afterthought, but as a primary exercise goal."
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The Phase III and IV terms may no longer apply, but as used, "On Point II" implies that our ground component, its resources, and planning processes were ill-prepared for Stability Operations. If viewed from a COIN/Stability Ops perspective, kinetic operations from FOBs with insufficient troops and interaction were not achieving any of the lines of operations sufficiently. Viewed from an "offense and defense" traditional view, we were not satisfactorily closing with and destroying the unseen enemy.
Schmedlap, thought you were making a superb argument for how COIN transitioned the FOB-oriented force incapable of securing or stabilizing a deteriorating situation into a more effective stability operations force. Then I realized...
If we really care about recent history related to U.S. forces being able to close the strategic deal...then Viet Nam, Desert Storm, the Balkans, OIF, and OEF indicate far greater need for more training and resources for Stability Ops. Combined arms operations have been far more successful, yet even with half a million air/ground/sea combatants in Viet Nam losing nary a battle, we could not achieve our strategic goals there using primarily kinetics.
@Bill C.
If we are to accept the premise that 'conventional warfare done right' is the more efficient answer that we are looking for we should be able to compare the portions of OIF in which COIN warfare and 'conventional warfare done right' were used and identify the differences in effectiveness.
Testing your premise I would then ask why, since OIF1 began conventionally, did warfare TTP's move towards COIN over the course of that year in some parts of the country?
My question/comment stated in the alternative:
In determining what are feasible and achievable national goals -- and the requisite strategy needed to achieve these goals -- one would think that nations are constrained by the availability and sustainability of certain critical resources.
A most critical such resource would seem to be the "support of the people." Specifically: (1) the support of the people of the nation embarked on its mission to achieve certain national goals, (2) the popular support of allies and, optimally: (3) the support of the people of the world at-large and (4) a segment of the people in the opposing camp(s).
COL Gentile might argue that conventional warfare done right (with the appropriate number and type of initial and follow-on forces) achieves a quicker, cleaner, more sustainable and more humanitarian victory; precludes the need for "forever war" COIN scenerios and, as such, renders an outcome which COIN often cannot, to wit: (1) the long-term popular support "of the people" (as defined above) and (2) the capitulation of other enemies.
This method (conventional warfare done right), one might suggest, is how a nation mobilizes and maintains the critical resource of popular support in the post-Colonial/post-Cold War era and, thus, is able to "transform entire societies" in the 21st Century.
After 4 years of steady-state operations in which to...
- gather intelligence
- establish contacts
- erect FOBs and establish LOCs
- standardize theater-specific and AO-specific procedures to streamline operations
- stand up and train ISF
- establish a government
And, after 4 years in which...
- the people had largely separated into homogenous ethnosectarian communities and political factions with strong views on the security situation
- our adversaries had developed coherent networks that we could analyze and target
- people become more convinced that we would withdraw our forces due to domestic political pressure
- some of our forces began consolidating into FOBs
We abruptly change course by...
- announcing (by the President) that we aim to restore security, thus helping to remove doubts among fencesitters that we are leaving
- sending in an additional 5 US Brigades
- reversing the incomplete FOB consolidation
- pushing the "surge" forces into PBs and COPs
- dismantling AQI networks
- killing and capturing senior and mid-level leaders of AQI and JAM
- attacking EFP and human smuggling networks
- dismantling networks of bomb-makers and financiers to prevent or thwart mass-casualty attacks
By 2007, the people had made up their minds. The lines were drawn, the leaders were established, and the weapons were loaded. We set out to co-opt tribes, pay informants, gather intelligence, kill insurgent leaders, mentor ISF, and engage in a lot of high level political maneuvering at the national level.
What did we learn after 2005 that was so critical to working through the fundamentally different situation in 2007? What knowledge were we lacking from 2005 and before? How can anyone attribute the outcome to anything more than four years of preparation, a change in the situation, and a change in strategy as articulated by the President?
What knowledge were we blessed with at this moment of COIN Pentecost in 2005 and why was it more significant than any of the factors above?
Have I got this right?
Accepting that the mission of the United States in the 21st Century continues to be "changing entires societies," the argument remains only as to how to do this.
COL Gentile says that we must face the fact that this wrenching, ambitious and difficult task frequently requires the use of harsh tactics and heavy forces.
John Nagl, et.al. -- while acknowleding this classic mission requirement (the need to transform entire societies) -- believes that this cannot, in the current era, be achieved using the "harsh and heavy" tactics of old.
Why? Because in the current post-Colonial and post-Cold War World, one cannot hope to mobilize support for one's political interests (at home, with allies, elsewhere abroad and within the camp of the targeted nations/societies) through the use of such tainted methods. Today a (seemingly?) more "humane" and reasoned method (COIN/whole-of-government approach) is believed to be what is needed -- in order to mobilize the requisite political support -- and, thus, achieve victory.
Because your book, David, conforms to the Coin template. It accepts the notion without evidentiary proof that the American Army did not start learning and adapting until a certain point, then after that it did. You say 2005, then I ask again why 2005 and not 2003? What proof do you have? Don Wright's and Tim Reese's book, "On Point II," argues the opposite that the majority of Army combat units were learning and adapting and adjusting to Coin very quickly, almost as soon as they hit the ground in Spring and Summer of 2003. I heard a very senior American Army General who commanded a Division in Iraq in 2003 (not General Petraeus by the way) state basically the same thing that his Division learned and adapted quite well to the various situations that confronted them on the ground.
Your book reads almost verbatim like the Nagl/Krepinevich critique of the American Army in Vietnam in which the American Army did not learn and adapt in that war. Moonshine. It did, in many different ways. So too did the American Army start its learning and adapting in Iraq in 2003. And do you want to know why it was able to do that learning and adapting so quickly, David? Because it was an army trained and optimized for combined arms warfare. It is books like yours that elevate the principle of learning and adapting toward better population centric coin above the fundamental necessity to do combined arms. In a sense you and many of the other Coin experts are putting the cart before the horse. The ability to do combined arms at all organizational levels gives an army in whatever situation it is thrust into the subsequent ability to seize and maintain the initiative; it can act. And if it acts first in response to a hostile enemy force or complex conditions through the initiative it can learn and adapt. My worry is that all of this talk of Coin and learning Coin and learning and adapting, yada, yada, yada, has taken our eyes off the absolute necessity of combined arms competencies and replaced it with an artificial construct of learning and adapting toward better population centric Counterinsurgency. As I have argued before, the rules of this construct, however, do not allow a unit to learn and adapt its way out of doing Coin. This box that we are in continues to push us down the Coin path toward significant organizational changes, and it keeps us locked in a world of tactics and operations, unable to see and do strategy. Strategy in war of course is more important than tactics and operations. It was a failure at strategy that caused us to lose the Vietnam War, not because the American Army didnt learn and adapt toward doing better Coin tactics and operations.
Gian:
Replace '2005', or '2004' even, for 'in recent years' if you prefer. To me, as much as definite turning-points help to make sense of history, 2005 is a useful reference point for the U.S. ground force's conceptual (re)learning of COIN. You're not fond of my book (thanks for the plug though Gulliver) but it does provide a fuller answer to your question than I can provide here.