by Joshua Thiel
Download The Full Article: COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges
"Conventional wisdom holds that a government must expend ten times as much as insurgents in their efforts to contain insurgency" (Mataxis, 1994, p.7). Authors, experts, and military historians establish a variety of ratios for military engagements as a way of forecasting requirements and predicting outcomes. The U.S. Army teaches Second Lieutenants that three to one numerical superiority is the planning factor for a successful attack. However, in order to account for shifting demographics and various operating environments, the U.S. Army established five to one as the tactical number for an urban attack. Similarly in the Department of the Army's Handbook on Counter Insurgency, produced in 2007 under the direction of General David Petraeus, references the mythical ten to one force ratio prescribed for counterinsurgency (Department of Defense [DoD], 2007, p. 1-13).
Quantifying attacks is a method for conventional planning; it helps turn the fog of war into black and white numbers that end-state minded Americans like and understand: how much will this cost, and can I afford it. However, an insurgency is like no other type of conflict; it exists within a state of gray, with no black or white solution. Analysts constantly search for numbers on manpower, material, and money in order to predict the outcome of insurgencies or to prescribe recommendations for winning. The common numerical comparisons used by authors and military personnel to analyze insurgencies are governed by what is known as the 10 to 1 ratio or expenditure ratio, the minimum requirement to defeat an insurgency. Even U.S. Presidents have used a 10 to 1 ratio as a basis of strategy. The Reagan Administration elected to increase financial pressure on the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, by facilitating the insurgent's battle of exhaustion, based on the ten to one ratio (Mataxis, 1994, p. 7). The strategy worked and United States assistance allowed the Mujahedeen to erode the Soviet will to invest the resources and manpower necessary to succeed in Afghanistan. However, the Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is clouded by the same question overarching all counterinsurgency, does victory or defeat rest on the ratio of manpower, or are policies and implementation the decisive components of counterinsurgency?
The 10 to 1 ratio is referred to so frequently that it has become a documented fact, yet remains a scientifically unfounded statistic. Without a documented source of statistical analysis on the 10 to 1 ratio; the ratio is only an assumption. This paper provides statistical data to prove that the 10 to 1 ratio is an invalid ratio; and thereby, the 10 to 1 ratio an invalid tool for analyzing and prescribing manpower for counterinsurgency operations. The data reveals a new ratio and draws conclusions on the relevance of prescribed force ratios for counterinsurgency.
Download The Full Article: COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges
Major Joshua Thiel is a United States Army Special Forces Officer and graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis and a graduate of American Military University with a Masters of Arts in Low Intensity Conflict. His undergraduate degree in Economics is from the United States Military Academy at West Point. He has deployed to Iraq, Thailand, and Papua New Guinea, and has served in both the Infantry and Special Forces. He is currently preparing to return to the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne).
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Comments
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b>
Nothing wrong with trying to do things many put in the 'too hard' box. That, IMO, is why one gets more pay than Joe...
However, it has long been my observation that frontal attacks and blatantly obvious moves rarely succeed against entrenched interests. Such interests, somewhat varied to be sure, are what you, Gian, Dave and I are discussing and they <u>are</u> the problem.
As I've been trying to tell you for a couple of years, "Good job; go get 'em; avoid frontal attacks; infiltration can save the nation..."
That or use one up, two back, feed the troops a good hot meal and hit 'em in the flank. ;)
I see my work here is complete... :-)
Ken, I realize we are not well geared in our national security framework to make the types of decisions we need to make, and implement the types of operations we need to implement for success. But just because getting the right decisions made and effectively implemented is hard is no reason not to make them in the first place. I spent a little time with the QDDR this week, after last week spending a lot of time with some key players in the "peace" community. They are very excited about the QDDR so I figured I should pull it out and see what I was missing.
God love the State Department, but they still really just don't get it IMO. QDDR is a step in the right direction, but at this rate it will take 5-6 such efforts and a dozen years to turn this ship around. (And no, that is not an implied blessing of the QDR. I worked in the belly of the beast on that one, and it just as flawed, but in other directions based on inherent DoD biases).
As to my mantra, I don't mind getting out in front and drawing fire. Someone has to. I almost got NGB to sign up to a domestic counterterrorism program back in '96 that was outside Posse Comitatus, tied to the FEMA regions and focused on three areas: Identifying and prioritizing critical infrastructure and making small security improvements to those at the top of the list to make them less attractive targets; developing a surveillance and perimeter security force for the Feds to fall in on as a known and trusted partner; and lastly an analysis section that was designed to bridge the gaps between local, state and federal agencies that were not collaborating in a manner that painted complete pictures who might be preparing to conduct a terrorist event. "Great briefing, but we don't see this as a big problem, and besides, its just too hard to predict where such attacks might occur."
(Oh yeah, and as to Malaya, the Communists came back from their excile, but found little traction for their movement. They had in effect "won" by forcing the governmental reforms necessary to address the conditions of insurgency in Malaya, and in so doing had put themselves out of a job. Communist ideology was never the enemy in the first place, it was the ideology of liberty burning in the hearts of an oppressed populace that fueled this insurgency. Communism was was just a convenient tool to move a solution down the road. Same is true with Islamist ideologies in states like Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Saudia Arabia, etc today.)
<b>Dave Maxwell:</b>
I, for one, totally agree. To mangle Clausewitz, you have identified the center of lack of gravitas.
My running but sporadic complaints to Bob revolve around the his seeming determination to totally ignore lack of that gravitas in the halls of the decision makers. They are also missing the other Roman desired attributes and this is why getting to the point that I think the four of us and many others wish to see is so very difficult -- the US political milieu is literally stacked to preclude it.
It was not a designed or a one time thing but rather that over many years a series of Congresses in order to secure the blessings of incumbency for themselves and their posterity have perverted the system. There is a window of opportunity ahead, I think, as the voting public seem s to have realized this...
That stacked deck of the current political system is yet another unintended consequence. Many warned against it but greed and a lack of gravitas -- particularly in the sense of duty --won out and we are where we are. In my view there are two problems that should be focal points for the future.<blockquote>"While we argue ... often the lack of a coherent strategy that causes us to have problems with such operations)..."</blockquote>I contend our political milieu and electoral frequency will usually effectively preclude extended (ââ°Â¥ five years) coherent strategies at the Presidential level. It is my view that this problem will be exceedingly difficult to change in the foreseeable future, thus it must be accepted and a work around sought. We all know the Executive can order a 'mission impossible' scenario. They are unlikely to do so <u>provided</u> they get coherent and consistent advice on capabilities from their executive agents, the services and those capabilities offer an <u>adequate</u> array of options.
As an example, I suspect that our low key but consistent resistance to the concept of strategic raids has many Fathers but it arguably removed an option from the COA that DoD could offer in 2001-3.
The second problem is that while DoD and the Armed Forces are capable of producing coherent and durable strategies for their employment, the current rapid rotation of senior personnel in positions where such strategies should be formulated and the turbulence thus generated adversely affect that ability. Those personnel policies can and should be changed. A secondary impact is service (and too often, Congressionally supported or fostered) parochialism and in strategic terms that is engendered more by our budgeting process than most other factors.
Effectively, to enhance their power and preclude a too militaristic approach, Congress likes this state of affairs. So too do the CoComs -- Congressional creations -- and the Specified commands. While more difficult than adjusting the personnel system with Congress' consent, the modification of Goldwater-Nichols, the hopefully sensible Personnel system adjustment can assist in ameliorating that parochialism impact. Congress may be more receptive to budgetary change after the 2012 election when I suspect yet more incumbents will be voted out. The Voters are finally on to Congress little tricks and do not like what they see...<blockquote>"These are just a few random thoughts but my point is we really need to study the efficacy of the decision of to intervene. Once we assess the situation and determine we can intervene with an effective strategy then and only then should we consider an intervention. And perhaps we should also consider if our intervention meets some kind of ethical or moral criteria as well in addition to our interests. Again, just some random thoughts here that I am thinking about fleshing out over time."</blockquote>I hope you do. There's no question that you've hit the crux of the issue and the factors that we have too often ignored for the sake of domestic -- and that's important -- <u>domestic</u> political expediency. The key is to change the decision parameters to avoid that and force a hard headed pragmatic assessment of the relative foreign policy and military merits and a decent cost-benefit study. Domestic politics can never be ignored but they should never be <i>the</i> determinant as they too often are.
The <u>only</u> way to insure they aren't in a Democracy is to make the voters aware of the issues. The services cannot 'politic' the voters and they cannot get off the Administration message -- but they can on a daily basis over several Administrations accurately inform the public of what they're doing, can do and why so that knowledge becomes general. The great American public seems sort of wacky at times but collectively, they usually tend to make sensible choices. Congress is not so likely to do that and the Administration of the day is even less likely due to political pressures -- unless they believe the great unwashed are really watching closely...
Thus my suggestions would be to accept the chaos induced by our governmental system; fix our personnel policies by stopping the very flawed 'generalist' and up or out approaches while developing true specialists who are employed in their specialties to the exclusion of ticket punchers; Work with Congress to do that personnel fix, reduce budget food fights and thus (slowly...) rid ourselves of base and destructive parochialism; become more competent at what we do and broaden our capabilities sets -- all while enlisting and educating the American public. That will require some soul searching, some confessions of borderline ineptitude and the repairs or changes envisioned plus genuine efforts to improve the total force. It will not be easy but lacking most if not all that, I fear little improvement will occur. Business as usual is just too easy...
Ken, Gian, Bob,
Just to jump in quick here one of the things I have been giving a lot of thought to lately is the strategic decision to intervene in the affairs of other countries (decisions short of war and decisions not affecting a vital US national interest - e.g., something that creates a potential existential threat). While we argue about COIN and Full Spectrum Operations and Nation Building (and often the lack of a coherent strategy that causes us to have problems with such operations) we really need to step back and examine the strategic decisionmaking process and rationale that drives us to these operations. We need to really assess the merits of intervention and before we decide to intervene we really need to assess the possibility of a successful or acceptable outcome when we intervene. We also should consider whether the effect of our intervention on one side (usually the status quo government) is really the most effective way to influence the outcome - when we intervene we may actually lose leverage with the government we are supporting (and given Bob's mantra that insurgencies are governance problems) and we may not be able to help the government address their governance problems because the government believes that with the US on its side it no longer has to make the changes to solve its internal problems. These are just a few random thoughts but my point is we really need to study the efficacy of the decision of to intervene. Once we assess the situation and determine we can intervene with an effective strategy then and only then should we consider an intervention. And perhaps we should also consider if our intervention meets some kind of ethical or moral criteria as well in addition to our interests. Again, just some random thoughts here that I am thinking about fleshing out over time.
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b><blockquote>"I know you are fully aware..."</blockquote>Not fully aware, I was not there. A bit aware, yes. I submit the reality lies between the poles you and Gian take. Neither the military aspect nor the governance aspect would have achieved a solution. Together, they did. There is no better lesson to be drawn on either side as each would have failed in the absence of the other.<blockquote>"There are indeed a lot of good military lessons to be drawn from Malaya. The better ones are the political/policy ones though... Defeat or victory is settled by men with soft hands and clean shirts sitting around polished tables."</blockquote>I've said before and will say again, there is no defeat or victory in any COIN / FID operation. The best that can be achieved is an acceptable solution -- and even that not always, pace Viet Nam and probably Afghanistan. The real Policy lesson to be drawn from all three of those conflicts and many others is to do ones very best to avoid getting in them.<br><br>
An incidental lesson from all three is that <b><i>every</i></b> war is different and it is quite dangerous to attempt to derive behavioral lessons or 'rules' from any one. Even broad generalities from several must be viewed with suspicion -- to do less is to guarantee the next one will be totally from deep center field... <blockquote>"...Do that at the start, rather than waiting for all those hard young men to tear at each other for years first. There will always be times when one must fight, and when one must fight it must be to win. Colonial interventions are not such times, not now, not ever. It's time to move on."</blockquote>As I hope you recall, We are in agreement on most of that. Most all of it, in fact. I only disagree with respect to Afghanistan. That's one of those cases of unintended consequences and while, like you, I'm rather glum about the outcome, I do not agree with an abrupt departure. Over a large number of years, I have seen us undertake too many abrupt departures and I've talked to people affected by our hubris and short attention span. It's really dumb and some of those departures put us where we are today -- far more so than did any Cold War missteps...
The solution, as you and I have agreed before, is to avoid these things totally, enhance our Diplomatic capability and efforts, improve the Intel effort worldwide and use small quantities of <u>refocused</u> SF in those really relatively rare cases where some FID is warranted.
If we commit the GPF into another nation, we should all be aware that it is not COIN, period. Never has been and won't be -- and they don't do FID at all well. Nor should they.<blockquote>"Where Gian, I, and I suspect even you, agree is that while we dedicate ourselves to such extensive efforts over arguably non-vital interests; who is armed, trained, and postured to deter or defeat the types of threats that could truly topple our nation?? "</blockquote> Mmm. No, not really. I agree with both of you that we should avoid such efforts totally and I believe that is eminently possible. I agree that such efforts are not in our interest; indeed, even that they are detrimental to our interests.
Where I differ from Gian is that I have over many years seen the US Army when it was a basket case and at other times really a pretty good and effective organization -- and most stops in between and in multiple periods for all. So I'm not worried about the ability to rebound and get 'er done. The COIN fad will pass. We will never be fully tactically and technically competent outside a major existential war. No Democracy can be -- and that's okay. Those living here accrue many benefits due to that and they (and I) consider it worth that cost -- sacrificing the cream of the active Armed Forces initially. That's not going to change.
Where I differ from you is that I do not publicly espouse that we should return to our roots, so to speak. We have <i>never</i> been that shining City on the Hill. Never. Nor will we ever be. The Policy determinations early on that you and I believe necessary to avoid commitments to stupidity are not going to occur. You continue to push for them and hope they will. I'm pretty sure they won't but believe there are other ways to influence such action. It requires Armed Forces that are more professionally (misused word) competent (not a misused word) than I think most in the service are prepared to be and I'm quite sure most of the wives and families are not going to put up with it. I know Congress is not. So we can't get where you want to go from here without a radical change in government and people. That's not going to change.
So, on balance, the three of us agree we should stop with the nation building stuff -- it's abysmally stupid. OTOH, unlike you two sterling gentlemen, I believe the rest will work out, the threats will be handled -- just not efficiently. I can live with that. ;)
Ken, as you well know, there is no "convincing" people on such things, all you can do is make an argument and let them think about it for themselves. I know you've thought about it more than most and I respect your position. I don't agree with it, but then that is the nature of such "unprovable" topics.
As to "the glory," the glory I speak of is that captured by the writers of histories. I know you are fully aware of how the military aspect of Malaya ("separate the insurgent from the populace", etc) is held up as the model of what right looks like in a hundred or perhaps thousand, historical accounts or references. I realize that the grunt-level perspective is significantly more grounded in the hard realities of harsh conditions, extreme human emotions, and the day to day realities of just getting out and trying to get it done without getting killed in the process.
There are indeed a lot of good military lessons to be drawn from Malaya. The better ones are the political/policy ones though. The infantryman does not either start or end such conflicts. Neither does the rank and file insurgent. They "merely" fight them. Defeat or victory is settled by men with soft hands and clean shirts sitting around polished tables.
By point is a simple one: Do that at the start, rather than waiting for all those hard young men to tear at each other for years first. There will always be times when one must fight, and when one must fight it must be to win. Colonial interventions are not such times, not now, not ever. It's time to move on.
Where Gian, I, and I suspect even you, agree is that while we dedicate ourselves to such extensive efforts over arguably non-vital interests; who is armed, trained, and postured to deter or defeat the types of threats that could truly topple our nation??
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b><blockquote>"I am not the one who refuses to look at both sides..."</blockquote>That may be true but if so, you certainly conceal it well. I always enjoy reading your exchanges with Gian -- mostly because I've needled both of you about excessive intransigence in defense of your relative pet causes and when you two post, I get to see that unilateral vision thing in operation...<blockquote>"I have done so and found the historic military perspective to be illogical and lack merit."</blockquote>At the risk of stating the obvious, allow me to remind you that is your opinion, not a proven fact and that several of us were and are unconvinced. We have also suggested that while the "historic military perspective," as you now describe it, may be illogical and may indeed lack merit it very frequently reflects events that occurred but which were unintended -- and / or unforeseen -- consequences and which were out of control of many actors or occurred due to flawed perceptions. I mention that merely to caution that it is possible to err in that same manner by becoming unduly fond of and overstating or selling one's position...<blockquote>"The best lessons of the Malaya campaign are lost in the glory of the military victory over the guerrilla."</blockquote>I've talked to a number of people who served there and to more from other wars. None of them, save one Major General -- who had some issues -- ever made mention of <u>any</u> "glory" in any 'victory.'
<b>Visitor</b> wrote "<i>Unfortunately, I think our ability to manufacture endless amounts of this social science gobbledy-gook is a large part of our problem."</i> He followed that with other sensible statements ending with: "<i>But it makes technocrats feels better, to think that such a number can even be reliably calculated. However, the fact that such a number can be published in our manuals, and was actually used in strategic planning (before the Afghanistan surge), demonstrates the complete lack of critical assessment and thought that the miliary (sic) has applied to these arguments."</i> As an aside, I very strongly agree with both those assessments.
You then contend that he is dangerously wrong and that many an empire has collapsed under the weight of such logic. Yet you do not mention what he wrote that is dangerous, <i>what</i> caused those Empires to collapse.
How you got from what he wrote to reinstalling Ben Ali in power, I know not. How you got from his castigation of a poorly conceived and written Field Manual to write:<blockquote>"... simply because that is what the manuals based on colonial warfare tell us to do??"</blockquote>I cannot grasp...
You will recall that I'm old and slow, so I'd appreciate it if you'd enlighten me as to precisely what he or she said that was dangerous as well as how Visitor's criticism of a manual morphs into our de rigueur usage thereof.
Dear Mr. "Visitor"
We are all entitled to our opinions to be sure. For my money, you are not only dead wrong, but dangerously so. Many an empire has collapsed under the weight of arguments much like yours.
There was a time when merely crushing those who dared to stand up to despotism was enough. In the modern information age such hubris leads to attacks such as the U.S. suffered on 9/11. Since then our national influence is in a major downward spiral as the we send our security forces chasing one intel-driven target after another around the globe seeking to somehow shove the genie of liberty back into the bottle of dozens of oppressed populaces across Islam.
There is a tremendous opportunity in the current events in Tunisa for the U.S. We stand at the precipiece. Will we support the populace and help guide events there to new, and better governance iaw the principles we hold out to the world in our Declaration of Independence? Or will we rush to the aid of yet another friendly despot and use our fading power to leverage him back into power against the express will of his populace simply because that is what the manuals based on colonial warfare tell us to do??
Yes, you are a dangerous man, Mr. Visitor, and while many share your positions, that makes them no more right, and no less dangerous to the continued welfare of our nation.
Best Regards,
Bob
<i>There is a big difference between "the insurgent" and "the insurgency"
Insurgency is a condition of discontent that comes to exist within a populace.</i>
Unfortunately, I think our ability to manufacture endless amounts of this social science gobbledy-gook is a large part of our problem.
Emphatically - No. The insurgency is a group of insurgents. It is not some metaphysical entity that independently of them. They are the active agents.
Regular men who react according to the same mix of carrots and sticks as any other group of human beings. The right mix of these will naturally depend on the context, and cannot be simplified in a general rule. And, historically, both extremes have worked depending on the circumstances.
Unfortunately, much of the rest of the modern-day "COIN" field is just intellectual navel-gazing, dressed up in fancy language and presented as exotically counterintuitive wisdom.
As for the article specifically, it's about time that someone knocked the nonsense that is presented as a reliable force-density ratio in COIN field manual. There is no scientific basis whatsoever for its assertion that COIN generally requires 10 troops for every 1000 insurgents. It is pure hokum. But it makes technocrats feels better, to think that such a number can even be reliably calculated. However, the fact that such a number can be published in our manuals, and was actually used in strategic planning (before the Afghanistan surge), demonstrates the complete lack of critical assessment and thought that the miliary has applied to these arguments.
There is a big difference between "the insurgent" and "the insurgency"
Insurgency is a condition of discontent that comes to exist within a populace. It is about the relationship between the government and the governed. The insurgent is whatever organization emerges to take advantage of those conditions for their own motivations, purpose and agenda. Sometimes a selfless servant of the populace, such as a Washington or Gandhi, or King comes along; sometimes a patriot such as Mao or Ho; often though it is some man or organization that merely seeks an opportunity to rule that takes advantage of such conditions.
Not surprisingly, military history focuses on the military aspects of such situations. Not surprisingly our military doctrine tells us "COIN is War."
The facts you cite are from the perspective of the "counterinsurgent" rather than from the perspective of "counterinsurgency." More accurately, you are actually looking at this from the perspective of counter guerrilla warfare waged by a colonial power against a nationalist insurgent movement. Yes, the british military defeated the guerrilla organization; but it was the changes of governnace and the relinquishment of governmental control that resolved the acutal insurgency.
I am not the one who refuses to look at both sides, I have done so and found the historic military perspective to be illogical and lack merit. This led me to digging deeper into what exactly is this thing we call "insurgency." The best lessons of the Malaya campaign are lost in the glory of the military victory over the guerrilla.
Robert:
I would add just one more comment to what you say above that it was not the military factors that defeated the insurgencies and the notion that it was political accommodations that rendered the "revolutionaries moot." Dude, the people who supported the insurgents were the Chinese squatters who were resettled in large numbers so in a sense these political accommodations only really mattered to the 60or so percent of Malayans who supported the British Counterinsurgency anyway. Further, in combination with the resettlement it was the military operations to disrupt the links between the insurgents and the resettled population along with the killing of the insurgents that broke its back. Primary evidence from the operational record of the British Army shows this to be the case, and more importantly primary evidence from the communist enemy side shows it too.
The leader of the communist insurgents, Chin Peng, attests to this argument. Too as I have said before studies done on the Chinese Malayans who were resettled show that there was no winning of their hearts and minds through political adjustments, but instead only the effect of control over them through the resettlement camps.
Why wont you consider the non-British, other side of primary evidence to this problem? Sometimes in insurgencies and in the countering and defeating of them political accommodations do matter, but not in this case of Malaya and the military defeat of the insurgents.
gian
Aaron,
"The Malayan Government" you speak of was controlled through the office of the High Commissioner back in London all the way up to 1957. So, no, actually it is yourself and Gian that have been misled by the popular military "lessons" from the Malayan Emergency. All of the political changes that contributed most the current stable country of Malaysia were decision made in London, and required no military operations to either design or implement. "Security first" is largely a myth.
The British military did indeed wage a very smart and effective campaign in Malaya, but this clinging to the misconception that it was this military action that turned the tide contributed to the US taking the wrong lessons learned to Vietnam (to our demise there), and continuing to take the wrong lessons learned to places like Afghanistan.
Then, as now, Insurgencies, or more accurately, Colonial Interventions are waged in the countryside, but our won or lost based upon policy decisions made back in the capital of the intervening power. In Malaya, they made the right decisions in London. Perhaps they had learned much more than we Americans give them credit since King George made the wrong decisions and thereby lost the American colonies some 200 years prior.
The following is from the "Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts" Special Operations Research Office, The American University, Washington DC, December 1962. This is from the Chapter "The Revolution in Malaya: 1948-1957"
From page 70, describing the form of government in Malaya. The British attempted to form the Union of Malay following WWII, granting the ethnic Chinese greater political power. This was rejected by the "Malay elite and the Malayan Civil servants" who pressured London to back off to the creation of the Federation of Malays in 1948.
"The High Commissioner, the representative of British interests, was the supreme authority over the whole Federations and was directly responsible to the Colonial Office at Whitehall. He had veto power over the legislature. The Federal Executive Council was an appointed body forming the cabinet of the government and helping the High Commissioner in an advisory capacity. The Federal Legislature was presided over by the High Commissioner... This in effect placed the British in firm control of Malaya and also reaffirmed the status of the old Malay rulers. The Chinese and the Indians remained second class citizens or aliens and had few or no political rights."
In that same year the Communists revolutionaries went to work... "the goals of the revolution were to 'liberate an area of Malaya, gain control, and declare that area independent. The periphery of the controlled area was to be widened to include larger sections of Malaya. Captured documents show that the Communists had timed a declaration for the independence of a Communist Republic of Malaya for August 3, 1948. As announced by the revolutionary leaders, their objectives were national liberation, the establishment of 'democratic government based on universal suffrage, and the unification of all the 'oppressed peoples of the Far East." Page 75.
Ultimately the British granted these reasonable demands and rendered the revolutionaries moot. The fact is, that while the "insurgents" were militarily defeated, they in fact achieved their goals and put themselves out of business.
Page 71: "Until 1957 the High Commissioner was the highest authority in the postwar Malayan Government, and he in turn was responsible to his government in Great Britain. Government institutions could only be changed with his approval. The Malayan Government until 1957 was under the direction of the British Colonial Office and its foreign policies reflected British interests."
Aaron:
quite correct.
Also the other advantages the British Army had were first a mediocre to at times incompetent enemy, especially with its senior leadership; and as you say an army in place with much experience from World War II and other imperial policing; and also I would add (although derided by the Coin narrative) were the early large unit sweeping operations from 48-49 that although did not kill many insurgents had the positive strategic effect of breaking them up into small pockets and out into the jungles-this was significant strategically because Chin Peng had wanted to do Mao in Malaya, establish base areas and concentrate his fighters into large conventional formations.
Lastly, to make qualitative statements of comparison between Malaya and Vietnam with arguments like the British did Coin correctly and the Americans in Vietnam failed is wrong. The Coin experts have at times quipped that in Vietnam Westmoreland should have been held criminally liable. But a better case can be made in the court of history to try Sir Robert Thompson as the consummate opportunist selling Coin snakeoil to the Government of South Vietnam and convincing them that they could do Malaya version II--aka the strategic hamlet program--in Vietnam like the Brits did resettlement in Malaya. Plus Thompson is also guilty of writing a book that thoroughly got wrong the reasons for British success in Malaya. Yet the current American Coin doctrinal manual treats it as the oracle of historical wisdom.
gian
Robert,
Just a comment: The British did not grant the vote to the ethnic Chinese. The British did not control the Malayan government. Templer may have had unified authority that Briggs did not, but he was not the head of state in Malaya.
COL Gentile is correct on the application of force in Malaya. The British military units focused on killing the CTs in the jungle, as population interaction was to the indigenous was about as palatable to a kid from Birmingham in the 50's as it was to U.S. soldiers in Iraq in 2003.
What gave the British huge advantages in Malaya was the reserve of very capable military leaders (particularly those from the old Indian Army) that had fought in Burma as well as colonial administrators with years of experience (including local language fluency and cultural expertise). Other factors were also influential, but we certainly didn't have this advantage in our early years in Vietnam (55-64), when it probably mattered the most.
Aaron
All,
On the lighter side of this issue, I was flipping through a book my Mother in law sent me for Christmas, "The greatest War Stories Never Told," and a small vignette on point jumped out at me.
"...a group of old men ambushed a British ammunition wagon, gunning down two British soldiers and driving off the rest. Several of the soldiers fleeing the ambush came upon an impoverished old woman named Mother Bathrick and begged her to accept their surrender and escort them to safety. This led critics of the war back in England to pose this rhetorical question: 'If one old Yankee woman can take six Grenadiers, how many soldiers will it take to conquer America?'"
(Then and now, this is the wrong question, so the "correct" answer is of little import. NO ammount of military power can defeat the conditions of insurgency within a populace subjected to such conditions of governance. It can defeat insurgent groups and oppress or suppress the populace for some period of time, but ultimately, if the conditions are not addressed, the people will prevail.)
Gian,
This is the great debate of "control the populace":
A. Must one exert control over a populace first (verb), and then create the space required to move forward with governmental reforms (or more likely, just call it good and rely upon ones security forces to keep such movements suppressed and the populace "controlled.")
Or
B. Is a populace that perceives its governance to be "good" under control (noun); in that recognizing the legitimacy (right to rule), and the justice and equity of that rule, and trusting in the legal tools available to them to affect non-violent change, they no longer support illegal challengers to government.
It is the chicken or the egg of governance. Often it realistically requires a mix of both; but I only see it producing enduring results when approach B is the focus. We talk about "protecting the populace from the insurgent"; but far too often neglect the protection of the populace from the government as well.
Cheers!
Bob
Robert: No but defeating the insurgency militarily was the necessary and decisive factor that allowed everything else to follow. I re-read your post Robert, and you do make very clear that the critical factor to "victory" were the winning of the allegiance of the Malayan people through political reform. Again, those things of political optimization could not have happened unless they accomplished the military defeat through force of arms of the insurgency: that was the critical factor for success and not political adjustment, or as you say addressing the "causal factors of the insurgency."
Chris: Ironically Abrams was the epitome of what you call "nomothetic" in that he fought essentially the same chart driven war as Westmoreland and was most comfortable, as was Westmoreland, with using massive amounts of US firepower to try to achieve US objectives. And like Westmoreland, he failed, conclusively.
gian
Gian,
I did not say that that the Brits did not militarily suppress the existing movement, merely that that was not was not what resolved the insurgency in such a fashion as to allow a new and stable nation to emerge. It is moot that the leadership of that suppressed movement felt "defeated"; what is not moot is that the populace they drew their support from no longer felt compelled to support new groups to take up the cause. Resolving the cause is key, not defeating those who respond.
We do not suffer from differnt facts, merely from a different understanding as to which facts are most important.
As to the Insurgent Archipelago, I agree that there is much good in that book. But there is no more "Global Insurgency" today in the AQ vs the West UW/counter UW campaign, than there was in the Soviets vs the West UW/counter UW campaign of the Cold War.
A non-state actor picks up the bat, and suddenly no one thinks we're still playing baseball. The conflation of threats that occurs from the whole "global insurgency" concept is dangerously misleading.
Cheers!
Bob
The use of metrics/ratios to measure effectiveness or performance reminds me of another war -- Vietnam. Also reminds me of this passage from Lewis Sorley's book, where Gen Abrams sees the worship of charts [our PowerPoint" today] is a sickness:
"It finally gets to the point where that's really the whole war--f***ing charts ... Instead of really thinking about what the whole thing's about, and what really has to be done. ...[W]e get wrapped arond the axle watching these charts...somehow the chart itself becomes the whole damn war, instead of people and the real things!" (p. 195)
As a community, we seem to be seeking nomothetic ("best practices" or "lessons learned") approaches to knowledge of wicked situations. This may be our Achilles heel (and may reveal our institutional arrogance that believes its members can become "experts" -- see the Army's new campaign on professionalism, for example).
Perhaps with "small wars," the idiographic view of knowledge is preferable where we assume uniqueness and rely more on rich description concerning the situation at hand at a point in time. History, then, becomes a source of idiographic knowledge (better known as heuristics). We have to be mindful of the "tyranny of metaphor," as Robert Dallek has recently put it, if we instead seek nomothetic science.
No Robert, that is not correct nor is it supported by primary evidence from the Communist enemy side in Malaya. Those things that you mention were important, but should be seen as optimization of what allowed them to proceed and that was in fact the breaking of the insurgency through military operations. What defeated the insurgency was in fact quite simple and a combination of a couple of things: first was the forced resettlement of huge numbers of Malayan Chinese squatters who were providing material support to the insurgents; second, and in combination with the first, was the British Army's military operations that were in fact directed toward killing the Communist enemy in the jungle and in so doing severing the links between them and the resettled squatters; thirdly was the general inexperience of the Communist enemy and some serious strategic mistakes that they made along the way combined with the crucial fact that they had no external support whatsoever.
Chin Peng acknowledges that it was the first two things that essentially broke the back of his insurgency. He also states that the insurgency was broken before Templer even comes on board.
Now to be sure the political adjustments that the British made and their announcement that they were leaving Malaya played an important role in maintaining of the roughly 60% of the Malayan population that was already supporting their efforts anyway. Too the efforts under Templer to win the "heart and minds" of the resettled squatter population through nation building programs had some effect, but more so in terms of control rather than winning them over to the government side. Analyses done from the side of the squatter populations supports this argument.
I am happy to move forward from the colonial experience as you suggest (John Mackinlay's excellent new book "Insurgent Archipelago" makes a strong case in doing this to properly address the contemporary global insurgency that we face) but before we leave the past we should at least understand it properly, and your post with regard to Malaya suggests that we still have a long way to go. I got to tell you man that your fixation on governments as the key to success in ANY insurgency in terms of addressing what you believe to be their root causes makes you read the past of insurgencies withh a wrongheaded gloss.
I suggest that you read Lucien Pyes older but still relevant "Guerilla Communism in Malaya" to get a good sense of what really defeated the insurgency during the Malayan Emergency.
no worries
gian
In support of this paper's thesis, the actual ratio is indeed moot. The original citation of a 10:1 ration was a theoretical number (I'm trying to find the article, it was in a paper written in the 1960s by a Brit or American civilian) for achieving a manpower superiority in order to create a presence/perception of control as well as actually provide enough manpower to do all the work necessary for material advantage over an insurgent force. There are way too many on-the-ground variables to create a doctrinal ratio for any real advantage -- the heart of COIN is intangible as well as material (as noted by Chris).
I think the ratio discussions (whatever they maybe within the JTFs in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere) are merely psychological anchors that the commanders and staffs use to quantify the fight...to bring a level of scope and scale to operations planning and Force Generation that is more easily discussed than opinion-filled discussions of host-nation policy or strategic messaging. I also think that any mention of force ratio in planning is a return to what officers learned from their military history and tactics classes that taught 3:1 and 5:1 ratios for Relative Combat Power in a conventional fight. Thus, force ratios in counterinsurgent manpower discussions are of extremely limited utility, if at all useful. Rather, based partly on the type of insurgency (rual or urban), COIN force structure should be based upon what it takes to provide the important populations a perception of counterinsurgent or host-nation government control. And,again, the target population is only a small part of the equation that will change over time.
A technical point: this is a counter-guerrilla issue, not a COIN issue. We never seem able to separate the issues appropriately. The military's typical ignorance about the existence and nature of the Underground (the state-counterstate conflict) is a core part of the systemic flaw of discussions about force ratios in COIN campaign planning.
I disagree about Malaysia. The British did not just "kill" their way to victory -- they had relocation programs, deforestation projects, food rationing and favorable terrain. And there ws a rebellious ethnic minority easily discernable by the friendly, supporting population. It is not a silver-bullet that "wins" a COIN campaign, it is a symphony of instruments employed by a skilled and creative Conductor that makes an insurgent prefer contained politics over living off hand-outs in the mountains. Assuming, of corse, that the host nation government is willing and able to meet the needs of the people. If you could kill your way to victory, then the US Marines would have been on their way to victory in Anbar in 2004.
FYI, there is a parallel discussion about this on LinkedIn COIN Group's thread.
Gian,
If the Brits had relied upon "killing their way to victory" in Malaya, they'd either still be there suppressing the populace, or have been run off in defeat long ago.
The keys to the British "victory" in Malaya were their wise decisions to address the causal factors of the insurgency. To grant the vote to the Chinese-Malay populace, to end British control of the government, and to withdraw, leaving Malaya to Malayans.
I lend you my full support in the belief that the U.S. Army serves the nation best when it focuses on warfighting. Deterrence of threats who appreciate full well that we are a nation ready, willing and able to respond to those who cross clear and reasonable red-lines of behavior is the essence of an Armys role. But those who conflate the intra-state civil emergencies of Insurgency and COIN with war and warfare do us all a disservice as they are neither. It is time to move forward from the controlling nature of the colonial experience and embrace a new future; a future where states arent quite what they used to be, and the recognition that that isnt necessarily a bad thing.
Cheers,
Bob
I actually liked the essay a lot and I thought it made a very important interpretive point that is respectful of history and the uniqueness of historical events, and contingency.
Numbers are a factor to be sure, but in Vietnam the SVN government by 1972 had close to 1 million men under arms, and in the end it couldnt stave off defeat.
This notion that you cant "kill your way out of an insurgency" is just hokum. The British in Malaya actually did "kill their way" to breaking the insurgency.
At least this essay by Major Thiel did not conform to a preexisting template and made the important point that numbers--aka the ratio of troops either to insurgents or the population--are not a guarantee to success; further it has relevance for the current approach in Afghanistan and all of the hoopla that finally the "right inputs are in place;" namely more troops.
gian
The paper is fundamentally flawed and is self defeating. It is self defeating because it focuses on the "ration" and then tries to prove that the "ration" is unimportant. The result is that if the papers own logic is used then the only important subject in the paper, the "ratio", is moot.
The actual problem both with the paper and the "ratio" straw man used is: the ration between what and what? Is it the ratio between insurgents and counter-insurgent forces? Is it the ratio between counter-insurgent forces and the population? Number of potential targets? Size of the country?
How does someone conduct a census to get the number of insurgents? Where do the insurgents report these numbers?
There are several fallacies that come up often in the discussions of insurgencies, such as "can counter-insurgency kill their way out of an insurgency?" Counter-insurgency cannot kill its way out of an insurgency. Just like counter-insurgency can not defend all targets nor police all people, and the true number of insurgents can not be known.
Policy, moral and momentum are the more important. Policy, however, is meaningless without the ability to implement the policy, and that needs numbers. Moral depends a lot on numbers, because numbers determine security, work load and the scope of what can be done in operations. Momentum is the key political factor and numbers and especially surges target the insurgents momentum even if the increased numbers are no more capable than the former smaller numbers.