A Test Case for Counterinsurgency Theory

At this point in time, the recent Iranian protest movement is as much an "insurgency" as that which America encountered during its own widespread protest movement in the late 1960's/early 70's. Gentlemen: do you consider that chapter in American history as undergoing a phase of insurgency? Maybe you do, maybe you don't.

It should be pointed out that- to date- the Iranian government's response on the street has been to employ less-lethal force by the Islamic Republic of Iran Police Force (Iranian acronym: NAJA), with Basij volunteers provided in a supplemental role. That is to say, this situation has been addressed in practical terms of law enforcement.

Contrary to many reports which have stated the contrary, neither the IRGC or Artesh (conventional armed forces) have been mobilized. Antiriot operations against unlawful assemblies are the responsibility of Iranian law enforcement (as they are in any Western nation).

For an empirical gauge on Iranian public opinion, I suggest the following be reviewed:

http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/6…

Timely article from the Post today:

Washington Post
February 8, 2010
Pg. 8

Broadcasters Arrested

Iran has arrested seven people linked to a U.S.-funded Farsi-language radio station for allegedly fomenting unrest, and it accused some of the suspects of working for American spy agencies, Iranian state media reported Sunday.

The official Islamic Republic News Agency and Iran's state radio cited an Intelligence Ministry statement saying the suspects played a role in violent anti-government demonstrations in Tehran on Dec. 27. On that day, at least eight people were killed and hundreds were arrested during clashes between opposition supporters and security forces.

The violence was the worst since authorities began a harsh crackdown immediately after Iran's disputed presidential election in June.

State radio said the suspects were trained outside Iran in sabotage, disturbing public order and overthrowing a government by soft means.

-- Associated Press

Ken.

Coucur very much that the US should not intervene in the Iranin insurgency. Neither to conduct UW to push any of the subversive parties to the next level, nor to help the Iranians suppress their populace (which is how we typically conduct FID, though we call it COIN...).

But it good to understand what we are watching there though so that we can accurately assess what our course should be and best predict what might the likely response to our words and deeds may be.

Illegitimate, oppressive regimes in a country where the populace has no certain and legal recourse do inedeed tend to attract insurgencies...

There is a lesson there for those willing to pause and ponder.

For Ken White,

Let me clarify one thing. I did not mean to imply (in my post-Super Bowl haste) that we should consider Iran a friend, partner, or ally and that we should in any way be helping them counter their insurgenc(ies). I wanted to make the point that it is worth studying their application of COIN theory against their insurgenc(ies). Helping the insurgenc(ies) in Iran is of course a another policy discussion. I would also note that Iran is worthy of study because even though I outline the basic Maoist theory as a template or baseline (which I still think is the most useful in trying to observe and assess an insurgency) I think all insurgencies are different because the conditions are rarely the same and the multiple conditions and characteristics that influence all sides are never the same. (e.g., look at Che in Cuba and Che in Bolivia). Every insurgency is worthy of study in its own right but no insurgency or counterinsurgency contains the silver bullet for another.

Everything Dave Maxwell says above is spot on. Of course there is an insurgency in Iran. Kitson came up with a logical divsion of when a subversion becomes an insurgency, but the point is largely moot, as the factors giving rise to both are the same, and you are really arguing about is the matter of degree. It is also essential to understand that the insurgent can win in any phase; but the counterinsurgent only wins by moving the insurgency to phase 0; or can achieve temporary breathing space by simply crushing the rebelling actors and holding the insurgency down artifically in its current phase. Once that boot is removed, however, it will pop back up to where it was.

Mao's three phases are very helpful, and Dave is right that what we are looking at is if the insurgency will evolve upward to the next phase. The government of Iran's goal in COIN should be to move it into a "Phase 0 pre-insurgency" status and attempt to maintain it there.

Applying the Jones principles of insurgency, it looks pretty grim for the government of Iran:

1. Does a significant segment of the populace perceive the government to lack a legitimacy that they recognize? Check. Strike one.

2. Does a trusted and certain process exist within Iran for the popualce to effect its governance? No. Strike two.

3. Does this same segment of the populace have perceptions of disrespect or injustice? Check. And is the government striving to inforce the rule of law in the face of this perception? Check. Strike three.

The only wise thing the Iranian government is doing is attempting to control information and vigorously blaming others for their problems. The problem is, and this is THEE essence of what has actually changed about insurgency in the modern age, is that even a state as autocratic as Iran cannot effectively control information. They cannot "separate the insurgent from the populace."

My advice to the government of Iran:
Move immediately to identify a source of legitimacy that the insurgent segment of the populace truts, and bring in trusted agents to implement that process to repair the perceptions of illigitimacy.

Stop the overt oppression of the protestors. Announce and enact the above stated measures immediately and release any who have been incarcerated in a very public show of good faith.

Turn down the rhetoric blaming others. Accept responsibility publiclly, while annoucing bold reforms to address the same.

Ok, so I have given Iran the golden ticket to peace and stability. I doubt very much they have the moral courage to employ it. Instead they will continue to attack the symptoms of the insurgency, and ultimately it will explode into phase II violence with tragic results for their country, and those around them.

So far the comments on Small Wars Journal have criticized this paper saying that there is not an insurgency in Iran. Basically I think Dr. Cox is assessing whether or not there is a movement in Iran that is in the latent or incipient stage of an insurgency and is the Iranian government taking the necessary steps to counter it in accordance with some of the traditional COIN theorists. One of the useful things that he points out by invoking the writings of Galula, Kitson, and ONeill is how hard it is to recognize and counter an insurgency in the latent and incipient stage. But Dr. Cox argues that Iran is taking steps to crush the insurgency in this stage and working to prevent it from executing all the steps needed to further the insurgency and be prepared to transition to Phase II, Guerrilla Warfare.

"a. Phase I: Latent or Incipient Phase. Resistance leadership develops the resistance movement into an effective clandestine organization. Prepares the population psychologically to resist subversion - propaganda, demonstrations, boycotts, and sabotage. There is no major outbreak of armed violence. Shadow government may be established. Tasks include:

(1) Recruit, organize, and train cadres.

(2) Infiltrate key government organizations and civil groups.

(3) establish cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks

(4) Organize or develop cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations to develop popular support for later political and military activities.

(5) Solicit and otherwise obtain funds (rob banks, embezzle, outside donations)

(6) Develop sources of external support."

I think a key quote form this paper is this:

"Unlike Galula and Kitson, Bard ONeill believes that any government can react quickly to an insurgency and have a great deal of success. According to ONeill, any government, regardless of type, has the advantage during the embryonic stages of an insurgency due to a higher level of political organization and more mature institutions in addition to control of well-organized means of coercion.23 Having argued this, ONeill notes that governments who could act and succeed initially often fail to do so due to either governmental complacency and a lack of proper vigilance or because many of the early stage activities are non-violent and, therefore, go undetected as insurgent consolidation.24 Further, even governments that do react quickly often fail to understand what type25 of insurgency they are dealing with and, therefore, make grave initial errors.26"

This really gets to the heart of the challenges a government faces during the latent or incipient stage. Whether you agree that Iran has an insurgency in the latent and incipient stage I think this paper is a useful thought piece. Most of our work in COIN is really focused on the guerilla warfare of violent stage and of course when the US commits forces during this phase it is usually too late and we get sucked into the swamp. Ironically we would be better suited form a military perspective to allow the insurgency to get to the war of movement phase or the conventional phase which of course Mao argued was required for ultimate insurgent victory. It is at this stage that the military is better able to defeat an insurgency - probably the mistake the Tamil Tigers made in Sri Lanka; there shift to large scale fighting vice guerilla warfare allowed the Sri Lanka military to use its strengths to defeat it decisively. It is unlikely that a decisive victory can be achieved in the guerrilla warfare phase yet that is where we find ourselves most of the time. The best case is to defeat the insurgency in the latent and incipient stage and undercut the legitimacy of the insurgent organization by making political and economic adjustments to take away the conditions that drive the people to support an insurgency. But governments rarely do that for the reasons Bard ONeill mentions. And of course it is politically unacceptable to allow an insurgency to develop sufficiently to transition from the guerrilla warfare phase to the war of movement phase even though that is where decisive victory is most likely achieved. Political prevention has to occur in Phase I or decisive victory can occur in Phase III but we end up mired in Phase II

Even though many think Mao is irrelevant to todays irregular wars; but I think the basic 3 phase model remains applicable. The problem we have though with some insurgent movements is that they think they can be victorious in the guerrilla warfare phase and they do not have the desire or the capability to move to Phase III and they do not want to revert to Phase I (unless they need to live to fight another day) nor does the government want to make the political and economic adjustments necessary if they were to drive the insurgency back to Phase I so we get mired in the swamp of Phase II - which reminds us of the Sun Tzu adage that no country has ever benefited from protracted war. Some can find examples otherwise but I think it mostly holds true.

And if allowing an insurgency to progress to Phase III is unacceptable (the politicians and the press would crucify the military for allowing it to happen - even though decisive victory could possibly be achieved)l the issue is how to push the insurgency back into Phase I where political and economic changes could be made to address the conditions that are causing the insurgency; thus eliminating support of the population and causing the insurgency to dissolve for lack of support or be integrated into the political process. But we usually end up flailing around in Phase II.

But the bottom line is I think Dr. Cox is correct to look at Iran from an insurgency/counter-insurgency perspective and think through the application of COIN theory there. Arguing over whether or not there is an insurgency misses the point. We dismiss the potential for an insurgency anywhere at our peril.

And finally, if we are going to be successful in helping friends, partners, and allies in defending against lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency either through Foreign Internal Defense or Security Forces Assistance or whatever we end up calling it, we need to spend a fair amount of time understanding Phase I and helping our friends, partners, and allies, with not only the security aspect of the problem but also with their internal defense and development programs that will help to address those conditions during Phase I and not wait until Phase II emerges.