Lost Opportunities with a New SOF Career Course

A friend passed this article as I currently serve as the Director of the SOF Captains Career Course (SOFCCC). I do not contend the title that opportunities are lost, a result of all organizational change, however there is always gain. It is the comparison of the two that best inform leaders as to the value of an action.

I find some topics discussed: savings (money and time), relationship building (US and Allied), ARSOF 2022 CF/SOF Interdependence, and instruction quality. I would like to help the comparison by recognizing what is lost but developing what is gained.

Savings: As pointed out, the course saves 7 million dollars annually; a rare occurrence when creating a course. Additionally, families are spared an additional PCS move; and since a great deal come from FT Bragg, sometimes two PCS moves. For working spouses or children who keep friends and doctors, the stability is priceless. When I PCS'd from Bragg, my wife stayed to keep her job. The author is also correct about the utilization in operations billets. The manpower study completed found that Captains will save 5-7 months utilization. When you train 384 officers that equates to 160-224 Years in the force! In a service with high PERSTEMPO, that value is incalculable. To me, this topic is all gain.

Relationship Building: On the topic of partner nations officers the author is 100% correct. USASOC senior leaders have been briefed that I am currently working to get partner nation officers here. I hope this happens in the next 6-12 months. However, when he claims it 'denies them exposure to a peer group from other branches' I believe that to be inaccurate. I ran Special Forces Assessment and Selection last year and I can tell you that in last two fiscal years, 80% of all selected officers were prior Infantry or Armor. So, it denies them exposure to the SAME peer group. The exposure to different branches happens in SFOCCC, where the average number of branches represented in each class is 8-9. During the instruction of several classes, which often are student led, SOFCCC has the unique opportunity to have our fires class taught by a former FA officer, CAS taught by a former Aviator, unit maintenance taught by a Transportation officer, along with light Infantry, Stryker, and Armor officers. For the SF selected officers, 80% have been networking, learning about the combined arms fight, and finding lasting mentors for the last 4 years in BOLC, Ranger School, and their Infantry and Armor units. When they show up at SOFCCC, they don't say "I don't understand maneuver" they say "I don't understand ARSOF". That is why the additional time with the peers in this course is paramount. They need the time to focus on leading small units versus companies, utilizing empathetic planning since they work by, with, and through indigenous forces, and how the other two regiments in ARSOF operate. To me, this topic is around 80% gained, 20% lost.

CF/SOF Interdependence: The greatest issue I have with the idea that we are failing to meet ARSOF 2022 is that the document states that the goal of SOF/CF interdependence is to contribute to unified action, the campaign of learning, and embed SOF doctrine into Professional Military Education. The problem is that these officers, at this point, are not even SOF yet; they have not been awarded their branch and are at their infant stage of understanding their own branch let alone sharing it with others. The ability for this population to contribute doctrinally or with experience does not exist, so sending them to PME at MCCC, where there will be no embedding of SOF to the course doctrine, does not meet the intent of ARSOF 2022. It is better that these officers begin to make the transition to fully understand their branch so that they may better contribute to the SOF portion of CF/SOF interdependence upon their graduation of training. To me, this topic is not yet relevant to the discussion.

Instruction quality: The author contends SOFCCC attendees are deprived of some of the 'best training the Army has to offer'. While that is true, it is balanced by gaining some of the best training the Army has to offer. Our instructors have all made the transition from conventional to SOF and can mentor the students who are about to make that same transition. The instructors have experience as SOF working with CF and they provide the ability to mentor the student to see the combined arms fight through the SOF lens as a SOF member; something MCCC instructors and former company commanders cannot. With units like 8th Psyop group, 95th CA BDE, 3rd group, SF Command, SWCS, and USASOC all co-located we are able to build a robust mentorship program where students are able to brief current or former Battalion commanders from their branch. Additionally, our instruction is some of the best. The officer who won 'Instructor of the Year' for all of SWCS came from SOFCCC and when TRADOC visited in 2015 they stated that 'nobody utilizes the Army Learning Model better than SOFCCC'. To me, this topic is equal.

For additional knowledge sake, SOFCCC takes our graduates down to MCCC as often as possible to integrate with students for MDMP or Operational Planning, and while short, it is helpful and the MCCC has greatly supported us on this exchange. There is formal discussion between the centers of excellence on an instructor exchange, where the campaign of learning truly can be exercised.

Therefore, I whole-heartedly believe that due to top notch instruction tailored to their brand new branch, the ability to network with all branches and a more diverse peer group, coupled with the millions saved and families less disrupted that the SOFCCC is the right thing for our Army and the gains outweigh the loss.

Outlaw,

In my opinion, MDMP has been replaced by "bolstering." Commanders direct a change or a specified course of action and then the staffs gather data to support the decision. The key difference is that the decision comes first, rather than resulting from a thorough process. I am not an advocate for bolstering. Bolstering regularly produces flawed, personality driven policies that have to be reviewed with every change of command. Or, as Mr. Martin has noted, the policies are cemented by the bureaucracy and organizational politics.

I am short on the energy required to discuss the ARSOF CCC, but it's good to see that an ODA Commander was willing to open the dialogue.

All including comments below.

First, I am wondering where the idea that “..top notch…” instruction is not being provided. After all the SOF CCC is part is a ‘Center of Excellence’ also. I do hope someday we make a rank above commanding general where an Army officer can make changes to Army training and doctrine.

I just want to clear up a couple items for a cleaner conversation.
1.The bureaucracy has caught up and the slots are being formally set up. However, unlike the 18A Phase instructors there is not a formal benefit for promotion when the boards meet.

2.The CCC does not teach tactics it teaches doctrine and planning; other phases teach tactics. I doubt the other regiments or any general is going to publicly say that only ‘trigger pullers’ know how to plan. The CPTs at the SOF CCC are on the same timeline as MCCC CPTs so the level of experience if not the experiences themselves are the same. My first MCCC instructor was an un-tabbed CAV officer, the BN phase instructor was a Ranger tabbed IN officer. I was wearing 2 tabs and had more schools than both of them combined and I was not the most schooled student in the class. We still learned a lot about planning from both of them. If I follow the logic stream correctly, all SAMS instructors should be triple canopied combat arms officers with combat experience.

3. The students do not need to be “re-taught MDMP” the 18A Phase. This phase is part of the initial MDMP training. The SOFCCC itself is shorter because the CPTs get the rest of their training MDMP in their Alpha phases. This gives them the same amount of training as MCCC graduates. This would be like saying we should cut Benning Phase because the students have to be ‘re-taught’ patrolling in Swamp Phase. It is a continuation of the training. An argument could be made that the students are getting 2 months less training than CPTs of my generation. That however, is a different argument. Based on the lack of planning I have witnessed at the field grade level and above for both real world missions and as an OC/T at JRTC, I would argue the entire Army needs more planning training. At least a class on why they actually should plan. I outlined some of this in a SWJ article.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/failing-to-plan-is-planning-to-fai…

As for CF connections this is a back and forth. I have heard both sides bring up the same point argued in opposite directions. I wonder though if after a few years at West Point/ROTC/OCS, Airborne, BOLC, OBC, LT time, and other schooling (Airborne, Ranger, Sapper, SHARP, and peers that drop out of the Q) you have not gotten to know a couple of CF personnel is another few months in Benning going to shift the scales?

I am not saying improvements should not be made for example if the Army is going to keep all the separate CCCs then maybe the foreign officers should go to the SOFCCC. Maybe all the CCCs should be combined, then everyone would meet everyone. Maybe this is where the conversation should focus. We need a deeper solution section it is only a couple of years before CPT Richmond commands the graduates of a CCC. Who knows CPT Richmond could even get orders to teach at a CCC.

In the interest of full disclosure I do teach at the SOF CCC so there may be some bias, so use the salt appropriately.

Dave- I have talked to three Commanding Generals in the last three years- and all acknowledged to me that the SOFCCC was a mistake and wished they could undo it. Unfortunately, once something like that is incorporated, it is very difficult to change. The 2nd and 3rd order repercussions of changing anything having to do with the pipeline- unless it produces faster results- while we are at war is almost impossible.

Originally conceived to meet the terrible triple demands of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 4th BN growth- the SOFCCC sacrificed CF-SOF relationships as well as top-notch instruction and much-needed CF education for faster processing into the Q courses.

The problems I have personally witnessed with this are many, just 2:

1- the course was, and is still to my knowledge, done out of hide and thus the best instructors aren't available- there have been instructors at times who had just graduated their respective Q course themselves. CA officers from AG branch teaching tactics to Ranger-tabbed infantry officer SFQC students.

2- SF officers getting to the SFQC were having to be re-taught MDMP and planning, as the instruction was not sufficient. The result has been a lot of re-training in the 18A course as well as lots of issues in the planning phase of Robin Sage.

When these issues were reported to multiple general officers, there were attempts to get at least half of all students to go to the Maneuver CCC. These efforts were defeated due to bureaucracy and the time and effort these kinds of changes take- but, mostly it was because of the reality of the pipeline interruptions this would cause- the war needs bodies and we just can't take the pain in the short-term for the long-term gain this would provide...

I also 100% agree with your comment reference career management timelines. All of our decisions have to take that into account- which is really, really sad. We can't manage our ARSOF careers with sense- instead we have to manage them as a massive bureaucracy would...

CPT Richmond is speaking truth to power.

I am in no position to judge this course as it was implemented after I retired. There are of course merits to this course especially if it includes a deep dive into unconventional warfare for the junior SOF leadership. On the other hand if conventional and special operations force interdependence is important than this moves away from that.

I think my SF career benefited from serving in mechanized and straight leg infantry units (3d ID in Germany and 2d ID in Korea to include serving as a Brigade Plans officer in Germany writing a brigade GDP plan and serving as an infantry company commander on the DMZ in Korea), the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, as well as SAMS. (And I was able to do a deep dive into UW doing an MMAS in CGSC and one of my two monographs at SAMS on SOF - the other on the catastrophic collapse of north Korea)

But when I did my year in purgatory as the Chief of SF Officer assignments I learned the math behind the timelines for development of SF officers (which is of course the same for all Army officers). The timeline for promotions drives everything and that is why this SOFCCC makes sense (in addition to the fiscal sense as CPT RIchmond points out). The faster we get Captains through the pipeline the better (and remember that the 2006 QDR drove the requirement to grow from 270 ODAs to 360 ODAs (which we could not accomplish thus we had to reorganize the 4th battalions of all 5 SF Groups)) so that means a corresponding increase in officer throughput in the SF qualification course (and the same applies to the CA and PSYOP qualification courses as both forces grew significantly post 9-11). But as CPT Richmond notes the opportunity for developing special operations and conventional force interdependence is reduced.

The only way to overcome management by timeline and move to true talent management and provide significant broadening opportunities is to do away with year group management and the fixed promotion timelines in DOPMA. This applies to more than just SOF of course. But I am not holding my breath.