An Organizational Proposal for Counter-threat Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts
by Matthew R. Modarelli
Download the Full Article: DoD Special Branch
The United States military must develop a single, enduring organization for gathering and acting upon threat information in low intensity conflicts. Around the globe, current and future strategic partners of the United States are mired in bloody and relentless internal wars for stability and legitimacy of government. Since the early 19th century, the US has played an important role in irregular warfare abroad and as the government continues to identify and pledge assistance to struggling nations, that role will expand and grow. With a growth in low intensity conflict missions comes an exponential need to adapt and apply successful information gathering methods from past conflicts. For the US, victory in today's low intensity conflicts will depend largely on our capacity to enable partner nation counter-threat operations (CTO) conducted primarily by indigenous law enforcement agencies. To succeed in current and future low intensity conflicts, an enduring Department of Defense Special Branch dedicated to the complex mission of working with indigenous special police units and security agencies to gather and exploit threat information must be established.
Download the Full Article: DoD Special Branch
Major Matthew R. Modarelli is a special agent with the Department of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI). He has served as a major crimes investigator, joint drug enforcement team member, and counterintelligence field agent and team leader. He has held four separate OSI field command positions including two command tours in Iraq. He has served at Headquarters, United States Air Force, as the Air Staff Counterintelligence (CI) Policy representative. He currently serves as the Counterintelligence Branch Chief for U.S. Africa Command. He has a BA in History from VMI, a Master of Science in Management Information Systems from Bowie State University, MD, a Master of Military Studies from the United States Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, and is a graduate of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA. His last article on Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency is currently listed on the Army War College Bibliography for Irregular Warfare.
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Comments
A Special Branch operation was set up in Iraq from 2005 - piloted in one Iraqi province then planned to expand. Approx $125m project of which I was planning officer...(may be ongoing but I have since lost touch). Predominantly staffed by former RUC officers as mentor/trainers to INP district Intel. Sponsored and paid by DOD and providing support to and supported by USMC brigade during pilot. It was subject to heavy legal review by DOJ/DOD. My point is that it was developed as a province wide capability rather than as an LE 'advisor' and worked intimately with INP. May save some time and money.
That's nice, another layer of authority and responsibilty in an ever expanding mock of operational definitions that mean almost nothing new. Counter-Threat Operations (CTO)..really? isn't that what the entire DoD is and has always done? counter threats?
As much as law enforcement has an important role in DoD operations, the last thing we need are more cops. Special Forces and USSOCOM have the mission because they have the knowledge and more importantly the proper mindset for these operations. The world is already well amplified with international police and intelligence sharing capabilities, we could be better at it, but are not in need of more of it. How about this...USSOCOM allows a few experienced LE in the back door to advise them on their narrow expertise, and that should be plenty.
The author makes some interesting points about the role of LE in COIN/CT operations. It is certainly a capablity gap, as many police trainers aren't familiar with Low Intensity Conflict/Terrorism problem sets and aren't familiar with foriegn advisor missions. To say that our LE advisors were a mixed back would be to put it lightly.
Still, there are some problems with the Special Branch model. Special Branch implies a domestic mission (though the author does not suggest that). Even under another name and adjusted mission, there are some quite thorny legal issues, especially with our DOD advicing another country's Ministr of Interior. Advising foriegn militaries and intelligence services is tricky enough, outside of IZ/AFG. Behold the "low profile" trainers in Pakistan, Yemen, and Lebannon.
The idea has merit, but those legal questions will have to be worked out. And perhaps the FBI and DOJ might be a more appropriate agency.
You left out Leon Comber's book: "Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency".
This suggestion for DOD has "empire" written all over it. I am not a fan of US directed "Lawfare" as an appropriate doctrine, regardless of how we want to label small wars.
The British model didn't even task organize "SB" under their Ministry of Defense, but rather as an arm of its own civilian police. And "SB" remains a part of the national police organisations in those former colonies.
What kind of legal framework would exist to support this? The legacy of the UK in its former colonies is the "Internal Security Act (ISA), it is alive and well. Do we want DOD cops in liaisson with police forces empowered to detain people for long periods without trial just cause DOD cops want to get the bad guys?
Additionally, what would DOD bring to bear that DOJ'S ICITAP and DOS'S ATA programs don't?
Lastly, USSOCOM, primarily US Army SF, have had many formal engagements and long term formal relationships with LE'S OCONUS. However, many of those relationships were discontinued because it is no longer US policy to have the US Military developing foreign LE agencies.