by Derek K. Barnett
Download the Full Article: The Fallacies of Fourth and Fifth Generation Warfare
In evaluating current warfighting trends (and reconciliatory attempts to understand said trends), it appears the conceptual model of Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW) (and, by extension, Fifth-Generation Warfare (5GW)) has achieved a level of dominant preeminence to the point of doctrinal establishment. Granted, there are frequent (and cogent) counterarguments against inherent 4GW precepts, but said arguments appear to face an almost uphill battle as 4GW/5GW concepts have permeated through the irregular warfighting spectrum, becoming established as "common knowledge." As these terms have become commonplace, frequently spoken with self-assured absolution, it is rather troubling that these concepts of future warfare, intended to reveal (as proponents argue) the myopic stasis of "conventional" understanding, have themselves become a closed and limited paradigm. Thus, the inherent problem with 4GW/5GW (and the difficulty in countering these concepts) is the nature of their own conventionality.
Download the Full Article: The Fallacies of Fourth and Fifth Generation Warfare
CTRC Derek K. Barnett is currently serving as an All-Source Intelligence Analyst at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., for an organization that specializes in countering IED threats. He possesses a master's degree in Strategic Intelligence and recently completed a graduate certificate program in Asymmetric Warfare.
About the Author(s)
Comments
Dayuhan:
So buzz words do not count---are we in fact edging into 5GW and do not want to admit it as it is a 'buzz word".
If COL Jones does not believe in evolution of warfare then this short comment might just be the start of an interesting take on 5GW.
ââ¬Â¢Stuxnet. A professional grade software worm that is designed to take control and destroy industrial systems. It has infected 45,0000 industrial systems worldwide. "Stuxnet is a 100-percent-directed cyber attack aimed at destroying an industrial process in the physical world. This is not about espionage, as some have said. This is a 100 percent sabotage attack." What's interesting is that it is weaponized software aimed at a very specific industrial target. This is a great example of replication (and self-replication) as it applies to open source warfare and systems disruption. The future of warfare has already happened, most people haven't realized it yet.
So Dayuhan---ready to start the discussion as there is no need to divert it to another site?
Anon:
No need for condescension; I understand exactly the what the terms mean. I'm just not impressed with them, I see no particular utility in them, and I feel no compulsion to genuflect before those who run them up the flagpole.
There's an excellent dissection of the "swarming" construct here:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9795&highlight=swa…
which I see no need to repeat.
At the end of the day, it's not about theories, buzzwords, and terms, it's about contextually based understanding of actual unique environments and actual unique antagonists. This need is not enhanced, and is often obstructed, by burying observed conditions under a pile of pompous verbiage.
Col. Jones' observations make a great deal of sense because he describes what he sees, without imposing abstract and largely irrelevant classifications on it. Note that he specifically rejects the notion that these developments represent an "evolution of warfare".
I've said this before, but the discussion board is really a much better place for this sort of conversation: the discussions endure longer and draw a wider variety of informed participants. Links to relevant threads have been provided, and it's easy to start new ones, and easy to remain anonymous if desired. If a real discussion is desired, that's the place for it. If that's not what's desired, I see no reason to pursue what seems to be degrading into an exercise in 1G chest-thumping. No further comment here, from me at least.
For those interested in John Robb's discussion of a year ago referencing 11 Standing Orders of an opens ource insurgency.
Wednesday, 03 June 2009
STANDING ORDER 8: self-replicate
This is a hard point to grasp, but it provides a substantial amount of leverage for small groups. It's important to manufacture copies of yourself that can advance your goals whenever possible. In short:
...self-replicate...
This can take a direct physical form in the case of technological copies -- this includes everything from software bots (which can reach millions of "hacked" computers) and genetically engineered contagion. These technological copies will only get smarter and more responsive as technology improves.
Another method is to create socially engineered copies of your organization through the use of social media. Basically, this means providing the motivation, knowledge, and focus necessary for an unknown person (external and totally unconnected to your group) to conduct operations that advance your group's specific goals (or the general goals of the open source insurgency). All forms of self-replication will rapidly improve with advances in technology and connectivity.
Robert Jones---you might find this of interest as it applies to "open source warfare".
Dayuhan---you may not find it of interest as it has too many buzz words or it might be too difficult to understand.
OPEN WARFARE AND REPLICATION
Here's some warfare theory (a little studied field that's currently claimed/overrun by political scientists, regional experts, psychologists, and historians). I find the below a useful model for thinking about drones/bots/bio-engineered organisms. Mileage will vary.
___________________
Open (source) warfare enables individuals and groups to take on much larger foes. In short, it allows the weak to defeat the strong.
One of the factors that makes open warfare so potent is superempowerment -- as in, the power of individuals and small groups is amplified via access to open networks (that grow in value according to Metcalfe's law = Internet growth + social networks running in parallel) and off the shelf technology (that grows rapidly in power due to the onslaught of Moore's law and the market's relentless productization).
A subset of superempowerment is replication.
Replication is achieved through the manufacture and deployment of devices, software programs, or organisms that can operate independently (autonomously or without requiring active human control) in a target environment. In short, this is a way technology can produce the equivalent of adding, albeit currently limited in terms of capability, new members to a group. Already, high levels of replication can be accomplished through the repurposing of inexpensive, off the shelf technology that's well within the reach of individuals and small groups.
Specifically, replication is realized through the design, deployment, and operation of:
ââ¬Â¢autonomous software (bots, worms, etc.),
ââ¬Â¢autonomous robotic devices (drones, crawlers, etc.), and
ââ¬Â¢genetically-engineered biological organisms.
In the simplistic form of replication, these devices and creations are manufactured en masse and deployed into the field of battle. In an advanced and even more effective form, self-replication is used. In self-replication, these devices, software, or organisms create copies of themselves using materials found in the environment they are deployed into. Self-replication is a process that we already see in use with software bots and biological organisms. With self-replication, tens can become thousands and thousands can become millions. The superempowerment conferred by replication also grows multiplicatively through improvements in the intelligence (see below) each device, program, and organism is bestowed with.
Here's a video that shows the state of the art in autonomous drones. It's an example of how quickly the multiplier provided by replication is accelerates as the intelligence of the autonomous device is improved.
NOTE: I'm in the process of working through some of the thinking on open warfare. It's the result of attending the excellent "small violent groups" conference I keynoted at Pitt.
<b>Anonymous at 12:01 PM:</b><blockquote>"So if I decide to stay in the shadows of grey then I will remain in the shadows of grey as that is a decision I make and I really do not care if others find offense with it."</blockquote>Can't speak for others but I don't take any offense at Anonymous posters at all. I just do not see much sense in it for several reasons, one of which is that everyone can be easily tracked if anyone cares to expend the effort.<blockquote>"...that is what I have been trying to get you to understand-it is all about theories, buzzwords, and terms."</blockquote>Yes, I can sure agree with that... ;)
Ken/Dayuhan:
Pay close attention to Robert Jones's writings---he is getting closer to my long held views which each new posting.
His recent posting on two tier insurgent structure was as accurate as anything I have seen for a long time in the IC world--and in the following he uses the term "market" which is now starting to sound more like John Robb's "open source warfare" which talks about marketplaces where information, weapons, TTPs are shared amoung different competing insurgent groups all with a heavy dose of speed and evolution.
He gets it, but it is coming from his vast experiences and what he was seeing on a daily basis and that is the same thing that John Robb came too back in 2003/2004 when he combined his SOF experiences to what he was observing in the world of "open source" technology developments---much like myself.
So if I decide to stay in the shadows of grey then I will remain in the shadows of grey as that is a decision I make and I really do not care if others find offense with it.
"Now, if all of this happens in an environment where transportation and communications technologies link everyone together in new and empowering ways, these insurgent movements begin to coordinate more, perhaps primarily to draw moral support and lessons learned at first, but then evolving to greater coordination over time. This then creates a market for a new creation. The non-state UW actor to emerge. An organization affiliated with no state, but with goals that speak to members of many states. They step into this new market, with new tools, and turn loose coordination into true synergy."
Wow what a statement---now if coupled to Lind's 4GW theories and Kilcullen's "conflict ecosystem" theory THEN in fact you have a model to work from that provides answers as well as challenges to think about!
Dayuhan---that is what I have been trying to get you to understand-it is all about theories, buzzwords, and terms.
Ken:
"nothing will change much"
How right you are and you were not trying to be right.
If you really read Lind's early writings on 4GW he keeps going over the fact that the US miltiary is actually bogged down in 2/3GW and one of the main problems is that it never really accepts 4GW---he himself is not so sure that the early indications of a 5GW are actually there as be puts strong emphasis on the word "generational" as well as the word that slapout9 points to which is also repeated by Lind over a large number of times "moral".
Dayuhan:
If you truly understood the terms "conflict ecosystem" or "open source warfare" then in fact the discussion in this blog would be far further along than it is currently.
Robert Jones in fact writes much more about both but he does not use the terms, but in fact he is getting there with every new point he brings in as he is working through in his mind his terms and defintions---something that Dayuhan steadfastly refuses to do.
Dayuhan: really go back and understand how I use "far eastern battle tactics" starting with the term "swarm attacks" then jump forward to Iraq late 2007 early 2008 and then ask the 1stCav if they experienced a number of such attacks because they were the driving TTPs for AQI, Ansar al Sunnah and Islamic Army of Iraq.
Also truly go back and read your ME history of warfare and you will see the exact same battle formations as used in the "far east" and then ask yourself just how is that possible?
One way to understand 4GW is to think of them as NGO's(Non Government Organizations) which in all the writings about 4GW that I have read is one of the main differences. There is no country to invade,there is no government to overthrow,there is no capital to capture. They are organizations based upon Moral ideals and because of that they can and do exist anywhere and everywhere. Until we understand that they have to be seen in that light I don't think we are going to get very far. We have to start at the Moral level of war and win there first. Focusing on the physical level tactics (no matter how good they are) will not get us where we want to go IMO.
War is natural, and like all natural things, it conforms to the environment that it finds itself in.
Man inserts himself into nature and attempts to conform it to his will. The same happens in warfare. The most successful commanders over the course of the history of warfare are those who best understood the environment they were in, and enhanced the natural path of success with their manipulations.
Currently in an environment where strong states can and do exercise complete dominion over weak states; any weak state that wants to challenge a strong state MUST do it outside the state construct. This is not an evolution of warfare; this is merely understanding the environment one is in.
Of course strong states see this as a gross violation of the "rules," those rules being written by strong states for the very purpose of keeping weak states in line.
As second order effect of this is that these same weak states that are dominated by strong states often have their natural legitimacy processes disrupted by the influence of the strong states that they must align with in order to protect them from other strong states that the fear more (if this is starting sound like prison alliances, you are beginning to get it). As the populace of the weak state's perception that their government is beginning to put the interests of the strong state over the interests of the populace (classic appeasement) the conditions of insurgency grow and one begins to see an increase in such outbreaks among the populaces of their weaker allies.
Now, if all of this happens in an environment where transportation and communications technologies link everyone together in new and empowering ways, these insurgent movements begin to coordinate more, perhaps primarily to draw moral support and lessons learned at first, but then evolving to greater coordination over time. This then creates a market for a new creation. The non-state UW actor to emerge. An organization affiliated with no state, but with goals that speak to members of many states. They step into this new market, with new tools, and turn loose coordination into true synergy.
Is this an evolution of warfare? No, its just doing the best you can with what you have available, assessing relative strengths and weakness of ones self and ones opponent, and then seeking to match strength against weakness; coupled with efforts to build alliances to increases ones strength as well.
Once the environment changes, this will change as well. After all, that's natural.
Re "far eastern fighting techniques"...
are these really uniquely "far eastern", or are they simply the names that far eastern cultures have given to techniques that have been emploued wherever there is warfare (e.g. wherever there are people)? Have Afghan mujahedin been studying far eastern history, or are they simply developing tactics that suit their environment and their specific challenges?
I honestly don't see how all of this <i>classification</i> - think "far eastern", "4G", "5G", "open source", "superempowered", etc, ad nauseam - enhances understanding. If anything, it seems to me to obstruct understanding of any given situation. As in most fields, jargon is typically not designed to enhance understanding, but rather to create a certain mystique around a specialty, an air of sophistication and an impression that those who use the jargon know something that others do not. Once these concepts are translated into plain English they become a lot less sexy and a whole lot less inclined to enhance the reputations of those who sling them around.
People on this thread may be interested in THE HANDBOOK OF 5GW (Nimble Books, Sep. 14, 2010) http://amzn.to/9V4Oxc
Heh, I'm not Mr Jinks, I love Meeces... ;)
Your post implies there is an argument; that is an academic construct and is best conducted over too much beer or coffee 1t 0340 in an off campus tavern or coffee shop. Your contention may or may not have merit for those who wish to argue arcane points but my personal belief is that I've just attacked you and not your argument so that seems a fallacy on your part.
Having said all that nothingness, my "THE solution" comment was a generic bromide (I'm old, I can do bromides...) aimed at those who tout particular ideas as having so much merit they will solve many / most -- if not all -- problems. I did give one example that IMO has been overexposed to little avail, that being "conflict ecosystems." That's a theory with some merit. It appeals to some and, as it is not discussed much here, obviously it does not appeal much to many, not enough to 'argue' about...
Mentioning the same pet rocks a lot -- as I do with our failed personnel system, our inadequate intial entry training and a couple of other things is fine. So is multiple mention of "conflict ecosystems" -- but I suggest that stating "and just maybe discussions and analysis using such concepts as "conflict ecosystems" might be a way of life" in various ways repeatedly is looking for an argument, not a discussion and that having been chided for doing that under a screen name, to drift off into anonymity is one way to do it -- but I doubt it'll change much.
That was my point on wanting discussion on one's terms. I say the same thing a lot -- but I do NOT do it in the pejorative, "you folks are fouled up if you don't do it this way" mode. And I don't get upset if no wants to discuss (argue?) with me about it and I'm willing to sign my name to what I write and take the flak if I err.
Just observing the progression of these comments, I noticed an "Anonymous" poster responding to a critique with his professional credentials. On the discussion board we are always invited to introduce ourselves, and that goes a long way toward garnering good will and understanding. After all, knowing one's audience is an important part of the communication process.
Just a thought.
It has been my experience that those who demand to know the face behind an argument are doing so for less than forthright reasons. It shows a tendancy to critique an argument based on what one thinks of the person making the argument; not on the argument itself. Almost any doubt you have over a factual assertion made by an anonymous person can quickly be resolved via internet search. The real value of posting anonymously is it forces those who disagree to focus thier arguments on the MERITS of the argument made.
<b>Anonymous at 11:40:</b>
You're obviously correct on the definition of redundancy and may be on its applicability in training for COIN. Hopefully, US Forces will never again have to practice COIN (the last time we did in CONUS was officially 1891 -- though Robert C. Jones will likely disagree; the last overseas in the Philippines in 1913) and will do little future FID. We've done a fair amount of that latter over the last 100 years -- and we've not done it well nor has it done us a lot of good...
Nor are we likely to ever do it well; goes against the American psyche.
I agreed with SJPO'Neill on the use of 'Anonymous.' It is not helpful in discussions. I totally understand that those who opt to post that way have a right to do so. However, I have a right to refuse to put much stock in any 'Anonymous' post -- and I do. Some say their job will not allow them to post under their name. My response to that is that they probably shouldn't be posting. Others do it for various reasons. I do not -- and I generally grant little credence to those who do. YMMV.
Just maybe I used redundundundancy and not redundancy (is that redundant?) a new word I coined, to address repeated applications of "conflict ecosystems" among other repetitious stuff from several unnamed souls. Redundundundancy defines as 'too much of a good thing.' ;)
Part of my problem is that I'm admittedly old and crotchety, another part is that I'm wary of anything or anybody who believes they have <u>the</u> solution to political problems and / or warfare. Or anyone who wants a discussion to run solely on <i>their</i> terms...
Redundancy (linguistics), the construction of a phrase that presents some idea using more information, often via multiple means, than is necessary for one to be able understand the idea.
Maybe if there was more redundancy (linguistics) in the training of COIN then we would not be discussing multiple different definitions to the same term, just maybe buzz words might in fact be accepted as everyone knows the exact definition, and just maybe discussions and analysis using such concepts as "conflict ecosystems" might be a way of life.
There is a reason languauge instructors when introducing a new word use it seven different ways as it is a left brain, right brain kind of thing.
Author;
If the professor had spent more time in teaching "conflict ecosystems and open source warfare" then the tie into 4/5GW is a breeze otherwise it is a deadly slog.
Shame both subjects get no attention by the academic world which is in some aspects beholden to others--say that as there have been no major "academic thinkers ever involved in the latest COIN debates" as the discussion has been driven by military or prior military types.
Wonder why that is?
@Most Recent Anon
I was asked by you or another "what does one learn in a graduate certificate program in Asymmetric Warfare?" I dont see how my response was anything but...
Likewise, I never claimed to be a SME on anything... do you excel at putting words in other peoples mouths?
As for your experience, my hats off to you, truly, as it is to anyone with a robust career in the field of defending our nation. And I am most open to being critiqued and greatly enjoy as well as appreciate all of the comments listed... however, I do not grovel; I give what I get (perhaps its the Navy in me? :)
Cheers!
@OODA Loop
No worries, I didnt take offense. And my response isnt intended to be scathing; I just have a very sarcastic sense of humor (of course, what Navy Chief doesnt? :) If anything, I am amused by the comments, particularly those who express disdain for bringing up 4GW/5GW (e.g. the comments by Pericles - hilarious). While I would agree with much of what is said in that regard, I did have my reasons for seeking to publish this (see my previous comments directed at Anon 1). As for Pericles...
@Pericles
Understood, but I dont see the horse as quite dead yet; particularly given the doctrinal subsumation Ive seen 4GW/5GW take in my studies. Furthermore, while I rehash a good deal of material (again, in hopes of keeping the argument alive, or counterargument, as the case may be), I havent seen soon of the examples I included in previous literature (e.g. Lusitanian War, ninja... because ninja are just plain cool :) nor have I really encountered an argument which establishes 4GW/5GW as an inherently conventional argument (Ive seen this danced around a lot but not clearly asserted, at least to my satisfaction... ah, opinions, theyre grand arent they?) - i.e. You know what we need to clear up all these bureaucracies? Another bureaucracy! (of course, that new bureaucracy is never advertised nor really believed by its proponents to be as such). Furthermore, it is the post-Lind work you reference that I am critical of. Then again, if its really old hat to you, perhaps you might want to avert your gaze lest you become bitten by the time vampire and sucked into portal o' waste.
As for your comments regarding Google, yes, I am most proficient. Of course, I try not to limit myself to simply one tool and exercise great caution in its use, lest I fall trap to the "limitation effect" (in material and in the ability to process material). Perhaps you suffer from this process limitation phenomenon? http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-making-us… As for Amazon, isnt that what environmentalists abandoned saving over a decade ago? :)
@SJPONeill
No worries, I like it rough and, as I said to OODA Loop, I don't take offense nor do I seek to offend (just my sarcastic streak at work. As for seeing more from me... we shall see. Again, this paper was a short assignment I wrote for class and, honestly, the only reason I sought to post it at Small Wars Journal was due to rather emphatic pleas from my professor to seek publication. Not that I dont enjoy research and writing, just dont have much time these days (particularly due to my newborn son - good times :)
Author:
Checked your link for the academic side of this argument so let me get this straight--this line of studies makes you a "SME" in the area of AW?
"The Certificate in Asymmetrical Warfare is designed for students interested in unconventional operations within the larger scope of high-intensity conventional warfare: the application of special forces and ability to deal with adaptive enemies in difficult situations. Students explore such topics as the history and missions of special operations, forces and the role within national security policy. Special emphasis includes the origins of insurgency and revolution using theories to evaluate specific groups of insurgents, terrorists, and revolutionaries. In addition, joint warfare and its future are examined in light of technological advances, the information age, non-state threats, rogue regimes, and clashes of culture between regions."
THEN what does the following make;
1. six long years in SF during the late 60s and 70s with 18 months in VN, followed by training key NATO countries on how to counter Soviet SF troops attacks, fighting in Jordan in Sept 70 to support the Jordanian King, training the Greek personal guard troops "Hellenic Raiding Force" to defend the COLs, and defeating virtually every NATO major manuever using GW/UW tactics in every AOR assigned to
2. spent hours in university classes listening to some German students named Meinhof and Baader who later I had to chase across all of Germany
3. spent a long 14 years doing Strategic Debriefings in the Berlin Refugee Center in three different languages seeing the Cold War developments in Central Europe up front and personal
4. watching personally the Wall come down
5. ending up in Iraq as a very Sr. Interrogator as there were virtually no or limited quality Army Interrogators for 16 months with over 1000 interrogations of AQI, Ansar al Sunnah,and Islamic Army of Iraq personnel using both culture and the Koran in ways that even surprised me
I could continue to go on and on but maybe I am getting to old for this and have in all my years seen nothing improve and I have seen that we are as a military unwilling to truly learn from lessons past or lessons that the insurgencies are teaching us daily worldwide.
So I guess I could also claim to be a "Graudate of AW" as well as saving amount of money in the process.
And this on top of obtaining along the way a MA and Ph.D-I happen to call it enjoying history and not worrying about titles/certificates.
So do not take things so seriously and be open to critique especially if you write something for publication.
Even Iraqi insurgents taught me a few new things in the area of UW/GW.
Dayuhan:
"I'm curious about the notion of "far eastern fighting techniques". I've lived 30+ years in the far east and I'm reasonably familiar with the history, but I can't think of any fighting technique that is unique to the far east or could be reasonably characterized as a specifically far eastern technique. I assume we're not talking about martial arts!"
1. Swarm attacks
2. Differences between eastern and western views of Strategic Advantage
3. now lets really go on as to what is "eastern" that has been to some degree translated into actual western versions over the last 20-40 years
a. the Cord Battle Array
b. the Obstructing and Blocking Array
c. the Cloud Battle Array
d. the Yingwei Battle Array
e. the Hesui Battle Array
f. the Three-Shaped Array
g. the Cone-Shaped Battle Array
h. the Flying Geese Array
i. the Closing V or Haichi Shiki Battle Array
j. the Circle Formation
k. the Split-Unit Formation
Then we could get into the areas of as they define it far difrrently than we do;
1. military posture
2. flexibility to react to unforeseen circumstances
3. initiative---which by the way has a deeper meaning that in the west
4. and the combined power of several warfare styles
By the way any number of the above mentioned have their equal in US tactics--which begs the question of which came first-I am betting on the "eastern versions" as they are the oldest recorded uses.
I could go on and on, but it is in fact interesting that the insurgencies in the ME in fact do to a large degree copy these tactics---which is not surprising when one really studies history and how far "west" the "eastern' style of war fighting was pushed---if I recall my history also deep into the Middle East LONG before we were a country.
NOW recreate each ambush in Afghanistan against the US as well as the Soviets--you will then "see" the direct linkage to the "past".
Dayuhan/Author:
If both think that things are fine in the lands of Iraq or Afghanistan and that COIN is working well and that buzz words do not count, theories are old fashioned, and the fact the whole world is just great then explain this after nine years of fighting in Afghanistan and explain the resurgence of AQI in Iraq when we have supposedly killed the entire second generation of leadership and do not use the word adapt to explain it-as yes everything in mother natures' world adapts to everything else on a daily basis.
I am all ears---as nothing you have written here seems to explain the evolution, the technological advances shown by both insurgencies and for that matter all current worldwide Salafi insurgenices. Even OSINT is proving your points wrong on a daily basis. Go back an really look at the Wikileaks data work done in the blog Zero Intelligence Agent and you will see a vibrant growing insurgency that defies current media explanations.
"While I also posted this in the Videos section, I felt this deserved some attention here at Threat Matrix. This Al Jazeera report certainly goes a long way toward punching a big hole in the notion that a mere sprinkling of al Qaeda operatives are working in Afghanistan. Note that for one Taliban unit fighting in Baghlan province, it is estimated that about one third are "foreign" - or al Qaeda. Also note how the Taliban commander is encouraging his fighters to accept the growing number of foreign fighters into his ranks.
Most likely the bulk of these "foreign" fighters are members of the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, but remember that "Chechens" (a catch-all for fighters from the Russian Caucasus region) have been spotted in units operating in the north, including in Baghlan and Nuristan. Turkish al Qaeda fighters have also made appearances in the Afghan north.
At The Long War Journal, we've long maintained that al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan is far greater than the "50 to 100" number that was repeated [See LWJ report, Analysis: Al Qaeda maintains an extensive network in Afghanistan for more background]. This analysis differs greatly from that of CIA Director Leon Panetta and Nation Counterterrorism Center Director Michael Leiter.
Note: The number of cells detected in Afghanistan has increased since the last time I noted it a few weeks back. By my count, al Qaeda and allied groups have operated cells in 58 districts in 19 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. These numbers are based on ISAF press releases over the past three years. If I incorporated al Qaeda propaganda (such as As Sahab notices of suicide attacks), this number would easily grow."
Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/09/al_qaeda_b…
Anon:
I'm curious about the notion of "far eastern fighting techniques". I've lived 30+ years in the far east and I'm reasonably familiar with the history, but I can't think of any fighting technique that is unique to the far east or could be reasonably characterized as a specifically far eastern technique. I assume we're not talking about martial arts!
The need to embrace the correct meaning of the buzzwords falls a bit flat with me, I'm afraid, because every time I dig into one I can't find any meaning at all, beyond a mass of racy verbiage.
Re this:
<i>
THIS was what LIND was driving at--it is the technology that drives generational warfare and if one does not keep pace one loses--- I am afraid we have when it is all said and done "lost" Iraq and Afghanistan.</i>
We may well have "lost" Iraq and Afghanistan, but I don't for a moment believe that it's because we haven't kept pace withe technology or haven't adapted to a new generation of war. Our problems in both places stem from a rather more fundamental issue: a decision by political leadership to use military force to accomplish objectives - the installation of functional, democratic, centralized, sustainable government in Iraq in Afghanistan - that is not suited to accomplishment by military force, and may not, especially in the case of Afghanistan, be achievable at all. Driving screws with a hammer makes a mess; this is not a generational issue... in fact it's an old lesson we should have learned by now.
I don't see how our problems in Afghanistan are generationally or fundamentally different from the ones that the Soviets faced there, or for that matter than the ones the British faced there in their day. What's so different, really? The enemy adapts? The enemy chooses tactics that play to their strengths and our weaknesses? The enemy uses whatever means are available to them? Well, clutch the pearls and gasp in horror, who would ever have expected <i>that</i>...
@Anonymous 1
So, the assumption is that because I am educated, I lack experience. Interesting... incorrect, but interesting... As for what one learns in an Asymmetric Warfare grad cert program: http://www.amu.apus.edu/academic/programs/degree/1309/graduate-certific… (feel free to click on each course title for a synopsis of what is "taught" :)
In regards to Lind, I believe that he has already been discussed ad nauseam. Furthermore, my intent was not to discuss 4GW precepts as Lind envisioned them but what subsequent proponents have mutated 4GW/5GW into [in fact, I rather respect Linds initial treatment of 4GW as a "thought experiment" (something to consider as opposed to terms of absolution); it is the permeation of a general sense of acceptance as promulgated by those who have mutated 4GW beyond said thought experiment that I take issue with and what my rather brief article was intended to address (what it has become as opposed to how it began)]. Perhaps 4GW/5GW discussions fell "off in intensity about two years ago," but it is promoted rather frequently within academia, which is rather frightening to me [in fact, the only reason I mention academic credentials in my bio is that this brief article began as a short reaction paper in one of my grad cert courses; mapping what I was being taught over what I have learned through experience, I was greatly troubled]. If the debate is over and current 4GW/5GW conceptualizations are given general acceptance, then we begin straying into the area of doctrinal absorption and/or establishment. Forgive me for keeping the debate/discussion alive but it is perhaps a vain attempt to see this from happening.
@SJPONeill
While I dont think you can discuss the origins of the 4GW theoretical construct without discussion Lind, such was not my intent [see above]. As for why I feel that I have to surround myself in mystery: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:The_enemy_is_listening.jpg. Now, I might ask why is it that intel types seem to be the only ones ever interested in OPSEC?
@Niel Smith
I love the 8 minute abs reference. Shouldve based my argument on that - wouldve been a far more interesting read :)
@LPierson
Now thats funny :)
@OODA Loop
How did I neglect to address the false concept of asymmetric warfare? My article was not about asymmetric warfare and I did not use the term once in what I wrote... did you get lost in the bio - I hope not as it was intentionally kept quite short :) As for your diatribe regarding Asymmetric Warfare, now were getting into semantics. Asymmetric Warfare, as I see it, defines or describes a situation, not a strategy. The quotes you list see General Smith treating Asymmetric Warfare as a strategy (which, in this context, I would agree with you). Furthermore, the picture it defines is one of generality, not of specification. For example, my friend recently told me that he drove down a narrow, winding road and he was a little scared by this. I took his description (narrow, winding) as he intended: a general reference. By your argument, I should counter his statement by saying: "Narrow as compared to what? All roads are narrow when compared to the infinity of space. Furthermore, all roads winding as no road is perfectly straight or symmetrical... blah, blah, blah." It goes back to the snowflake argument, which I frequently see used to counter the Asymmetric Warfare model (i.e. no two snowflakes are the same). However, the mathematical/physical patterns that defines snowflake crystallization is universal; thus, while no two snowflakes are the same, there is symmetry between individual snowflakes. Indeed, snowflakes are far more symmetrical to one another, than snowflakes compared against baseball-size hail. Likewise, my friend and I, while different, are the same age, height, build, medical disposition and possess the same weapons and general fighting ability. We are far more symmetrical with one another than putting one (or both) of us up against a 4-foot tall quadriplegic dwarf who possesses no weapons or general fighting cognizance. Again, I am speaking of defining a picture, not the strategy employed (i.e. my friend and I are relatively symmetric in appearance only; when it comes to conflict between us, no holds barred; likewise conflict between myself and the aforementioned quadriplegic dwarf would also be a no holds barred contest... wow, I really am coldhearted arent I? :) Regardless, this is ultimately how I have come to understand Asymmetric Warfare... and the wheels on the semantics bus go round and round...
As for my views on Lind, see above.
@DeltaCharlie
I could spend a lifetime listing examples; I believe those I concisely reference are enough to make my point. As for the language, this was initially written as a short college paper; I left it to the SWJ editors to determine if their audience would need a different presentation. Besides, I prefer to see language as poetry and would much rather use flowers than force other to wade through fields of weeds.
@Abu Nasr
Thanks. And Im glad to see you recognize me as an NCO; there are many officers who stop at CTR and believe me to be a contractor :)
This was quickly shot out. More/better responses to come as time permits. Thanks for taking the time to read/comment. Even if you completely disagree with me or vice versa, I still deeply appreciate your taking the time to write.
SJPONeil:
Systems disruption---here are two articles-one from 2005 and now notice how it has been refined in 2009 with additional information/experiences gained from Iraq:
Saturday, 10 December 2005
SYSTEMS DISRUPTION SWARMS
A new variation on an extremely old method of warfare has emerged. This new method is called systems disruption -- which has been a major theme of this weblog since its inception. Based on extensive analysis, I believe that systems disruption will become the dominant method of warfare for non-state networks against nation-states.
It consists of simple attacks (using ad hoc weapons) on critical nodes of infrastructure -- oil, gas, electricity, water, etc. These attacks, if properly targeted, can cause cascades of failure that sweep entire systems. The result is a paralyzed economy that produces costs that far outstrip the costs of the attack (this is a guerrilla version of the American air power method called effects-based operations). This new method vastly improves on the three other ways non-state entities have fought strategically with states in the past:
ââ¬Â¢Moral conflict. 4th generation guerrilla war. A slow and difficult process of erosion.
ââ¬Â¢Strategic symbolic terrorism. A variant of moral conflict that can be projected. Pushed to a new level by al Qaeda. Limited in its long term impact. Requires extensive pre-planning and flawless execution.
ââ¬Â¢WMDs. Limited and flawed attempts in the past. Requires extensive knowledge and likely state support to accomplish correctly.
Lessons
In Iraq, systems disruption is the 'secret sauce' of the insurgency. A series of relatively infrequent and small attacks have held the Iraqi electricity, oil, and water systems at nearly pre-war levels despite a massive reconstruction campaign. This success has fueled the insurgency by creating economic chaos and radically decreasing the legitimacy of both the US occupation and the new Iraqi government. These attacks boast the following attributes:
ââ¬Â¢Easy, inexpensive, and safe. Almost none of infrastructure attackers have been caught or killed. Infrastructure networks are notoriously easy to destroy using ad hoc weapons and have a vast number of vulnerable points.
ââ¬Â¢Fuels fragmentation. The decimation of primary services provides a way to fragment the target state's population. If cultural fault lines are present (Huntington), this will accelerate the descent to primary loyalties and conflict.
ââ¬Â¢Fantastic ROIs. The network effect of infrastructure attacks can produce returns on investment in the thousands of percent (a rate of return recognized by bin Laden)
How this works
Over time, systems disruption will become the most effective method by which virtual states subvert or coerce target nation-states. It does this by:
ââ¬Â¢Leveraging external connections. Systems disruption uses the ties of globalization against the target state. By making it an unreliable business partner it hurts its ability to compete globally and retain relationships. These partners (often morally ambivalent markets), will put heavy pressure on the target state to resolve the crisis.
ââ¬Â¢Minimizing moral opposition. Symbolic or body count centric attacks increase the moral staying power of target states. In contrast, the blame for sustained systems disruption typically rebounds onto the state itself. Since almost all wars in the future will be over marginal objectives (external to the life and death of the state or the central well being of its populace), attacks that radically increase costs without a corresponding increase in moral commitment have a high likelihood of success.
ââ¬Â¢Riding urbanization. The growth of urbanization is a global megatrend. These urban centers are the economic lifeblood of a nation-state and typically the key points of connection to the world. Large cities, however, offer a green field of vulnerability to this method of attack. The larger the cities, the more reliant it is on key systems. Systems disruption can quickly collapse urban environments into disaster zones.
I have detailed two scenarios (last year) that show systems disruption in action:
Russia.
Saudi Arabia.
SECOND:
Tuesday, 03 November 2009
BASIC SYSTEMS DISRUPTION
Here's a simple overview of what is increasingly becoming the dominant method of offensive warfare in the 21st Century. Early applications of this methodology to modern conflict have been very successful. In short, it's better to understand its dynamics than to assume it doesn't exist.
There are two basic types of systems disruption:
ââ¬Â¢Social. Disruption of social networks. Division of the network into non-cooperative or openly antagonistic centers of gravity.
ââ¬Â¢Physical. The disruption of physical networks, particularly infrastructure.
System disruption leverages network structure and dynamics to turn small attacks into large events. Selection of the best point to attack is based on an analysis of the network's design and flows. The term to describe this point is: the systempunkt. Essentially, the systempunkt is the point in the network, that if attacked, will yield the maximal possible impact.
Systems disrupters typically prioritize attacks based on the potential of the following:
ââ¬Â¢Cascades of failure.
ââ¬Â¢Cross network/system cascades.
ââ¬Â¢Self-reinforcing failures. Those failures that generate feedback loops that keep the system from returning to the status quo ante (the former equilibrium point).
Systempunkts typically fall into the following categories:
ââ¬Â¢Highly connected nodes (particularly useful in scale free network designs).
ââ¬Â¢Sources of systemic flow.
ââ¬Â¢Cross sub-network or cluster connections.
Repetitive systems disruption yields better results than singular large events since it impacts decision making processes of those impacted (disruption tax).
Systems disruption is superior to traditional methods of attack due to the following:
ââ¬Â¢It is effective at delegitimizing governments. Service availability is a key political good.
ââ¬Â¢It produces minimal public backlash and is likely to generate co-operative entities.
ââ¬Â¢It is easy to recruit for (few skills and very little, if any combat required), usually results in low casualties and few arrests, and requires nearly zero (financing, equipment, and personnel) to accomplish.
Open source warfare, a set of autonomous groups engaged in coopetition to achieve an amorphous promise/goal, works extremely well with systems disruption due to the following:
ââ¬Â¢Rapid discovery of systempunkts across a variety of target systems/networks via tinkering networks and stigmergic processes of cross network communication.
ââ¬Â¢Increased chance of repetitive attacks due to a multiplicity of groups.
ââ¬Â¢Self-reinforcing dynamics. Systems disruption gives rise to groups that can profit or exploit the dynamic. These groups in turn disrupt systems to perpetuate their survival and thereby give rise to yet more groups.
Market dynamics and systems disruption can become mutually reinforcing processes. The precise dynamics of this connection are still amorphous and ill defined. However, practice shows that this cross connection can be leveraged to achieve coercive results.
Most target networks are designed to maximize efficiency. This design constraint yields configurations that are particularly vulnerable to systemic disruption. Further, globalization (due to network integration, tight coupling, and network complexity) have made systems disruption applicable to nearly every corner of the globe.
Urban environments are particularly vulnerable to systems disruption due to the extreme concentration and cross connections of the networks required to sustain high population densities. As a result, urban takedowns are possible if not probable.
The high levels of amplification and potential reach of system disruption allows participants in a local conflict to attack regional and global foes with minimal effort.
Systems disruption can generate results (damage) that if measured in a return on investment (the damage caused divided by the cost of the attack) that exceed one million percent.
The long term trend toward individual superempowerment -- the leverage gained by individuals due to network access and new tools -- is made dangerous due to an ability to accomplish systems disruption.
Response to Abu Nasr and CTRC Barnett.
"Abu Nasr:
Attacking the argument is fine, but attacking an enlisted sailor's education is low. At least try to maintain the illusion that there is not a deep-seeded elitism in the officer corps. For consistency's sake, I hope none of the ad hominem attackers are also advocates of empowering NCOs."
Abu Nasr. First, I'm enlisted too. I'm a retired Gunnery Sergeant...and we call things for what they are. Also, I've not completed my degree; the educational system does not keep pace with reality on the field.
Additionally, I've worked all the issues I've commented on in some form or fashion over the last 20 years. I did not simply learn them from school.
I was attacking the issue of terms...and I should have cleared the air on that, however, what Rupert Smith said only highlights the ambiguity and confusion caused by terms.
I was not attacking the individual. I was attacking terms...terms that block what is really important here...the threat, how the threat reacts, and how we respond and/or fail to respond.
Don't get me wrong. I used to subscribe to the idea of Asymmetric Warfare myself until I realized it did not make sense.
Again, this is more about the educational institutions, not the person...unfortunately it may have appeared that way.
For that reason alone, I want to clarify my statement. If I came out appearing I was making this personal- I apologize for the misinterpretation.
Semper fidelis Gents and Semper Thick Skin, OODA Loop
"When we are constantly being hit by Far Eastern battle tactics in Afghanistan and we have not either adapted to them and seemingly cannot learn from them then we have "lost"---this is what LIND calls 4GW and yes we have not thoroughly discussed 4GW/5GW in this blog regardless of what one thinks." by Anonymous
I agree that is what Lind means but he also talks a great deal about the Moral component of Warfare and how different social organizations will rise to challenge the concept that the Nation/State is the highest form of social organization that can govern a population.
Dayuhan:
Maybe if we spent more time on the actual definition and correct use of the buzz words we might actually be further along on a number of discussions in SWJ. The core problem is that while all tend to use or not use the "buzz" words not all use the correct definitions which then causes many to dislike or not use them.
We might for an example go back and review H. John Poole's book "Phamtom Warrior" who wrote in 2001 prior to 9/11 extensively on Far Eastern fighting tactics which if one historically looks at them discovers really I think what Barnett was trying to get at, but again he did not fully understand the 'buzz" words. I in fact used the book by Poole as a key interrogation manual when talking with Sunni insurgents simply to doublecheck their battle tactics/TTPs. We in the Western world tend to not want to see things from the "lips" of one's enemies-example many US military personnel/military intelligence/researchers/writers view the IO videos being released by the Salafist jihadi's to be "propoganda"--I do not. Actually they do not care if we watch as we are not the target audience.
I pay extreme attention to detail as they are always saying/showing something of interest and it constantly shows one that yes in fact Far Eastern battle tactics have merged with 21st century technologies to drive their movements further and faster than we in the West think possible.
Guess what yes history was in play- what I was taught/practiced in GW/UW in Special Forces in the 60s and early 70s came out of the WWII guerrilla tactics and we used some of the actual developed weapons/tactics from that era, but with the technology of the times.
Then I learned the Vietcong style of guerrila warfare again up front and personal and then we watched from 1970 to 2001 as different Western and Eastern terrorist groups/insurgenices developed and followed historical patterns, BUT each with a different twist in using the technology of the period.
THIS was what LIND was driving at--it is the technology that drives generational warfare and if one does not keep pace one loses--- I am afraid we have when it is all said and done "lost" Iraq and Afghanistan.
Simply because things are "nasty" and from the past does not mean that in fact they have indeed morphed into a generational change driven by 21st century technology. When an Iraqi Sunni Salafist can build the IR focused anti jamming mine "Black Cat" for about 600 US that is costing us well over 2B to counter we have "lost" and when the Taliban have introduced a truely all wooden mine we have "lost".
When we are constantly being hit by Far Eastern battle tactics in Afghanistan and we have not either adapted to them and seemingly cannot learn from them then we have "lost"---this is what LIND calls 4GW and yes we have not thoroughly discussed 4GW/5GW in this blog regardless of what one thinks.
The argument in the article and the subsequent comments make the error of beating the same dead horse that current 4GW/5GW theorists left in a ditch long ago. This may be convenient for anyone wishing to offer an alternative ride or route for subsequent pathtreaders, since mere repetition lends the aegis of respectability and might serve as a defense for the would-be self-serving iconoclasts; but it ignores the work that has been done since Lind's original framework first began to bow beneath the weight of its own hubris.
One wonders if the author of the article has ever dreamed of such a thing as Google (or Amazon, for that matter) or merely lifted the terms "4GW" and "5GW" from the pile of rubbish littering his office -- ye old arguments he has thoroughly enjoyed when reading other horse-beaters over the years.
Take away the buzzwords, and all you have left is a nasty situation... certainly not a generational change. All of these things have been seen before.
The link given above leads to an excellent discussion of the limitations and egregious overuse of thee terms, which I won't try to repeat here... much better to do it on the forum.
Anon...no real disagreement with what you say, although i guess a sign-in would be nice so you don't get mistaken for one of those faceless intel type...
But you totally lost me with this paragraph:
"ââ¬Â¢Systems disruption. A method of sabotage that goes beyond the simple destruction of physical infrastructure. This method of warfare, which can burst onto the scene as a black swan, uses network dynamics (a new form of leveraged maneuver) to undermine and reorder global systems. It is through this Schumpeterian "creative destruction" that new environments favorable to opposition forces are built (often due to a descent into primary loyalties and pressure from global markets)."
Could you expand on this less all the buzzwords?
SJPONeil:
'Also agree re the vagueness of the bio - why is it that (many) intel types feel that they have to surround themselves in mystery...?"
They do it in order to divert from their lack of standing up and calling a spade a spade when they have to as they have been taught over the last nine years to do work via by team or department. SWJ recently had an article referencing just this intel problem called noise.
Take the newest intel term HUMINT Analyst---just what the heck is that as there is no formal MOS for it---either you are HUMINT or an intel analyst--but wait there is the odd chance that you worked as an analyst together with an interrogator at the Corp/Theater level and presto you are a HUMINT Analyst-excluding the fact that potentionally the HUMINTer taught you what you had to do to provide him the information needed to drive HUMINT so again not really a school house trained MOS, but man is there a demand for them lately in Afghanistan.
Still like the 2006 article by John Robb referencing 5GW from his blog.
Into 5GW
Lind: Whoever is first to recognize, understand, and implement a generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat.
Things would be bad enough with just fourth generation opponents but as the research on global guerrillas has borne out, a new more dangerous generation is forming: potentially a 5th generation of warfare. Much of this new generation was derived and accelerated in cauldron of Iraq, just as the basis for 3rd generation of warfare was proved out in the Spanish Civil war. What we see is jarring:
ââ¬Â¢Open source warfare. An ability to decentralize beyond the limits of a single group (way beyond cell structures) using new development and coordination methodologies. This new structure doesn't only radically expand the number of potential participants, it shrinks the group size well below any normal measures of viability. This organizational structure creates a dynamic whereby new entrants can appear anywhere. In London, Madrid, Berlin, and New York.
ââ¬Â¢Systems disruption. A method of sabotage that goes beyond the simple destruction of physical infrastructure. This method of warfare, which can burst onto the scene as a black swan, uses network dynamics (a new form of leveraged maneuver) to undermine and reorder global systems. It is through this Schumpeterian "creative destruction" that new environments favorable to opposition forces are built (often due to a descent into primary loyalties and pressure from global markets).
ââ¬Â¢Virtual states (ala Philip Bobbitt). Unlike the guerrilla movements of the past, many of the 4GW forces we are fighting today have found a way to integrate their activities with global "crime." No longer are guerrilla movements or terrorists aimed at taking control of the reigns of the state or merely proxies for states. A new form of economic sustenance has been found. This black globalization is already vast (a GDP of trillions per year), and gains momentum through weakening and disruption of states. This military/economic integration creates a virtuous feedback loop that allows groups to gain greater degrees of independence and financial wealth through the warfare they conduct.
NOTE: Whether you call these developments 4GW on steroids or the start of a 5th generation, it just doesn't matter. Whichever way you cut it, things are developing quickly and in the wrong direction.
Wow! OODA Loop, that comment is almost longer than the original paper...top effort! Just a couple of minor points...
In ref to your point 1, "He knows only that whoever fails to adapt the experiences of the last war will surely lose the next one." One might argue that this is why it took so long to adapt to 21C informal war because we are still trying to adopt to (false) lessons of the last war (DESERT STORM) which 'proofed' all the work that had gone into AirLand Battle - possibly the answer to a question that no longer existed.
Para 2. I'd argue that there a two separate points in this paragraph. One is that the 911 attacks by a mere 20 people are a DS example of asymmetric warfare in terms of the scale of the attacks and the effects achieved. the second point is that US markets were probably tottering already and that the collapse that led to the bailout was not something AQ could realistically claim credit more.
Para 5. Arguably this is not new either and this is exactly what occurred post-Tet in the US, when it was manipulation of US domestic perception that undermined the Vietnam war effort. By considering cartels etc in the same paradigm as a Cold War enemy we are limiting our ability to counter them as opposed to an unachievable defeat.
Para 6. Spot on!!! The one environment where we consistently get whipped, the information domain, and the one where we are most timid and blunder-footed about engaging in.
Para 7. "The West no longer dominates the world." Debatable...though ironically, if we meddled less in the rest of the world we might actually control/influence more of it i.e. by increasing unsustainable populations in third world regions we actually create the conditions that drive the stability that threatens us.
Para 8. Tend to agree but it's not that prescient as this is a trend well developed from the 1930s into the 50s and 60s. I think that the changes you speak of may be more attributable to an equally small group in 2003 when they took the world into the rock show called Iraq.
To say that no other theory has proved better than fourth generation warfare is a bit of a leap, certainly attributing it to the 1989 paper as none of those 'lessons' are that new now or then. One might argue equally well that Toffler's Third Wave from 1980 a full 9 years early identifies many of the same issues; and that the Fourth Wave he introduces in War and Anti-War (1995?) describes the task-organised nature of modern conflict where partners ally for brief periods/contingencies and then go their separate ways again instead of reliance on grand alliances.
Still...good discussion....
While I commend the author for addressing the confusion and complexities associated with the concept of fourth and fifth generation warfare, HE FORGOT TO ADDRESS THE FALSE CONCEPT OF 'ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, the certificate the author received from his masters degree program.
See, there is no such thing as "asymmetric warfare", and here is why as noted by British General Rupert Smith. I highlight this portion...
"Labeling wars as asymmetric is to me something of a euphemism to avoid acknowledging that my opponent is not playing to my strengths and I am not winning."
"The practice of war, indeed its "art," is to achieve asymmetry over the opponent. Labeling wars as asymmetric is to me something of a euphemism to avoid acknowledging that my opponent is not playing to my strengths and I am not winning."
"War amongst the people is different: it is the reality in which people in the streets and houses and fields-all the people, anywhere-are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defense of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force. However, it is also not asymmetric warfare since it is also a classic example of disinterest in the change of paradigm. The practice of war, indeed its "art," is to achieve asymmetry over the opponent. Labeling wars as asymmetric is to me something of a euphemism to avoid acknowledging that my opponent is not playing to my strengths and I am not winning. In which case perhaps the model of war rather than its name is no longer relevant: the paradigm has changed." - General Rupert Smith, "The Utility of Force" page 6. One can look up more regarding the term "asymmetric" via Google Books.
Here are highlights from the 1989 article that cause the concept to remain resilient today, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation". Note thats its not the term 4GW that cause the concept to remain resilient, but the elements that define it. Even Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria of the Armys Strategic Studies Institute appears to have missed this in his counterpoint on 4GW several years back.
1. The 1989 article highlights, "He knows only that whoever fails to adapt the experiences of the last war will surely lose the next one." This 1989 piece highlights our shortfalls in adapting to Iraq, Afghanistan and now Mexico.
2. Todays threats e.g. al Qaeda, al Qaeda affiliates, Hezbollah and drug cartels seem to rely less on centralized logistics. Todays enemies treasure their ability to maneuver, vice hold key terrain. 20 terrorists took the US to three wars (Iraq, Afghanistan and War on Terrorism worldwide); help nearly crash the US stock markets, change the laws and perceptions of over a quarter billion citizens in 2001. All three enemies leverage the societies, and the culture, they exist in to their favor.
3. Cartels, Al Qaeda and Hezbollah all focus on "collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him". The cartels do not need to overthrow the national government, when all they need to do is overthrow local governments... knowing the national government cannot do anything about it-while their goal is profit, they have to buy support from local leaders- "silver or lead". Hezbollah took 30 years to infiltrate Lebanese society in order to finally officially become a part of the sanctioned government. Al Qaeda of Iraq penetrated Iraqi society well enough to blunt counterinsurgency efforts. It was mostly because of the Awakening Movement that this all changed. Now that the US has pulled out, and the Awakening Movement is left high and dry, al Qaeda in Iraq is using the Sunni frustration to reorganize Sunnis against the dysfunctional Iraqi government.
4. "Fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts." The US has been fighting against an IDEA since 1998, but especially since the attacks on 911. Al Qaeda is an idea. The group functions off mission type orders. C2, therefore, is nonlinear and is not able to effectively be targeted. The western world is running about the world and wasting resources against a threat that is comparable to a mouse against herds of elephants... the west being elephants.
5. "Tactical and strategic levels will blend as the opponents political infrastructure and civilian society become battlefield targets. It will be critically important to isolate the enemy from ones own homeland." WE ARE FACING THIS ISSUE TODAY IN THE US WITH CARTELS, GANGS AND POSSIBLE HOMEGROWN TERRORISTS.
6. "Psychological operations may become the dominant operational strategic weapon in the form of media/information intervention." THIS 1989 article highlights the challenge we continue to fight today... we call it "the narrative".
7. "The West no longer dominates the world. A fourth generation may emerge from non-western cultural traditions, such as Islamic or Asiatic traditions. The fact that some non-Western areas, such as the Islamic world, are not strong in technology may lead them to develop a fourth generation through ideas than technology." This 1989 article again highlights a key issue the West fights against today.
8. "The contradiction between the military culture and the nature of modern war confronts a traditional military Service with a dilemma. Terrorists resolve the dilemma by eliminating the culture of order." Also, "a direct attack on the enemys culture". Example, the 911 attacks and all the political, economic, military, ideological, social and legal changes 20 people caused in 2001... noted in an article written in 1989.
The bottom line is this; maybe the term 4th Generation Warfare is not correct, but neither is 'asymmetric warfare.
However, the 1989 paper by Lind, Wilson et al, remains accurate with respect to describing the threat, the threat environment, threat strengths and US weaknesses in 2010. No other theory has proved better. It is for these reasons the concept will retain a strong presence in the minds of persons in the defense and intelligence communities.
4GW and 5GW are grossly overblown concepts and fallacious for the reasons you describe.
Not worth getting overly emotional about it though.
Some great discussion on Lind's pseudo-historical theories (and its discontents) on the council:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6112
It's also kind of like the "8 minute abs" joke in "There's Something about Mary" - "now 6GW, that will be the seller ...."
I thought it was pretty superficial as well - while I don't agree with his model, I don't think that you can discuss 4GW without at least referring to William Lind. The Strategist at http://kotare.typepad.com did some interesting work in this area - I'm having trouble opening the site up (possibly due to server issue at my end) but if anyone can get through on this link, his work is listed under the tab/tag for 'cohorts of war'. If Peter has actually closed off his site, I'll see if I can contact and get a copy to share - certainly his logic is an advance over this article which feels like it is driven by a 'publish or perish' philosophy...
Also agree re the vagueness of the bio - why is it that (many) intel types feel that they have to surround themselves in mystery...?
"works for an organization that specializes in countering IED threats. He possesses a master's degree in Strategic Intelligence and recently completed a graduate certificate program in Asymmetric Warfare.
Just a couple of interesting side comments;
1. what does one learn in a graduate certificate program in Asymmetric Warfare?---this has been the core issue for the last nine years of guerrilla warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan---too much book learning and not enough actual tactical field experience and I can name alot of intel analysts that fit that mold. Not many intel analysts do actual on the ground field work right next to the trigger pullers-and this is where asymmetrically warfare is learned, conducted, and THEN used in intel analysis. Many times in the world of MI the cart does get in front of the horse, because we confuse certificates with actual experience.
2. It looks like to me that one of the critical thinkers in the area of 4GW was left out of the article---William Lind--and this from an intel analyst.
Total disappointment in the rather short article from an analyst especially one from the CIED world ie "Attack the Network" world which has to a large degree also failed in it's lack of looking at the relationship of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistain in the light of 4/5GW. Matter of fact the discussions around 4/5GW fall off in intensity about two years ago.
Last time I looked at a recent Wired article the IED fight has given us insurgent IED technology developments that would in fact equate to 4 if not 5GW and it is costing us billions with a big B to counter.
REFERENCE:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/07/4gw-as-a-model-of-future-confl/