by Richard N. Pedersen
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Mission Command is emerging as a multifaceted construct that integrates the functions and techniques of the art and science employed during the exercise of command authority over missions applying military and other instruments of national power.
The Army Operating Concept (AOC) defines mission command as the exercise of authority and direction by commanders and their staffs to integrate the warfighting functions using the operations process and mission orders to accomplish successful full-spectrum operations. This is a dramatic expansion of how Army doctrine previously defined mission command—the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. This new definition is expected to be incorporated into the forthcoming FM 3-0 update.
The central idea expressed in the Mission Command Army Functional Concept (MC AFC), a derivative of the AOC, is that mission command fosters mutual trust, encourages initiative, and empowers lower echelons with the combined arms capabilities and authority to fight for information, create opportunities, and exploit advantage consistent with the commander's intent and concept for accomplishing the mission. Although this describes the benefits of the new mission command, its net effect is to renew emphasis on existing ideas.
The outlook is that mission command is fundamentally the exercise of power to determine, adjudicate, or otherwise settle issues revolving around the warfighting functions during the conduct of the operations process. Currently, the Army's warfighting functions line up directly with the six joint functions described in JP 3-0. The Army sees the newly defined mission command as an evolved concept encompassing both the Army's philosophy of command and the integrating function that effectively combines all warfighting functional capabilities.
Download the Full Article: Mission command
COL Richard N. Pedersen, USA Ret., is the lead mission command analyst at the Combined Arms Center's Mission Command Battle Laboratory. He commanded a Combined IBCT Task Force with duty in combat as Commander, Regional Command-South in Afghanistan; he also commanded BCTP.
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Mission Command was the standard operating mode of the US Army by the end of WW II when senior commanders found out that it was impossible to micromanage and that they HAD to trust subordinates.
That was a time of 18 four stars for an Army of 12 Million, more or less in both cases. Today, if my count is correct, there are about 20 for about 540K. The point is that we are significantly over-officered and that cheapens the value to the Army of every serving officer. Add to that the fact that micronmanagement began to take hold in Korea when the lines stabilized and in trench warfare, many senior people discovered they had little to do. Follow that with Viet Nam, a Lieutenants war and over control became the rule.
The Army lost the bubble. Added to that grade creep and type of warfare problem, a Congressionally forced personnel system caused the Army to dumb-down training. That caused Commanders to further distrust subordinates because they know that subordinate is all too often only marginally trained and is placed in a position not because he or she is competent at what they're supposed to do but because their number was placed against that slot.
Round peg in a square hole? Not a problem -- other than the fact that to make it fit, it has to be smaller than optimum size...
Design is at its simplest merely unfettered consideration of problems. That too was the Army approach to assessing situations prior to MDMP -- which is a failed attempt to turn average or below commanders and staff officers / NCOs into competent models by telling people what to think.
The personnel system is the culprit and in fairness to the Army (and the other services who really have the same problems today), Congress bears much blame for the sad state of affairs. That flawed personnel system led to a flawed training process that over emphasizes 'standards' which fail to consider the huge variety of 'conditions' and to concentrate on 'tasks' that are actually enabling skills and knowledges instead of on mastery of the basic mission requirements of the Army.
That's a long way of saying that the budget process is indeed part of the problem, as is Congress but that for true mission command to work a cultural change of some magnitude is in fact required. It can be achieved. It should be before we have to repeat the WW II experience and learn the hard way.
If Congress will allow it...
They should -- we may not again have the luxury of a two plus year learning period that conditions in WW II allowed.
COL(Ret) Pedersens article was informative and in its brevity, conveyed some of the more interesting goals on the US Armys lengthy wish-list concerning joint, inter-agency, and "whole of government" structure and doctrine for the 21st century. There are several key points that this paper alludes to that will likely become significant battlegrounds within each service, inter-service dogma, and the illusive "other instruments of power" that Mission Command discusses in holistic terms.
First- within the US Army there already exists an ongoing debate on where, how, and why to introduce design (or the more appropriate term, conceptual planning). With "become skilled in the art of design" second on the Army list of supporting ideas for Mission Command, this is a deceptively simple statement that is likely going to be extremely challenging to implement in the short-term. Currently, 'design only exists doctrinally in the latest Army Field Manual FM5-0, The Operations Process; albeit in a scant and confusing fifteen pages comprising chapter 3, Design. Outside of this slim portion of official doctrine, 'design is largely theoretical and still a significant work-in-progress. Getting the entire US Army as an organization to understand, visualize, and execute conceptual planning in addition to our more linear and mechanistic military decision making process (MDMP) and operations order processes (OPORD) is going to require unique vocabulary, design concepts spread across far more doctrine than fifteen pages in FM5-0, and significant decentralized training throughout the Armys academic, training, and operational environments. And that is just talking about the Army.
The US Air Force largely subscribes to 'operational design in accordance with Joint Publication 5-0 (the Joint Planning Process) and along with the USMC, they hold the center-of-gravity principles of Dr. Strange, Dr. Kem, Dr. Reilly, and COL Boyd (the OODA Loop master) in extremely high regard. I personally consider the Armys current 'design theory compatible with many sound aspects of 'operational design as well as other joint theories; however all of the services are going to need to accept what the next "Joint design doctrine" is ultimately going to look like. Again, vocabulary will be critical, and there is bound to be more inter-service rivalry in lines with continued relevance, alter worshiping of long-held self-defining principles, and perpetual jockeying to be the lead proponent for implementing 'conceptual planning within ones own theoretical cornerstones instead of others. Carl Builders "Masks of War" is still marvelously relevant in todays 'design debate between services. Mission Command is currently just in the Armys theoretical toolbox (pending publication of new doctrine with FM3-0); sister services will get a vote on whether they want to join the party or let this model wither on the vine of 'neat ideas and die. 'Design is also in a similar precarious condition, but conceptual planning has enough horsepower in intellectual capital now that it has good odds of prospering across the services within the next decade. This is just intra-service; what about 'whole of government?
Lastly, Mission Command discusses the importance of 'holistic synergy with other non-military organizations- getting all of the instruments of power to work together. While the military services can thank Congress for the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 for getting everyone within the military instrument of power to begin playing fair in the sandbox, where is that level of directed integration at the next level? How does Mission Command help a Joint Task Force Commander 'exercise command authority over missions applying military and other instruments of national power in practice? Mission Command straddles the operational and strategic levels of war where the military has the assets, personnel, and budget to build this ambitious enhanced command and coordination structure- but other key players like the State Department do not. How will a JTF CDR leverage the economic instrument of power at the national level other than how it is currently done? Will the State Department increase in size and scope to build this operational level structure to plug into military ones? These are but a few of the many questions that 'Mission Command brings to the party.
Either way, enjoyable article by COL Pedersen; discourse on Mission Command at the inter-Army, inter-service, and intra-agency levels in the coming year should be quite entertaining (especially with pending budget cuts!)
Major Ben Zweibelson
US Army, Infantry
School of Advanced Military Studies
Interesting that the new definition says this is "the exercise of authority and direction by commanders and their staffs to integrate the warfighting functions using the operations process and mission orders to accomplish successful full-spectrum operations." The focus is on the ideas of the commanders and staffs and process. The historical reason for mission command was when those commanders and staffs and processes were wrong--dead wrong. Followers, whether subordinate commanders and staffs or just leaders in the field, were given latitude to come up with their OWN concept when the one issued by the commanders and staffs turned out not to work (usually because things had changed between the time the order was formulated and the time it was carried out). Just as often, sometimes the desired level of integration could not be accommodated without sacrificing necessary speed. Mere coordination or even just deconfliction might be "good enough" in some case, done on the fly. So, if there is a conflict between being consistent with the commander's intent or with the commander's concept, intent always won out....
Mission command focused on subordinates. It was intended to empower them in dynamic situations. I don't get that from this definition...if this a "new" understanding, I'm not yet convinced that this is better.
The move toward Mission Command is a positive development in how Army leaders lead Soldiers (what some might call Command and Control). Although, the idea is not as novel as COL Pedersen suggests. The German version, <i>Auftragstaktik</i> (translated: Mission-type Orders) has its roots in the stalemate on the Western Front of WWI. I think we are just now "re-discovering" it because the last 20 years have been filled with assumptions about the promise of centralized command and control enabled by information/network-centric warfare (the "fog of war" was supposed to be lifted).
Those assumptions turned out to be false.
What is somewhat disappointing is the failure to address the biggest obstacle to Mission Command in the Army: culture. Indeed, a quick search of COL Pedersen's article reveals that the words "culture" and "cultural" do not appear.
Perhaps this is because we use the acronym DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities) to analyze shortfalls in Army capabilities. Notice that this acronym does not include culture, which is perhaps the most important component of all.
CPT Ronald J. Bashista, in his article "Auftragstaktik: Its More Than Just a Word", writes:
<i>Auftragstaktik is not simply a term describing a method of operating as a unit. It is a culture. Taken in its purest form, as it was originally conceived, the word describes a culture within the profession of arms. We cannot wake up one morning and decide we are going to practice mission-type orders that day. Cultures develop over long periods of time, and if not practiced are soon extinct. We must practice mission-type orders every day, in everything we do as an Army.</i>
Equally instructive - he wrote this in ARMOR magazine in 1994.
Army culture does not support decentralized decision making.
A recently published study of students at the Army War College showed that Army leaders believed the Army culture should emphasize "flexibility, discretion, participation, human resource development, innovation, creativity, risk-taking, and a long-term emphasis on professional growth and the acquisition of new professional knowledge and skills."
However, it also found these same leaders believed that current Army culture emphasizes "an overarching desire for stability, control, formal rules and policies, coordination and efficiency, goal and results oriented, and hard-driving competitiveness."
We <i>want</i> a decentralized culture. We <i>have</i> a centralized culture. Until we acknowledge this, and formulate a strategy to move from A to B, I fear Mission Command is D.O.A.