R.I.P. Mr. Charles Wilson, Father of the Taliban

<b>Duck:</b>

Too true on the fruitless bit. Everything has to be viewed through the lens of the time. Most people in the pit try to make the best decision they can based on the information available. They are often constrained to less than satisfactory solutions due to limitations on means as well as a lack of full information...

It is entirely too easy -- and often misleading -- to go back and second guess based on the brilliance of hindsight and possession of updated information.

As for the 'what ifs,' it's interesting to consider that Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Bush 41, Clinton and Bush 43 all had Islamist terror problems; that the first five brushed them off to handle domestic political concerns they considered to be more important and the last did not do as good a job of responding as one might wish due to those same concerns.

However, at least he did something, a very favorable contrast to his predecessors...

All that is also more proof our strategizing is not as good as one could wish. ;)

Ken your interpretation of my comment is more accurate than anonymous. In my view it is just as tenous to place the current problems we have in the Middle east on Ol' Charlie Wilson's head as it is to place the cold war victory on Obama's head. Who the F really knows what would have happened if ol' charlie hadn't followed his d@@@ into afghanistan?(as portrayed in the movie). What would have happened had Roosevelt rode into Berlin on his high horse in 1936? IMO going back in time to ask ol' charlie and his brethern to ignore afghanistan in the 1980s is the same as going back in time to ask the Bush administration to ignore afghanistan in the fall of 2001. It would have been a fruitless exercise.

<b>Bill M:</b>

We may not agree totally on some things but we're close enough that people are starting to talk. ;)

Agree with all you say.

One minor point. You're absolutely correct on the Islamist problem. Those inside the then building beltway knew or should have known: <a href=http://www.gaffneyledger.com/news/2005-01-24/AP_News/040.html>(LINK)</a…;

The high and mighty were just more concerned with domestic politics than they were about the pretty accurate findings (and recommendations) that Committee produced -- many <i>before</i> Nixon left office.

That concern with domestic politics to the detriment of foreign affairs is the penalty paid for living in a very large and excessively wealthy nation.

And it is one more reason we don't do strategy well...

Ken, don't disagree with any of your points, so I assume we were simply interpreting Duck's comments from different view points. Although the EBO crowd will tell us that everything is knowable and measurable, I know we both strongly non-concur with that nonsense, so I agree with most of Duck's assertions, but one area I tend to agree with the article is that the Islamist threat to our interests shouldn't have been unknown (based on very recent history at THAT time), so assuming it was known and the decision was made to support them as the lesser of two evils, then it was a rational decision. Charlie Wilson in is a hero (to be frank, I'm jealous the adventure he lived), but it is a saga that IMO needs to be examined with a critical eye and the appropriate lessons drawn from it, which I think is the author's point.

As for Langley running roughshod over foreign policy, I'm sure they wish they had that authority, but they don't, and as you stated there are more naysayers (men who wear skirts) than can doers, but their is a difference between a rational can doer and careless one (I think it is wisdom). Bill M.

<b>Bill M:</b><blockquote>"You mistakenly (IMO) credit our support to the Muj in Afghanistan as the primary factor that brought the USSR down."</blockquote>I'm sure <b>Duck</b> can speak for himself but since he may be busy and I'm not...

I don't think that's what he said or implied; he merely posited that 'what-if's are, as you say, not a valid approach because the answers cannot be known.

Thus it seems to me he is implying that the 'what ifs' of the Article we're discussing are equally invalid -- and that article contains several 'what ifs,' most notably what if we had <u>not</u> gone to Afghanistan at all under two Presidents and what if Charlie Wilson had not adopted the cause...

This from one of the Author's responses above:<blockquote>Had someone played the devils advocate and bothered to tell leadership something they might not have wanted to hear, and done their job, someone would have told Carter and Brzezinski that their plan was full of holes and not let Rep. Wilson and the CIA run roughshod with US foreign policy.</blockquote>The final clause is an assumption and not a very smart assumption at that. There are too many players involved for one Representative and some Langley folks to run roughshod with US foreign policy. The first clause is also an assumption, that no one did in fact try to stop that train. Wasn't there so cannot say for sure but my limited DC experience is that there are far more nay-sayers than overly enthusiastic types. Unless the Author was there, I doubt he can back up his assertion. Had he said he wished or hoped that some one might demur, I could agree -- he implies that no one did and that, too is an assumption. We all know about assume... ;)

We have no clue what might have transpired.

<b>Other Jim</b> may be totally correct, it could just as well be all about Presley O'Bannon and Steven Decatur. Oh -- and let us not forget William Eaton. :D

Duck,

You mistakenly (IMO) credit our support to the Muj in Afghanistan as the primary factor that brought the USSR down. It definitely contributed, but there multiple factors that brought down their empire, and it was clear they were rotting from the inside out. Our support to the Muj in Afghanistan didn't do much to support the Velvet Revolutions in Eastern Europe, they were two separate issues. Not an accusation, but a discussion point, your comments sound like something a political spin team would drum up. They frequently try to connect dots that shouldn't be connected.

You focused on the what ifs, what about focusing on what we know. We knew that the Islamist problem was serious national security issue. We knew we were supporting them (the lesser to two evils). It wouldn't have taken to much analytical guess work to predict that the anti-Soviet efforts (far more involved than the U.S., so we can't take all the credit for the victory or the undesired second order effects) was uniting/globalizing the Jihad movement, and would lead to long term instability. On the other hand as some have correctly pointed out, the Soviets were the greater threat (at the time) and our intell community missed just how rotten their empire was, and it was on the verge of collapse with or without Afghanistan. Bill M.

To piggy back on other jim's point:

What if we had not intervened in A-stan in the 80s? Would the Soviet Union had gotten bogged down if the mujh had not been supported by us? Would Gorbechev come to power if the Soviet Union had been out of A-stan by 82 or 83 without a bloody nose? where would we today be if Gorbechev had never come to power?

Certainly the Gian P. Gentiles of the world would be happy. But would the rest of us? What about the peoples of the former soviet union and eastern europe?

An over-whelming amount to take in, digest, and respond to. Rather than attempt it at this late hour, I'll just throw out some questions -- more "churning:"

1) How far back should we go in casting blame for "unintended consequences?" Did the War against the Barbary Pirates in the 1800's start Muslim ill will toward the U.S.?

2) Were there "unintended consequences" to siding with Stalin in WWII? (Pat Buchanan certainly thinks so!) Should we have been steadfast in "opting out" of both world wars? Could we have, really?

Similar questions for numerous other points in history: What if we had ... ?

Trying to avoid these "consequences" in international relations is like trying to avoid them in life -- it'll never happen. In too many ways, we are on a winding, dark path with no clue what is in our way until we round the bend and catch it in our headlights -- or theirs.

I think too many have forgotten, if they ever knew, what a formidable threat Marxist Communism was.

<b>Andy:</b>

Don't muddle a good overly idealistic diatribe with facts. ;)

Though you certainly do ask a quite pertinent question...

Maj. Kotkin,

I don't understand your continued exclusive reference to the "CIA" and "Wilson." The CIA was implementing the policy of the executive branch. Charlie Wilson, and the Congress, were providing the funds to enable that policy. Neither Wilson nor the CIA created the policy, so I'm not sure why you expend all your powder on them.

For example, the decision to go through the ISI and the arrangements made to support the Mujahadeen had nothing to do with Wilson and were made before Wilson got involved. In fact, the decision to train and support fighters was made many months before the Soviets invaded - long before Wilson even knew there was a covert war in Afghanistan. So Wilson greatly expanded funding for a policy which was already in effect. You can criticize him or laud him for that, but placing the entire policy on his shoulders, including the blowback, is ahistorical at best.

I'm churned

Jim,

Understand your point; overall intent was to get people's grey matter churning about unintended consequences....although I still maintain that Op Cyclone was beyond grand strategy at the time and the CIA, through Wilson, were allowed to follow a plan developed through a soda straw.

But your point about Vasco de Gama is intriguing. With some research time, that would make an amazing episode for James Burke's "Connections" TV series. :o)

Has there ever been a COA that didn't have unintended consequences? Is Portugal to blame for this because of Vasco de Gama ended the Silk Road by outflanking the Middle East and Central Asia?

I am not convinced that back in 1979/1980 someone could have predicted the Taliban and Bin Laden. Both are obviously tied to the events of that time, but there could have been other outcomes. What if in 1990 the US made it clear to Sadam that we would respond to an invasion of Kuwait? What if we had not put troops in Saudi Arabia in 1990? What if we had stayed more engaged in Afghanistan after the Soviets left? Each plays a role in the US/UBL/Taliban issue. I am sure there are many others as well. Variables and alternative outcomes multiply so quickly as you move forward in time that I think it becomes impossible to predict events with the precision needed to justify blaming Wilson for the Taliban and the Taliban/Al Qaeda alliance. This does not mean his actions didn't play a role. My meaning is that in the face of uncertainty, complexity and limited information no one could have reasonably predicted the trajectory of events from 1980 to 2001. The analysis of that path is educational, but assigning blame is not.

Bill-

I'd add one minor point to the history. We should probably include the events between 1917-1928 that set the conditions for the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood to include:

- The dismantlement of the Ottomon Empire.

- Turkey's decision to become a modern, SECULAR, democratic nation-state.

- Europe's post-WWI exfiltration plan from the Middle East- drawing lines in the sand and hastily turning the power over to the people and declaring each colony a sovereign state to join the League of Nations.

Toby Dodge argued that these events set the conditions for an eventual civil war in Iraq, and I think that many of the unintended consequences from these actions taking during that time period are still being felt today.

v/r

Mike

I think it is impossible to contribute the raise of "modern" militant Islam to any particular event, but it probably safe to say that some of the major contributors were the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the writings of Qutb, the formation of Israel, Gaddafi support for international terrorism, U.S. policy in Iran, etc. The match that lit the inferno was Khomeini ousting the Shah of Iran in 1979. 1979 seemed to be the key year that the Militant Islam conflagration ignited.

Khomeini assumed power with a revolutionary agenda that is not limited to Iran. That same year radical Sunni militants seized Mecca creating an international stir in the Muslim world. The Saudi military with French commando assistance finally resolved the crisis, but with up to a few hundred dead and wounded from the fighting. Although these militants were anti-American, Khomeini effectively created the rumor that the Americans were responsible for the attack on Mecca. This resulted in Muslims around the world (first sign of global identity in modern times) protesting and rioting against the U.S., and resulted in U.S. Embassies in Pakistan and Libya being attacked.

Attention temporarily switched from the Americans to the Soviets when they invaded Afghanistan the same year. Muslims from around the world come to fight the evil Soviets, and thousands of Madrass popped up in Pakistan to provide the needed ideological fervor to keep the Jihad going, while the West and many Muslim nations provided funding to the Jihad. The Jihadists were supported by numerous Western nations because it is seen as an expedient method to weaken the Soviet Bear, yet an argument could be made (and was in the article presented by MAJ Kotkin) that supporting the Jihadists may not have been in our best interests (even without the benefit of hindsight based on recent history).

Like all international policy issues it was a complex decision (the world isnt anymore complex now than it was then) to provide the assistance, so Im not weighing in on whether Charlie Wilsons support was right or wrong (it was both), but I think the record shows that their victory gave them confidence that enabled a vision that defeating the West with Jihad was possible, since they just defeated the Soviet Superpower. Move fast forward to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which led to our persistent presence in Saudi giving militant Islam cause for declaring Jihad against the U.S. and West. In the end it is just the result of a series of events throughout history that led us to where we are today. In my opinion we clearly had the high moral ground in opposing the Soviet Union, and we had the high moral ground in liberating Kuwait, just as we had the high moral ground in invading Afghanistan after 9/11. The argument, if there is one, is just maybe we could have going about it smarter by developing a grand strategy that considered how to possibly mitigate the secondary effects of our actions.

Ok - let me wade through the argument and distill it to the primary points I was trying to make:

First, though, youre using 'bureaucrat in the popular definition. The actual definition, and the usage I meant it in, is valid and appropriate as well.

Ok, main points:
*First*, "<i> "It is not really insightful to trace events of today back to those of the past and conclude that previous decisions were wrong because of what we see now." </i>

Really? If theres a better way to learn from the mistakes of the past, then Im all ears. My conclusion was that the decisions which led to the implementation of Operation Cyclone were a mistake, and so I deconstructed the history and logic at the time to show it as such. Of course hindsight is an available luxury but I maintain that the environment of today was, at least better than partly, owed to the decisions made by Brzezinski, Wilson, and the CIA in 1978/9. The initial intervention, weaponization of the Pashtuns and Tajiks, and giving the ISI carte-blanche threw the equation out of balance; any other 'lack of follow-through theories are only hypothetical.

*Second*, Im aware of the genesis of the modern jihadi movement and understand that it was exported at least a quarter century before Charlie Wilson took to the scene. The Muslim Brotherhood, through people like Hekmatyar in Kabul University, began the radicalization process as early as 1950-60. But without arms from the US, China, and Israel, and further radicalization from the ISI and Saudi Arabia with our blessing, would the jihad have been successful? Would it have spread like wildfire across the region after the thousands of jihadis we trained and sanctioned then returned to their home countries and spread the myth?

*Third*, they never 'turned on us because they were never 'with us. Its a simple fact of mirror-imaging and an incoherent logic trail to assume the muj and/or the ISI would share in our strategic ends. They used us as much as we used them. We, literally, just chose to ignore that when it really mattered.

*Finally*, as the major is a strategist, part of my job is to: 1) as much as possible, ensure commanders understand the entire system into which they are injecting power and what the likely results will be, 2) that if something seems too good to be true (at the strategic level) it usually is, and 3) maintain a policy-strategy match and the balance of ends, ways, and means using documented grand strategy in the development of military strategy. As I read NSC-68, Operation Cyclone fails to keep that balance and that match. Had someone played the devils advocate and bothered to tell leadership something they might not have wanted to hear, <i>and done their job</i>, someone would have told Carter and Brzezinski that their plan was full of holes and not let Rep. Wilson and the CIA run roughshod with US foreign policy.

"Consider the 1979 attack in Mecca" A very astute observation. This event alone, though widley unnoticed at the time, had a profound affect on Usamah Bin Ladin in shaping his thoughts.

This was a very difficult essay to wade through because it never really seemed to present an argument.

It reads as one long assertion and in no way shows that the rise of AQ and the TB as a threat to the US could have been foreseen by anyone in the early 1980's.

Style and polemic effect also seem to take on more importance than analysis--for example a Congressman is not a bureaucrat even though he is described as on in this piece.

It is not really insightful to trace events of today back to those of the past and conclude that previous decisions were wrong because of what we see now. You have to consider the alternatives at the time also. If the Major is a strategist, he should be able to do this.

Final point: The jihadi movement was brewing before Charlie Wilson got involved with this. Consider the 1979 attack in Mecca and the context of the revolution in Iran. These guys probably would have gone to Afghanistan even had we not supported the Muj. They turned on us after the Gulf War despite our support for the Afghans. Would they not have also done so then if we hadn't provided that support?

Kha Nguyen,

Thanks for bringing up to relevant points. The Taliban was not interested in activities beyond its borders to my knowledge and they didn't attack the U.S., so your point is well taken. On the other hand there was amble concern about the Taliban violating human rights long before 9/11.

If I'm not mistaken AQ left Afghanistan after the conflict if I got my history right. Besides returning to Saudi, he subsequently went to Sudan and after our attack on Sudan he was asked to leave, which is when he returned to Afghanistan.

Probably worthwhile to capture all of this in a helpful chronology.

Davidbfpo,

"which appears to be missed here is that the US government and legislature failed to oppose him. Yes he was a character, as displayed in the film and above all he knew his way around Capitol Hill, so did many others - what went wrong?"

I'll offer a thought on this, since I was one of the most adamant anti-communists around during those years (I guess I was radicalized by todays definition of the term, but we called patriotic back then). Despite a vocal left during the Vietnam War, it was still politically risky for any politician to appear to be weak on communism, so Charlie in effect used the anti-communism card has level IV body armor. Who is going to oppose him when he is facilitating the killing of Soviets who are slaughtering innocent Afghanis? The USSR didn't simply pose a threat to our interests, but to our existence. Thus it was political suicide for any politician to appear weak against communism.

Nixon could go to China and open a dialogue because he appeared to be tough on communism. Reagan could do the same with the Soviets because he appeared to be tough on communism. On the other hand, imagine the reaction to Jimmy Carter if he did the same.

Like most nations we dont always use sound logic when making decisions, but rely heavily on the prevailing emotion of the time. I still wrestle with the pros and cons of Charlies War. Concur killing Soviets was good, but on the opposite end of the scale letting the Islamists win was also undesirable. Other options may have been to let the Soviets win (assuming that was even possible) and draw a line in the sand around the Afghan border. Support the Jihadists just enough to stay in the fight to allow the Soviets and Jihadists to kill one another for another decade (not sure how Pakistan would have felt about that), develop a coalition and take Russia on in Afghanistan (conventional forces join the Jihad), or as it played out pump enough aid into the Jihadists to defeat the Soviets. Im sure there may have other decisions, but Im not sure what they were.

Certainly the U.S. does strategy. The problem is our strategy can often snowball into the law of unintended consequences: in this earlier case, pre-Charlie Wilson, the original framework was to suck the Soviets into Afghanistan and keep them there. I dont believe there was any original intent to see them ever leave.

The rest is history and isnt worth rehashing save for one tidbit of unintended consequences, I may have missed in previous discussions: we allowed the Agency to set the stage for a privatized heroin industry of epic proportions.

Indeed - R.I.P. Charlie Wilson

<b>MAJ Kotkin:</b>

Thanks for the response. I take it then, that your essay is predicated on media foolishness... ;)

You say one thing in that reponse that's worth repeating:<blockquote>"...the point here is that idealists like Wilson/CIA/NSC at the time use that soda-straw through which to look at the world and then are surprised at the blowback."</blockquote>I cannot speak for Wilson but I have enough experience with the other two and enough recollection of the time to say you're laboring under a dangerous misconception. If there's one thing the CIA is not it's surprised at blowback; the NSC may be as it is often populated with civilian policy wonks who have no sense of what is real, my belief is that the NSC of the day was not as naive as some. Regardless, the point is that the trio you cited were NOT the decision makers. The latter two never will be and Wilson obviously cannot be ergo I again suggest you're shooting at a random tree or two and missing the forest -- if I can totally twist a metaphor...

Point being that the decision makers are responsible and other players often have dissenting views on the efficacy of an operation which are completely ignored by said deciders -- who can also be manipulative...

Never lose sight of that; it's important.

As for the 'we don't do strategy' like Brian I can accept -- but do not applaud -- your idealism which is as dangerous as was that of Wilson and is that of many others as Bill points out. I believe that a historical review will show that we do not in fact do strategy for the reasons I mentioned. The military problems; PCS, promotions to different jobs and retirements are a recent complication added to the basic and long standing elections issue. Those military consideration were mostly not a problem before the early 1960s. The Armed Forces in prior years were a factor that did give us a small measure of contnuity in policy (not necessarily strategy...). Current personnel policies and competition for promotion strongly mitigate against much continuity today.

Neither problem is going away and you are quite welcome to hope we can be better. My guess is you'll be sorely disappointed.

SOF Intel also introduces a dash of on the ground, in the pit reality, always highly beneficial and ignored at some peril.

Theory is a wonderful toy.

Thanks for all the comments; my only hope was to spur debate on this topic.

*Ken*: Yes, There might be a little scapegoating of the late Mr. Wilson for the actions of his peers, but there can be no doubt that it was largely him alone who sold this one-trick pony to the responsible elected officials and the Agency to kick the program into overdrive. Brzezinski is one of the other big players but mainstream media didn't try to make us fall in love with his idealism. ;o)

And as far as the U.S. doesn't "do" strategy, I agree that we caught a lot of lucky breaks in WWII, Vietnam was a classic example of how 'not' to do strategy, and in the Persian Gulf we really didn't need a strategy because it was Saddam Hussein we were fighting; but, really, the basic problem is not that we don't do it, but rather that we keep using that excuse to excuse critical thought. It's a safety net for intellectual rigor that I would hope we can be better than.

*Brian*: the quotes I used were directly out of NSC-68. Granted, Nitze took Kennan's ideas in a different direction, but as approved by President Truman, NSC68 used that exact wording. If its idealistic, it was only to better organize and equip ourselves to fight the Soviets, not an idealism that sanctioned proxy wars.

*Bill*: Thanks for making that connection to UW; I was wondering, especially on this board, what kind of response that would get. That was one of my primary goals: although I've got no direct experience in UW, the point here is that idealists like Wilson/CIA/NSC at the time use that soda-straw through which to look at the world and then are surprised at the blowback. It still happens all the time today wrt Iraq and Afghanistan in this decade and I was only trying to highlight the fact that events don't take place in a vacuum. A more systemic approach needs to be taken when trying to determine strategic COAs.

*Abu Nasr*: I'm aware of the timing; I'm also aware of Article 88 of the UCMJ. After his passing, I saw not one critical article in the press on what his death should really mean to us, as strategists, as planners, or as foreign policy wonks. There are some things that cannot be excused and left unchecked. If they are, we keep allowing things like OIF and the current incarnation of OEF to occur.

*SOF Intel*: Im not talking about the tactical level. While there I wont have the luxury to think about the big picture, but only hope that my superiors have ensured the operations I support and plan for nest inside the larger strategy. My point is that Strategy cannot be a knee-jerk reaction. I completely understand that things are never black and white (that was the initial remark in the essay). Pragmatism, especially tactically, might be required for immediate safety and security, but it must also be looked at very critically and not charged ahead into without appreciating the larger system.

MAJ Kotkin -

We'll see if you view things so black and white after you actually spend some time in Afganistan. Friends today arent our friends 5 years from now or 5 years ago. Doesnt mean we dont engage with them.

The timing for such an article is offensive in spite of whatever intellectual points are raised. The man has been dead for six days. Poor display of judgment major and even worse for the SWJ editors.

For those interested in paying their respects, there will be a memorial service on the 23rd at Arlington National Cemetery.

JLQ - I was aware of what is contained in your reponse. I suspect my original statement should have contained the caveat: understand who your middle man is, i.e. the ISID. Thank you. : )

Anonymous -- We <i>did</i> provide SA-7s for a while before providing Stingers; the mujahideen. They didn't work as well, natch; they were almost completely ineffective against fixed-wing aircraft, and likewise ineffective against the Hinds after some modifications to the helos. And though Rep. Wilson was the most prominent and important advocate of the Stinger's introduction, he was hardly the only one.

The author calls Rep. Wilson's foreign intervention ideas in Afghanistan/Pakistan "idealistic," in a pejorative sense. But what's actually more idealistic: utilizing a proxy foe against the Soviets or Maj Kotkin's insistence that we could have contained the Soviets by "gettiong our own house in order" and sitting around being a shining city on a hill? Just my humble opinion, but I'd say the latter is more idealistic, and probably more simplistic too. I'd say the proper description of Wilson's efforts is "cynical," but only about the same level of Machiavellian cynicism that was also a characteristic of some pretty significant historical world leaders.

I also think there's some selective rewriting of the thinking behind NSC-68, which was actually a fairly aggressive, military-oriented document compared with Kennan's original conception of containment. It's not entirely clear who was misreading who, but I think it's kind of misleading to say that there was this other model sitting the shelf, especially since authors of NSC-68 like Nitze were quite hawkish (advocated for more military expenditures, opposed arms control talks with the Soviets in the 70s, challenged National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR as watering-down the threat).

As for the condemnation of proxy wars, I guess all there is to say is, good luck with that. Maybe it's "cowardice," but international relations is not a medieval joust. Kotkin is right that we would do well to better consider second- and third-order effects of our actions, and this could have been done in Afghanistan; however, states are going to pursue their perceived interests (including the interest in undermining their enemies however they can) and proxy wars are highly likely to remain a part of that equation. I think rather than condemning it, the more useful recommendation for policymakers is to consider under what circumstances they should or should not be used.

Thought-provoking article though. Just my two cents.

Stinger Missles - Truth be known, Congressman Wilson could be a pain in the neck.

Had the Pentagon pushed back harder we probably would have supplied the Muj with the Russian SA-7 instead of the FIM-92 Stinger. Many were concerned about funneling it through the Pakistani ISID, and that the technology would end up elsewhere, which it did - Iran.

In addition, the SA-7 would have been untraceable back to the U.S.

Major Kotkin:

Thank you for the response, my questions were those that I had while reading through your article and I very much appreciate and enjoy getting to hear a clarification of your thinking.

I agree with it being incorrect to view the world through black-and-white googels during the Cold War, but I do see why individuals rationally had this perception.

I only disagree with this further comment:

"Did we not think the Soviets would figure out where the Stingers came from? Of course they would. Why unnecessarily raise the temperature and change the 'calculus as quickly as possible' when there was no imminent threat to warrant such a hasty action to begin with?"

I disagree with it because-at the risk of sounding like a highschool prom queen-we knew that the Soviets knew we were involved in Afghanistan. I think both sides knew this, and accepted it, as they had set a precedent since the 1950's for this type of action to be allowed.

For example: The United States did not directly attack China during the Korean War, the United States did not launch a large scale invasion of North Vietnam, even though Soviet weapons and pilots were killing Americans. A direct example from Afghanistan during this era would be the bombing led by the ISI of a Soviet base in Uzbekistan, and the quick firing of people involved in the ISI--suggestively due to pressure from the CIA and the Soviets (as reported in Bearden and Risen's The Main Enemy).

For whatever reason, the line was drawn at no attacks inside the Soviet Union. If the Soviets had signaled that they were to attack Pakistan if the Muj. kept attacking their troops from the N.W. frontier and the Soviet threat was credible, I doubt Rep. Wilson would have had found much support in the executive branch to continue killing Soviets. The same reason there was not much support for becoming involved in the Central Asian States then in the Soviet Union.

That said, I very much appreciate the dialogue and found your article thought provoking. I also understand and agree with your points on needing to instill foresight into strategic thinkers.

MikeF - I just don't think we were involved in the 1980's in Afghanistan to spread democracy, nor have I ever read that Rep. Wilson was interested in this. He seemed to revere the "warrior culture." He seemed to be at it to kill Russians.

@ Maj kotkins response to Jon

"Did we not think the Soviets would figure out where the Stingers came from? Of course they would."

well simple revenge...I mean they did funnel vast amounts of Surface to Air weapons, among others to the north Vietnamese, weapons far more advanced than mere stingers.

I know its a different geopolitical dynamic but to use school yard etiquette they threw the first "arms supplying" punch, you state "Why unnecessarily raise the temperature and change the 'calculus as quickly as possible' when there was no imminent threat to warrant such a hasty action to begin with?" Is true there was no imminent threat... just a memory of a low intensity conflict a decade removed from the USSRs in Afghanistan, in which they supplied our adversary with arms indirectly.

I dont think it truly was considered a escalation on our part, just a another move in the "game" that they had to respond to.

A few points:

1. It is an assumption at best that the Islamist victory in Afghanistan resulted in the fall of the Soviet Empire. I'm sure the expense of the operation contributed to their downfall, but much more was involved than this little proxy war.

2. It is also a pretty weak assumption that a Soviet victory in Afghanistan would have led to a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the USSR.

3. There is an assumption that if we provided humanitarian support after the Soviets pulled out that the Taliban wouldn't have taken over. Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't the Soviet's leave their puppet government in place? After supporting the Islamists we were then supposed to provide aid to the communist government? The Pakistani's were supporting the Taliban, so you had a State sponsored insurgency, which is hard to defeat unless you have a real strong position. I don't think there is anything we could have done to counter the Taliban at that time unless we turned on Pakistan.

4. I'm happy to see the saga of Charlie Wilson challenged, and still hear too many naive officers in our ranks state they want to be a Charlie Wilson. While this article didn't effectively capture the dangers of misapplying UW, Charlie Wilson's war (or his escalation of the assistance to the Islamist resistance) definitely took the policy of support to a new level, which if I going to believe what I have read was not supported by many in the Government at the time, because they actually had the foresight to see where this was going. The great Islamist revival didn't start with 9/11, but was an ongoing challenge to the Middle East (and Western governments who had interests in the area) since at least the late 60s. The Saudis were more than happy than to send their Islamists to Pakistan to join the Jihad, that way they wouldn't be causing problems at home and hopefully they would die there.

5. While the article may have missed the mark, it still opens a needed discussion on the pros and cons of using unconventional warfare to achieve objectives. There are times, but they are rare, when it is appropriate, but most of the time it creates more problems than it solves.

Jon,

While I completely appreciate and agree that Wilson and other Cold Warriors were stuck with a single lens through which to look at the world, the basic argument gets back to unnecessary and shortsighted intervention in and of itself. If the world was a more dangerous place during the Cold War than now due to MAD (which I disagree with, but anyway..), then why get into a shooting conflict, proxy war or otherwise, with that opponent whatever the stakes or situation? Did we not think the Soviets would figure out where the Stingers came from? Of course they would. Why *unnecessarily* raise the temperature and change the 'calculus as quickly as possible' when there was no imminent threat to warrant such a hasty action to begin with? The strategic importance of Afghanistan to us in 1979 was nil, as it was nil in 1839 to the Brits, and as it is again to us in 2010. The only difference among those three examples is that the Brits eventually realized the falsity of their strategic assumptions (at least by 1880) and changed their strategy accordingly. We have yet to realize the similar hollowness of our Afghan assumptions.

I would worry that someone, Rep. Wilson or otherwise, who would "do whatever was necessary" to combat a non-existential threat (not the Soviets themselves, but the Soviets *in Afghanistan*) has no concept of limited war and risks escalation to the extremes. A proxy war with a superpower was just such an unnecessary risk. That it worked and hastened the end of the Cold War is no excuse to have gone straight to the military option and create a hornet's nest in the interim and afterwards.

Short-term thinking and the results of the all-out weaponization and unbalancing of the Pashtun and Tajik cultures were the direct results of that idealism. The true crime was fact that he made us strike deals with Zia's ISI, the Saudis, and Hekmatyar so we could reach our ends. Assuming a common enemy with another state but without deeper common ground of shared interests between the two is false and dangerous pragmatism. In my view, it is only simplistic logic trails and blind ignorance to ignore realities and contexts while seeking any means to justify your ends.

I'm unsure where to start on this polemic. I guess to wonder what purpose it serves...<blockquote>"This essay is not simply an interpretation of history to condemn the legacy of a politician..."</blockquote>Ah. Then what was it designed to impart?<blockquote>"...To be sure, the causal events were not Mr. Wilsons doing alone. Two presidencies...</blockquote>True.<blockquote>"...Idealists such as Wilson ... such monsters as Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Somoza in Nicaragua, Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, or eventually a band of religious atavists in Afghanistan."</blockquote>Idealists do strange things. <i>All</i> of them. Really...<blockquote>...Because Mr. Wilson and his CIA brethren could not even begin to conceive of the complexities and nuances of Afghan culture, power bases, and politics, he doomed his own effort to failure..."</blockquote>I'm quite unsure that's correct. Having spent some time nearby shortly before and knowing a couple of folks who were involved, I think that assessment is rather naive and probably simplistic. It also neglects the fact that those people warned not Wilson but the Executive agencies involved of some of the future problems -- and were told to hush and keep pushing. IOW, I'm not sure you're trying to castigate the right players in that opera. Did you get the program at the door?..<blockquote>"The history of Charlie Wilson should serve as a warning against ever using "the enemy of my enemy..." 'theory' of foreign relations ever again. It is never so simple and clear cut; it is the Strategist's easy way out which only serves to create more long-term problems than it seems to solve in the near-term."</blockquote>Aside from the simple fact that available options deemed suitable are determined in the eyes of the decision authority -- who may have a different worldview than you or I -- The basic problem is that the US doesn't do strategy; never has for any length of time. Can't do coherent long term strategy when the players change at 2, 4, 6 and 8 year intervals and people like Charlie Wilson can skew the system. Been doing that since, oh, 1794 or so...

Not likely to change, either. Between elections and PCS moves (not to mention retirements and promotions), it's just hard to do long term thinking... ;)

While I think your purpose was to warn against short-termism and allowing certain actors to change the script, I think you were unduly harsh on Charlie who was also a manipulatee and I still am unsure of the potential benefit of the essay to effect any change in the way we operate. Due to those factors, elections and such including PCS moves...

Jon-

I meant my first post was disjointed...not yours.

Mike

I agree with the first commentor jon on this one, you make a good point but you make it from a different perspective than was available in the late 80's.

"Mr. Wilson, as much as he derided our lack of follow-through and commitment to what he started in Afghanistan leading to its collapse in 1991, did not see that it was he and his fervor to contain the Soviets that actually began the long slide to those very events and, in the view of the author, 11 September 2001 itself."

You say the above qoute as if it was worse that we lost several thousand lives on 9/11, as well in the low intensity conflicts to follow, compared to Millions if not Billions that could been lost in a MAD scenario.
you come off in you article that you would have almost preferred the US supported the USSR in its "invited" takeover of Afghanistan, rather than oppose it. and you views of an isolationist non intervening policy of the US during the cold war is idealist at best.

You are are right the notion of "the enemy of my enemy..." is a bit off, but imagine if the rest of the government had not been short sighted and, decided to invest in the development of Afghanistan, which I am fairly sure charlie wilson had advocated, would we be in the same situation we are now...I don't know. But I do know blaming the last 20 years of US policy both the most recent failures /entrenched foreign involvements, and early successes (to a certain degree)entirely on Congressman Wilson is a dick move on your part.

It feels as if it is an attempt to scapegoat the entire last decade of Foreign intervention squarely on the shoulders of Charlie Wilson, and I for one disagree with you thoroughly.

But nicely written article overall and it its always good to see a unpopular viewpoint represented.

That post was as disjointed as our foreign policy. Let me clarify...

Are we really going to be arrogant enough to believe that we can influence the hearts and minds of all these broken nations with a panacea of democracy and free-market capitalism injected without any direct responsibility and accountability or ownership of the problem?

That's like saying, "it's okay private that you lost you're weapon....we'll just give you a new one. No harm, no foul."

Mike - I completely see that point. But I do think the contextual issue is that policy makers were doing everything possible to end the threat of another Cuban Missile Crises. This meant defeating the soviets, not necessarily communism (Why North Korea and Cuba exist). For them any future small wars as a third tier effect were preferable to nuclear confrontation (especially when these effects were not guarantees). I just don't want my point to be confused with condoning rampant idealism.

Jon-

After the earthquake in Haiti, I had to caution many friends and family members that volunteered in Haiti with Christian orphanages from intervening.

"But Mike, we want to DO something. We want to help," they'd state emphamatically.

"I know. I feel you, but right now, you will only hurt the effort. What are you going to do? You'll probably end up robbed and broke, stricken with illness, or just simply being another mouth to feed and another vagrant that we have to shelter...Don't do anything yet. Let the US Army do it's job," I'd answer.

This speaks to Jeremy's greater point that he has emphasized in his other writings. We feel the need to help others, but we haven't had a real strategy to cope with the rest of the world since we dismantled the Nazi regime and Japanese empire.

Jeremy-

I agree with your ideas, but I think you're approach is off. In this article, I think you put Charlie Wilson in a 2010 context, not the 1980's disregarding the perceived threat of the Russian Horde. In reality, not many people cared about the Afghans then, and not many of us really care about them now. Do the Afghans really care enough about themselves to try and better their way of life? I don't know, but I'm pessimistic. Maybe we need to stop trying to make them care and put the responsibilty on them instead of trying to promote and influence another welfare state.

Maybe we should start asking the questions,

"What are you going to do to help yourselves?"

"What responsibilities are YOU going to assume to better your family, tribe, and country?"

instead of feeling this need to try and help and beating ourselves up when they refuse to help themselves.

The more I consider the Haiti issue, the more that I'm persuaded that we are only concerned by the proximity of the disaster and the celebrity intervention. There is not much concern for the daily tragedies in Africa or the widows of Diyala province.

v/r

Mike

When we look at the perceptions of the actors (like Rep. Wilson) in the context of the Cold War, dealing with unsavory individuals and taking the easy way out was preferable to preventing mutually assured destruction. In other words, actors chose rationally to do what ever was necessary to change this calculus as quickly as was possible. I would rather be in today's situation then a situation where both sides (particularly elites) are assuming that we are on the edge of destruction, making it a real possibility. So I would counter Major Kotkin's argument that actors did not consider third tier effects, but that they did and saw that those effects were not as bad as the current situation. So it appears those who fought the end of the Cold War are not to blame; instead, the strategic drift in the years between 1989 and 9/11 that prevented us from adequately dealing with the second and third tier effects should be the real target.

That said I would appreciate a response from Major Kotkin as to why my assumptions are not the case.