by Michael Miklaucic
Download the full article: The Tea Fallacy
Shock and awe don't leave much room for empathy. The doctrine, technically known as "rapid dominance" may have devastated the military capability of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in short order, but America's failure to win the peace in either Iraq or Afghanistan with overwhelming military force has galvanized a profound re-thinking of the concept of war, the process of peace, and the challenges of failing states. This is evident in national strategies, doctrines, policies, manuals and the quadrennial defense review, as well as countless other official and unofficial statements, both military and civilian. Reflection on such a scale on so many levels and across such a broad range of disciplines and agencies is rare and impressive. The output has been dramatic, the implied self-criticism penetrating, and the insights promising, but there is a potentially a profound misunderstanding at the heart of much of this that could result in failure, defeat, and death.
The central epiphany of the new thinking is the recognition that the object of war, at least of the kind of wars that have been prevalent in recent decades, is the people. This message comes through clearly in such documents as the recent military field manuals on counterinsurgency, stabilization operations and unconventional warfare, not to mention General McChrystal's recent strategic analysis of the Afghanistan war. The population dimension has also been re-discovered by diplomats who lament the loss of our previously robust public diplomacy capacity. For the development community the focus and main constituency for their efforts has traditionally been the population, though on occasion that focus has been lost in the halls and offices of ministries throughout the developing world capitals.
Download the full article: The Tea Fallacy
Michael Miklaucic is Director of Research and PRISIM Editor for National Defence University's Center for Complex Operations.
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Comments
My apologies for interjecting the obvious amidst what appears to be a group of higher level contributors, but I'm pretty sure many people in the military understand that a more balanced approach to targeting is necessary. However, arguing against those who took a leap of good faith in fostering an ally in order to generate effects that they felt were necessary or beneficial or just right, well thats probably why I see alot of inaction/indecision from where I am right now (deployed to Afghanistan). These types of decisions and their effects are much more ambiguous and as a result less measurable, which in my humble opinion is why ground commanders sometimes avoid having to make them. The arguments present in this article might exacerbate the problem.
Outlaw7,
Ok, back on track. As I stated, that struck a nerve.
You saic,
"Swarming can also take the form of multiple SVBIED attacks from multiple avenues of approach. If I recall the Arab translation correctly they indicated initial fire fights to distract the US personnel from the actual avenues of approach as the trucks were being driven towards the facility-trucks detonated approximately 3-4 minutes apart--- estimated explosive weight was 1-1500 lbs."
Indeed, that is the TTP they employed in many patrol base attacks within Diyala. Out of the approximately 20 PB attacks during my time there, only 2 were successful in overruning the base (Zag IP station 10 Nov 06 and Buhritz IA compound Dec 06). The others, while explosive (literally) on video were marginalized as the various IA and US units simply rebuilt or reoccupied and held their ground.
After we killed our local bombmaker, we found a treasure trove of these videos (some published/some unpublished). Through careful examination, looking for key terrain features (radio towers, mosques, cemetaries, etc) we were able to accurately identify the location. Oftentimes, the enemy was merging different attacks into one story for their narrative.
Another interesting note to consider is the profile of the suicide bomber. As late as March 07, the martyr was a top-selected recruit from the training camps. By April 07, that supply ran out as many footsoldiers began to quit. AQ switched to using mentally handicaped teenage boys. After that supply dwindled, they finally started recruiting and employing teenage girls.
v/r
Mike
Outlaw,
You asked,
"IF you doubt the effectiveness of the TTP ask the 1st Cav based in Diyala about two major attacks in 2007/2008 on their COPs and the killed and wounded they suffered."
This statement touched a nerve with me. My squadron suffered 8% KIA and 25% WIA during the Battle for Diyala. Tommorow is the third anniversary of when I lost 4 boys to a suicide bomber that penetrated my interior lines in the town of Qubbah. In the context of that fight, I am one of a handful of subject matter experts. I know that terrain (physical and human) better than I know my hometown. To whit, that video is not Sadah. That attacke occured in downtown Baqubah. Sadah is to Baqubah as Spring Lake is to Fayetteville. What you watched is propaganda.
What follows is something that I have not yet published yet as I haven't seperated the emotion from the story.
Now back to swarming. I would simply call it a counter-attack. At the time, we had cleared the DRV of the ISI and established our main patrol base in the former al Qaeda HQ in Zaganiyah. We were now in the Hold phase attempting to seperate the people from the insurgency, dismantle the remants of the shadow gov't, begin conflict resolution between the Sunnis/Shia, and transition authority back to the GOI.
The enemy was desperate as they lost their main base, immediate control and tacit support of the populace, and training areas. A big difference exist between what they wanted to do and what they actually did.
What did they want to do? Their COA was to destroy my patrol base in Zag, force us to leave, and re-establish governance.
What did they do? Hit a temporary PB in Sadah and blow up the Blue Bay Bridge.
Why the difference? By April 2007, through counter-intelligence, we effectively penetrated their communications network. In this game, we were one step ahead of them. Every time they mobilized for a catastrophic attack in Zag, informants gave us the time, location, and method. I'd counteract with a mounted/dismounted curfew and subsequent raids on the safe-houses.
The enemy was forced to shift focus to disruption attacks on softer targets.
After the attack on Sadah in April 2007 that killed 9 paratroopers and wounded 20, we brought the hate arresting Sheik Septar, the leading AQ sheik, killing a lot of footsoldiers, and finally killing the primary bomb-maker. By late June 2007, we broke the enemy's will to fight and violence in my village went from 12 attacks a day to 1 every 3 days.
Then, we began combat advising the IA and transitioning authority to them while working with representatives of the Ayatollah Sistani's conflict resolution initiative.
Did we respect our enemy? Yes.
Did we understand our enemy? Yes.
More importantly, and this is the real learning point, in this particularly situation, we decided that the enemy would fear us more than he would support his cause to the point he would quit or die.
v/r
Mike
Mike--- the Babqubah battle video released depicted the two separate truck SVBIEDs attacking from two angles after being driven into Baqubah, the destruction of the main building and the medivacs landing and taking off. With running commentary in the background which talked about the attack planning cycle.
Swarming can also take the form of multiple SVBIED attacks from multiple avenues of approach. If I recall the Arab translation correctly they indicated initial fire fights to distract the US personnel from the actual avenues of approach as the trucks were being driven towards the facility-trucks detonated approximately 3-4 minutes apart--- estimated explosive weight was 1-1500 lbs.
Camera distance to the medivacs as the camera shots were taken through a destoyed window and out of the backside of what appears to be an apartment maybe 50m.
My experience indicated field camera teams especially in Diyala almost always had two involved.
This particular video was released via www.hanein.info (as they still are as of today)approximately a month after the attack and carried the video camera date time stamp of the actual attack date.
Swarming and variants thereof were also used on the American Frontier by a number of tribes, with varied levels of success. If we're going to start talking about learning from history, then maybe we could look at that period.
In most cases where swarming or variations of the same were successful (the Little Bighorn is perhaps the most famous, but there are other examples), the key to swarming's success lies in the failure of the attacked unit to respond properly. In cases where swarming-type tactics failed (Beecher Island, Wagon Box Fight, Apache Pass) the units that were attacked responded forcefully and refused to come apart under the force of the attacks.
Mao didn't invent swarming, nor was it confined to the Far East.
<b>Outlaw 7:</b>
Apparently I was unclear. I and others are not unwilling to accept that history can teach and we've probably read and applied as much as you and still other folks. We simply draw different conclusion than you from the same history. I for one do not believe I have the only correct answers.
Being aware of Mao's phases before John Kennedy got elected and having served in the ME and traveled there and in South Asia (as well as in SEA) some time ago I have some familiarity with their combat methods and abilities -- factors which have advantages and disadvantages.
As I said, I also do not believe that pop-centric COIN will be successful in Afghanistan. Nor do I believe that it <i>or any other magic bullet</i> exists. An amalgam of methods based on plain, old, simple METT will suffice to achieve a generally acceptable conclusion -- which is all anyone <i><b>ever</b></i> achieves in FID and COIN like fights. There will be no win or lose...
Outlaw7,
If you are referring to the attacks in Sadah in April 2007, then that was my unit attached to 3/1 CAV. I wouldn't characterize it as swarming.
In fact, I sat down with the al Qaeda leaders 72 hours prior to the attacks to issue an ultimatum. They didn't listen. I wrote about it in "Love and Hate."
The video of the patrol base attack was never published. As I sent two platoons to reinforce security at the site, my boss gave me priority of all CAS/UAV assets. I used them to track down the videographer. We killed him seven hours after the attack as he attempted to exfil back to Zaganiyah.
There are other videos from PB attacks in Diyala, but not the one that caused significant casualties.
v/r
Mike
Ken---your comments are exactly an example of what the core problem is--namely a certain unwillingness to accept that maybe History can teach us something if we just open our minds to it.
The SWJ released today the guerrilla warfare article written by the Pakistani LTC and the
SWJ board released the FP article "The New Rules of War" http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/
the_new_rules_of_war?page=0,0
IN that article if you really read between the lines the author is in fact discussing OPEN SOURCE WARFARE and tying it as well to swarming which is an integrated core feature of OSW.
Swarming became the core Sunni insurgent attack TTP especially practiced by the Islamic Army of Iraq and Ansar al Sunnah in 2007.
IF you doubt the effectiveness of the TTP ask the 1st Cav based in Diyala about two major attacks in 2007/2008 on their COPs and the killed and wounded they suffered. THAT TTP was in fact placed onto the internet complete with pre attack briefing to the attack teams together with the actual attack videos.
Since I am assuming based on OSW the Taliban have picked up on it as being effective against US COPs which explains the two major COP attacks with related US losses even though the military tried to blame themselves and had no comments on the TTPs of the attacking Taliban elements.
Swarming is by the way a very old far Eastern
battle tactic. Read the 2000 RAND commissioned study (by DoD)"Swarming on the Battlefield" by
Sean Edwards.
NOW take the concpet of "open source warfare" (OSW) and tie it to the discussion caused by the MAJ Gant article which some would call "open source defense" or from my experiences (the CIDG program) and you will fully understand my positions.
NOW tie OSW and OSD to the LTC's article on guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan and tie all of it to the quantative analysis previously talked about here which provided peer reviewed validation to the concept of OSW/OSD and now you have the model for UW and the confirmation that what MAJ Gant has been discussing is but one way to address the problem of guerrilla warfare/OSW in Afghanistan.And based on the current situation on the ground probably the only way forward.
It also draws into question the validity of the population centric COIN being anywhere close to successfull.
On the other hand:<blockquote>"Somehow contributors to this blog have somehow forgotten Mao and his three phases of guerrilla warfare. Being between phases 2 and 3 does not bode well for the MC population centric approach."</blockquote>There is a distinct possibility that many contributors to this blog have not forgotten Mao or his three phases, rather that they believe that no one, Mao included, has all the answers and that hewing to a rather doctrinaire belief in "three phases of guerrilla warfare" in <i>all</i> insurgencies may be unwise.
While I agree with your assertions on certain lacks of knowledge being exhibited by some commanders, it is distinctly possible that the omission of the three phases is not directly relevant at the tactical level and the bad guy TTP are to a fair extent irrelevant at the operational level. As long as there are those at the relevant levels with appropriate knowledge there is no particular problem...
Far more bothersome is the US troops' routine inattention to basic tactical principles evidenced all too often in open source graphics. Even more worrying is the apparent command culture of risk avoidance.
All that said I do agree that the emphasis on the cities in Afghanistan is as unwise as would be rigid adherence to a belief in phases.
The problem, of course is that the nation is too large and the borders too porous for the Coalition troop strength available to exercise any form of lasting control over the vast rural areas. They can, though, counter Mobile Warfare IF it does erupt but then, that means accepting more risk...
George---to again focus your attention to the question of cities vs villages and the denial of sanctuaries which with the MC strategy is being totally ignored and which in fact supports the concept of "one tribe at a time".
Somehow contributors to this blog have somehow forgotten Mao and his three phases of guerrilla warfare. Being between phases 2 and 3 does not bode well for the MC population centric approach.
"Taliban guerrilla operations can be likened to those conducted by Mao Tse-tungs forces in resistance against the Japanese Forces in late 1930s. Mao wrote in 1937, "In guerrilla warfare... avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. The guerrilla facet of Taliban Warfare is tactically identical to that of Mao, even though, Pashtun are predecessor rather than successor to Mao in guerrilla tactics. They have used the same scheme of tactical maneuvers against various invaders for centuries.
Mao has given three stages of the pure guerrilla warfare facet of the Protracted War: Guerrilla Warfare; Mobile Warfare; and Positional War. Taliban are over with the Guerrilla Warfare stage and are now in Mobile Warfare stage.
I would argue and make the case that many Army Cmdrs currently working in Afghanistan do not even understand Mao's three phases and to an even larger degree cannot recite the common far eastern battle tactics used almost daily by the Taliban.
George:
If this is true then explain how a city/population centric focus is countering a
Taliban full out guerrilla war? Wondering just why MC picked a population protection concept when as I have stated over and over the war is being fought in the villages and rural areas for the "heart and soul" of Afghanistan.They are winning "one district at a time" and the only way to counter that is "one tribe at a time".
"This is an important issue and draws the interest of military strategists. Taliban are waging a proper insurgency in Afghanistan wherein they have structured a classic counter-state all over the country. According to a new map of Taliban presence in Afghanistan (Figure-1) issued by the London-based International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) in October 2009, Taliban have now permanent presence in 80% of Afghanistan, up from 72% in November 2008, According to ICOS, another 17% of Afghanistan is seeing 'substantial Taliban activity.2 NATOs unclassified briefing gives even clearer picture. Taliban have a shadow government in 33 out of 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Figure-2 shows the how Taliban Movement in Afghanistan moved from sway on 11 provinces in 2005 to 33 in 2009.3 In the words of Admiral Michael Mullen, Taliban [are] getting pretty effective at it [governance]. They have set up functional courts in some locations, assess and collect taxes, and even allow people to file formal complaints against local Talib leaders."
"Taliban are fighting their war in the interior of the country, away from the major communication centers, taking advantage of the rural conditions. However, urban areas too are not out of the reach of their suicide bombers
It is essentially a guerrilla form of warfare marked by hit-and-run tactics in rural areas and IED blasts in urban areas in order to embroil the state / international forces bit-by-bit, lower their morale and gain moral as well as operational ascendancy."
I've not fact-checked this presentation, and don't personally know the owner. But I do know and hold in high esteem several other people who know this person, and who - in turn - vouch for him. Being a hard-ass, I'd have to rate him F-6. But, among friends, I'd go with a B-2, with caveats.
The photos and text speak for themselves. It's relevant because it's indicative of how we "get played." And, unfortunately, it's not as uncommon as we would wish.
I've asked the guy who posted this on his FB page if I can capture it and post it at SWJ. I don't feel like I'm violating his privacy or intent by posting this link because he posted the pics as viewable by anyone.
http://www.facebook.com/album.php?aid=202371&id=746271258&ref=nf#!/albu…
So sayeth <b>Outlaw 7</b>:<blockquote>I just wish big Army would understand that what worked in Iraq will simply not work in Afghanistan unless there is one heck of a learning curve.</blockquote>Seems to me based on these threads and what Will Rogers and I read in the papers that 'Big Army' is <i>far</i> from alone in their need to adapt to METT-TC.
Who knew it was that hard...
Brother Ian,
I most certainly appreciate the sarcasm... injured soul that I am... but you continue to miss the point. I very much agree with much of what you have to say. It appears that we have read a number of the same authors. Would you like me to regurgitate those valid points you made on the "Tribes-Stupid" thread and that I wholeheartedly embrace, share, and agree with? I could shout it to the world if youd like.Let me know. I also agree with much of what that BAMF George (your words) has to say but lets make this not about what we disagree about about what we could agree. What exactly do you believe is worth praising in Major Gants account? I just think that it is sad that you refuse to acknowledge that Major Gant et al are not telling anyone that this methodology is the only method on the street. Neither has David Ronfeldt, or anyone that I know who has actually worked with tribes or solidarity groups and is published on the subject. You persist in this endeavor. But then admitting this fact would weaken the argument against the tribal option and might even make the Major a sympathetic figure.
Each situation is different, is it not? Maybe we should let our population centric COIN advocates in on this little secret since it appears that the Maoist interpretation of revolutionary warfare and distinct pattern of behavior is advertised as universally applicable everywhere, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. But then, lets be honest, population centric COIN is a kindler-gentler cover for changing the social order of things... is it not? So the revolutionary approach might actually be what the doctor ordered.
Wow, the delicate flower that I am feels your pain when smart people have difficulty dealing with communities that are constantly changing their group identity and membership and are lacking in authoritative leadership. Could it be that since we are unable to nail down one authoritative leader, membership or group identity we instead seek to create them? State agents (like you and me) are always forced to identify, and if need be, to create clear political boundaries in place of the multilayered, and constantly shifting group alliances, allegiances and membership. Identity creation is critical when it comes to linking these vague identities to the political apparatus of the state. Are we not attempting to create a strong central government through the application of a kinder-gentler population-centric COIN approach? So how does it play itself out?
I actually believe that you have to create identity groups and labels. Without them our population-centric COIN approach will surely fail. Is it possible that our population-centric COIN approach at times seeks to change the existing patterns of social relations, reinforce existing patterns, reorient them by shattering some and rebuilding others from scratch? How will we succeed if there are no identifiable groups? We could always try to atomize all of Afghan society into its component parts and in the process create the new Afghan citizen? Good luck on that one. Could it be that the needs and policies of our kindler-gentler population COIN approach actually requires that we create solidarity groups because tribes dont fit the vision of a strong central government? God forbid, we empower the wrong tribe or solidarity group for that matter; itll be regime change for sure. Lets shatter the lot to protect the regime. As far as my unscholarly mind sees it, the argument against tribes has more to do with creating an appropriate solidarity group so as to make this whole strong central government stick work. Indirect rule, technical blueprints to build a new Afghanistan and a bit of social engineering to tweak the indig are all part of the campaign plan. Not that there is anything wrong with that but for once could we admit this fact instead of continuing this inane my thing is bigger than your thing conversation. We actually get it that there is a lot riding on winning this debate ... a lot of things.
Ian, please know that I respect your intellect and agree with you and your brethren have said concerning anything and everything. You have won this debate hands-down. Your rapier wit has disarmed me and your sarcasm has cut me deeply. I am bleeding. I withdraw with my head hung low for I am unable to sustain this intellectual confrontation any longer; it wilts my flowered soul.
Fruit, I need fruit (Time Bandits).
Weak man hugs,
v/r
MAC
All guerilla wars are similiar in nature and must be fought as such.
The Mexican drug cartel example which also is very similiar to the Taliban movement in scope of power, terror, drug money, and the intimadation of the local population is also something to study as it relates to UW.
"Three years into Calderón's escalation, an increasing number of Mexicans may now conclude that the only path to greater peace may be accommodation with the cartels. With their ability to apply intense pain and also distribute their massive revenues within some of Mexico's neighborhoods, the cartels are in a good position to sway public opinion toward a truce. Calderón sought to establish the state's authority as supreme. Juárez could instead show him what defeat looks like."
RC---the problem are the cities --not the solution which MC is seeking.
The war as a whole will be won or lost in the villages and for the "hearts and minds" of the villagers" not for the residents of cities---it is the cities that have the focus right now ie water, electricity, some sense of security, and some sense of unity. BUT as long as the guerilla war is being feed by the villages Katie bar the door.
This piece out of Newsweek clearly shows what I am talking about--which basically is stating that after 6B USDs later there is really no ANP and if one followed Iraq events things started calming down when Iraqi's perceived the police to be "fair" and "competent".
"They don't listen, are undisciplined, and will never be real policemen."
"Poor marksmanship is the least of it. Worse, crooked Afghan cops supply much of the ammunition used by the Taliban, according to Saleh Mohammed, an insurgent commander in Helmand province. The bullets and rocket-propelled grenades sold by the cops are cheaper and of better quality than the ammo at local markets, he says. It's easy for local cops to concoct credible excuses for using so much ammunition, especially because their supervisors try to avoid areas where the Taliban are active. Mohammed says local police sometimes even stage fake firefights so that if higher-ups question their outsize orders for ammo, villagers will say they've heard fighting.
One could have taken this right out of VN where I often purchased BAR ammo from the local market place as it was being sold by the local RVN soldiers.
Corruption is the key and I do not think as George does the Karzai central government really cares as a majority of the civil servants are making as much money as they can before the Taliban knock on the doors.
So were is the difference to the local tribesman between the perception of the local Taliban "trying" to provide some sense of normalacy and the "corrupt" local policeman who in their eyes IS the government--how would you choose?
I just wish big Army would understand that what worked in Iraq will simply not work in Afghanistan unless there is one heck of a learning curve.
Actually the crux of the problem in both Vietnam and Afghanistan is that in both cases we chose to support and prop up a centralized government that lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. Or a series of three such illegitimate governments in the case of Vietnam.
The fact that the west also drew an arbitrary line through the popualce of Vietnam to create a UN sanctioned sanctuary in the form of the new state of N. Vietnam is a bit of western map work that I suspect was largely moot to the people of the region.
Were both rural-based inusrgencies? Sure, and equally, so what. Insurgency may be fought among the people and draw sanctuary from the remote areas, but its cause and cure more often than not lies in the captital.
As I recall we never addressed the problem in the capital of Vietnam and after years of engaging the symptoms of the problem, we finally called it quits and left. I'm not saying its not important to engage the symptoms, nor that on does not create critical shaping and supporting effects from engaging the symptoms; but I am saying if you think you will "win" (rather than merely suppress)the insurgency by such actions you have mis-read your history books.
George---from under the cover of a smoke grenade.
Since one has to assume you were not a VN vet maybe reading this article might lead one to learn something from history.
Take out the name VN and substitute the name Afganistan and then substitute any remote area of Afghanistan for a remote VN name and then substitute any tribal name or minority in Afghanistan for those in VN, substitute the VC term for Taliban, AND NOW just how close is history to reality.
Beginnings of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program
There were two principal reasons for the creation of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program. One was that the U.S. Mission in Saigon believed that a paramilitary force should be developed from the minority groups of South Vietnam in order to strengthen and broaden the counterinsurgency effort of the Vietnamese government. The other was that the Montagnards and other minority groups were prime targets for Communist propaganda, partly because of their dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese government, and it was important to prevent the Viet Cong from recruiting them and taking complete control of their large and strategic land holdings.
One major study of the situation in Southeast Asia concluded that in 1961 the danger of Viet Cong domination of the entire highlands of South Vietnam was very real, that the efforts of the Vietnamese Army to secure the highlands against Viet Cong infiltration were ineffective, and that the natural buffer zone presented by the highland geography and Montagnard population was not being utilized properly to prevent Communist exploitation. The government was, in fact, failing to exercise any sovereignty over its highland frontiers or its remote lowland districts in the Mekong Delta where other ethnic and religious minority groups were established. This lack of control deprived the government of any early intelligence of enemy attacks and any real estimate of Viet Cong infiltration. The Communists, on the other hand, continued to exploit the buffer zone, and there was always the danger that the insurgents would use this territory as a springboard into the more heavily populated areas.
The Vietnamese had not only made no attempt to gain the support of the Montagnards and other minority groups but in the past had actually antagonized them. Before 1954 very few Vietnamese lived in the highlands.
SO George convince me it is all about the cities---the sanctuaries for the Taliban are in the villages and valleys as are their reinforcements, arms shipments, drug smuggling, training camps etc---AND if my geo history class was correct do not the valleys and villages all point towards the major cities?
MC picked the fight of protecting the population centers as he knew that the US population would not approve the ratio of 15 US per 1 Taliban. SO up the ante by using the TETs to interdict and harass the Taliban and if luck holds out actually gain control of previously denied areas.
ACTUALLY this is already being done via the USMC efforts that is causing some problems for MC as they are in effect substituting their troops for tribal fighters and are being successful at it.
SO George as the smoke slowly disappears prove me wrong!
George---if he was in Bonn for the talks and returned with Karzai then I know your friend as I was also in Bonn during that period--so the world is a small place.
1. An you think he is not corrupt--if Karzai ever leaves Afghanistan he will leave as well is what some people are saying. Kind of reminds me of the Shiite politican we so trusted who drove us into Iraq with his fake intel and who is now the Iranian gatekeeper in Baghdad
2. If he is as great as you think he is-- being a district chief taking care of his people, tying them closer to the central government, and defeating the Taliban should be his single most goal for the people of Afghanistan--right?
Not sure how sitting in Kabul and traveling the world drives that goal but stranger things have happened in Afghanistan recently.
Not sure why you are fighting the concept of TETs as hard as you are--unless you are a hidden HTSer, but hey competition drives the global market place of insurgencies and especially Army doctrine.
To those who make the decision to support the TET in country concept good luck and stay safe.
To MAJ Gant from a former SF--good luck and know that the concept as the Germans say has "hands and feet".
Popping smoke as this coversation is going nowhere and it started initially as a good thought provoking one and I was hoping that someone somehow had learned something from the VN war and applied it to Afghanistan--even George has somehow missed it. But again maybe George is not a VN veteran.
Mac, such an injured soul you are... I, for one, apologize for ever disagreeing with you--I never would have if I'd know how it would hurt you so.
If George is who I think he is, he is a BAMF. This is a true statement I assure you. Even if you don't agree with him, his arguments are well worth taking into account, much more than mine, which were ignored by Mac as is proper. Jim Gant's are worth taking into account too, by the way; I just don't believe that applying his method everywhere will replicate what successes he might or might not have had.
Brother Gant,
Is it really worth the effort any longer to engage the nay-sayers in honest dialogue? What are you actually learning from these folks? How to take an intellectual sucker-punch? How is your craft improved by the likes of those who watch the fight from the hills and after the battle is over climb down into the valley to take some photographs and to criticize? Talk about mirror imaging, especially when they attack you personally for sharing your flawed experiences; accuse you of chest-thumping and possessing an egomaniacal personality.
These folks make some valid points but then it isnt really about winning a debate is it? They have no practical advice for the folks on the ground except to tell them that whatever they need to be doing cant be done and that what they are currently doing will fail. I am not sure that the naysayer approach will get us out of the Afghanistan any sooner or with a semblance of our frontier prestige intact. That is the goal is it not?
It matters not that they have selected you as the bogeyman of choice and as target to vent their personal frustrations. You are in good company. The same technique was and is still used against Montgomery McFate.
Tell me brother, who are these people? Failed HTS folks who are frustrated because they couldnt understand much less change the military corporate culture; loyal opposition or something different altogether? Conspiracy theories are fun. Who else disagrees with your regime change approach? It is so easy to hide behind anonymity these days. Keeping your enemies close and tripping up your friends is a tactic of choice in these types of power games. A gentleman hides his sword with a smile.
I personally no longer see how this conversation supports the kids in the field. Instead of sharing with us every reason why something cant be done, why not help us develop appropriate methods to get the job done. Really, if so smart, where are the solutions? Maybe its just too much to ask but if you cant get these folks to help the cause, dont waste your energy, passion and time trying to change them. Break contact and focus on those who want your assistance. Unless of course, in true infantry fashion, you actually enjoy the mud-slinging :-)
Strength and Honor, Brother Gant.
v/r
MAC
well said; and graceful.
I wouldn't worry about the debate becoming negative. These are academic and intellectual debates. And when academics and intellectuals discuss ~ anything ~ it can get heated. Especially when you throw blood, treasure, and national sovreignty into the mix.
When I get the chance I'll buy you a beer and tell you what I found "flawed" in your story. It may well be just how or what you told there; and it may be nothing. But I didn't mean to make it fodder for a broader discussion in a public forum.
I think your post is a chapeau for this thread.
GPB,
Hope all is well.
On this blog I stated,"If anyone is being "manipulated" as you say, I believe it is our "academics" who have been manipulated by a group of well-educated, dari speaking Pashtuns who haven't lived in a village since the 60's."
I clearly did not intend this remark to be used as any type of ammunition against someone like "Habib Yaqubee" or any other Afghan-American. I do not know him, but if what you say is true, then he has been a warrior who has carried a gun in defense of his great people and is also educated. I would be stupid and it would be egotistical (even more egotistical than I am comfortable with!)not to fully listen to and understand his perspective and gain his insight.
And you have clearly demonstrated a very strong knowledge of your beliefs and have backed them up with valid concerns and arguments. I have no beef with you or anyone who makes counter-points and does not believe what I do, even when I disagree with them.
I have found it impossible to be involved in healthy debate on this subject any longer as I have become a polarizing figure within the debate, that has, I have been told become negative.
That was never my intent. I stated clearly that the paper was just MY perspective on what we did and what I believe we could do again on a large scale. I am not naive enough to think that TE could win the war as a stand alone "strategy"...
I do not know exactly how to answer the claim that what I experienced or wrote about my time there was "flawed". I had many men there with me, I have the OPSUMs from our CONOPs there, I do not doubt that there will be both americans and afghans that will say, that is not what or how it happened, but I would venture to say that none of them that would say that were there.
Of course, if we go back today and sit down and ask them what happened, there will be a 90% agreement on what I said, but who knows about the other 10%? I can't figure out my 10 year old daughter, much less what was going on in the mind of several thousand pashtun tribesman in 2003. It is my belief that in their minds (in 2003) the "war" still hung in the balance. It is harder now to get "straight answers" from anyone - on either side of the aisle - against or for TE - or american/afghan.
Do we expect those "afghan advisors" that I am talking about in Kabul to say,"Yes, tribal engagement is a very important aspect of what we are doing...we need to do it on a large scale? We really need to bring the tribes into the central gov't?"
I may have over-estimated the amount of corruption in the gov't at this time, but I don't think so.
So, once again, sorry. Another bad habit of mine, not knowing when to stop talking...
Take care. I have no personal beef with you or your afghan friend. My best friend in the world is an Iraqi. He was my interpreter for 15 months over in Iraq and I brought him and his wife back to the states and they lived with me and my family for a year until they got on their feet. So, yes, I am fully aware of the goodness and bravery of many of the Iraqi and Afghani people.
PS The only reason I brought up the "killing" thing was that the author of "The Tea Fallacy" implied (or so I thought) that I didn't understand the power of fighting and killing. The truth is, that if I do understand one thing, and one thing only, it is this.
Have a great weekend.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
Geez! What's with the fascination with killing people? You guys trot-out your war experience like high schoolers showing scars or comparing penis size.
What you know or doubt about me and my service record - while the implication is annoying - is immaterial, and not a discussion I'll be drawn into. As is the fact that you've led men and boys into battle. I'm not interested in comparing war records. And I ~ really ~ don't intend to run-down what 316 did in AFG (along with dozens of other ODAs throughout the country).
But what I find interesting and really frustrating is that you - and Gant - refer to your experience with boys dying as somehow validating your intellectual arguments on strategic initiatives for AFG. To be blunt, it doesn't, and it's almost irrelevant.
BLUF: We need to find ways to bring adequate stability to the significant population centers of Afghanistan IOT generate enough security for GIRoA to take root. We then need to sustain that stability and security as we nurture and shape the emergence of a credible State. Because in an unfortunately short period of time, we'll be leaving. And we'll have done more harm than good if we've created a host of CDI/AP3/TE forces around the country without a capable and nominally credible central government to deconflict them and keep them from deginerating into the 1990's all over again.
I also disagree with your assessment of where the war will be won or lost. I think it'll be won or lost in the minds (not hearts) of the Maliks, the Mullahs, the Maulavis, and the Shuras. Some of them do stay in the village, but they aren't as parochial as your statement suggests. Furthermore, I think you're off with respect to the balance of influence/power as regards urban-v- rural populations in Afghanistan.
Things I think military leaders must work hard to keep in mind:
1. Afghanistan isn't Iraq.
2. The South and the East aren't Afghanistan (Pastuns aren't everything; though I'm sure they'll tell you they are)
3. The Taliban isn't our enemy; only those who take up arms against GIRoA or us (the insurgents are to the Taliban as the KKK was to good Southern Baptists).
4. Any insurgency - and certainly this one - are quite a bit broader than military victory, and require quite a bit more than military strategy.
5. Killing is just a tool in the service of IDAD/FID; But one with irreversible consequences.
PS Outlaw - It wasn't a language class. Just the first pages of the Cliff Notes version of Afghan Culture for Dummies. Chapter II is don't sit in the chair when your counterparts are sitting on toshaks.
You seem to have a full-out hardon for my Afghan colleague: I'll call him "Habib Yaqubee" for simplicity (Habib was my driver's name).
He speaks 4 languages; was in AFG through the Muj period, and was medevaced to the US by the US during that time. I'd be willing to bet he could match "killing stories" with any of the snake-eaters in this debate (if that really matters to you for some reason). He participated in the Bonn talks, and returned to AFG with Karzai. I have personally been with him in all regions of the country, as well as PAK, Iran, and the 'Stans to the North.
I'm not sure why you think sticking him in a district job would be useful:It's like asking a shit-hot Staff Officer to be Captain-of-the-Guard. And one of the few things we all seem to agree on is that, in AFG, the local governance really does have to be local; he's not.
George--we will probably never agree as I have asked 14/15/16 year olds to "die" for their country and support their adivsor's decision to attack when we needed to attack. This is exactly the same thing MAJ Gant is pushing on the TET concepts.
And I have held and comforted those 14/15/16 year olds when they were dying. Doubt seriously if you have had the same experiences.
Maybe this imprints one brain on what MAJ Gant is trying to do and accomplish.
Try to build a nation, country, or whatever one wants to call it when large areas of that nation, country, or whatever one calls it is in fact under control of a very real shadow government capable of holding their own even against us. I am assuming that you believe that Marja is totally "pacified" and there is not a single Taliban left in the area or are we simply treading water in that we see it "perceived" to be pacified---ie refer to yesterday's NYTs article.
This war will not be won or lost in the cities it will won, lost, or influenced in the villages/valleys leading into those cities---he who controls the most terroritory will win this one and if it is the TETs that MAJ Gant speak about then so be it--I tend to believe they will be there long after the RA has left.
Last time I checked the remote villages and valleys are the sancturaries of the Taliban--not the cities.
So yes I have my peeves and you failed to respond to one of most my pet peeves.
Outlaw - We're just not gonna agree I don't believe... From my posts you can probably tell I'm engaged in and supportive of State-building as a sustainable legacy for when we, the international coalition, depart: Believing, as I do, that AFG is a Nation without a State (in contrast to Iraq, which was a State without a Nation). From your posts I infer that you seem to support reaching past the Westphalean state into the heart of the nation, and bonding with and building upon some more foundational aspect of Afghanistan. It's a credible perspective, and perhaps (probably) better than mine, were it not for the resource and time constraints under which we are operating.
I think I've done something of a disservice to the notion of TE by associating it only with Jim Gant's story. Gant makes the logial error of generalizing from his specific (and, to my mind - based only on his published story - somewhat flawed) experience to the general of all (or even other) tribes in AFG. But even without the baggage of his story, I think TE as a strategic concept is doomed, and need cite no other literature than that found on the TEW website for data.
On the other hand, I think TE as a tactical and operational tool is vitally important and under-utilized in AFG. But I do still assert that we've been doing TE since the days of the ELJ & CLJ; where tribal leadership were engaged by UNAMA heads of office individually and collectively to discuss how selection of delegates to these massive Jirgas would be done.
Jeff: GPB as a nom de guerre has been all over the world; in MilRec Centers on almost every continent, and even stayed in some damned-fine hotels on occasion! No harm nor foul in being taken-in! *grin*
Irie All,
GPB
George---thanks for the language class.
Still stand by the fact that if he is at the ministry level is he or isn't he corrupt--if he is not corrupt then he probably is not making much headway in anything at the ministrial level other than making a good salary and living in a relative peaceful neighborhood.
But hey I guess one can fight the Taliban from a major city without having to leave it.
My pet peeve are those nationals of a country mired deep in an insurgency enjoying the abilities of traveling back and forth, being able to breath fresh air in countries where there are no SVBIEDs, rocket attacks, IEDs, intimadation, beheadings etc. making comments concerning those that are willing to take chances on the ground with villagers/tribesmen who will never have the same opportunties.
No doubt the new Government district representative of the first "government in a box" is not the criminal many in the German media make him out to be and based on yesterday's NYTs article he is definitely not the person who has not left his compound since taking over his new district. It has to be a case of mistaken identity?
I would say maybe the ministrial member might offer to volunteer to take the position if it proves correct that we placed a convicted criminal into the position.
Just a side comment from someone with a long record of having trained, armed, and led irregular forces in an UW environment.
So yes I definitely understand where MAJ Gant is coming from and think that in fact his experience springs from the SF experiences gained out of the CIDG program and I wish him all the luck and oh yes--- I do think he knows when he is being played.
George,
IDAD is a bit of "lost doctrine" these days. Tossed in the bone pile of "something the army thought about insurgency in the 60s" in favor of "what the army learned about insurgency in Iraq."
IDAD is a sound concept, and to be honest I think of it as fitting up under the FID umbrella. But as we all know, reasonable minds can, will, and do differ on the entire family of U.S. insurgency-based doctrine. The current mix of old and new is a crazy quilt of overlapping and gapped concepts read and applied by a military with overlapping and gapped perspectives of what the same means.
It really is time for a (shudder) new manual. One ideally led by SWCS but with TRADOC firmly on board, that combines, compiles, deletes, refines, etc down to one rather simple lean product. Recent concepts like IW and SFA aren't bad, they just aren't necessary and contributed to the layering. I nominate Dave Maxwell to lead the project! :-)
kdog & Outlaw: The Afghan in question has had 2 tours as a ministry official in Kabul; and, while there travelled pretty extensively through the country. As noted elsewhere on SWJ ("It's the Tribes; That's stupid" I think), he's cast his lot with the central government rather than the district. But he's earned his Afghan "Tab" for facing physical risk and mind-numbing stupidity, cupidity, and bureaucratic dysfunction (and, in my humble opinion, the latter is more challenging than the former). I'm not going to out him; it was Chatham House rules (and, oddly enough, he wasn't on the programme at all...)
And Outlaw... a bit of a linguistic pet-peeve: An "Afghani" is a unit of currency, not a reference to the people of the country. They're referred to as "Afghans." Here's a decent link with some of the debate over the word http://www.slate.com/id/1008397/ But I rather expect we have bigger issues than etymology...
Jeff: Thanks for your kind words, but... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_P._Burdell
RC Jones: I liked your post. I think what sets apart those I respect from the rest of the class is that they intrinsically understand that they're probably being played. And take that into account in their planning and execution. I especially liked your observation about FID & UW... Though Im more than interested in why we equate FID as the obverse of the UW coin, rather than IDAD. I think it would enrich our debates and capacity greatly if we relegated FID to its rightful place as a single element of a successful IDAD campaign, and put our blood, treasure, and intellectual energy into the paradigm of IDAD rather than FID/UW.
I didnt mean for my post to be an attack of anyone whos been in theatre; whether under arms or not. I have only respect for the steely-eyed killers among us. But, on the other hand, I ~ really ~ dont like the "Ive killed people so listen to me" argument. Its superficial, counter-intellectual, and - in this case unnecessary; as Gants article stands on its own.
Anyone in Afghanistan who does not think they are being played by their respective counterpart does not deserve to be in Afghanistan. I suspect that Major Gant, and GEN McChrystal for that matter, both understand that very well.
That does not mean that you do not engage, but as suggested above, it does mean that you keep your own national interests and reasons for being there in the first place in mind at all times.
I've come to the position that Afghanistan may perhaps be the easiest country in the world to conduct UW in, and conversely the most difficult to conduct FID in. It is a culture of all or nothing. If you team is in, you are in. If your team is out, you are out. So there is always a ready team in the wings for the UW actor to operaitonalize to take down the team that is in. Anything we can do to help create structures to mitigate that "all or nothing" split should be a strategic priority. From my read of the Afghan Constitution, it actully reinforces this dangerous construct, ensuring corruption and instability.
Just one guy's assessment. You don't need to hate the players or the game, but you damn well better try to understand the rules of the game in the land you are playing it.
Mr. Burdell- are you the old fart from Georgia Tech? That's a term of endearment, I would never insult a WWII veteran. In all of my history readings WWII was my favorite war. Back then you really were fighting for our country. First (if you are the now 89 years young George P. Burdell) thank you for your service. Second, I'd like to send you to the following link:
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2010/01/gifts-of-honor-a-tale-of-two-c…
This should answer your question as to whether MAJ Gant got played.
God Bless You Sir, you old fart!!! :)
George:
Really like those Afghan-Americans who can travel the world, but chose not to remain in their respective villages and take the Taliban on themselves.
The local Taliban would be quick to define that person a "spy" for the Americans if I understand the local culture.
But who knows he might in fact be a drug dealer, local member of a NGO, prays five times a day, a local businessman with import/export ties and corrupt, a local business and not corrupt, tied to the Pakistani intelligence, tied to the national government and corrupt, tied to the national government and not corrupt, local warlord, an actual Taliban cell member/leader, or even working for OGA or both, or all of the above and he still travels the world---maybe that is why he is still alive in his village and not executed by the Taliban.
But again who really knows the Afghan culture and that includes Afghani's?
George P. Burdell,
Regarding the Afghan-American that made these comments, was it one of the speakers at this conference?
http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/themes/defence/conference.aspx?confref=WP1…
The program:
http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/conferences/WP1022/pdfs/WP1022pr…
If so, who was it?
Major Gant,
Please lay-off the chest-beating. It makes it hard to read the intellectual arguments (yours among them) through the fog of testosterone...
No one has, to my knowledge, challenged your masculinity, or the bravery, sincerity, dedication, or efficacy of you or the men of ODA 316. But "been there, done that, got the T-shirt" doesnt translate automatically into cultural knowledge that trumps the rest of us. With your well-received article, youve thrown your ideas into the intellectual arena; now intellectually man-up and let the intellectual games begin!
Regarding the notion of how deep our cultural understanding of Afghanistan goes, I work from the mantra of "When you think youve figured-out a relationship within Afghan society, think again." I think it goes without saying that you and your team had the best possible understanding of the interests of the populations with whom you work: To do otherwise would be derelict. But that doesnt mean that you had absolute understanding (which would be quite impossible, give your limited exposure); or even adequate understanding. And, as party to the discourse in question, youd have no real way of knowing how much you know, and how much youd need to know in order to avoid being played by locals who are incredibly savvy. My guess is you probably got played, to at least some degree. But dont take it personally; I think ~everyone~ in the international community gets played by our Afghan counterparts to some degree.
At a conference in Wilton Park, UK just a week or so ago, a very credible Afghan-American cited your paper, saying (roughly) "I read Gants paper, and realized that was my village & district he was talking about. And his understanding of the situations there is not - as he suggests - adequate. In fact, they got played almost as badly as the intel guys who bombed a convoy because someone told them it was Taliban, only to find out it was their sources enemy. "A direct quote from him was "If this is going to be the new strategy you guys adopt in Afghanistan youre going to finish in worse shape than the Soviets."
So your ideas arent invincible. Im looking forward to the intellectual free-market of ideas considering your article, along with "My Cousins Enemy... ", among others next week. But dude, youve got to thicken your skin a bit if youre going to take the intellectual lumps that are bound to come your way.
DE OPRESSO LIBRE dude...
PS A Final thought: You said in your SWJ note "I and my men DID have the tribe we were working with best interest in mind. PERIOD." Really? Did you go native? Because I ~think~ the mission is to understand their interests, but to use that understanding in pursuit of ~US NATIONAL INTERESTS~...
Mr. Miklaucic,
I have no problem being cited in your article at all. As a matter of fact, I appreciate it. I do however wish you had read it a little slower.
ODA 316 did a lot of killing up and down the entire Konar river valley, north into the Pesch and Korengal Valley. A LOT.
We were in the words of a great marine, writer and reporter "The strongest tribe"...
I don't really think that any military professional believes we can win the war over a cup of chai.
As far as the "My Cousin's Enemy is My Friend" I have personally talked to many an expert who does not agree with any of the major claims put forth in that report. It is funny to me that it would hold any more value than any other document on tribalism out there. I could cite twenty-five that counter everything that is said there.
I and my men DID have the tribe we were working with best interest in mind. PERIOD. WE did not lie, abuse, "pay-off", bribe, or twist any of the truth to them.
And I wouldn't do it this time either.
I nor you can control anytime line for how long we would stay there...but I can tell you this, I for one could say, "Chief, I will be here as long as they will let me stay and I will fight right next to you until I am killed or they drag me out of here..."
So qoute my paper, but please do not think you can get inside my head, or the men that were there, or the men I would take with me again. They are a truly remarkable group of men, who do understand empathy, relationship building and, oh by the way...killing and the power that killing brings to the table.
If anyone is being "manipulated" as you say, I believe it is our "academics" who have been manipulated by a group of well-educated, dari speaking Pashtuns who haven't lived in a village since the 60's.
I didn't see any of them in the Konar or the Helmand when I was there.
And lastly, Sir, I am not trying to sound disrespectful. I am passionate about what my men and I did, and what we could do again.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
Granted, a fair amount of Machiavellian cynicism should be applied to Afghanistan; after all, human beings can only be counted upon to act in their own interest.
Still, I think it's a straw man argument to suggest that Petreaus and company believe that chai meetings and courtesy alone will sway the local population's mind. I think our leaders are well aware that political war is ruthless.