Continuing the Discussion on the Reported Death of the Armor Corps
by Thomas Weiss
Download the Full Article: Mostly Dead
In mid-April, COL Gian Gentile offered what amounted to an Armor Corps post-mortem in a piece for Small Wars Journal called The Death of the Armor Corps. Recently in the same pages, Major James Smith and Major James Harbridge wrote a rebuttal entitled A Combined Arms Response to Death of the Armor Corps. The first question which came to mind after reading the latter piece was: if two Jacks beat a lone King in poker, do two Majors trump a Colonel in a doctrinal argument?
COL Gentile, in many important respects, echoes the arguments made by three former BCT commanders in a white paper diagnosing the Field Artillery with a similar disease, entitled The King and I (which was, ironically, forwarded to me by a gleeful Armor officer some two years ago). In essence, both arguments state that the capability of the maneuver, fires and effects elements of the Army to prosecute a high intensity conflict has been drastically reduced by our commitment to the counterinsurgency competencies employed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, COL Gentile plainly declares that the Armor corps "is no more."
In their rebuttal, Majors Smith and Harbridge seem to be saying, like the old man about to be put onto a meat wagon in Monty Python and the Holy Grail, "We're not dead yet." They offer examples of units transitioning the spectrum of conflict and proffer that as an Army, our strength "is our ability to adapt and innovate while still retaining the ability to relearn our core competencies."
Three fundamental questions arise from these two articles. First, is the Army truly at a place where its combined arms competencies have degraded almost to the point of non-existence? Second, if these competencies have degraded, does it constitute a crisis or a point from which we may never return? And third, looking beyond our current conflicts, how should we best organize and train our forces?
Download the Full Article: Mostly Dead
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Weiss is an active duty Field Artillery Officer with served in various command and staff positions in multiple tours to Iraq. Currently, he is rehabilitating at Fort Sam Houston, TX, following injuries received in Iraq last year.
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<b>libertariansoldier</b><blockquote>"Well, I suppose it depends on your definition of "acceptable" and "reduced"."</blockquote>My definition is based on wide ranging service in multiple tours in both Korea and Viet Nam and is predicated on participating in and observing the performance of several Regimental and Brigade sized units as well as their parent Divisions. Overall, that performance ranged from good to poor -- never excellent -- and was adequate. All that preceded the birth of the CTCs.
My supposition is also based on comments from serving field grade officers and NCOs who have been through one or both US CTC and some who have also been OCs. All have been to Afghanistan or Iraq or both. None totally agree with your assessment.
They and I, as I said, accept that "...the level of competence, though somewhat reduced, that can be reached without waiting for a turn at a Center" is indeed acceptable.
How did we do in WW II sans the CTCs...
Let me also quote you out of order on two additional points.<blockquote>"...yet units home station training was never able to prepare them to do well out of the gate. The learning curve was invariably steep."</blockquote>Having deployed to two quite different combat theaters (and a couple of other places...) on two occasions as part of a unit that did not have the CTC 'advantage,' I acknowledge the basic truth of your assertion but contend that while the learning curve existed it really was not at all steep. It was actually minimal. However, I must acknowledge that it also preceded the foolishness and adverse impacts of BTMS and deeply flawed Task, Condition, Standard philosophy.<blockquote>Every leader wants his unit to be as well trained as it can be--if only to enhance his career...</blockquote>I can deplore the last clause quoted but acknowledge it is accurate in some cases. Hopefully few cases.
It is telling that you mention that. As an Army Retiree working as a supervisory level DAC in a major headquarters on training during the 80s and 90s, it was quite obvious the CTCs became a training tool that served as a 'personnel management' device. I suggest better personnel management practices will not eliminate the desirability of the CTCs but could certainly make them less a perceived imperative...
Thus I strongly agree with your bottom line:<blockquote>""regaining collective combined arms competence lost through small unit COIN focus". the basis of the curve is likely to be low, indeed."</blockquote>The basis is low -- so is the apogee. To steal a phrase, we're not talking Rocket Science here. We're discussing combat competence. If that was as difficult to attain as you imply, we'd have done and be doing better than we are at many things. As one former General I know is fond of saying, "Best is the enemy of good enough."
Of course, none of that addresses the fiscal aspects of the possible lack of such an imperative. ;)
Ken White writes: Not having CTC experience but being fully aware of the terrain at both US Centers and the methodology and benefits, I suggest that while the Centers are beneficial, they are not absolutely necessary. Believe it or not, it is possible to train units, even BCTs, to an acceptable level of competence without going to a CTC. We might even be surprised at the level of competence, though somewhat reduced, that can be reached without waiting for a turn at a Center.
Well, I suppose it depends on your definition of "acceptable" and "reduced".
Having been both a CTC O/C and a divisional chief of G3 Training, my perspective is that the dedicated OPFOR, dedicated O/C corps, and instrumented battlefield, that are only found at a CTC, add orders of magnitude to the quality of the training. Every leader wants his unit to be as well trained as it can be--if only to enhance his career--yet units home station training was never able to prepare them to do well out of the gate. The learning curve was invariably steep.
And since the current discussion seems to me to be about "regaining collective combined arms competence lost through small unit COIN focus". the basis of the curve is likely to be low, indeed.
Bill:
Correct, the opinions between John and I have become polarized to the extreme to where he is presented as "anti conventional" and I as "anti Coin." But that is not a fair characterization of either of us. John has always said that we must remain strong in terms of our capacity to fight conventional or high intensity conflict. And I have always argued that the American Army must maintain its proficiency in Coin. But there are significant differences between us in terms of conceptions of the future, the past in Iraq, ongoing ops in Astan, etc, but those differences as you suggest have been colored gray to the point where we are presented only in terms of black and white.
thanks for pointing this out.
gian
Agree with prior comments, but I also think the nature of the debate between Gian and Nagl has become excessively polarized, thus has lost value as an intellectual debate (while I think both officers agree there are gray areas, they're largely ignored in the debate). The real issue in my view is how we organize, train and equip our defense establishment for the projected challenges in the relatively near future. It is highly probable that every conflict will involve elements of irregular warfare, so we can't simply click our heels three times and wish this challenge away. We will engage in high end conventional combat again (where and with who is anyone's guess). It is easy to say we need a balanced approach, but very hard to do. The debate now should focus on the morning after.
Colonel Weiss' article is excellent. Gian's comment is also excellent and is a much needed cautionary on the unintended consequence of the overly mellifluous style of military speech and writing today. "Battle hardened" is really inappropriate given the overall intensity of most combat these past few years. I, of course, continue to rail against calling Soldiers "Warriors..."
I digress. LTC Weiss wrote in summation:<blockquote>"In sum, what I offer is a middle ground between COL Gentile's assertion that the Armor corps is dead and the two Major's assertion that it¸s not dead yet. Like the hero in the movie The Princess Bride, it's only mostly dead. As Billy Crystal's character says, "There's a big difference between mostly dead and all dead." But unlike the movie, it will take more than a magic pill coated with chocolate to revive it."</blockquote>Target.<br><br>
He also wrote:<blockquote>If we pull out of Iraq and Afghanistan now and begin our retraining in earnest, in 2017 we, as an Army, will have regained the competencies and the depth we have lost. It will be a long, hard road filled with many scathing After-Action Reviews at the Combat Training Centers. Armed with the leaders we have, however, it is possible."</blockquote>I agree with the last sentence. The rest is correct, I suppose, if we continue to train as we have over the past 35 years or so. The BTMS and individual Task, Condition, Standard systems need to go. We must transition to Outcome Based Training and Education (OBTE) and the sooner, the better. That will reduce the reset training time and costs significantly -- even though OBTE will increase those factors for initial training. Those increases will be easily offset by long term savings. The benefits of the methodology will increase combat effectiveness considerably.
Not having CTC experience but being fully aware of the terrain at both US Centers and the methodology and benefits, I suggest that while the Centers are beneficial, they are not absolutely necessary. Believe it or not, it is possible to train units, even BCTs, to an acceptable level of competence without going to a CTC. We might even be surprised at the level of competence, though somewhat reduced, that can be reached without waiting for a turn at a Center.
Thus, he could be correct on the time factor -- but it doesn't <i>have</i> to be that way...
God Bless Colonel Weiss, his family, and their hard, dedicated service to the nation.
What a fine and well argued piece which makes my original little missive pale in clarity and articulation to his.
I disagree with parts of Colonel Weiss's argument but I do so appreciate the spirit and intellectual rigor that went into them, just as I do to those of brothers Smith and Harbridge.
I agree with Colonel Weiss that our combat experience of the last 9 years in Afghanistan and Iraq are important and can act as a fulcrum to help us transition from one form of conflict to another. But it should not be over stated and over-used as it often is by general officers and others when they use such catchy phrases as "battle hardened" army, and implying that with that kind of experience we can tackle any monster or slay any dragon in the future. In fact history shows that experience in one form of combat or conflict is not at all transferable to another, especially in the application of tactical method.
Thanks to the good Colonel for continuing the debate.
gian