MRAP Future Discussion Paper

<b>Thaddeus Jankowski</b><blockquote>"General Officers initiated MRAPs by directing their staffs to study the problem and come up with solutions, thus doing the thinking of the 1990's mentioned above, and initiating the rapid catch-up job."</blockquote>Your statements are partly correct, as are mine. No US procurement action is <i>ever</i> going to be simple...

Yes, some senior people did look for, as Charles Sullivan accurately states, risk avoidance solutions to problems identified in Bosnia and Kosovo. They settled on up armoring HMMWVs and a decision was made not to procure MRAP like creatures that the Europeans had already purchased and that South Africa and Rhodesia had used 30 years earlier. Those solutions though, were not invented here and thus were not procured. However, some staffers did indeed continue to look and press for procurement -- obviously not successfully.

That media storm in late 2003 fomented a major procurement action but many senior folks questioned -- correctly, IMO -- the military logic of the vehicle type so a lot of stalling took place with the Military folks thinking they'd just wait out the furor. That worked until the pressure mounted and peaked in 2006-7. That occurred mostly because the side strikes that had been prevalent earlier in Iraq were replaced by the bottom strikes as the bad guys tried for maximum numbers of iconic targets. It is a complex story and there are a lot of players -- but few to no heroes of foresight involved...

All of which is really immaterial to the point -- the MRAP is simply not a good tactical choice. Providing the Troops a mobile armored cocoon instead of providing decent training will arguably harm more people in the long run than just doing it right. The MRAP was bought, it has served its purpose. Use it but do not replace it with a similar vehicle. Simply procure better tactical vehicles.

What about the cost of poor tactics, poor choices in equipment, and the overall inability of the MRAP to serve any useful tactical purpose?

This quantitative analysis related to the cost of casualties sounds like code for "risk averse".

I disagree with Major Kranc. I support the incorporation of MRAPs into the U.S. Army force structure based on the following reasons: MRAPs proven survivability, U.S. militarys vulnerability to IEDs, and economic advantages of MRAPs.
First, MRAPs have proven their survivability and protected mobility in theater. MRAPs can be useful as armored transports that are necessary in unsecured routes, such as, combat engineers, MEDEVAC teams, essential network support (signal) elements, ammunition resupply convoys, military police patrols, and forward command vehicles.
Second, it is likely that potential adversaries such as North Korea or Iran recognized our vulnerability to IEDs. Therefore, these countries must have incorporated the vulnerability into their war doctrines by now. MAJ Kranc argues that MRAPs will be ineffective in North Korea or in Iran due to their lack of anti-tank capability. However, the U.S. Army has employed the up armored HMMWVs and M113s for many years, which provide no better anti-tank capability than MRAPs do. MRAPs can be deployed to overseas more expeditiously "due to the increased availability of C-17 air transports, and rapid sea-lift and ship-to-shore transfer capability" (from Defense Update. MRAP Could Assume New Missions in Future Conflicts). In accordance with FM 3-0, "by 2015, well over half the worlds population will live in urban centers, and by 2030, up to 60 percent will live in cities." Therefore, the Army needs to be prepared for future military operations in urban terrain, where MRAPs can provide the maximum protection against snipers and IEDs.
Third, incorporation MRAPs will save taxpayers billions of dollars compared to researching and developing a new tactical vehicle from scratch. The Army currently has a plan for developing the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in order to replace the current HMMWVs However, if engineers improve and modify MRAPs to be lighter and to have offensive capability, it could outpace the development of JLTV.
In summary, I believe that the MRAP program has its place and purpose in our current force structure to fight in the full spectrum battlefield, from peace operation to major combat operation.

Lots of discussion and testing going on using chimneys inside of tactical vehicles to defeat IED effects. So far it looks promising and comes in at half the weight. Seems to work along the same lines as blowout panels in tanks.

Maybe there is a smarter way.

That's a more bureaucratically complete response than most I've read in my short and happy life.

Still, it is not at all convincing. The MRAP is an idea of dubious merit that was literally forced on the Army, it is a tactically unsound choice for much of anything except providing a reasonably bullet proof traveling cocoon. It's maintenance burden is significant, mileage is atrocious and tactical mobility quite poor. It inculcates a desire to ride protected instead of getting out and doing things that should be done. The Army may be forced to do what you write but one should hope not.

The potential challenge to leaders to incorporate those monsters into tactical units will indeed be significant. It would be quite interesting to discover just how inclusion of large bulky MRAPs in BCTs will "<i>...enable greater flexibility to planners to be able to balance the force and allow the Army to rapidly deploy its brigades and project its forces globally without significant reorganization.</i>"

As for the National Security Strategy, that's not the President's, it's the work of a slew of staffers and it is almost certainly going to be no more accurate than was one GO I heard in 2000 who said that all units need to train to breach large sand berms and on trench clearing...

Incorporating MRAPs into Army BCTs is a good idea. There are numerous considerations both near and long term, that impact on the Armys plan to broadly incorporate MRAPs into its brigade combat teams (BCTs). However, the greatest impact affecting this course of action will be on unit organization and personnel.
The effects of incorporating MRAPs into tactical units will have a tremendous impact Army wide. According to a June 2010 Army briefing, approximately 5,750 vehicles will be assigned to infantry brigade combat teams, 1,700 to heavy brigade combat teams and approximately 165 to Stryker brigades. Additionally, support units such as sustainment brigades, and EOD organizations will be assigned approximately 5, 350 vehicles. The significance of these numbers will be felt at the unit level. As units return from deployment and begin the reset process, they will immediately have access to MRAPs for familiarization, and qualification in preparation for future deployments. Approximately 1,000 MRAPs will be assigned to sustainment and war reserve stocks, with the remaining allocated to Pre-Deployment Training Equipment (PDTE) and Combat Training Center (CTC) fleets. These allocations will facilitate training and familiarization to be incorporated into leader training programs and branch specific courses for both commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
Near term, the impact of a massive influx of new equipment into BCTs presents a significant challenge to personnel; specifically, insuring that qualified operators are available to support this capability. Personnel allocations for certain Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), specifically 88M and 19 series personnel, would require reevaluation and appropriate reclassifications made based on the increased presence of MRAP vehicles amongst tactical formations. Another critical subset within this issue is that of higher-level or depot maintainers, where historically, contractors have filled this gap. Possible solutions to address this factor include the utilization of mobile training teams (MTTs), train-the trainer programs and accelerated training at the Centers of Excellence (CoE). The 3rd BCT, 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky is one unit already in the process of implementing these strategies.
The second largest impact is on unit organization; or simply, how tactical units task organize. Given the proposed distribution plan mentioned earlier, many types of units will be required to modify their organizational structure in order to effectively integrate this capability. An example of this might be a route clearance team comprised from a brigades engineer company personnel. Much in the same way Fire Support Teams (FIST) in many BCTs are habitually associated and often attached to maneuver battalions for training, organizations could likewise attached these clearance teams, along with associated equipment to various units depending on its mission. This approach addresses a fundamental aspect of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Material (DOTMLPF) analysis, specifically under the organization category, by identifying both primary and secondary missions and management functions of units. In fact, staff members at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, are examining similar options using lessons learned from the field. A recent publication notes that the centers staff is already, "... supporting doctrine development aimed at helping units adjust their organizations in preparation for deployment and incorporating MRAP into their formations".
Another example involving organizational impacts may involve a field artillery battalion scheduled to deploy as a task force, where large caliber howitzers would have limited use. In this instance, the task force commander now has the flexibility to reorganize his howitzers sections to develop an internal route clearance capability using his organic MRAPs. The key element of DOTMLPF analysis in this example examines the staffing and funding of the organization to ensure that it can accomplish its assigned tasks. In this case, the commander is afforded the flexibility to reevaluate his Full Spectrum Operations Mission Essential Task List (FSO METL), and as a result, prioritize training to ensure that howitzer section members could now function as route clearing teams with MRAP vehicles and associated equipment. This option is not a new phenomenon, as we see similar types of reorganization or force shaping happening routinely in Iraq and Afghanistan with great success.
Long term, the challenges associated with wide spread incorporation of MRAP vehicles across the Army will lessen. However, this will not happen based solely on the sheer will and ingenuity of organizational commanders alone. It will be incumbent upon Army planners and leaders to provide greater deployment predictability combined with ARFORGEN management and equipping strategies to ensure units have the necessary capability to accomplish their missions. It must be noted that while the Army can have visibility on emerging threats, it cannot, with 100% certainty, predict when and where all contingency missions will occur. However, it can provide complete visibility on pending deployments allowing commanders to ensure their Soldiers are proficient in the tasks required and are well suited for their mission. According to the Armys 2010 posture statement, this plan also allows our strategic planners "flexibility to surge in response to unexpected contingencies across the spectrum of conflict, and provides operational depth with more forces available for longer commitment times." The benefit of this course of action is a more customizable force, able to rapidly deploy with the right balance of protection and performance.
Skeptics will argue that the cost of this modernization strategy is too great in both manpower and resources. They cite the Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) and Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) within the acquisition process as a limitation on this course of action; specifically the personnel requirements. However, their analysis is insufficient, as it does not account for the flexibility of organizations to absorb additional vehicles and associated capability into their tactical formations as mentioned earlier. Further, the Army has considered this issue as required under the acquisition process and determined it a reasonable balance in the near term to meet the need for increased survivability with mission effectiveness of its Soldiers. In fact, one report indicated that Improvised Explosive Device (IED) fatalities were down almost 90% partially due to MRAPs, therefore, to delay implementation based on further evaluation would be irresponsible and costly in terms of investment dollars spent and human treasure.
Despite the challenges associated with incorporating MRAPs broadly across the Armys
BCTs, Army leadership is correct in moving forward with this plan. There is no doubt that this family of vehicle is well suited for a variety of operating environments. President Obamas strategic vision outlined in the most recent National Security Strategy, highlights how over the past 20 years, the potential threats we face as a Nation have shifted. Further, he states that while competition among nation states endures, we must be prepared to face a diverse array of asymmetric threats. Moreover, change 1 to field manual 3-0 (just released MAR 2011), emphasizes the increasing importance of security force operations as being essential to stability operations, countering irregular threats, preventing conflicts and facilitating security transitions. Clearly, this suggests the need for an adaptable force capable of defeating these threats across the spectrum of conflict. Incorporating the MRAP Army wide into its BCTs is an ideal means to this end. Its influence near-term on brigade combat teams will challenge leaders from an organizational and personnel perspective to receive and integrate this capability. However, long term, it will enable greater flexibility to planners to be able to balance the force and allow the Army to rapidly deploy its brigades and project its forces globally without significant reorganization.

Perhaps instead of the Military - Industrial Complex, Eisenhower should have warned of the Congressional - Industrial Complex.

Speaking of the sad HMMWV, note this <a href=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/02/AR20110…; Op-Ed from the Washington Post.</a>

Even the Army is not totally to blame for failing to adjust...

<b>BGS</b>

Thanks. No question on anything you say. I just regret we were not more flexible and innovative post Desert Storm. There were studies made and good advice that pointed the way but the senior leadership would not listen -- and Congress had a sad part to play in it all (and then joined the castigation that led to the MRAP procurement! :< ).

When finally procured the MRAPs filled a definite need. In fairness, the 'system' was trying to produce a better alternative but, in equal fairness, the 'system' is simply broken...

Agree it was needed at the time and I'm sure not saying junk them all -- I do hope that we take advantage of the technology improvements to produce better, lighter and more agile <b>combat vehicles</b> and procure more survivable support vehicles that can be easily up-armored IF and when required.

While the desire for systems to be rationalized for procurement, logistic, training and maintenance purposes is smart and understandable, IMO the US Army goes too far in that direction. There's nothing wrong with buying gear that can be easily adapted to varied uses; there is also nothing wrong with buying discreet purpose equipment for singular usage.

And that ought to be able to be accomplished in less than ten years... :(

Ken,

Good points all around. Regardless of blame the military was in a rock and a hard place, light skinned utility and flat bottomed combat vehicles were an Achilles heel. Soldiers were demoralized and desperate, adding their own armor to survive. Our enemies knew this and we had to stop the bleeding, especially if the USG wanted to continue the wars amid unpopular support and recruit soldiers to fight in them. I cannot think of an alternative COA to the MRAP in terms of armored force protection. Of course there were flaws in procurement, nothing is perfect (Remember the Bradley?), and the M-ATV shows how far we've come in design evolution.

Grr. The Anon at 10:10 PM is me...

<b>BGS:</b>

Having seen a number of Army wheeled vehicle strategies -- virtually all of which fell by the wayside for various reasons -- the fact that an existing vehicle is retained as an "interim" substitute for something else is not an at all radical idea. We've done it dozens of times over the last 60 years or so.

Interim is one thing, continued unnecessary purchase of an overweight vehicle of dangerously poor mobility is another. To use the MRAP as an interim vehicle in BCTs deployed makes sense. To purchase more of them beyond the current operations makes no sense.<blockquote>The argument that it does not belong in BCTs seems irrelevant when you consider the fact that the BCTs already had HMMWVs, transport trucks of various sizes, Stryker APCs and the Bradley IFV all rolling around Iraq or Afghanistan.</blockquote>Apples and Breadfruit. The Strykers and Bradleys are nominally combat vehicles -- neither is great but both are adequate compromises foisted on the Army not by the MIC but by TACOM and Shinseki and The Infantry School, respectively). The transport vehicles -- of which the HMMWV is one -- were never designed to be armored or up-armored and in all cases the culprit again is not the MIC but US Army TACOM.<br><br>

A lot of folks in the Army railed against the HMMWV when it was conceived but the US army has an unhealthy fetish for buying 'GP' stuff. By definition, if it is General Purpose, trying to be all things to all people, it will be a dodgy compromise and will fail miserably at some things. The HMMWV was a poor choice way back when and it got no better with time.<blockquote>Since we were using large vehicles on the battlefield already it only makes sense to use one that increases the odds of saving your life.</blockquote>That's an arguable statement on many levels but suffice to say that those who ride about in ultra-armored safety can become quite fond of their cocoon. There are also minuses to your plus...<blockquote>That is what the soldiers on the ground voiced to Congress after they saw them in action with the Engineers and this is why we have the MRAP.</blockquote>That's not exactly how and why but Congress was definitely and intimately involved. So was our ignorant media who sandbagged Troops into pleas for armor because that made sense to they, the media types. Anyone with complaints about the MIC should look closely at the things Congress forces all the services to buy and at the true basis for some of the things the media spouts...<blockquote>...thousands of dead or wounded American soldiers who could be alive and well today with a better vehicle.</blockquote>That's a dramatic statement. It's also true to a great extent. However, the fault lies within the Army.<br><br>
During the 90s, the Wall was down and many European armies learned from forays here and there, not least into the Balkans. They also learned from operations seen in Southern Africa and began buying better protected, mini-MRAP like vehicles. Unfortunately, the US Army in the 90s went blithely and blindly on its merry way dreamily across the North German Plain. They saw no utility in those sorts of vehicles -- or missions.

Those same sorts of folks who were focused on major war in Europe totally ignored the potential for deployment to less than MCO away from Europe. It is perhaps ironic that they, today, are railing about said heavy centric MCO being ignored. In any event, their shortsightedness back then was the genesis of my comment above that that the MRAP fiasco was required "to compensate for Army shortsightedness in the 1990s." The omens were there, the vehicles were there -- the US army wouldn't even consider them. I probably have more resentment toward the MIC than do you -- but fair's fair; this one is an Army shortfall.

Let's not compound that error by making another in retaining an ill suited vehicle of good purpose but limited utility for one second longer than we must.

Make no mistake that the MRAP in some form or another is here to stay in most Army formations. The Army has outlined this in its tactical wheeled vehicle strategy. The MRAP is an interim vehicle until the Joint Light Tatical Vehicle (JLTV) is developed, which will basically be the end state replacement for the HMMWV. The argument that it does not belong in BCTs seems irrelevant when you consider the fact that the BCTs already had HMMWVs, transport trucks of various sizes, Stryker APCs and the Bradley IFV all rolling around Iraq or Afghanistan. Like the MRAP they all transport troops or material, but had less protection. Since we were using large vehicles on the battlefield already it only makes sense to use one that increases the odds of saving your life. That is what the soldiers on the ground voiced to Congress after they saw them in action with the Engineers and this is why we have the MRAP. Army and DoD had a very cozy relationship with AM General and their HMMWV. So cozy that after an Army study declared the HMMWV a death trap after the battle of Mogadishu they kept the HMMWV anyway and it took acts of Congress to make them change. It is a classic example of too much influence of the Military Industrial Complex and its negative impacts...thousands of dead or wounded American soldiers who could be alive and well today with a better vehicle.

Major Kranc has it right:<blockquote>"Incorporating MRAPs into the brigade combat team structure is an unreasonable and unrealistic proposition that will ... not equip them to fight and win our nations wars on the full spectrum battlefield."</blockquote>The MRAP was and is an idea whose time should never have come. It was a stopgap measure to compensate for Army shortsightedness in the 1990s, purchased under media and thus Congressional pressure to fill a niche for a type of operation that we should never repeat. It should be allowed to go via transfer to other Nations as security assistance material where it may be put to good use.

Rather than think about applying it to Line of Communications usage, far better to think of ways to significantly reduce or eliminate such lines as the drain on combat power that they can be...

Putting MRAPs into BSBs does not solve the problem or address the issue of who/what unit will protect the BCT's convoys and MSRs. Without adding additional personnel, who either end up with less hauling capability as truck drivers become MRAP crews or MRAPs get dropped in as replacements for existing HMMWVs that for the most part are there for C2.

Perhaps a better choice would be to look one up at the Maneuver Enhancement Brigades and their MP, Chem and Engineer units and possibly extending to the maneuver battalion assigned as a Tactical Combat Force.

Think Lines-of-Communications Security Force/troops.

While I agree that MRAP needs to be better understood for inclusion in the future force, I submit that it does have a place in the current force, and that is with the Sustainers. Having just spent a year in Iraq (July 09 - July 10) with an MRAP fleet, the mechanics under my charge were well-versed in Field and Sustainment level maintenance. Repair parts were coming on-line and reasonably available. My Battalion (Field Artillery) had more than enough trained drivers. Bottom line: maintenance and qualified drivers are not an issue.
As to utilization, I submit that MRAP can find a home within the Logistics community. The logistics community is tasked with delivering supplies and services, but is also tasked with protecting these supplies during delivery. None of the BCT's have any platforms that provide defensive capability. MRAP provides this. By putting MRAP in the Brigade Support Battalions, this will allow Commanders the ability to learn how to utilize these fighting platforms and let the Soldiers more extensively train on the equipment.