02/10/2020 News & Commentary – Korea
News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Daniel Riggs.
1. It’s Time to Get Real on North Korea
2. Opinion | Covid helped isolate North Korea in a way sanctions never could. What now?
3. South Korea Restarts Cost-Sharing Negotiations With Washington
4. North Korea Uses Military Holiday to Shake Down Citizens for Supplies
5. Kim Jong Un’s Congress Report: More Economic and Social Controls on the Horizon
6. UN experts say North Korea still modernizing nuclear arsenal
7. Seoul-Tokyo relations at lowest, affects 3-way cooperation with U.S.
8. Insight into Kim Jae Ryong and Oh Il Jong's new appointments, and Kim Yo Jong's current status
9. Report: Seoul official denies Vladivostok meeting covered power plant
10. UN Finds Torture, Forced Labor Still Rampant in North Korean Prisons
11. S. Korea to keep striving to improve ties with Japan: NSC
12. U.S. will move on N. Korea after bringing allies to same page: Price
13. N.K. leader specified policy direction for inter-Korean, external matters
14. Central Committee conducts inspection of political and security officers in two military units
15. 'North Korea low on daily necessities after shutting down borders'
16. [Kim Seong-kon] The Divided States of America vs. divided Korea
17. What will Pyongyang expect from return of Chung-Suh team?
1. It’s Time to Get Real on North Korea
usip.org · by Markus Garlauskas· February 10, 2021
A nice piece from our former NIO for Korea.
My recommendation is:
First answer these five questions:
What do we want to achieve in Korea?
What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia?
Who does Kim fear more: The US or the Korean people in the north? (Note it is the Korean people armed with information knowledge of life in South Korea)
Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
Second, determine sound strategic assumptions upon which to base policy and strategy.
Any effective approach toward North Korea should be based on two new assumptions. The first recognizes that Kim will give up his nuclear program only when he concludes that the cost to him and his regime is too great – that is, when he believes possession of nuclear weapons threatens his survival. But external pressure alone, although important, will almost certainly fail to create the right cost-benefit ratio. It is the threat from the North Korean people that is most likely to cause Kim to give up his nuclear weapons.26 As former CIA analyst Jung Pak of the Brookings Institution has argued, “Kim fears his people more than he fears the United States. The people are his most proximate threat to the regime.”27 The ROK-U.S. alliance has yet to adopt a strategy with this in mind.
Kim, the DPRK military, and the North Korean elite must be made to recognize that keeping nuclear weapons poses an internal threat to their survival. External threats and actions alone will not suffice, though they are important. In addition, if these actors choose not to relinquish their nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, a maximum pressure 2.0 campaign should threaten to weaken the regime.
The second new assumption is that Kim will continue to employ a strategy based on subversion of South Korea; coercion and extortion of the international community to gain political and economic concessions; and ultimately the use of force to unify the peninsula under the domination of the North, thereby ensuring the survival of the Kim family regime. A key element of his strategy is to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States. Kim’s strategy can best be described as a “long con” whereby he extracts as much as possible for the regime while conceding little to nothing and preparing to achieve unification under his control. Kim is pursuing a strategy established long ago by his grandfather and improved by his father.
This assumption requires the United States and South Korea to prepare for the possibility that Kim might refuse to relinquish his weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This assumption is buttressed by a U.S. intelligence estimate maintaining that he is unlikely to denuclearize. This cannot be discounted and must be factored into a new strategy.
And, one further assumption to illustrate my personal bias: The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
Third: determine the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, sustain, and advance US and ROK/US alliance interests in Northeast Asia.
The answers to the above five questions should guide us to the strategy to solve the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice) and lead to the only acceptable durable political arrangement: A secure, stable, economically vibrant, non-nuclear Korean peninsula unified under a liberal constitutional form of government with respect for individual liberty, the rule of law, and human rights, determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK)
Fourth bring our relevant allies into the analysis and policy and strategy development.
If we do that I guarantee we will be able to get real on north Korea:
The bottom line is a new strategy must be built on deterrence, defense, denuclearization, and resolution of the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice Agreement) by employing a superior form of political warfare. It should consist of 5 lines of effort: comprehensive diplomacy, resolute alliance military strength, pressure through enforced sanctions, cyber defense and offensive operations and information and influence activities to target the regime elite , the second-tier leadership, and the population to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and separate the Kim family regime from the elite and the 2d tier leadership as well as to prepare the population for unification.
As part of this strategy the Alliance must take a human rights upfront approach because human rights are not only a moral imperative, they are a national security issue. Kim Jong-un denies the human rights of the Korean people living in the north so that he can remain in power. Human rights cannot be sacrificed for the pursuit of denuclearization negotiations. We should also remember that when we talk about the north’s nuclear program it reinforces regime legitimacy. However, we expose human rights abuses and crimes against humanity and inform the Korean people in the north about their basic human rights it is an existential threat to the regime.
A political strategy alone will not defeat the Kim family regime's political warfare strategy. We need a superior form of political warfare.
A wise Korea hand once said to me that just about everything that could be tried with north Korea has been tried and all we can do is keep repackaging previous actions in new ways to try to achieve some kind of progress.
But we need to thoroughly assess the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. and then develop a new strategy that will result in a new acceptable, durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK.US alliance interests.
A key initial effort of the Biden administration should be a convening of the MOFA-State strategy working group and a review of alliance strategies should be conducted with a focus on assessing the fundamental assumptions upon which ROK and US policies and strategies are based. The Moon Administration has been laboring under the erroneous assumption that Kim Jong-un supports President Moon’s vision of peace and reconciliation and that there can be north-South engagement on reciprocal terms. A thorough analysis and understanding of the Kim family regime will reveal the Kim family regimes’ strategy is to use political warfare to subvert the South Korea nation and when conditions are right to use force to unify the peninsula under northern rule. Basing policy and strategy on the Moon administration’s assumptions is the path to failure on the Korean peninsula.
Again, there is no silver bullet to the north Korea problem. This is why we need to focus on the long-term solution to the security and prosperity challenges on the Korean peninsula. That is to focus on resolving the Korean question,' the unnatural division of the peninsula.” Solve that and the nuclear issues and the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will be fixed. The question to ask is not what worked and what did not, but whether our action advanced our interests and moved us closer to the acceptable, durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US alliance interests?
The way ahead is deterrence, defense, denuclearization and solving the “Korea question” (e.g., unification) with the understanding that denuclearization of the north will only happen when we resolve the Korea question.
2. Opinion | Covid helped isolate North Korea in a way sanctions never could. What now?
NBC News · by Victor Cha· February 10, 2021
Dr Cha is right - but it is not simply COVID. It is really the policy decisions by Kim Jong-un to not just fight COVID but that use COVID as an excuse to further crack down on the population and ensure maximum control over all aspects of north Korea. It is Kim Jong-un who has further isolated the north in ways sanctions never could.
This is probably the reason why Kim has refrained from providing a "welcome gift" (provocation) to the new Biden administration,
But the most important statement from Dr. Cha is this: "Some help needs to come soon; otherwise, the regime could face internal challenges that even those with confidence in its resilience may not be able to dismiss."
I would say help can come some - there are countries that want to provide it starting with South Korea. However the question is will Kim accept help?
And if he does accept help we need to be observant for the indications and warnings of "internal challenges" and the potential for implosion or explosion. We need to dust off contingency plans.
3. South Korea Restarts Cost-Sharing Negotiations With Washington
thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · February 9, 2021
I am hopeful that these SMA negotiations will continue after the lunar New Year this week and I am optimistic they will successfully conclude relatively quickly. I recommend the negotiators on both sides work closely with their public diplomacy/public affairs professional to have an information plan ready for immediate execution that shows how a shift from a transaction alliance perspective to one of shared values, interests, and strategy is a good thing for the American and Korean people. They must craft an effective supporting information plan to explain why this is good for their publics.
4. North Korea Uses Military Holiday to Shake Down Citizens for Supplies
rfa.org · by Jieun Kim
Two points - the corruption of the systems is well known and this exploitation of the people is nothing new. But in the context of the current situation it bears watching because if the military is suffering from shortages the people are suffering more due to the increased population and resources control measures. And there is no safety valve of the markets because of the pressure put on them, the use of foreign currency, and the shutdown of the border with China.
And again we should be grateful for the kind of reporting Radio Free Asia is able to do with its sources inside north Korea.
5. Kim Jong Un’s Congress Report: More Economic and Social Controls on the Horizon
38north.org · by Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein · February 9, 2021
Hard to believe the regime could impose even more control. But it is attempts to impose such control that could cause the regime to lose control. This bears watching.
6. UN experts say North Korea still modernizing nuclear arsenal
AP · by Edith M. Lederer · February 9, 2021
The all-purpose sword is ... well ... all-purpose and especially useful in supporting the treasured sword.
7. Seoul-Tokyo relations at lowest, affects 3-way cooperation with U.S.
This is going to have to be a part of the Biden Korea policy review. There will have to be a realistic and frank assessment of ROK-Japan relations and franks discussions with both. If we cannot engender sufficient ROK-Japan cooperation on national security issues we are going to adjust and adapt our strategy.
As I have stated many times the only way we are going to see an improved relationship is through decisive leadership by Moon and Suga. They both must pledge to place national security and national prosperity above historical issues while trying to manage them effectively. They have to stand up to their political bases and put the security and prosperity of their nations first.
8. Insight into Kim Jae Ryong and Oh Il Jong's new appointments, and Kim Yo Jong's current status
dailynk.com· by Ha Yoon Ah · February 10, 2021
The important point is in the subtitle. I think we all know and understand this but Kim Yo-jong likely remains powerful as she is possibly the only person Kim Jong-un trusts.
9. Report: Seoul official denies Vladivostok meeting covered power plant
upi.com· by Elizabeth Shim · February 9, 2021
I hope he doth not protest too much. If the allegations are true, this will put some strain on the alliance and may have political/election implications for Moon's party.
10. UN Finds Torture, Forced Labor Still Rampant in North Korean Prisons
hrw.org · by Lina Yoon · February 9, 2021
Human rights is a national security issue as well as a moral imperative. The Kim family regime must be held accountable as it denies the human rights of the Korean people in order to ensure the survival of the regime.
11. S. Korea to keep striving to improve ties with Japan: NSC
en.yna.co.kr · by 최수향 · February 10, 2021
Some good news. But actions speak louder than words.
12. U.S. will move on N. Korea after bringing allies to same page: Price
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 10, 2021
This is most important. For us to have an effective policy and strategy we must have sufficient alignment with our allies. We need to conduct the policy review at deliberate speed and get it done right and not in haste. And it needs to be a long term strategy. This of course is problematic because the Moon administration needs to see short terms progress and results as it heads into the election cycle in the fall. The US and the ROK are operating on different timelines and that must be resolved as we move forward.
13. N.K. leader specified policy direction for inter-Korean, external matters
en.yna.co.kr · by 고병준 · February 10, 2021
The direction should be up. There is no where to go but up given that the regime is at rock bottom.
14. Central Committee conducts inspection of political and security officers in two military units
dailynk.com· by Jeong Tae Joo · February 9, 2021
This could be a significant indicator. We should keep in mind the nKPA has three "chains of control" - the traditional military chains of command from general to private, the political chain of control, and the security chain of control. This report indicates a weakening of the party control.
One of the indicators we should be watching for will be defections/escapes by small military units. This will be an indication of weakening of the chains of control.
15. 'North Korea low on daily necessities after shutting down borders'
The Korea Times · February 9, 2021
There is no safety valve or escape mechanism for the Korean people living in the north. The black markets and later the 400+ allowed markets have always been the safety valve ensuring resilience among the Korean people. But the crackdowns on all trade and markets are going to severely impact the people.
But we should never forget the reason for the suffering are the deliberate decisions of Kim Jong-un.
16. [Kim Seong-kon] The Divided States of America vs. divided Korea
koreaherald.com · by Kim Seong-kon · February 9, 2021
An interesting OpEd comparing the divisions the ROK and US.
17. What will Pyongyang expect from return of Chung-Suh team?
The Korea Times · February 10, 2021
Pyongyang certainly hopes for the friction in the ROK/US alliance caused by these minister (and at MOU Lee as well)
Conclusion: Even before taking office Tuesday, Chung Eui-yong has been making a series of remarks on North Korea policies, such as Kim's intention to denuclearize his country. Those comments triggered concerns about possible confrontation with the new U.S. administration which has launched a review of the diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang during the previous Trump administration.
---------
"The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts."
- Bertrand Russell
"I do not claim to have any developed or sophisticated views in political philosophy, but I think that one of the lessons of the last few hundred years of history is that the greatest threat to human prosperity and well-being is fanaticism and intolerance, even in the name of apparently laudable goals."
- Tim Crane
"Our faith in democracy, personal freedoms and human 'rights', and the other comforting prescriptions of the humanist liberal credo stem from the supremacy of maritime over territorial power. Pragmatists may deplore this as crude determinism, as another vain attempt to construct a general theory of history. They should reflect on the sort of political philosophy and structures we might now adhere to had the Habsburgs, Bourbons, Bonaparte, Hitler, Stalin or his heirs prevailed in the titanic world struggles of the past four centuries."
- Peter Padfield