by Matthew Ince
Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Falling Short of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan
As we enter into a new year of conflict within Afghanistan, NATO must seek to work alongside its partners to overcome failures in the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach to COIN operations. At present the political and economic pillars of such an approach continue to be overshadowed by their own shortfalls and a disproportionate emphasis on the military dimension of the campaign. If left unaddressed this will critically impact upon the ability of the international community to address key grievances within Afghanistan and will further perpetuate a situation whereby political objectives will become increasingly unattainable.
Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Falling Short of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan
Matthew Ince has an MA in Geopolitics and Grand Strategy, and a BA (Hons) in International Relations from the University of Sussex. In February 2011 he will begin an internship at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI).
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Mr Ince: aside from the points other commenters have made about alliance warfare and politicization, there are a couple of interesting insights from organizational theory and public administration that help explain some of your "shortfalls".
Those are not just about "political will," although differences in the objectives and views about the war do play a role, of course. If you're interested, I've recently had the opportunity to provide a brief analysis of the institutional obstacles to "comprehensiveness" in a <a href="http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=231">paper written for the NATO Defense College</a>. I would appreciate any comments or feedback you may have.
Best,
Philipp
Jan:
Counterinsurgency does not have to be a "political war." But unfortunately the matrix of American population centric Coin has convinced folks that ANY war of counterinsurgency is by rule, as you say, a poltical war.
It might be as such, but strategy should determine whether or not it is rather than a doctrinal rule.
gian
Mr. Ince, Suggest you contact and read related material written Dr. Tom Marks (COIN) and COL (Ret) John McCuen (Hybrid wars). They can provide many answers to your key underlying questions such as political objectives. Bottom line: COIN is political war. In COIN, the political objectives are the heart, and all other objectives only facilitate the success of the political objectives. Anything else requires a very close re-look.
Best regards and VR, JSH
I agree with most of this but after reading it I almost get a feeling that the author is calling for a more rigid operation from the top down. Maybe I am off base here.
IMO a more fluid operating environment where the tactical units are more responsible for determining their long range plan is a better fit here. I agree that there needs to be unity of effort at the higher levels and that each tactical move must somehow fit into the overall strategy but the high HQ commander shouldn't plan and direct the operation. He and his staff should be there as a QA for the lower units plan and should support them, not the other way around.
Good on you Matthew Ince,
I read your article and what struck me the most is when you wrote:
"the US should use its position of influence within...the EU and NATO to actively encourage its partner countries...to uphold their fair share of obligations within the campaign"
When our European partners should work like 'a hand in a glove' they continually fall short of American expectations, time and time again, in Afghanistan. I see the three majors of the EU/NATO partners (ie: UK, Germany and France) as being almost to the point of being a dysfunctional force within the contexts of the Af/Pak campaign. The European/NATO partners, as a whole, in it's military/civilian effort is just not good enough. The truth to your basic premises are so glaringly obvious, that I am quite frankly dismayed, by our political partners across the West in general. If I could get all three politicos in one room to read them the riot act I would do it in a heart beat.
Your piece just reinforces the American view of European-NATO dysfunctional-ism when it comes to supplying the serious 'effort of need' for a thorough civilian campaign within the guidelines of COIN.
I find that President Obama has ignored the West, over the East and the South, in his political orientation/history and view of the world. If I could only get the the West Wing of the White House to lock in (for example) a 10-day run across Europe to address these basic issues and more (ie trade), I think it would be to the greater benefit of our partnership at large. At last, I think the Obama administration will continue to ignore our Western partnership over the growing need to focus on the East.
Your article is just another kick in the pants to the immediate problems that the NATO Alliance faces now and into the future.
GoodLuck friend.