by Colonel Gregory A. Grimes
Download the full article: Economics: The Better Bullet for Grey War
What do quantum physics and American foreign policy have in common? Both are still searching for a unifying theory. Albert Einstein spent the latter decades of his life searching for a theory that unifies all the forces of nature. The United States lacks a unifying theme for its foreign engagement efforts in combating terrorism and insurgency. Mischaracterization of the problems, competition among implementing agencies and a reluctance to jettison entrenched legacy programs are all obstacles to developing a single, unifying underpinning to American foreign engagement policy in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. The U.S. needs a theme that underlies and unifies our efforts at winning over susceptible populations.
America finds herself embroiled in a tar baby of a war unlike any previously fought. This "grey war," likely to be the definitive style of warfare for this and the next military generation, will simmer as a low-grade, continuous engagement alternating between diplomacy and violence. The United States and assorted extremist groups will jockey for position in a war the U.S. can neither definitively win (a la World War II) nor disengage from. Like the tar baby, grey war will be a sticky mess we cannot easily rid ourselves of. Commonly thought to be a concerted global effort the various terror groups, even those operating under the banner of Islamic jihad, are in reality a hundred different groups with a hundred different grievances. Many of these grievances are catastrophic, some are legitimate and all are meaningful to the people suffering them...
Download the full article: Economics: The Better Bullet for Grey War
Colonel Gregory Grimes, US Army, is a Civil Affairs officer currently assigned to the Standing Joint Force Headquarters at US Africa Command.
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To me this seems to be the same argument that we have promoted for several years. If we simply offer a better economic model that provides hope to the people it will eliminate the grievances that drive people to participate in terrorism and insurgencies.
There are conflicts where this will perhaps work, but not all grievances are going to be resolved by provided (assuming this is possible) "hope" for a better life by establishing economic systems.
There are many conflicts in the world beyond those fueled by identity with Islam that have little to do with economic grievances (though they almost always play a role), such as the Uighurs in Western China, the separatist movement in Tibet, numerous separatist movements in India, Shi'a versus Sunni conflicts, Islam versus Christian conflicts, etc. that are all tied to identity and fear and hate of others.
The terrorist who attempted the Christmas bombing on NWA flight had more economic opportunity and hope for a grand future than many of us, as did the doctor who conducted the attack on the CIA base in Afghanistan.
Economic development plays a role in counterinsurgencies, but less so in counterterrorism. The grievance that Al Qaeda exploits is that Islam is another attack, and uses American occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan; and Israel's suppression of the Palestinian people as examples to draw middle class supporters into the fight as fighters. Not all politics are local, we're living in a globalized world that is increasing connected by the information technology that allows alleged or real suppression of Islam to be an issue to fight for that has nothing to do with economic development in their own country.
I recommend avoiding economic development as the unifying factor for our overall strategy. We'll end up expending billions on the wrong fight.
Often the general population (consider, for example, the opinion of the general population in the Greater Middle East) is heavily focused on the desire for freedom.
This, in one respect, is because they perceive the lack of freedom as being the primary impediment to their ability to achieve either peace or prosperity for their region. (Looking, again, as they might, to the recent examples of China and Vietnam; wherein, peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without freedom first being obtained).
In such instances, how can our message of economic prosperity -- in lieu of freedom -- be considered reasonable or compelling?
Thus, again I would suggest, that even when a degree of economic prosperity can be achieved, minus freedom, then these funds are likely to be used, much sooner rather than much later, to better organize and better facilitate the insurgency(ies).
In addressing the grievances noted by Bill Moore above, let me offer the following:
In many instances, the desire for freedom, from foreign interference, and from foreign direct and indirect rule, is both the grievance and the unifying principal and theme that has ultimately provided for the needs of a people, and for the needs of the world at-large.
As the recent cases of China and Vietnam illustrate, there are actually two phases of corrective action needed to achieve the requisites of security and prosperity:
a. First, the nation and/or society must -- often through war and/or other radical and extreme measure -- rid itself of the foreign presence and interference.
b. Second, these nations must -- frequently through harsh internal actions -- re-establish and re-constitute their society (which has often been decimated by decades or even centuries of carefully crafted "divide and rule" tactics employed by various competing/cooperating foreign powers.)
Only after these emancipating and re-constituting actions have been achieved (again looking at China and Vietnam as our examples) is the nation and society able to: (1) Rapidly achieve economic prosperity and success, (2) be placed in a position to consider democracy and thus (3) be able to join the rest of the world as a full partner in the international community.
The problem for the United States -- and for the rest of the developed and developing world, however -- is that, in such cases as the Middle East, due to the need for consistently available and cheap oil and other resources, we cannot allow this, presently on-going, emancipating/re-constituting process to achieve success.
Thus, we are left to arrive at and craft some other solution, which may be very difficult indeed.
Herein, one must ask a closing question: Will the "medicine" of increased economic prosperity (if this is able to be achieved minus freedom), will this ameliorate the "illness" of lack of freedom in places like the Middle East? Or will these new financial resources, and the influence and other weapons that these new resources can buy, will they be used to better fuel, fund and otherwise facilitate a more potent regional and global insurgency?
hi well being frank an straight forward i shall say that the perceptions prejudices narrow national intrests and mindset are the real causes of conflict confrontation an sufferings of all humans on earth if u live an let others live an understand by keeping conflicts alive u may sell some more weapons an earn but in the end there would be more blood shed i dare ask what makes mandatory for us to always support Jewish state in its efforts to brutalize middle east snatch more Arab lands always an every time. who stops us asking Russia to vacate Caucasian lands an get them under nato umbrella what stops us an west not to get involved with simmering oldest issue on us agenda self determination for Kashmirs. and who gives the west an us to dictate how should an Iraqi or an afghan behave let them be what they are help humanity to improve its standards food shelter security etc.
Anonymous,
I'll agree that the desire for "freedom" is a compelling motivator among many populations but 'freedom' can mean different things to different people. It may mean an expectation of substantial government support for one's efforts at the "pursuit of happiness" or it may merely mean the absence of government oppression.
Again, however, I emphasize that my comments are meant to inform how we deal with specific populations (those considered to be susceptible to the extremist message) in terms of how we conduct our counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts through our multiple U.S. agencies.
Lastly, I don't consider that freedom and economic prosperity are mutually exclusive. In fact I view them as mutually supportive.
Thanks for the comments. A little feedback--
A distinction to make is that my assessment needs to be viewed as focussing more on U.S. policy and practices than on the target populations. That sounds a bit contrary so perhaps a bit more explanation will help.
The thrust of my article is highlighting the need for coherence across the board for ourselves (the U.S.) in terms of the policy we espouse. We don't do a very good job articulating our message to the populations we seek to influence. Projects (schools, wells, bridges, power plants, etc.) are undertaken willy nilly with no attending message nor, too often, any *quid pro quo* action from the local population. There's plenty of lip service given to the concept of achieving heightened security in exchange for development, but in practice it is too rarely achieved. My comments speak to the importance of the message of economic hope but the issue is two-sided: we need to more effectively sell our message and we need to achieve unity of message among our various agencies in the first place.
Secondly, my comments are based on how we should interact/communicate with the general population. We are unlikely to induce existing members of a terrorist or insurgent group to renounce their membership. What I'm describing is the need for us to do a better job of selling alternatives that convince the general population to refrain from buying the insurgent or terrorist message in the first place. There will always be an element of the population for whom ideology trumps economics; there will always be an element of the population who can only be addressed with a kinetic solution.
Lastly, your observation that there are insurgencies not originating from economic grievance is true. But even among these groups the economics of 'tomorrow' are a powerful motivator. Even if the original grievances are not economic in nature the significance of economic hope among the population from whom the insurgents will attempt to recruit is valid. In most populations the vast majority of people simply want to be able to achieve the things I describe in the paper. There will always be outliers like the Christmas day attempted bomber (for whom a sound future was virtually assured) that don't fit this mold. I emphasize again that my observations are meant in general, overarching terms to highlight the need for us to improve our message, make it universally relevant and articulate it better.