"Penny Wise, Pound Foolish"

In my more cynical moments, I reflect on the equation {smart power = cheap power}. Now, Washington DC is full of ambitious youngsters who:

1. Will work for next to nothing.
2. Are desperate to find jobs relevant to the social sciences in the best of times.
3. Are even more desperate to find work that pays the bills now.
4. Have parents (such as myself) who give them a cold look based on hard knocks, and remind them that there is a wonderful career waiting for them as a stockbroker if (a) the CIA continues to snub them; (b) they can't beat the odds on the Foreign Service entrance exam; (c) are unable to continue delaying the inevitable by continuing to pursue the next level of graduate education.

So, I find it very hard to believe that rescinding the budgets of any or all these organizations will do anything but worsen the structural unemployment that already exists in this field, reduce opportunity for the enthusiastic (and perhaps even talented) but disconnected, and pass the financial burden for paying off expensive student loans to hard-pressed parents, who in many cases are themselves under the gun to stay afloat in a hostile economy. Are we really proud at how many $30-60K jobs get cut in this process ? Really ???

In other words, sanctimonius talk about institutional failure and poor return on investment belies the fact that "soft power" jobs are scarce and don't really pay all that well at the bottom, and are unbalanced at the middle and the top. The personal and professional risks are daunting, and few people can afford to spend their lives doing it. Cultural and regional fluency is difficult to attain, and go against the organizational culture of ALL US national security organizations. Let's not even talk about exploiting technology - there are some interesting nascent efforts out there - and there is enormous technical illiteracy among practitioners. It is bothersome that our spending profile contradicts our National Security Strategy, but we need to look at reality in the face as we consider the record: Soft power investments, much like European defense spending, tend to beat DoD hard power spending cuts in a race to the bottom. Increasingly - "offshore balancing" looks like isolationism, smells like isolationism and tastes like isolationism: because it IS isolationism.

I'm somewhat torn, and while I agree with the comment about mindless cost cutting, at the same time I question the effectiveness (return on investment of our treasure)of these organizations. After years of significant investment in peace operations and irregular warfare we have a very poor track record, so Congress has some justification for questioning the value of continuing to fund these efforts.

One could make an argument we would be better off if we invested that money in our own economic infrastructure so we can continue to enjoy our true advantage which is our economic strength. It seems that where we invest on a smaller scale (El Salvador, Philippines, etc.) we have greater returns on our investment and where we invest largely trying to implement the ideas of the various think tanks we tend to fail (Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). I suspect that is because we take ownership of the problem we provide no incentive for local solutions, but that is another discussion for another day.

Dave's comment about having national priorities and a supporting strategy is what we need now more than anything else. It would save us billions of dollars over time.

I'm somewhat torn, and while I agree with the comment about mindless cost cutting, at the same time I question the effectiveness (return on investment of our treasure)of these organizations. After years of significant investment in peace operations and irregular warfare we have a very poor track record, so Congress has some justification for questioning the value of continuing to fund these efforts.

One could make an argument we would be better off if we invested that money in our own economic infrastructure so we can continue to enjoy our true advantage which is our economic strength. It seems that where we invest on a smaller scale (El Salvador, Philippines, etc.) we have greater returns on our investment and where we invest largely trying to implement the ideas of the various think tanks we tend to fail (Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). I suspect that is because we take ownership of the problem we provide no incentive for local solutions, but that is another discussion for another day.

Dave's comment about having national priorities and a supporting strategy is what we need now more than anything else. It would save us billions of dollars over time.

Although some of Dr. Schult's basic arguments are valid, in that they point to mindless cost-cutting, they are reduced by her emotionalism and her selective (and somewhat inaccurate) examples. PKSOI is not the only organization that looks broady at these types of operations. At the National Defense University, the Center for Complex Operations is Congressionally mandated to do so; it in fact crafted the training program for advisors that she credits to USIP, although USIP did significantly contribute to the program. Also at NDU, the College of International Security Affairs conducts training and education in conflict porevention and stability operations not only for DoD, but also in support of State's S/CRS. Each service maintains its own irregular warafare or COIN centers to address opertaional and tactical-level issues. In addition, excellent research is conducted by the DoD federally funded research entities like RAND, IDA, and CNA. This list does not tally the many private think tanks and universities drawing federal funds to analyze problems associated with COIN and stability operations. All these organizations compete for resources and often attention. The problem is both one of setting priorities, as noted by several in the remarks to this article, AND, as seems to be ignored, reducing duplication and redundancy. Stability operations, IW, COIN or whatever the nom du jour is for today's messy conflicts, have become a cottage industry. Perhaps the question should be how do we reduce redundancy and get these many organizations to integrate their efforts and move in the same direction- a problem that after nine years of war, also continues to vex the so-called "interagency".

I get the feeling that we are making salami slice cuts in the budget and capabilities. What is lacking is a clear establishment of priorities. Our National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and the 2010 QDR have failed to establish priorities and because of that the only way to make cuts is to use the salami slice method.

Please do not get me wrong, I believe we need to make cuts. But because we have not done the hard intellectual work of establishing priorities we have no choice but to get out the hedge trimmer and just keep whacking off the tops of bushes. As I look at the strategies I see consensus documents in which organizations within the defense community protect their equities in order to protect their resources (budget and force structure and major procurement programs). We really need a strategy (and grand strategy) that allows us to prioritize our interests based on our necessary end states and our vital interests and then we can develop the appropriate ways based on the funding constraints that force us to prioritize the means in synchronization with the priorities of our interests and ends. I think we need to develop strategy based on what is right for the Nation vice with the focus on how to protect and justify the resourcing of the means that our various agencies want to make available to support the ALL the ways we need (vice desire) to achieve the prioritized ends to protect our interests (also prioritized).