American Guerrilla: A Review

I invite all readers to visit Amazon and read the latest comments posted by Helmsing and most recently by Joe Hone.

The tragic irony (or humorous irony, depending on your point of view) is that Paddock seems to have suffered more PR damage than Guardia. I, too, have read "Army Special Warfare" and "American Guerrilla," and I agree that they have much in common re the roles of Col. Volckmann and BG McClure in OCPW. Paddock, you call Volckmann the "chief architect" of the SF concept...so it seems pretty reasonable to me that he could be the Father of SF. You also admit that, under McClure's leadership, "the thrust of the organization was on psychological warfare."

But Dr. Paddock, your reaction to Guardia's book is what I find the most disturbing. You posted two identical reviews on Amazon and the Small Wars Journal. If that wasn't enough, you later published this SAME review in the Sept-Oct issue of "Special Warfare Magazine."

And you call this "professional responsibility?" (quoting your latest rebuttal on Amazon)

Paddock, you deliberately targeted cyberspace so you could reach the widest possible audience for trashing Guardia's book. Following it up with the same review in a print magazine is completely unnecessary.

You claim that you have no "axe to grind?" If your review had stayed on the internet, I might have believed you. Reposting it again in print, however, removes all doubt. But wait, "Both ARMY and SPECIAL WARFARE published my reviews of Robert Kaplan's book...and Doug Stanton's book..." Then why haven't you posted these reviews on Amazon/Small Wars as well? Obviously, you haven't attacked Kaplan's or Stanton's work with the same ferocity or redundancy that you have with Guardia's.

Disagreeing with another author's work is one thing; making a shotgun blast of reviews across multiple internet sites and magazines is something else. I won't accuse you of "professional jealously," as others on this forum have done, because I think you're response to Guardia's book has been decidedly UN-professional.

My comments are in response to Robert Helmsing's post on August 18, 2010.

Helmsing contends that Guardias book and mine (US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, 2002) have much in common, particularly in our treatment of the contributions of Russell Volckmann and Robert McClure. Actually, our books are quite different in both purpose and scope.

Guardias book focuses primarily on Volckmanns impressive guerrilla warfare exploits in the Philippines during WWII, with one brief chapter at the end in an attempt to establish him as the "true father of Army Special Forces." He began his research with Volckmann as the key subject. His book is biographical, in part, by focusing only on Volckmanns military service.

My book is not a biography of McClure. Its purpose was to determine the origins of the U.S. Armys capabilities to conduct psychological AND unconventional warfare. That search took me through World War II, occupation of Germany, the Cold War, Korea, Fort Bragg, NC, and an Epilogue on Vietnam. It is primarily an institutional history. I did not begin my investigation with McClure as the major subject. In fact, I had no knowledge of him prior to my research in the classified files of the National Archives.

During my research, McClure emerged as the key figure in the creation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) in 1950. As early as 1946, from assignments outside the Pentagon, he had been urging officials in the Army to rebuild a psychological warfare capability essentially dismantled following World War II. After being called to the Pentagon to head up the OCPW, he directed the rebuilding of the US Armys psychological warfare forces, the creation of an unconventional warfare capability (Special Forces), and the development of a center at Fort Bragg for both of these capabilities.

Realizing that his background lay primarily in psychological warfare, McClure recruited men with behind-the-lines experience to draw up plans for what eventually became known as the "Special Forces Concept." Among these was Colonel Russell Volckmann, McClures key architect in the development of these plans. I did not imply, as Helmsing claims, that Volckmann "would have been ignorant and lost without McClures direction...one would get the impression that McClure was an omnipotent 'super-hero who just brought Volckmann and Bank along for the ride. That is a mischaracterization of what I have said in my books, articles, and lectures.

Notwithstanding Volckmanns important role in this process, McClure selected Colonel Aaron Bank from among his OCPW staff to command the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg. Volckmann certainly had the credentials to command the 10th, but McClure, for whatever reasons, instead chose Bank. Had McClure chosen Volckmann for the honor, ultimately he probably would have been throned as the "father of Special Forces." Beginning with a handful of men at Fort Bragg in mid-1952, Bank did a creditable job of organizing and training the 10th for deployment to Germany, leaving behind a nucleus for the 77th Special Forces Group.

And this statement by Helmsing is puzzling: "Also in Daves comment [COL Dave Maxwell], he speaks of regional orientation and how it influenced Banks selection as the first SF group commander. In Guardias book, however, we see that Volckmann was the SpecOps director for the U.S. European Command. I would think that this job placement speaks volumes on regional orientation and Volckmanns utility there."

More accurately, heres what Guardia says in his Epilogue on page 190: "After Volckmann left OCPW, he completed a course of study at the Army War College and went on to serve as the Director of the Special Operation Division, U.S. European Command." In other words, his assignment in Europe came well after McClures selection of Bank to command the 10th, thus played no role in the decision.

After retirement from the Army, Bank continued to be active in Special Forces activities, and was selected as its first honorary colonel of the regiment, remaining so until his death at age 101. In further recognition of his services, by Congressional decree he became designated as the "Father of Army Special Forces," and the JFK U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School Academic Facility was named in his honor.

In addition, the Army officially recognized McClure as the "Father of US Army Special Warfare" in a ceremony at Fort Bragg in January, 2001. Yet Guardia does not acknowledge this fact, even though the event took place nine years prior to publication of his book.

I reiterate these points because of Guardias statement that "It would also not be appropriate to bestow McClure with the title 'Father of Special Forces." Well, who has tried to make that case? I certainly have not. Instead, the Army recognized McClure in 2001 for his contributions to both psychological operations AND Special Forces.

Linked to this is Helmsings comment, "If McClure should be seen as the patriarch of Special Forces, or 'special warfare, or whatever youd like to call it, thats fine. His vision led to the creation of OCPW, the Armys first office for unconventional warfare. But Guardias book shows that it was Volckmann who provided the meat and bones for the concept. And without Volckmanns expertise, who knows where the whole OCPW endeavor may have gone?"

First, Helmsing disregards the distinction between "Special Forces" and "special warfare" that Ive reemphasized above. Second, OCPW was not just an office for unconventional warfare; the office also encompassed psychological warfare. Third, while Volckmanns expertise was clearly important, other OCPW members also contributed to the development of plans to create Special Forces. Indeed, the process in OCPW that led to the development of this concept was lengthier and more complex than that portrayed by Guardia in his eight-page chapter on Special Forces.

Finally, in addressing Helmsings rhetorical question, it would be more accurate to ask where the "whole OCPW endeavor" may have gone without the vision and direction of Robert A. McClure, and his success in selling the concept to senior military and civilian officials.

Al Paddock

I agree. Too bad that the Filipino is overlooked and/or underappreciated. While I can't speak for the accuracy of the 22,000-man guerrilla force, one thing I noticed in "American Guerrilla" is that Volckmann speaks very highly of his Filipino warriors and fought to get them the recognition they deserved.

If you haven't already, I would pick up a copy of "American Guerrilla". Definitely a book that doesnt cast the Filipino in a trivial light.

Interesting discussion. I suppose I'll weigh in with my assessments.

I would take care not to accuse the author of "shoddy scholarship." As noted in his Introduction, Guardia apparently spent three years writing and researching this book and his argument makes sense. Having read both Paddocks and Guardias work, it seems that "American Guerrilla" and "U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins" have more in common than Paddocks scathing review would have us believe. The main difference is that one book heaps more praise upon Volckmann, while the other gives more praise to McClure. Therefore, it seems that this loggerhead is more the result of two men who differ in their idea of which man (Volckmann or McClure) deserves the spotlight.

On the merits of his research, Guardia does a fine job, I believe, in presenting his thesis that Volckmann created a private army that contributed significantly to the defeat of the Japanese in North Luzon. Guardia does not, mind you, say that Volckmann did so single-handedly or attempt to paint Volckmann as the sole reason why the Japanese Army fell. While most of the commentators on this thread agree that Guardias "Philippine" chapters are well presented, it seems that the only real contention focuses on his final chapter (Chapter 12 - Special Forces).

First, let me address some of the comments posted above. Paddock quotes from his own book that "Volckmann was THE principle architect" of the Special Forces concept. This sounds like more of an endorsement of Guardias thesis than a refutation. Regarding the memoranda authored by Volckmann (according to both authors, there were several), Paddock downplays Volckmanns involvement by asserting that it was done under the knowledge and direction of McClure. If McClure was such an "expert," why did he bother to bring Volckmann on board?

In fact, for every one of Volckmanns accomplishments in OCPW that Guardia highlights, Paddock is quick to qualify that McClure is really the one who deserves credit (never mind that Paddock extolled Volckmanns contributions in the "Special Warfare" book years earlier). On one hand, Paddock says that Volckmanns contributions were vitally important and that McClure NEEDED him for his expertise in guerrilla warfare - expertise that Psy-Warrior McClure lacked. Yet on the other hand, Paddock ties every one of Volckmanns contributions back to McClure. The further implication is that Volckmann would have been ignorant and lost without McClures direction. Based on Paddocks review and comments, one would get the impression that McClure was an omnipotent "super-hero" who just brought Volckmann and Bank along for the ride.

Second, we all know that the Special Forces has a set of "founding fathers" and that each man in OCPW had a hand in creating it. But is it really so difficult to consider that Volckmann may be the true "Father"? Whether Bank has a "Congressional decree" that awards him the title is beside the point. If we look at Volckmanns contributions (as highlighted in BOTH books) we see Volckmann left an indelible imprint on the special forces. Also in Dave Maxwells comment, he speaks of regional orientation and how it influenced Banks selection as the first SF Group commander. In Guardias book, however, we see that Volckmann became the SpecOps director for the U.S. European Command. I would think that this job placement speaks volumes on regional orientation and Volckmanns apparent utility there.

Third, all the men involved in OCPW (McClure, Bank, Volckmann, Fertig, etc.) made great contributions to the program. I learned that by reading both books. If McClure should be seen as the patriarch of Special Forces , or "Special Warfare", or whatever youd like to call it, thats ok. His vision lead to the creation of OCPW, the Armys first office for unconventional warfare. But Guardias book shows that Volckmann provided the meat and bones for the concept. And without Volckmanns expertise, who knows where the whole OCPW endeavor may have gone?

In short, it seems like Guardia and Paddock will have to agree to disagree. The arguments on both sides have their merits, but I suppose the reader of both books will have to decide which man is more deserving of the spotlight.

I just wanted to congratulate Mike on finishing and publishing his book. Although I am from a military background, I do not know much about the topic of his book, but I am sure that he did a great job writing it.

I had resolved not to engage in this discussion. However, if Mike Guardias father believes that it is necessary to post L. Mendozas comments from Amazon.com to bolster his case, I believe that it is appropriate to post my responses on Amazon. Theres an old adage that is relevant to this discussion. It goes something like this: one is entitled to his own opinions on a subject, but not to his own set of facts.

Comment 1:

How to begin in answering comments that misrepresent my own, particularly when you charge that my "criticism of the author and his work warrant suspicion"? Ok, I'll try to focus on the major points on which we disagree.

First, I read Guardia's Introduction carefully. In my view, he should have listed all of the works that he consulted there in his bibliography, which I understand to be standard practice. However, I simply added a couple that he did not mention in his Introduction or bibliography, particularly Bernard Norling's "The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon." And, I continue to believe that Volckmann is better known among scholars and special operations personnel than the author states--in part, frankly, as a result of my own writing and lectures in a number of fora. Visit the Special Forces training facility at Camp Mackall, Fort Bragg, and you will see a photo of Volckmann displayed, along with Aaron Bank and Robert McClure. And, the commander of that Special Forces training battalion told me that each soldier in that course is given a copy of my book--which also contains Volckmann's photo.

Second, I mentioned Wendell Fertig primarily because he was another key individual in McClure's OCPW staff who had substantial guerrilla warfare experience and contributed to development of the "Special Forces Concept". Book reviewers, I believe, have license to broaden their comments if they have some relevance to the subject.

Third, McClure, in fact, made a personal visit to Walter Reed Hospital to recruit Volckmann, assuring him that he was interested in developing a behind-the-lines capability. And I discuss in my book the manuals authored by Volckmann. However, the point I was trying to make here is that McClure developed an early interest in an uncoventional warfare organization like that in the OSS because of his association with William Donovan. That took place in World War II. And, early in his organization of the OCPW, McClure sought the transfer of unconventional warfare proponency from G-3 to OCPW. This does not in any way detract from the value of Volckmann's experience to McClure's efforts.

Which brings me to your fourth point. McClure was responsible for oversight, direction, and decision-making of every major policy issue in his OCPW--both psychological warfare and Special Forces. He also was the vital point man in "selling" his plans to senior military and civilians. Most of these folks he knew on a first-name basis because of his long service with them. He was the boss. My 31 years in the Army and a few years in the corporate world told me how the chain of command works.
This in no way denigrates Volckmann's contributions to Special Forces, and I've extolled those in books, articles, and lectures for many years.

Fifth, and on a related point: I don't understand your comment that I didn't recognize that "most historians have traditionally called Bank as the 'Father of Special Forces.'" Of course I do. There's an academic facility at the US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School dedicated in his name.

Sixth, I also don't understand your comment that I "practically shoot myself in my foot" by saying in my book that I gave Volckmann credit as "THE principal architect in McClure's employ for the development of what eventually became known as the 'Special Forces Concept.'" I stand by that statement, but it does not mean that Volckmann was the sole participant in the development of these plans. He was not. This is hardly "shooting myself in my foot"--an unfortunate phrase.

Seventh, at this point in my life I'm hardly one to engage in "professional jealously." But my ire is raised when I see shoddy scholarship such as that practiced by Guardia. I have some background for making this charge. Off and on, for 50 years, I've been engaged in the practice, study, and writing of Special Forces and psychological operations policy and history. My special operations career began when I joined the 77th Special Forces Group as a lieutenant in 1960. My first group commander was Donald Blackburn. I also have an MA and Ph.D. in history from Duke University. As a writer, for many years my research interests have been on special warfare history. Many of the documents Gordia cites in Chapters 11 and 12 came from files in the National Archives, including Top Secret documents that took me over a year to get declassified. All of the ones that I used in the 1982 and 2002 editions of my "US Army Special Warfare" are carefully cited in my endnotes, and, where appropriate, in my bibliography. So when historians see selective use of history, claims of the fresh "discovery" of evidence, and misinterpretation of evidence, most of us give little credence to it. Good historians, for example, would be aghast at the unprofessional, careless, use of endnotes by the author and his publisher. No reputable press would allow this to occur. Unfortunately, the "general reader" too often is misled by such substandard work.

Eighth, I do not agree that Guardia's treatment of McClure is fair. He asserts that McClure has no real claim to the title, "Father of Special Forces." Well, who said that he did? I certainly have not in my writing. Why did the author feel it necessary to state this, and then make the claim that he was not entitled to the honor? I explained in my comments that he was memorialized as the "Father of Army Special Warfare," a broader scope that includes his contributions to psychological warfare and Special Forces. Please reread my paragraph on this. Guardia fails to mention that this honor was bestowed several years before his book. As I stated, the evidence is quite clear at Fort Bragg, and, I should also say, in the 2002 edition of my book. This is poor scholarship, but I assume that you would characterize my criticism as "professional jealousy."

And, your statement, "It seems that McClure was more interested in utilizing special operations as a vehicle for the psywar effort," is just the opposite of what occurred. Again, McClure came away from his association with Donovan convinced that unconventional warfare (Special Forces) and psychological warfare should be a combined effort in conflict. That's why he sought and received responsibility for unconventional warfare from G-3 on the Army staff. In fact, as I've written before,
"Special Forces came through the back door of the psychological warfare house." Four years after establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, its name was changed to the Special Warfare Center--which I believe was appropriate.

Finally, your statement that "In all, it appears that you don't like Guardia's work because it attacks McClure, a man whom, in your own writings, you've tried to establish as the 'Father' of SF". It's sad that your final criticism would be so demonstrably incorrect. Here's what I said on the final page of both the 1982 and 2002 editions of my "US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins": "If any one man can be called the father of Army special warfare, surely that man is Robert Alexis McClure." And he is.

Comment 2:

I will try as much as possible to avoid redundancy in my reply to the comments of Luis Chama and L. Mendoza, and will address a few main points. First, I will stand on both my review of Guardia's book and my reply to Mendoza. Russell Volckmann's experience in the Philippines was admirable, and his contributions to the development of the "Special Forces Concept" were important--quite important. Nevertheless, there were other members of the OCPW who also played a useful role in this regard, to include Wendell Fertig, Aaron Bank, and their chief, BG Robert A. McClure.

Guardia does not give the latter full credit for the vital nature of his role. He asked for transfer of responsibility for unconventional warfare from G-3, had the vision for some sort of a behind-the-lines capability similar to that of the OSS, recruited the personnel with appropriate experience to draw up the plans, sold the concept and creation of a training facility for psychological warfare and Special Forces at Fort Bragg to the chief of staff and Secretary of Army, among other senior officials. And, he selected the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group--Aaron Bank.

During this same period, he was directing the buildup of psychological warfare forces for the Korean War (the only active duty unit at the outbreak of war was a 22-man detachment at Fort Riley, KS), and for Europe. He personally intervened with the European Command over the proper role of Special Forces.

For these contributions, in addition to his psychological warfare responsiblities in North Africa and Europe during World War II, the Army honored McClure as the "Father of Army Special Warfare" in 2001. ("Special Warfare" encompassed both psychological operations and Special Warfare." Guardia fails to mention this in his book, but rather provides an argument as to why McClure should not be called the "Father of Army Special Forces." I did not advocate that in my review, or in my replies here. The claim that "it appears that you don't like Guardia's work mainly because it attacks McClure, a man whom, in your own writings, you've tried to establish as the "Father" of SF (Mendoza). This is demonstrably incorrect.

The author, in his attempt to deny Bank the title of the "Father of Army Special Forces," also fails to mention that the latter already possessed that title, by congressional decree and by the Army's naming the Special Warfare Center Academic Facilty at Fort Bragg in his name--which also took place prior to publication of his book.

That said, I in no sense denigrated Volckmann's experience in the Philippines, or his contributions to the development of Special Forces. I'm only stating that the latter should be put in proper context.

The other main point that concerns me is this assertion: "Now, it seems that your argument begins to devolve into professional jealously. From this point on, you extol your own research and accomplishments to try to and undermine Guardia's work" (Mendoza). Likewise, Luis Chama claims that "In short, your review sounds like a case of professional jealously. In fact, I never even heard of you until I looked in Guardia's bibliography, so you can at least be proud of that, even though he wrote this book and he didn't." Mendoza also uses the same term.

Professional jealously. Well, I'll try to pass over that offensive phrase, and concentrate on the first word, "professional." In the promotional material on Guardia's book that I received. he purports to be a historian. Well, let's analyze what constitutes a professional historian. Let's use as an example his book. Here's the way a typical scenario develops when a manuscript of a first-time author is delivered to the editor-in-chief of a reputable academic press.

First, the author has to get a qualified approval of his manuscript from the editor-in-chief, who then sends out copies to two or three published scholars who have expertise in the field. Their names are not revealed to the author. They send in their critque, thumbs up or thumbs down, or approval if certain changes are made. The process of copy editing, preparing an index, and reviews by the author at each stage is done. The author must approve the final galleys before production ensues. Completion of this process takes several months, perhaps a year or so.

If this process had been followed religiously, the number of errors pointed out by M. Pitcavage and me should have been avoided. The careless misnumbering of endnotes in the Notes section should have been recognized. The glaring absence of 47 endnotes in the Notes section should have been rectified immediately. Luis Chama's statement that "It does appear the editors were out of phase with some of the numbering in chapters 11 & 12" does not absolve the author of his responsibility to ensure that these type of inconceivable mistakes are not made. But they were.

No big deal, you say. What matters is the text. Well, it is a big deal for those who want to know more about an author's sources--particularly historians. They will immediately categorize the problems that M. Pitcavage and I point out as serious errors. That's the way it works.

What about Luis Chama's claim that "This brings the subject to the foreground for the public, not just to elite history snobs." There are three possible audiences for this book: the general reader, special operations personnel, and serious scholars. Let's say that the book sells fairly well for the first category, the bulk of whom don't know much about the subject. And it might do OK initally for some operations personnel, particularly for the younger members; that is, until the word gets around about its deficiencies, particularly the quite thin chapters, 11 & 12. And word DOES get around about books in the Special Forces community. Serious scholars, the third category, will give the book short shrift. If the book does appear in the book review section, for example, of the Journal of Military History, you can bet the review will be scathing. This is not the type of book that will be cited by historians in their own work, or earn for him their respect.

Finally, "professional jealously." Our oldest grandson will graduate from West Point next year. He's just a few years younger than the author. My life's work as a soldier and historian, good or bad, is mostly behind me. I have no desire nor reason to be "professionally jealous" of Guardia. He has a long way to go to be a historian. I wish him the best in that endeavor. These will be my last comments on this subject.

The reviews and debate on this topic are interesting, especially over at Amazon.com. Rather than engage in such nonsense as wisely advised here by the SWJ editors, one can download an excerpt from the book and judge for oneself.

Go to http://www.casematepublishing.com/dlc/9781935149224/9781935149224-CH01…

I like that the publisher has made this excerpt available on line. Based on that, it appears that the book is well written, and I have now ordered a copy. I did call the publisher about the issue of some of the appendix notes being numbered incorrectly that was pointed out on the Amazon.com discussions. It was a printing mistake due to their re-numbering software, not an author's mistake. The corrections have been made to the Kindle edition appendix and to the second printing. An errata will be made available for those interested in further research. However, the appendix does not detract from the biography in any manner, at least from what others have told me.

Based on the excerpt, looks like this will be a good book.

All - Keep the dialogue on topic and not personal - or I will delete all the comments, close that capability and let the review stand as is. - Dave D.

Oops! Make that 65 years. I did get a C- in Plebe math :o)

Dave,

Then the "lap dog" honor is all yours.

I differ on your reading of Paddock's review. His inconsistency is pointed out very well in Mendoza's review. Which is indeed useful, contrary to what you would have others believe with your "lapping." Paddock is a stakeholder by virtue of his own thesis, and because of the inconsistencies in his review, as pointed out by Mendoza (a disinterested 3rd party) one can only conclude that professional jealousy has reared its ugly head as the motive of Paddock's review.

I am sure Paddock's service in the US Army has been exemplary. However, that has nothing to do with historical analyses or the writing of history. In fact sometimes being in the Army can work against conducting unbiased research in a variety of topics related to the Army. Something that all military history readers should consider when reading military history. In fact, many notable military historians today never served in the military. And as I pointed out in the other thread here at SWJ, LT Guardia, does not discuss the book on the web, nor does he present it as a calling card anywhere he goes, nor will he do either. The two careers are separate, and the book was written and picked up for publication well BEFORE he was commissioned as a 2LT (it is his MA History thesis). He's busy now doing other stuff, namely trying to be a good junior officer.

Big leagues you say? Well maybe so, since this book was published by a legitimate publishing house in NYC and London, not a vanity press or a "university" press like with Paddock's book, which was released by a publishing academic consortium outlet so that professors can publish (and not perish). And while I can't speak for LT Guardia, the critiques are welcome, positive and negative, but I am ESPECIALLY enjoying the rebuttals to the negative critiques, like Mendoza's rebuttal.

Personally, I think I would have benefited more from reading about Volckmann at West Point, rather than the loftier "I shall return" legend of MacA. I am still trying to figure out the benefit to a 2LT in studying the history of FTG's ambush at Rossbach. I guess they are trying to crank out generals at USMA instead of platoon leaders. But then again I am still trying to figure out how a 2-star general who has never seen combat before becomes tagged as the nation's guerrilla and counter-guerrilla expert when (1) he has never seen combat prior to OIF and (2) has never prevailed as a guerrilla himself or a counter-guerrilla. How does one become an "expert" with those credentials? I mean WTF? Perhaps, some young college student will publish a book on this in 55 years or so <wink>.

Here at comments from L.Mendoza at Amazon.com in reply to Paddock's review. These are right on target.
***
I take caution in reading your review.

You're obviously qualified to speak on the subject, as you've written a book titled "US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins," but your criticism of the author and his work warrant suspicsion.

First, I notice that you lambaste Guardia for asserting that "the historiography of the guerrilla war in the Philippines is comparatively narrow." As someone who has studied the Philippine Campaign for years, I agree with Mike Guardia. The selection of material is indeed narrow - which probably accounts for why Volckmann and his contemporaries remain unknown to many historians. I'm surprised that you would make such a comment.

Furthermore, you mention books such as "Lieutenant Ramsey's War" and "The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon." As clearly stated in Guardia's Introduction, he interviewed Edwin Ramsey concerning his activities in the Philippines. An interview(s), it seems, would be a better resource. And you have ignored that Guardia included "Behind Japanese Lines", a book which Bernard Norling co-authored with Ray Hunt, who served as a guerrilla under Robert Lapham.

>>"While Guardia confines his tale to Volckmann's role in northern Luzon, the story of Wendell Fertig's accomplishments in the Japanese-occupied island of Mindano is also impressive."<< Indeed it is...but Volckmann is the subject of the book - not Fertig, not Ramsey, nor any other guerrilla within the Philippine Campaign.

>>"In his first staff meeting of what eventually became entitled the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), McClure stated that General Bolte agreed with him that unconventional warfare did not belong in G-3 and should be transferred to the OCPW. His association with William Donovan, head of the OSS in World War II, gave him an appreciation for a behind-the-lines capability in the event of war with the Soviet Union. McClure, however, knew that his expertise lay primarily in psychological warfare, so he brought into the OCPW personnel like Volckmann, Aaron Bank, and Wendell Fertig, to develop what became known as the Special Forces Concept."<<

Here, you are correct. McClure realized that his own expertise lay in the realm of psychological warfare...which is exactly why he sought out Volckmann, Bank, etc. You don't acknowledge, however, that he sought Volckmann out precisely because of (a) Volckmann's expertise in guerrilla warfare and (b) he had authored two field manuals on the subject, which themselves became an intellectual cornerstone for the Special Forces Concept.

>>"Guardia overstates the effect of Volckmann's memorandum forwarded to the Army chief of staff following his attendance at a conference at Fort Benning's Infantry School. That memo was indeed important in the chain of events leading up to formation of the 10th Special Forces Group, but it was done with the knowledge and direction of BG McClure."<<

That's funny, because in your own book, "US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins," you don't mention that McClure had any "direction" over said memorandum. In fact, when I read your book, you seemed very congratulatory of Volckmann. Why then, are you assaulting Guardia's work?

>>"And this statement by the author requires rebuttal: `Reviewing Volckmann's contribution to the development of Special Forces, it begs the question of why he receives virtually no recognition for his involvement and why history has given the lion's share of the credit to Aaron Bank.' This is inaccurate."<<

Is it? Because it seems that most historians have traditionally called Bank as the "Father of Special Forces". In fact, as I recall, shortly after his death in 2004, the obituary headlines proclaimed the death of the "Father of Army Special Forces."

You also say that had Guardia read your book, "he would have seen that I give Volckmann credit as THE principal architect in McClure's employ for the development of what eventually became known as the 'Special Forces Concept.'" In making this comment, you practically shoot yourself in the foot. This means that you agree with Guardia's assertion that Volckmann was responsible for the development of the SF operational concepts and framework.

Another one of your comments deserves mentioning here. >> "Over many years, I and other authors have repeatedly extolled the unconventional warfare experience of those personnel who served in the Philippines. Volckmann's contributions to the creation of Special Forces are well known among Special Forces veterans and scholars. He is hardly "unknown," as Guardia claims." <<

Now, it seems that your argument begins to devolve into professional jealousy. From this point forward, you extol your own research and accomplishments to try and undermine Guardia's work. I have no doubt that you (and others) have "extolled" the contributions of the Fil-American guerrillas during the war. In spite of this, however, the guerrilla conflict remains largely unknown. And, it seems that Guardia's work is another effort to bring more light to this relatively forgotten area of history. Fellow historians like yourself should congratulate him in this regard, not denigrate him.

In a similar vein, I feel that his treatment of BG Robert McClure is fair. Again, by your own admission, you state that McClure's expertise was in the realm of psychological warfare, and that he needed the expertise of someone like Volckmann to bring forward a cohesive plan for Army Spec Ops. It seems that McClure was more interested in utilizing special operations as a vehicle for the psy-war effort. Some may have different opinions in that regard. Nonetheless, I think it's quite clear that without Volckmann's expertise (per the two field manuals mentioned by Guardia) and his other intellectual contributions, the Special Forces as we know it today might not exist. Also, your comments regarding Bank don't contribute anything here. You mention that Bank was deemed the "Father" of SF by "Congressional decree" but you give no conclusive reasons as to why he receives the credit...while others like Volckmann do not.

In all, it appears that you don't like Guardia's work mainly because it attacks McClure, a man whom, in your own writings, you've tried to establish as the "Father" of SF.
***

I find the above comments on my son's book interesting. A visit to the amazon.com site where the exact wording written above is presented Dr. Paddock and his lapdog "Dave" have an interesting rebuttal by "L. Mendoza" (who by the way is not me, nor is it the author, nor anybody we know).

As I mentioned to Mike when he chose this subject, there would be rebuttals from those involved in the hagiography of Bank and McClure, and of course from those who have professional jealousies either because it refutes past work, or because they wish they would have written this work themselves. We will just have to let the reader decide.

Nevertheless, these are normal reactions from human beings that feel they are "stakeholders" in the history of the subject. Read the L. Mendoza comments appended to Paddock's review at amazon.com and see just how foolish Paddock's review really is.

Thank you to Dr. Paddock for reviewing this book. I too read this book this past weekend and it left me scratching my head as every day I walk into the Robert A McClure Building wondering if we are going to have to change the name of the building. We should be grateful to COL Paddock for succinctly and clearly setting the record straight on this important part of American military history. There is no one more qualified to tell the story of American Special Warfare than he. And most importantly, as he did in his seminal work, "US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins", he gives proper credit to all the "fathers" of today's Army Special Operations Forces. The history of Army Special Warfare is clear and well documented. Volckman played an important role and that role is properly recognized in the history. Cherry picking selective pieces of the history does not stand up to the accurate documentation that exists. While it makes for a catchy title and good marketing (and in fact influenced me to buy the book), the conclusion that Volckmann's important contributions are not recognized and that he should be noted as the father of Special Forces, it is not sound scholarship. It is unfortunate that we have to focus on this aspect of the book because the addition of Volckmann's diary is useful and interesting though there is not much new information that we could not find in "We Remained." Given the short discussion and sparse information presented on the controversial aspect of the book regarding the "father" of Special Forces, I wonder if the author was not influenced by an editor and publisher to use the title as a tag line as a marketing ploy. As I said, it caught me.

As an aside, Dr. Paddock raises an interesting point regarding the unknown rationale for selecting COL Bank over COL Volckmann as the first commander of 10th SFG. He alludes to the possible reason in this review and perhaps that was MG McClure's value of regional orientation and experience. While today we place great emphasis on and respect for regional orientation and experience within Army Special Operations, the traditional personnel management system and its command selection process is not always able support this critical characteristic of Army Special Operations. Although the priority remains to win the wars we are in in Iraq and Afghanistan we cannot allow the bureaucracy to drive us away from our core principles and the proven importance of regional orientation and expertise that apparently stems from our roots in 10th Special Forces Group. We will need regional expertise more than ever in this Era of Persistent Conflict. MG McClure should continue to be seen as the visionary he was.

Thanks to Dr. Paddock for ensuring we have the real history of Army Special Warfare.