Saving the COIN Baby from the Afghan Bathwater (and Vice-Versa)
by Dr. Tony Corn
Download the full article: Saving the COIN Baby from the Afghan Bathwater
When General Petraeus guided the elaboration of the new counterinsurgency field manual FM-3-24 in 2006, the main theater of operations happened to be Iraq, and the main operational priority was to analytically discriminate between global and local grievances in order to strategically disaggregate the transnational Jihadist from the "accidental guerrilla" whose space happens to be invaded. Given the urgency of the situation, there was no time to reflect on the "Grievance vs. Greed" debate that had been at the center of the civilian literature on civil wars in the previous decade. As a result, the COIN doctrine enshrined in FM 3-24 is as long on Grievance as it is short on Greed.
But while the Grievance paradigm was by and large adequate to understand the situation in Iraq five years ago, the Greed paradigm is more relevant in the case of Afghanistan - a country that has had a war economy since 1979, where warlordism and poppy cultivation play a central role, and which has achieved the dubious distinction of being the second most corrupt country in the world.
Add to that the "resource curse" represented by the massive U.S presence: beginning with Bush's quiet surge of September 2008, a series of military surges increasing the number of troops by more than 50,000 (plus an equal number of contractors) has been partly responsible for a fifty percent increase of corruption in the past two years.
Today, a good case could be made that the political divergences (Grievance) that once existed between the main protagonists (Kabul officials, regional warlords, Taliban of all stripes, not to mention Pakistani officials) have taken a backseat, and that a convergence of sorts has begun to emerge on a shared economic objective (Greed): milking the American cow for all it's worth, and for as long as possible.
Download the full article: Saving the COIN Baby from the Afghan Bathwater
Dr. Tony Corn is on leave from the State Department and currently writing a book on the Long War. This essay is a follow-up to two previous articles: "The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home: Strategic Communication and the Management of Expectations," Small Wars Journal, September 2009, and "Toward a Kilcullen-Biden Plan?: Bounding Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," Small Wars Journal, October 2009. The opinions expressed here are the author's own and do not reflect the view of the U.S. State Department or the U.S. Government.
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Brother Cole,
Reference "carpetbagger" pay scales... I was paid embarrassingly well and subsequently contributed a very large percentage of my profits to Uncle Sugar and the national wealth redistribution effort. I remain happy to do my part :-)
Maybe I need to get myself a better accountant... or remain outside the continental U.S. for the duration of the contract :-/
I agree with you and also believe that the local technocrat could accomplish even more with less since they know where all the systemic skeletons are located (literally and figuratively)... but then I suppose that we need the modern state builder (mandate administrator) to do the job for them because the locals just don't get how things are supposed to work in the modern world. On the other hand, I submit that many a dirty-toed sheik, jang salar, provincial and district administrator, strongman and/or warlord would run circles around our best and brightest if unleashed to execute tribal/qawm lobbying strategies in Washington D.C. The TTPs are very similar whether applied in tribal, qawm, or special interest political power politics.
I stand by my previous comment. Afghan territories are controlled by autonomous groups and where establishing quid-pro-quo and patronage relationships assist in imposing order and stability. The system of governance in Afghanistan is an ad hoc combination of political expediency and private enterprise. It is efficient in its own way, but can also lead to flagrant abuses and corruption.
Other than your experience with the Egyptian technocrat... how did you like Egypt? I thought it was eshta.
v/r
MAC
Thanks MAC. Was not trying to put words in your mouth. Was making the point that a drug-running family such as seen in Mexico would not be influenced favorably by COIN. If it doesn't work there, why would it work in Afghanistan?
Great point on the money trickling down, but personally believe many overseas contractors are vastly overpaid [yourself excluded no doubt ;)] and don't necessarily offer much more than what a local nationals or non-westerners could accomplish at a fraction of the pay...thus trickling down to the local economy.
But that can be a two-edged sword as low pay scales of Afghan/non-western contractors and other public workers in the M.E. is what drives corruption in many cases. ANP underpaid? Extort even poorer locals at traffic control points.
Then your country gets the reputation that graft is the only way to do business. In 1990, while in the Sinai, we had to turn in our passports so we wouldn't lose them. I complied and then the Army proceeded to lose mine. Had to travel to Cairo and get a new one at the U.S. Embassy to go home on mid-tour. That was the easy part. Was then told I would need an entry stamp on the passport across the street in the Egyptian immigration building or I would never be allowed to board a plane.
After using nice COIN-like manners for the first few officials, was referred to one who clearly had attitude. Remained patient during his tirade about Americans losing/selling passports and complied when told to "go wait." Watched him discretely from outside his office.
An hour and a half later, after seeing no apparent activity and getting bumped hard by a couple of Russian passport guys, and with pregnant wife delivering any day I began to get a bit impatient. I remembered the M.E. "little gift" but first inquired if there was a problem. A second tirade ensued. So I made the leap to asking if there was anything I could do to speed up the process reaching for my wallet...
Perhaps because a woman and kids were in the office, he went off and said I could have you arrested. He threw the passport at me and stomped off down the hall. Fearing the worst, I pulled an Elvis from the building and called the American Embassy that sent a Major to pick me up.
They ended up flying me back to the Sinai on an MFO plane and I crossed into Israel on my MFO card and left Tel Aviv instead. You can imagine the personal attention I got when questioned about the incident by Israeli security since they question every passenger.
But that's for something minor. Now imagine you are a business trying to deal with M.E. and similar countries with this kind of rep...for instance a Chinese company trying to win a copper contract. How much of that kind of thing should be put up with?
Brother Cole,
The basic definition of a 'rentier state' is 'a state reliant not on extraction of the domestic population's surplus production but on externally generated revenues, or rents, such as those derived from military subsidies, humanitarian assistance funds, blood money (solacia payments), security taxes on public roads, pay-offs, etc, etc. The British used to pay hefty subsidies to this or that Amir to keep the system afloat. A rentier state is therefore based on a rentier economy in which income from rent dominates the distribution of national income, and thus where rentiers wield considerable political influence.
I did not write "co-exist"... you did. I wrote that we should acknowledge that the rentier system exists (instead of labeling all actions as grievance or greed based) and learn how to best exploit the rentier system to our benefit... Is that a bad thing... or should I now be worried that exploiting this situation will place me in the same company of those "greedy", cynical opportunists?
I disagree with labeling all actions on the part of the locals as either grievance based or greed based... period. Having said so, $100 billion dollars spent annually may actually be well worth the price to prevent war between Pakistan and India, send a message to radicals, or show the Muslim world etc, etc... But this would depend on our strategic end state and success criteria.
I'd actually like to see the breakdown of that $100 billion bill into its component parts. I can't imagine that all of the $100 billion are lost in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or in the region, etc. I'd like to know the percentage that is returned to the United States as rents to the military-industrial complex (inclusive everything that you can imagine being handled by civilian contractors)? I earned good monies in both Iraq and Afghanistan and upon my return invested and spent those rents in the United States where they were taxed and amiably shared with Uncle Sugar.
How are we going to develop jobs for the country when rentiering (word I just made up) are the jobs? We've kept ourselves busy at developing a viable economic system for the last 9 years. Infrastructure construction might work in the near term...but what next? I have begun to doubt very much that our economic development skills are up to the requirement...especially if creating jobs and managing an economy during this our latest economic downturn in the United States is any indication (sarcasm). But then, look at how many jobs our economic development projects have saved in Astan so far... it actually could have been much worse.
You are absolutely correct. We can never win everyone's heart and mind. The challenge with embracing "hearts and minds" as a method is that the good-hearted can't bring themselves to acknowledge that all actions to change the status quo create winners and losers, no matter how good intentioned the initiative. You just can't please everyone all of the time... ever.
Final thought. Graft and corruption serve a different function in a rentier state.
Thanks brother, great conversation.
v/r
MAC
Mac,
Heh thanks for teaching me a new term: rentier state. Assume that means we should pay our landlord for military bases versus resources. But why is Afghanistan worth $100 billion a year? Wheres the rent control?.
Is it worth $100 billion annually and the loss of coalition and local lives because the coalition desires:
* to prevent war between India and Pakistan (value $25 billion and millions of potential lost lives?)
* fewer radicals wreaking havoc in nuclear Pakistan (value $20 billion and hundreds of thousands of potential lost lives?)
* prevention of an Afghan civil war that could spill over to the north (value $15 billion and potential tens of thousands of lost lives?)
* to show the Muslim world that the coalition will try to work with and protect Islamic people, as we did in the Balkans and elsewhere (value $10 billion and thousands of saved genocide lives?)
* a near-term military presence close to Iran (value $10 billion and second avenue of approach to safeguard Hormuz Straits?)
* to eliminate a safe haven for al Qaeda (value $10 billion and potentially thousands of potential lost lives to terrorism?)
* development of mineral, oil, and natural gas resources getting to China, India, and Europe which could prevent war over resources (value $10 billion and better lives for millions if not billions?)
If these apply, it might be a good idea to hang around and spend some money a few years to attempt to stabilize things. If we develop jobs for the country and allow its resource development, then suggest that it would go a long way to reducing that annual $100 billion because Afghanistan could pay for more of its own security and governance.
But if we moved to the northern provinces, there would be fewer IEDs killing our forces and local civilians. Coalition presence is what creates those IEDs. Why rid the nation of land mines only to prolong our presence in Pashtun lands and cause the seeding of a whole new brand of mines.
If we cant camp outside the house or office of every cooperating citizen, every official, every ANA/ANP relative, then not sure how we ever prevent Taliban assassinations and night letters. The Pashtuns themselves will need to step up and fix that on their own. Suspect the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Turkmen would fix it up north.
We could still attack and observe enemies from the air and using air assaults once their guard is down and they start to mass more often. Would suggest that with far fewer lost coalition lives, the premature withdrawal that insurgents want and allies fear could be postponed because the coalition's citizenry would be less upset.
If the coalition ended up going the Pashtunistan route, it would be a buffer state separating an India-influenced northern alliance from Pakistan. If Pakistan was smart, it could then cede some Pashtun lands (North Waziristan?) to augment Pashtunistan. That way the coalition could pursue more than just UAS attacks against extremists in the larger Pashtunistan.
As for GREED, believe you must differentiate between coalition monies being spent that
1)serve the most people and provide the most local jobs
2)serve as a substitute for poppy growth and $10-a-day Taliban
3)are efficiently utilized
4)attempt to avoid graft and government official corruption
When you say that GREED is OK and COIN can coexist with it, believe that is the case for all except 2 and 4. If we attempt to limit GREED in those two categories, dont believe you will ever win the hearts and minds of those currently getting those monies.
Only Americans would send a cow shedding milk from every available orifice into an environment starved for milk and then express surprise surprise and dismay when the locals choose to milk the cow. s my teenage daughter would say... like duh.
If we're going to fling dollars around, the locals will scheme to collect the dollars. That's fairly predictable. If we don't like it we can either try to fling our dollars more accurately, which will probably just result in more sophisticated and effective scheming, or we can take our dollars and go home.
Of course COIN and FID will work against GREED (Group Effort to Escape with our Dollars); especially if we embrace the notion and without moral prejudice that Afghanistan is a rentier state system and that certain groups in provinces, districts, villages and valleys all participate in the system in one form or another. Psychological reductionism, or the tendency to categorize all social phenomena such as motivations, wishes, needs, desires and /or actions as either an expression of "grievance" or "greed" does us no good, especially if this type of categorization forces us to label all local attempts to create wealth "greedy".
Riddle me this: What is the first impression you get when someone explains to you that the local strongman is just like a mafia boss. I bet it isnt positive and it might even influence how you subsequently interact with the man.
It makes total sense to me that GREED i.e. Group Effort to Escape with our Dollars is in play as the locals seek to protect themselves from outsiders who are attempting to impose their rule on them. Local groups are unable to develop their own strategy or set their own communal goals if unable to generate their own funds. Charity is a form of dominance. Economic independence is critical if groups choose to maintain their autonomy. I wouldnt call that greed nor should we assume that all actions to earn a buck are examples of greed.
I recommend that we learn how to better exploit the group effort to escape with our dollars in support of our strategic/operational intent.
r/
MAC
This guy is brilliant and fairly easy to understand.
Liked his argument that COIN doesn't work against GREED (Group Effort to Escape with our Dollars?). But not sure I buy his argument that a European-lead (as in NATO?) solution is preferable. Gotta love the great intentions of all coalition partners not necessarily matched by equal unity of commitment in forces, equipment, ROE, dollars, and timeline for leaving.
What is ideal is that most ISAF partners are already based in the north so little would change in most of their areas...except perhaps us moving into "Bosnia and Kosovo"...er I mean northern Afghan provinces...as partners eventually depart?
Still not sure why armed nation building is anathema when done in areas where ethnic partners will appreciate and secure it. Greed could be a wonderful thing when the contrast between well-spent and protected improvements in the north is contrasted with squandered opportunities in the south and east.
Plus it would seem you would need to complete the northern border ring road, plus adjacent electrical lines, pipelines, etc. and build a new road and railroad through the Hazara-controlled central Hindu Kush. After all, the southern Ring Road and Pakistan road routes might become rather inhospitable once exclusively in Pashtun/Taliban hands.
Such disparities in goodies also could lead to natural ethnic migrations, to include open-minded Pashtuns, where the grass/jobs are greener. That would most certainly be more politically expedient than forced displacements of the Malayan and Soviet Afghan era.
As for strategic coercive diplomacy, IMHO suspect General Petraeus' approach of "convincing" President Karzai that we are going to do this (local defense initiative, for example) whether you like it or not is more likely to work...because the General would never say overtly "make him an offer he couldn't refuse."
Not sure how he would convince President Karzai to partition the country and allow greater northern alliance autonomy...but have confidence that General Petraeus could make the case. Believe Secretary Clinton could, as well, but her gender might cause a needlessly stubborn President Karzai.
An A-Team effort might consist of Generals Petraeus and Mattis, with Secretaries Clinton and Gates, tied perhaps to giving President Karzai the monies he wants. They could offer to give him half for his controlled Pashtun areas (to include a (pension package for his brother outside the country) with the other half going to Co-President Abdullah Abdullah in the north.
A mutated Blackwell/Haas approach is well worth investigating IMHO.