Journal

Operational Check-Fire

An Assessment of Our Operational Concept of Operations in Support of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Interagency Policy and Goals

by R.J. Buikema

Operational Check-Fire (Full PDF Article)

The U.S. approach toward Afghanistan and Pakistan has seen marked changes since the transition from the George W. Bush administration to the Barack Obama administration during January of this year. With a new president came a new policy, fresh leadership, and a modified military/ diplomatic approach. Once new leadership was installed, an increase of 21,000 additional military personnel was announced, meaning that currently, 68,000 U.S. forces are present in Afghanistan. Forces have expanded offensive operations and are concentrating on two fronts. The first is the eastern border provinces with Pakistan, a traditional logistics route for Taliban and Haqqani Network forces, which also use the border area for safe havens, training, recruiting, and command & control. The second is southern Afghanistan where the Taliban loyalists of Kandahar and Helmand Province have had a menacing and somewhat dominant presence for years. Even now, some legislators and military commanders are calling for an even greater presence of U.S. forces, as Afghanistan has rapidly shifted from a delaying effort to the pivotal point of strategic policy. Meanwhile, some political pundits are already referring to Afghanistan as "Obama's Vietnam", even though some elements of the outlined civil-military objectives are only now being implemented. While the political-military debate is likely to continue for some time, it is prudent to review the core goals for the region and evaluate if the ongoing U.S. operational approach is in fact supporting accomplishment of those goals. What is the strategic vision for Afghanistan and Pakistan? Which tasks and objectives support that strategic vision? Has operational success (or failure) had an impact on those strategic goals?

Operational Check-Fire (Full PDF Article)

A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq

SWJ Book Review by Matthew Caris

A Question of Command (Full PDF Article)

A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq by Mark Moyar, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2009, 368 pp., $30.

Critics claim American counterinsurgency theory has become dogmatic, too fixated on making major political, economic, or even societal changes in order to combat insurgencies. Ralph Peters, Bing West, and others have written that proponents pay too much attention to the "truisms" that pervade FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, and not enough to killing insurgents. This is how Mark Moyar frames the COIN debate in the first chapter of his book A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. Dr. Moyar, a professor at the Marine Corps University, argues that both sides in this debate miss the real determinant in success or failure in COIN: leadership. Contending that insurgency is at its core a power struggle between competing elites, Moyar makes the case that the side that marshals better leadership, as defined by ten essential traits of commanders for COIN, will emerge victorious. He argues the particular tactics employed do not necessarily matter, though he tends to favor kinetic methods over the kinds of nonmilitary means often prescribed by COIN theorists. The book examines nine historical cases: the Civil War, Reconstruction, the Philippine Insurrection, the Huk Rebellion, Malaya, Vietnam, El Salvador, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In each, Moyar examines the performance of counterinsurgent leaders, and how their leadership values (or lack thereof) affected the outcome.

A Question of Command (Full PDF Article)

Marketing Framework in Support of Non-Lethal Fires

by Lieutenant Colonel Morgan Mann

Marketing Framework in Support of Non-Lethal Fires (Full PDF Article)

The purpose of this paper is to put forth an alternative or augment to conventional military planning processes when incorporating non-lethal fires, effects and targeting. The tactical units of the joint force are now infused with many non-lethal 'enablers' and coordinating agencies with which to influence the battlespace. However, this augmentation does not come with the additional planning frameworks that can assist the commander and his staff to integrate and synchronize the additional tools and capabilities. Several planning concepts from corporate America may be able to assist.

In 2004 the Secretary of Defense developed a 6 phase concept for fighting the Long War. Four of the six phases involve primarily non-lethal activities, and 2 of these are likely to require a commitment of U.S. ground forces. Stabilization and the enablement of civil authority, phases 4 and 5 respectively, involve engagement with numerous hostile and non-hostile actors by tactical units. It will be brigades, battalions, and companies of the joint force that will plan and execute much of Phase 4 and 5 operations. They will do this by integrating non-lethal military enablers such as engineers, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operation Teams. They will also need to coordinate with interagency teams such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and US Agency for International Development (US AID), as well as non-government organizations (NGOs). Battalions will also shape the perceptions of various host nation actors by their own organic operations.

There are numerous techniques and procedures documented for the accurate and timely incorporation of lethal fires. From fire support plans, to execution matrices and targeting board mechanics, the services are masters of integrating lethal fires. However, the planning frameworks for our tactical units to conduct non-lethal fires and targeting are limited. Recently published field manuals such as Stability Operations (FM 3-07), Counterinsurgency Operations (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), and the Army's new Operations (FM 3-0) manual reference non-lethal fires as critical components to planning and executing operations; however, there is little in way of prescriptive help. There are doctrinal publications pertaining to Information Operations (FM 3-13 and JP 3-13) and Non-Lethal targeting but these publications are focused on Division and higher level units where there are dedicated staff's for non-lethal fires and effects. In addition to the lack of tools at the tactical level we also lack much of the joint or service specific doctrinal language to communicate what 'non-lethal' or 'non-kinetic' fires and targeting are, and how they are suppose to affect the battlespace. We seem to try to shoehorn non-lethal efforts into lethal fires language.

Marketing Framework in Support of Non-Lethal Fires (Full PDF Article)

Threats in Southern Iraq Ahead of a U.S. Withdrawal

by Lieutenant Colonel John Johnson

Threats in Southern Iraq Ahead of a U.S. Withdrawal (Full PDF Article)

In November 2008, the U.S. and Iraq signed a bilateral security agreement, which set two major deadlines leading up to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq: the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009 and the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. Additionally, in February 2009, President Obama announced that all U.S. combat forces would be withdrawn from Iraq by August 31, 2010, leaving several advisory and assistance units and headquarters elements in Iraq and setting the force ceiling at 50,000 for those remaining at the end of August 2010.

As was the case during the deployment of U.S. forces into Iraq in 2003, the majority of U.S. forces will likely exit Iraq through the south, moving equipment to Iraqi and Kuwaiti ports in the northern Arabian Gulf for loading onto ships and subsequent return to U.S. bases or to other theaters of operation. There are three primary threats to the combat forces drawdown in southern Iraq including: Shia militant groups opposed to the presence of U.S. forces; Iranian influence that ranges from helpful to disruptive and deadly to U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); and intra-Shia violence, where Shia political groups compete for power and resources. This paper focuses on Shia militant groups and malign Iranian influence, and also briefly addresses the potential threat of intra-Shia politically motivated violence. Additionally, while the majority of violence in Iraq over the past six years has been concentrated in Baghdad, Anbar Province in western Iraq and in northern Iraq, the environment in southern Iraq described in this paper highlights how the complex, multi-faceted nature of the southern region can affect the impending withdrawal of U.S. forces.

This paper provides a description of the three major threats in southern Iraq, identifies several unlikely wildcard events which could alter the security situation, and concludes that while violence in the south is quite low when compared to historical trends and compared to the rest of Iraq, there remains several areas where U.S. forces should focus their efforts to ensure violence remains low ahead of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.

Threats in Southern Iraq Ahead of a U.S. Withdrawal (Full PDF Article)

Don't Try to Arrest the Sea

An Alternative Approach for Afghanistan

by Major Mehar Omar Khan

An Alternative Approach for Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Over the last three months that I've spent in the United States, I've heard with concern and trepidation the growing calls for a possible pull out from Afghanistan. No sane citizen of our world, let alone a Pakistani infantry officer who may soon end up being another name on an ever-growing list of the fallen soldiers in the war against terror, enjoys thinking about the painful possibility of our world's greatest military power and history's most inspiring nation retreating in the face of an onslaught by Kalashnikov-wielding bearded barbarians riding on the back of motorcycles, hungry horses and perspiring mules. What is being realized with increasing intensity is the pain of a seemingly endless and bloody war for almost a decade now; the pressure of a US public opinion that's almost irreversibly weary of war (at least for now); the misery of a mismatch between resources and mandate; the rising groans of despairing allies un—to persevere and, the scary scarcity of success stories. However what needs to be realized is the fact that abandoning Afghanistan will be an unmitigated tragedy.

For the United States, I believe, Afghanistan is not a case of 'success or failure'. The USA is too big and too powerful to fail against a collection of miserable fanatics holed up in the treacherous mountains of Southern Afghanistan. It's instead a case of doing too much with too little care and attention. It's a challenge (still quite surmountable) aggravated by ditching smart choices and contracting wrong compulsions.

An Alternative Approach for Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Assessing Russian-Chinese Military Exercises

by Dr. Richard Weitz

Assessing Russian-Chinese Military Exercises (Full PDF Article)

The modern Russian-Chinese relationship has most often been characterized by bloody wars, imperial conquests, and mutual denunciations. It has only been during the last twenty years, when Russian power had been decapitated by the loss of the Soviet empire and China had found itself a rising economic—but still weak—military power that the two countries have managed to reach a harmonious modus vivendi. According to various metrics, China now has the world's second or third largest economy, while Russia lags in approximately eighth place and, due to its slower growth rates, is falling further behind. Nevertheless, Russia still has a much more powerful military, especially in the nuclear realm.

Now the relationship is becoming better institutionalized and integrated. As befits two large and powerful neighbors, the senior military leaders of Russia and China now meet frequently in various formats. Their direct encounters include annual meetings of their defense ministers and their armed forces chiefs of staff. Since 1997, they have also organized yearly "strategic consultations" between their deputy chiefs of the general staff. The most recent session occurred on November 24-25, 2008, in Beijing, and included Russian Deputy Chief Alexander Burutin and PLA Deputy Chief Ma Xiaotian. In March 2008, the Chinese defense minister established a direct telephone line with his Russian counterpart, the first such ministerial hotline ever created by China and another country. In December 2008, the chiefs of the Chinese and Russian general staffs created their own direct link.

Assessing Russian-Chinese Military Exercises (Full PDF Article)

LNO Missions as a Model for the Division Headquarters RIP/TOA Process

by Major General Richard C. Nash, Colonel Neal Loidolt and Lieutenant Colonel C. Bryan Tierney

LNO Missions as a Model for the Division Headquarters RIP/TOA Process (Full PDF Article)

Situational understanding is the paramount goal of any Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) for a division commander as he accepts responsibility for his area of operations. This takes on even more urgency in counter insurgency or stability operations, as all the operational decisions and tactical employments that arise from protecting the population and rooting out insurgents takes on the gravity of strategic implications. The mobilization, and subsequent deployment, of the 34th ID Headquarters (HQ) in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) created a unique challenge in preparing Soldiers for a challenging mission. For only the second time during OIF, an Army National Guard Division HQ had been assigned the responsibility of a Multi-National Division (MND) Area of Operations (AO).

The 34th ID HQ, better known as the "Red Bulls", has a long and proud tradition dating back to World War I, but had not deployed as a full division headquarters since World War II. While the division headquarters and many of its members had recently deployed to Bosnia, Kosovo and to Iraq as part of 1st Brigade/34th ID, the scope and responsibilities required of this deployment would be much greater. Some of the challenges facing the Red Bulls were a shortened mobilization timeline, conversion to a larger Division HQ MTOE and a greatly expanded area of operations. Further, the Red Bulls would be conducting their RIP/TOA in Basra with the 10th Mountain (MTN) HQ who had just deployed their division headquarters from Victory Base Complex in Baghdad to the Basra Air Station. Complicating this TOA even more was the movement into a new facility on Basra, since the UK Division had operated with a much smaller staff from the Basra Airport Hotel, as their responsibility had reduced to one province. Though the 10th MTN HQ did the initial RIP/TOA with the UK Division in Basra on 31 March 2009, the Red Bulls would conduct their RIP/TOA with the 10th HQ MTN a mere 50 days later. Three previous MND AOs, encompassing nine provinces, were now officially the purview of one command, MND-S.

On 20 May 2009, the Red Bulls conducted their TOA Ceremony with the 10th MTN Division. Despite all these challenges, the higher headquarters of MNF-I and MNC-I remarked that this was one of the smoother MND RIP/TOAs they had seen occur. One of the leading reasons for the ease of the transition was the implementation of a specific program to help the Red Bulls gain the necessary situational understanding required of a complicated TOA.

LNO Missions as a Model for the Division Headquarters RIP/TOA Process (Full PDF Article)

Assessing and Targeting Illicit Funding in Conflict Ecosystems

Irregular Warfare Correlations

by Brigadier General David L. Grange and J.T. Patten

Assessing and Targeting Illicit Funding in Conflict Ecosystems (Full PDF Article)

In December 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a "Directive-Type Memorandum" whose subject was a DoD Counter-Threat Finance (CTF) Policy that included priority purposes to counter financing used by illicit trafficking networks in support of adversaries' activities, which may negatively affect U.S. interests. Countering threat finance included memorandum policy to deny, disrupt, destroy, degrade, and defeat these adversarial networks with many "counters" relying on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that follow Irregular Warfare concepts. Targeting and assessing the greater illicit funding mechanism within conflict ecosystems demands the same below-the-waterline tacit knowledge, situational understanding, and intelligence creation that most complex and unconventional operations require while keeping local populations out of the fray.

CTF and other Irregular Warfare efforts need an accurate contextual assessment identifying the nature of specific activity and the culture of the various ethnic groups involved to precisely apply the use of force or countermeasures while gaining (and retaining) legitimacy in the eyes of the civilian population. This requires understanding and circumstantial application of history, society, economic infrastructure/ecosystems, local/regional politics, tribes and clans or social ties, and legal structures. Combining typical joint-oriented preparation of the environment/battle-space with CTF doctrine details will require going beyond the capabilities in traditional financing theory and forensic techniques of transactional dates, amounts, sources of transactions, and personalities involved to more accurately identify, detect, predict, target, and actively interdict threat, terrorist, and / or illicit criminal finance activities.

By employing a hybrid of IW, CTF, and shared operating concepts, intelligence and forensic investigative strategies can become complimentary at the joint and interagency community of interest levels. Based on the illicit groups or actions involved and those government agencies covering them, a Whole of Government (or beyond) network of efforts will improve support to operational strategies at ground level up to the prosecution needs at the Justice level. From this community of purpose standpoint, Zones of Influence can be better established to contest the space that is utilized by criminal and adversarial purposes.

Assessing and Targeting Illicit Funding in Conflict Ecosystems (Full PDF Article)

I Can't Believe We Are Losing To These Guys

by Vegetius

I Can't Believe We Are Losing To These Guys (Full PDF Article)

"The greatest threat to the Afghan government is the Afghan government." This was the conclusion of a report on the Taliban compiled in the 2005 by the Defense Adaptive Red Team (DART) for the Department of Defense. The report further went on to say that the Taliban are the slow learners of the Islamic fundamentalist world. The report predicted that, if the Karzai government did not reform itself, and if the Taliban ever became a learning organization, the Afghan portion of the Global War on Terror could get very ugly indeed. It is 2009; the Karzai government has not reformed, but the Taliban have. We should not be losing this war, but it now appears that we are losing. One is reminded of John Lovett's Michael Dukakis character in a Saturday Night Live sketch during the 1988 presidential election. The faux Dukakis listens to an inarticulate pronouncement by Dana Carvey's faux George H.W. Bush, and exclaims, "I can't believe that I'm losing to this guy." That is a fair analogy about where we are in Afghanistan today.

This war is not lost, but we need to make some major changes if we are to turn it around. This was the clear message sent to President Obama by his commander in Afghanistan in August and leaked by The Washington Post on September 21st. General McChrystal was making a clear case for more troops in his report, but lost in the uproar was a strong statement that the Karzai government will have to mend its ways. All the king's horses and men will not help in Afghanistan if the Taliban are allowed portray their equally flawed governance approach as a viable alternative to the increasingly corrupt kleptocracy that the Karzai government has become.

As this is being written, there are reportedly several options on the table as alternatives to General McChrystal's recommended approach of sending more troops and fully employing the counterinsurgency doctrine that worked in Iraq (FM 23-4, Counterinsurgency). Some of these proposed alternatives are good supporting tools, but they won't work by themselves. McChrystal is right; there will not be an easy way to end this war. If the war is worth fighting, which the President said it was during the 2008 campaign, it is worth fighting properly. This piece suggests some specifics for turning it around in the manner that McChrystal suggests.

I Can't Believe We Are Losing To These Guys (Full PDF Article)

What Really Happened in the Tagab Valley?

A Response to Second Lieutenant James Parker

by Joshua Foust

What Really Happened in the Tagab Valley? (Full PDF Article)

I read with great interest the September 22 post on PSYOP in the Tagab Valley of Kapisa Province. As both the author of several articles on the province, including a study of counterinsurgency operations there, and considering that province was where I spent the majority of my deployment earlier this year, I was excited to hear a bit about how the area was doing.

What I found, however, caused me to scratch my head. 2LT Parker made several assertions that clashed with my experience and understanding of the area, and after asking several ex-colleagues and other contacts in the area, there are a few points that should be disputed.

What Really Happened in the Tagab Valley? (Full PDF Article)

Admin Note: This article has been removed - temporarily we hope - while it is reviewed by official authorities.

Theory, Policy, and Strategy

A Conceptual Muddle

by Adam Elkus and Mark Safranski

Theory, Policy, and Strategy: A Conceptual Muddle (Full PDF Article)

It is impossible not to notice that elements of the current acrimonious debates over theory, operations, and practice are proxies for larger political differences over the use of force and its relationship to American national interests. So why are these fundamental policy disagreements being expressed through debate over technical points of military doctrine?

The answer lies in the uncertain, even negligent, muddle that has substituted for a clear paradigm to guide US grand strategy. Because policymakers have failed to define clear US interests, goals, and objectives, attempts have been made to derive grand strategic principles from theoretical debates or operational concerns. While these debates have been intellectually stimulating and often very useful to developing US national security and military doctrine, they cannot sustain US grand strategy. While strategic drift might be inevitable in country where much of strategy is determined by the cleavages of domestic politics, the cost of meandering can be measured in lost opportunities, treasure squandered, and lives lost. Policymakers must make a stand for a strong strategic paradigm to guide US operational methodologies.

Theory, Policy, and Strategy: A Conceptual Muddle (Full PDF Article)

The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home

Strategic Communication and the Management of Expectations

by Dr. Tony Corn

The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home (Full PDF Article)

Whether in three months, three years, or three decades, the U.S. will have to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan some day. At this particular juncture, the Washington commentariat should be less concerned with the precise timing of any withdrawal than with the exact manner in which -- when the time comes - the U.S. can convincingly "declare victory and go home."

Contrary to a naí¯ve belief, actions rarely speak for themselves. The choice of a communication strategy determines whether a military build-up is perceived as a temporary "surge," or an open-ended "escalation," and this initial perception, in turn, determines whether a future withdrawal will be perceived as "mission accomplished," or "lack of resolve."

At its most sophisticated, strategic communication is the art of managing expectations of friends and foes alike in a timely fashion. If there is only one lesson of Vietnam that the Obama Administration should meditate at this point, it is that unexpected cascading effects can make the most seemingly-cautious incremental strategy unravel in no time. In 1968, it took only two months from the beginning of the Tet offensive (January 31) for a President Johnson, overtaken by events, to announce that he would not seek re-election (March 31).

While it is hard to quarrel with those who argue today that America's initial goals in Afghanistan have been met, it is still too early to heed calls to "declare victory and go home." If nothing else, the continued presence of U.S. troops on Iran's Western and Eastern borders has a nice way of "concentrating the mind" of the ayatollahs.

But it is not too early to realize that managing expectations over Afghanistan today is the most effective way of salvaging America's reputation (not to mention the President's own re-election) tomorrow. Irrespective of the future course of action in Afghanistan, the White House should not wait much longer before coming up with an "inoculation strategy" (as they say in comspeak) that will pre-empt future foreign attempts to equate an American withdrawal with a U.S. retreat or a U.S. defeat.

The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home (Full PDF Article)

The Army after This

by Vegetius

The Army after This (Full PDF Article)

The American defense establishment today is torn in two directions. It is agonizing between becoming a high tech, cutting edge 21st century fighting force poised for the uncertainties of tomorrow's challenges, or spending more money on preparing for the wars we currently have and are likely to fight in the next five years. The irony is that there does not need to be a choice. The United States has to be able to confront hostile high tech state actors as well as to handle the messy problems spawned by radical Islamic movements and the associated chaos caused by a breakdown in governance in many parts of the third world.

The Army after This (Full PDF Article)

When a Cup of Coffee Becomes a Soy Decaf Mint Mocha Chip Frappuccino

by Brigadier Justin Kelly and Ben Fitzgerald

When a Cup of Coffee Becomes a Soy Decaf Mint Mocha Chip Frappuccino (Full PDF Article)

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War marked a point of departure for military analysis. Until then, strategic problems, although complex and thorny, were necessarily dealt with in the context of the greater competition between the East and West. From then, each new strategic problem outwardly enjoyed a degree of singularity and, accordingly, required a greater amount of a priori examination. The profusion and novelty of these emerging strategic problems stimulated an equally profuse and disparate amount of analysis and prescription.

The new wave of military theory began a little earlier, in the late-1980s, when Soviet theorists began to discuss the implications of emerging weapons, and sensing and communications technologies -- conventional means that replicated the power of, and provided a useable alternative to, tactical nuclear weapons. They anticipated that the impact of these weapons was a Revolution in Military Affairs that would require a fundamental re-ordering of the tactical battlespace in the same way that the introduction of smokeless powder in the 1890s and tactical nuclear weapons in the 1950s did. The 1991 Gulf War offered a practical demonstration that hinted at what might be achievable through the thoughtful combination of these technologies and triggered a flood of seemingly new ideas, including proselytizing the proposition that there was an RMA underway. The idea of an RMA triggered a veritable flood of books describing the long waves of military innovation and identifying earlier periods of discontinuous or extremely rapid change. Depending on semantic arguments about what constituted a revolution, and historical arguments around the causality of victory and defeat, this resulted in lists of from none to 10 historical RMAs.

Academics, enthusiasts, think-tanks and contractors piled on. In the revolutionary fervor of the time, everything that had existed before was a suspect legacy and being up-to-date required coining new terms that seemed to capture the most recent sensation. As a result the militaries of the world found themselves rushing from enthusiasm to enthusiasm like spoiled adolescents. The RMA morphed into Network Centric Warfare, Effects Based Operations and a general desire for 'transformation'.

At the peak of this triumphant cascade of gleaming new concepts and technology came the strategic shock of 9/11 followed by Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As has been variously documented elsewhere, the early stages of these operations provided validation for the supporters of transformation but were followed quickly by costly insurgencies for which the military was unprepared. This in turn has seen a proliferation of new theories for counterinsurgency, population-centric operations and so called 'irregular' warfare. The net effect of these events is an increasingly diffuse array of ideas about the nature of current and future war, often described in dichotomies or mutually exclusive terms. While it is important to debate these issues, at present we are inadvertently adding to, rather than reducing, our strategic uncertainty.

When a Cup of Coffee Becomes a Soy Decaf Mint Mocha Chip Frappuccino (Full PDF Article)

Fulbright Scholars Want to Pave Way to Brighter Future for Iraq

by Hemin Sultan and Tenay Guvendiren

Fulbright Scholars Want to Pave Way (Full PDF Article)

The flagship international exchange program sponsored by the United States Government, the Fulbright Program, is designed to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. It promotes leadership development through learning and international cooperation. The Fulbright Program operates in more than 155 countries and has provided over 285,000 participants - chosen for their academic merit and leadership potential - with the opportunity to study, teach and conduct research in each others' countries and exchange programs. Approximately 7,000 grants are awarded annually. Hundreds of Fulbright alumni worldwide currently hold top positions in government, higher education, journalism, law, and the private sector, but in Iraq, these organizations are barely functioning and the potential benefits of the Fulbright program to Iraq are not being maximized.

Fulbright Scholars Want to Pave Way (Full PDF Article)

Tactical Strategic Communication!

Placing Informational Effect at the Centre of Command

by Commander Steve Tatham

Tactical Strategic Communication! (Full PDF Article)

In October 2006, Brigadier Andrew Mackay was appointed to lead 52 Brigade, British Army, to Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Mackay, with much stabilisation experience from previous conflicts had used his pre-deployment time to read and to research not just the country but also some of the many ideas of how counter-insurgency (COIN) operations may be conducted. At the forefront of his mind was the work of former French Army Officer, David Galula, who in his book 'Counterinsurgency Warfare' had looked at the need to build consent amongst organic populations to deny insurgencies support; his work was a direct result of his own military service in Algeria. For Galula, and for Mackay, 'the population was the prize' and in Afghanistan that prize might be for the taking, but in Mackay's view only if influence was embedded at its core.

Tactical Strategic Communication! (Full PDF Article)

Afghan Village Militia

A People-Centric Strategy to Win

by Dr. Ronald L. Holt

Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win (Full PDF Article)

The evidence is clear that what we are doing in Afghanistan is not working. Our credibility with the average Afghan is deteriorating along with popular confidence in the Karzai government (Ackeman, 2008). Counterinsurgency can only buy time and ultimately success depends on government reform and the effective delivery of services. There is little hope of this happening under a Karzai government.

Our methods are too clumsy, too alien, and we depend too much on airpower for the Afghan civilians to tolerate the current situation. We need to inculcate a new attitude of leveraging culture, as it is, not trying to change it into a centrally-organized nation mimicking US or NATO models. We are too focused on risk-aversion, careerism and force protection to make significant changes in the way we operate easily. If you keep doing the same thing the same way you generally get the same results.1 More troops will help, but will not be sufficient if they are used in the same way as the troop already in Afghanistan. In fact, more troops used the same way tactically, will leave a bigger Coalition Force (CF) footprint and, could potentially do more harm than good. Even with three new brigades we will still be running an economy of force operation and the force to space ratio is still going to be insufficient to provide the local population with security. This is particularly true if most of the increased troops spend most of their time on the FOBs and are road-bound targets of IEDs. We get a passing grade at "clear" but we are failing completely at "hold."

Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win (Full PDF Article)

Gaining the Initiative in Afghanistan

by Colonel Gian P. Gentile

Gaining the Initiative in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

A very recent article in the Washington Post says that the enemy in Afghanistan has improved its tactical fighting abilities when confronting American forces there. The article stated that the enemy has figured out "gaps" in the current American tactical and operational approach of population centric counterinsurgency. And the article added the tactical improvement on the part of the enemy in Afghanistan, according to "American military officials," has taken us by "surprise." This means in effect that the enemy has the initiative.

Afghanistan is war, right? In war there has to be fighting or the threat of fighting for it to be war, right? If there is no fighting or threat of fighting then it cannot be war, right?

The answer to this tactical problem in Afghanistan provided by the Counterinsurgency Experts is better population centric Coin tactics and operations; just try harder at building schools, roads, local security forces, establishing government legitimacy, and population security through dispersion of forces to protect them. Once we get better at these processes and try just a bit harder, with a just a few more troops, then voila (just like we think happened in Iraq) victory is achieved, triumph is at hand. But where in this formulation of scientific processes are the enemy and the killing of them?

Gaining the Initiative in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Detainee Operations in Counterinsurgency Operations

Lessons from Afghanistan 2005-2006

by Luke Coffey

Detainee Operations in Counterinsurgency Operations (Full PDF Article)

With the ongoing engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan much has been written recently concerning counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare. Even though counterinsurgency operations do not stop at the gates of a detention center, adequate guidance on dealing with detainees is lacking in much of this literature.

In early 2005 Task Force Guardian, the Military Police brigade task force in Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF)-76 in Afghanistan began a new approach to detainee operations. This was accomplished by building on the hard work of previous rotations and allowed leaders to simultaneously meet broader counterinsurgency objectives as set out by CJTF-76 while improving the welfare of the detainee population. Two things were done differently in 2005 than in previous years. First, there was a push to vastly improve the living conditions and welfare of the detainee population beyond those required by international and historical norms. Secondly, Task Force Guardian initiated a Psychological Operations (PSYOP) program in the detention facility in order to convey key messages to the detainee population. This combined effort placed the leaders of Task Force Guardian in a better position to meet desired CJTF-76 counterinsurgency objectives. This paper highlights some of the lessons learned and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used by Task Force Guardian in 2005 to meet desired end-states in the area of good detainee operations in counterinsurgency operations.

Detainee Operations in Counterinsurgency Operations (Full PDF Article)

Is the War in Afghanistan in the Interests of the United States and its Allies?

by Major Jeremy Kotkin

Is the War in Afghanistan in the Interests of the United States and its Allies? (Full PDF Article)

Is the war in Afghanistan in the interests of the United States and its allies? If so, at what point do the resources we are expending become too high a cost to bear? What are the strategic limitations of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and operations? And if the war is not in the interests of the United States and its allies, what are U.S. and allied interests in South and Central Asia -- and how do you propose to secure them?

Beyond the hyperbole that Afghanistan is a graveyard of empires, current misconceptions and conventional 'wisdom' could certainly lead the United States to a similar fate as our Victorian British or Soviet predecessors. Aside from 1842 or 1979 allegories, neither US policy nor grand strategy in 2009 can justify long-term military (General Purpose Force) presence in Afghanistan. Plainly put, creating, defending, and institutionalizing top-to-bottom cultural, governance, or humanitarian reforms in Afghanistan are not vital national interests to the United States. With those ends outside the precepts of stated US policy, there is no justification for any of the ways and means of armed nation-building, security or stability operations, or anti-drug operations conducted by the US military in Afghanistan.

The only hypothesis that can begin to explain the continued military presence in Afghanistan is the theory that defense of the homeland begins at the Hindu Kush; we fight them there so we don't have to fight them here. The immediate corollary being to prevent another 'strategic shock' like the events of 9/11, we must secure and stabilize the ungoverned, radical breeding ground from which they were hatched and could once again return to set up shop anew. There are multiple flaws in this argument which, taken at face value, yields a slippery slope of never-ending military engagements for anyplace we find an 'ungoverned space' or anywhere we find extremist elements which violently disagree with US policy or presence. Furthermore, this "strategy" to use the term loosely, will forever keep us on the strategic defensive, letting the 'enemy' call the shots while not enabling us to see beyond the tactical, threat-focused lens of the Cold War's dead-and-buried paradigm.

Is the War in Afghanistan in the Interests of the United States and its Allies? (Full PDF Article)

Complexity, Defense Policy, and Epistemological Failure

by Adam Elkus

Complexity, Defense Policy, and Epistemological Failure (Full PDF Article)

"Complexity," "uncertainty" and "chaos" are currently the preferred terms we use to describe modern conflict. It is an accepted truth that today's world is more complex, more dangerous, and more uncertain than it was before 9/11. But is conflict significantly more complex than it has been in the past? While everyone feels that his or her own era is somehow unique, our perception of unprecedented chaos is powerful evidence that the intellectual framework that we draw from to analyze US defense policy is broken.

At heart, our intellectual impoverishment is a linguistic problem. The traditional US tendency is to bracket off politics from defense, depriving us of the vocabulary we need to analyze the world and the challenges we face. The unfortunate result is an erroneous perception that conflict has taken a quantum leap into chaos, a lack of imagination concerning threats such as failed states, and the confusion of operational and strategic approaches.

Complexity, Defense Policy, and Epistemological Failure (Full PDF Article)

Dealing with the Crisis in Zimbabwe

The Role of Economics, Diplomacy, and Regionalism

by Logan Cox and Dr. David A. Anderson

Dealing with the Crisis in Zimbabwe (Full PDF Article)

Once, one of the better run economies in Africa, Zimbabwe has descended into one of the worst, above only Somalia and Sudan. Zimbabwe's history is one common to most of Africa: European colonization, minority rule followed by a war for independence, and subsequent autocratic rule by a leader from the independence struggle. Despite sanctions to oust the white-minority rule, the economy of Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), was able to grow and to develop import substitution products. After transfer to majority rule, particularly after chaotic land reforms in 2000, the economy of Zimbabwe has been in steep decline, with foreign investment vanishing and a willful dismantling of the commercial agricultural base of the economy. The Southern Africa Development Community was formed to improve the conditions of its member states but has been ineffective in positively affecting the situation in Zimbabwe. The member countries are inwardly focused due to inherent economic weaknesses, and the leaders of the SADC and member countries are institutionally un—to criticize a revolutionary leader from one of the independence movements of the 1970s. Since the SADC finally was able to push a unity government in Zimbabwe, the SADC must assume its declared role as a forum for regional stability and economic progress. The United States and other western countries and international institutions must be —to assist in the rebuilding of Zimbabwe through focused and closely monitored aid, while insisting on political and economic reforms. There may be an enduring role for U.S. AFRICOM to play in the region as well.

Dealing with the Crisis in Zimbabwe (Full PDF Article)

Cultural Awareness or Cultural Apperception

Is There a Difference?

by Colonel Victor M. Rosello

Cultural Awareness or Cultural Apperception (Full PDF Article)

One of the more favorable byproducts of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom is the US Army's rediscovered interest in the importance of foreign cultures. Of course this statement goes above and beyond the traditional elements of the US Army that have been educated and trained in foreign cultures and languages, such as Foreign Area Officers and Special Forces soldiers. It speaks to the heart of a matter that has created initiatives such as the TRADOC Culture Center at Ft. Huachuca, AZ or the mandatory Arab language training and enculturation of US Army majors at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. It is ironic to note that the efforts to immerse soldiers in a foreign culture came only as a result of the bogging down of conventional US Army armor and mechanized units in Baghdad following the invasion in 2003. If the Abrams' and Bradley's had been met by cheering and American flag waving Iraqis in downtown Baghdad, this interest in Arab culture may have never surfaced; anymore than it surfaced following Operation Desert Storm in 1991. But this is a moot point and should be left for historians to ponder. What is important is that the enculturation has occurred and has given the US Army a more multidimensional quality, leading to an enhancement and effectiveness of its efforts in theater. But has it really?

Cultural Awareness or Cultural Apperception (Full PDF Article)

To Kill a Mockingbird

The Deconstruction of Information Operations

by Colonel Randolph Rosin

The Deconstruction of Information Operations (Full PDF Article)

With the publishing of FM 3-0 in February 2008, the Army ushered in a new information doctrine. Based on the premise of an operational environment of increasing informational complexity, the Army made the determination that the current concept of information operations (IO) was too limiting in scope and necessitated a paradigm shift. The problem set, as defined by the Combined Arms Center (CAC), was "an inadequate capability to communicate effectively and coherently;" "no single cyber/cyberspace theory;" and "a perception that IO has somehow failed to deliver the goods."

To address this problem set, CAC created a conceptual framework based on five information tasks consisting of information engagement (IE), Command and Control Warfare (C2W), information protection, Operations Security (OPSEC) and military deception (MILDEC). IE is intended to address the first problem of an inadequate capability to communicate effectively and coherently while C2W and information protection intend to address the cyber/cyberspace issue. Organized along functional lines, former IO capabilities disaggregate and reapportion to different staff sections. Consisting of a blend of public affairs, Functional Area (FA) 30 and PSYOP personnel, IE is the staff responsibility of the G7. Electronic warfare (EW) and computer network operations (CNO) form the C2W cell under the fires support coordinator (FSCOORD). Information protection, formerly information assurance, remains with the G6; OPSEC belongs to G3 Protect, and MILDEC, to G3 plans. Effectively, the new Army doctrine deconstructs the IO concept.

In deconstructing IO, the Army is pursuing an independent path that diverges significantly from the rest of the Department of Defense (DoD) and, in so doing, begs the question whether or not it is heading down the right path. Because the information domain cuts across traditional military distinctions of land, air and sea domains, a common joint understanding of concepts becomes an imperative to ensure unity of effort.

The Deconstruction of Information Operations (Full PDF Article)

Inception and Early Evolution of a Partnership Doctrine

Building Afghan Army Capacity While Fighting a Counterinsurgency

by Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Ledford

Building Afghan Army Capacity (Full PDF Article)

During a 20 June 2007 press conference in Afghanistan, 82d Airborne Division's Colonel Marty Schweitzer described the approach to which he and the Soldiers of his 4th Brigade Combat Team had committed themselves during their rotation in the war-weary nation: "The 4th Brigade of the 82d is a subordinate formation to Colonel [sic] Khaliq and the 203rd Corps ... [Khaliq] developed this plan that we're currently executing."

Schweitzer added, "We've been fortunate . . . to be partnered with General Khaliq." Incidentally, General Khaliq sits to Colonel Schweitzer's left - in fact leading the press conference.

That press conference was over two years ago, so it was bitter irony to read Joe Giordono's Stars and Stripes article in February titled Afghans Will Help Plan, Execute Joint Missions. For fifteen months, from about January 2007 to April 2008, Soldiers of the 82d Airborne had set aside stereotypes, preconceptions, pride, fear and their more conventional and familiar tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to grow a significant and productive degree of trust between our Soldiers and the troopers in the Afghan National Army. They planned missions together, briefed missions together and executed missions together -- that was partnering. The idea Giordono's article headlines as a novelty or innovation was really old news...

That is, it should have been old news. At that point, we should have been well beyond thinking that Afghans will help our efforts; at that point, every coalition leader in Afghanistan should have understood that the Afghans must do much more than help.

The perspective we must adopt if we are ever to move forward is that we are there to help and support the Afghans succeed, and partnership is a big part of what will be that success. But we must understand what effective, embedded partnership means, and we must take it to its logical conclusion to achieve the greatest effects.

Building Afghan Army Capacity (Full PDF Article)

Bil Janoob: Multi-National Division-South Security Force Assistance

By Brigadier General Jeff Buchanan & Major Todd Clark

Read the Full Article as a PDF.

Task Force Mountain assumed responsibility for Coalition Forces (CF) in Multi-National Division-Center in June, 2008. Upon the completion of its tour, the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) -- now as Multi-National Division-South -- oversaw nine provinces encompassing the entire southern portion of Iraq. Within these provinces, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) included nine Provincial Directorates of Police (PDoP) of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), three Iraqi Army (IA) divisions, three National Police (NP) brigades, and three regional Directorates of Border Enforcement along both the Saudi Arabian and Iranian borders.

Through this collection of observations regarding teaching / coaching / mentoring the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), we intend to provide a holistic view of ISF professionalization endeavors in MND-S. We do not focus on a specific ISF component, but rather generalize to cover the IA, the NP, the IPS, and the Department of Border Enforcement.

Coalition Forces (CF) operations in the sovereign Republic of Iraq changed significantly with the implementation of the Security Agreement. The primacy of CF for both operations and national decision making yielded to elected Iraqi officials and ISF leaders regarding both political and operational decisions. The significant transformation from having CF "in the lead" with a token attempt to "put an Iraqi face" on operations has developed into fully Iraqi-led and inspired endeavors. In effect, CF now serve in a "supporting" instead of "supported" role.

The change to the operational environment required aggressive endeavors by CF leaders to set the conditions for Iraqi partners' success. This does not mean that the CF must acquiesce to every Iraqi concept. It does require that the CF both understands and appreciates the nuances of the Iraq operational environment. The key to assisting the goals of the Republic of Iraq -- particularly the ISF -- lies in developing influence with ISF partners.

We believe that the key operational demand in Iraq is developing cultural intelligence within CF partnership units. Cultural intelligence is a broad term that denotes gaining the ability to work in different cultures with a minimum of friction. The friction -- often caused by cultural ignorance -- threatens both relationships and force protection. This is primarily because the two are largely intertwined. BCTs may improve their capabilities by developing intellectual capacities, honing social skills, and through regular exposure to the local populace and environment. In addition, it is critical to understand the limitations of western culture. Many "best practices" are counter to the "American Way." It is important to be cognizant of such things as pride and vanity -- and the different views of these traits in differing societies.

Read the Full Article as a PDF.

The 800-Pound Gorilla

The Interrelationship of Culture, Economics, and Security in Afghanistan

by Major Bradley Boetig

The Interrelationship of Culture, Economics, and Security in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

On October 7th, 2001 the United States military embarked on a quest to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations. Before 2001, antiterrorism efforts were generally limited to direct-action efforts against terrorist camps and interests. After 9/11, however, it was determined that the United States has both a strategic and a moral interest in a prosperous and peaceful, democratic Afghanistan. It was thought that ad-hoc efforts to disrupt terrorist operations in one area would simply lead to terrorist activity moving into other areas, and that a lasting peace could only be attained through a comprehensive effort to eliminate the conditions that allow violent, extremist ideologies to flourish. Over the past eight years the international community has made tremendous effort to bring security and economic development to Afghanistan, but it has barely lifted a finger to help modernize the culture. It's now well understood by U.S. strategists that we'll never have lasting security in Afghanistan without economic development, but we haven't yet learned that there won't be sustainable economic development without cultural change. We must recognize that culture, economics, and security represent the three legs of a stool that is Afghanistan -- ignore one and it will never stand on its own.

Establishing democracy was presumed to be the solution to the Afghanistan problem. We quickly learned, however, that the Afghans are far more concerned with security and economic necessities such as food, shelter, clean water, and jobs -- concerns much lower down on Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs. This was made astoundingly clear in 2004 when the people voted overwhelmingly for a constitution that established the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as a representative democracy, yet the breadth and strength of the Taliban has only been growing.

The Afghanistan conflict is now fully recognized as a counterinsurgency operation. Insurgencies gain the critical support they need from the population by exploiting grievances often unrelated to their cause. In rural Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban are often the only option the people have for security and jobs. Coalition forces are working furiously to counter these deficits by training the Afghan Army and Police, and by financing the building of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and a wide variety of public works projects. This insurgent-counterinsurgent tug-of-war appears to have become a stalemated contest of wills and endurance. And unfortunately, if there's one thing that insurgencies in Afghanistan are good at it is outlasting their foreign opponents.

The Interrelationship of Culture, Economics, and Security in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan

by Colonel Donald C. Bolduc

Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

The collapse of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 led to the challenges of creating and then maintaining a stable, safe, and secure environment for the people of that nation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) failure to organize and establish the unity of command, unity of purpose, and unity of understanding needed to implement under an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has resulted in the ISAFs inability to assist the Afghan government to gain and maintain security, prevent a resurgence of the Taliban, and develop an effective infrastructure development plan. This paper uses key counterinsurgency principles to suggest a way to organize NATO and ISAFs political and military effort in order to succeed in Afghanistan.

NATO and ISAF can facilitate the Afghan's efforts, but the Afghans must win the counterinsurgency war. In 2009 the Afghan government clearly does not have the capability and capacity to effectively govern and provide security, stability, and safety to the Afghan people. NATO must build this Afghan capability and capacity so NATO can relinquish the role of leading the nation-building effort and assume an advisory or supporting role to the country's new central government. NATO has organized its current forces to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan instead of leading counterinsurgency operations in support of the Afghan government. To lead the counterinsurgency, NATO must develop a balanced COIN strategy, reorganize their COIN force, and consider relocating their bases to conduct internal defense and development (IDAD). President Karzai has informed NATO that more than anything else the Afghans need to rebuild their human capital and their institutions, their army, police force, administrative structure, and judiciary. When this comprehensive rebuilding process is successful, NATO can relinquish the role of leader and then serve as Afghan advisors and supporters.

Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan's Tribes

by Dan Green

Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan's Tribes (Full PDF Article)

As United States policy-makers undertake a series of exhaustive reviews of U.S. policies in Afghanistan, they are taking a closer look at Afghan tribes as part of a new strategy for confronting increasing violence.

Much of this newfound interest stems from the very successful turnaround of Anbar Province, Iraq, where Arab tribes played a key part in changing the province from a hotbed of the Sunni Arab insurgency to a place where security has improved to the point that U.S. troops are beginning to be withdrawn.

The tribes are also receiving increased attention because the U.S. does not have enough troops available to undertake a proper counterinsurgency campaign, because of existing requirements in Iraq and the dwell time required between deployments.

But as tribes assume a more central role in our Afghanistan strategy, it is essential that we approach the challenge informed by our experiences in Iraq, not dominated by them, and that we craft a pragmatic strategy that will achieve enduring security effects for the Afghan population.

Afghanistan's tribes must forcefully confront the insurgency and not be overwhelmed by it, while maintaining the active support of the people and reducing the tendency of the tribes to fight among themselves.

All of this must be done while building the capacity of the Afghan state without creating a parallel tribal system. Though this would seem to be an almost insurmountable challenge, it is not impossible, and to quote General David Petraeus's view about creating security in Iraq: "Hard is not hopeless."

Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan's Tribes (Full PDF Article)

Why Civil Military Operations will be a Combat Multiplier in Counterinsurgency Operations

by Master Gunnery Sergeant John Ubaldi

Why CMO will be a Combat Multiplier in COIN (Full PDF Article)

For the second time in a generation America went to war prepared to fight utilizing a conventional war strategy against an irregular army. Again, the U.S. failed to understand the premise that Clausewitz articulated, by entering into a war that we wanted to fight, not the war that we ended up with. Historically the U.S. defense and military establishments have focused efforts on the institutionalized combat operations of modern warfare, never completely understanding the enemy we were fighting. This lack of strategic vision crippled efforts to stabilize Iraq & Afghanistan and now has the U.S. embroiled in counterinsurgency campaigns in both countries. The United States is again seeing the emergence of fourth generation warfare, where terrorist groups and other factions use irregular warfare to devastating effect. Defense and military staff planners failed to move beyond the concepts of high technology and conventional attrition warfare that is ingrained in U.S. military doctrine. The insurgency the U.S. found itself fighting after the 2003 invasion of Iraq was the result of three failed premises of American strategic planning: over-utilization of traditional military doctrine; failure to plan for post stabilization operations; and failure to embrace the concept of civil military operations.

Debate rages within the U.S. defense community whether to embrace counterinsurgency techniques or to fall back on traditional conventional war fighting strategies. Unfortunately, current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown a lack of strategic thinking in counterinsurgency operations, resulting in hampered U.S. operations in both countries.

Why CMO will be a Combat Multiplier in COIN (Full PDF Article)

Troubled Waters

by Will Rogers, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Troubled Waters (Full PDF Article)

The success of our military campaign in Afghanistan may rest squarely on what happens in Pakistan. And though it may not be the obvious lynchpin for America's military strategy in Afghanistan, turning the tide there may involve the nexus of natural resources and national security in Pakistan.

Climate change is having a devastating impact on the region's water security. Scientists project that by 2035 the Himalayan glaciers may completely disappear, taking away the water source that supports the Indus River and its tributaries, leaving millions of Pakistanis -- already suffering from severe drought -- parched.

Water has been an undergirding issue for Pakistan's long-term stability. Competition over already scarce water resources has factionalized the society. Severe droughts have incited riots in its major cities like Karachi, while drought-induced grain shortages have shaped election outcomes. With Pakistan hinging on the verge of further destabilization, an irreversible water crisis that threatens the livelihoods of millions of Pakistanis may be the last straw.

Troubled Waters (Full PDF Article)

Six Reasons Counterinsurgencies Lose

A Complementary Perspective

by Captain James Cahill

Six Reasons Counterinsurgencies Lose (Full PDF Article)

Dr. Donald Stoker's article, Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose: A Contrarian View, provides a welcome paradigm shift to assist U.S. military practitioners analyze the outcome of past insurgencies, and by extension formulate strategies to defeat future insurgencies. Similar to Stoker's argument that insurgents often fail through their own missteps, counterinsurgents can also be their own worst enemy. Therefore, the following list of reasons why counterinsurgencies lose complements Dr. Stoker's perspective.

Six Reasons Counterinsurgencies Lose (Full PDF Article)

Avoiding Dien Bien Phu

by Captain Patrick McKinney

Avoiding Dien Bien Phu (Full PDF Article)

On 19 December 1946, armed members of the Viet Minh, a communist Vietnamese resistance group, launched countrywide attacks on French garrisons in Indochina. After more than a year and a half of delicate negotiations, limited conflicts, and the French failure to legitimize their authority, Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Minh's leader, and General Vo Nguyen Giap, the leader of its armed forces, launched a war that would continue for another eight years until a final French defeat in 1954. More than 300,000 Viet Minh, more than 150,000 Vietnamese citizens, and more than 80,000 French soldiers were killed during the conflict. The French fought the First Indochina War as Allied forces had fought in World War II, focused on controlling terrain and killing the enemy. The Viet Minh fought a different war, focused on winning the Vietnamese people while bleeding the French forces until their withdrawal or until a final guerilla offensive.

In October 2001, American Soldiers and intelligence officers began an offensive in Afghanistan against the ruling Taliban regime and its terrorist allies, al Qaeda. Using indigenous allies, American forces were able to drive the Taliban and al Qaeda from power and into hiding in the mountainous border region with Pakistan. After this initial defeat, the Taliban regrouped and gradually begin a strategy similar to the Viet Minh, focused on the rural and mountainous villages of Afghanistan. Though American strategy was broader in scope, the military strategy remained largely enemy focused, hoping to kill or capture High Value Targets and destroy Taliban, terrorists, and insurgents when engaged. American forces constructed bases throughout the countryside to serve as staging areas for raids, interdictions, and to prevent infiltration. Some units on the ground did conduct population focused counterinsurgency, but as a whole, the military conducted an enemy focused approach.

Avoiding Dien Bien Phu (Full PDF Article)

Police Operational Art for a Five-Dimensional Operational Space

by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus

Police Operational Art for a Five-Dimensional Operational Space (Full PDF Article)

The last fifteen years have yielded a rich literature on structural dimensions of modern-day tactics and operational art, particularly on the challenge posed by information age command and control (C2) technology, decentralized swarming, and irregular opponents. The linguistic shift of "battleground" to "battlespace" recognizes the current reality of forces operating in a multidimensional battleground against complex opponents. Similarly, many have recognized that in a rapidly urbanizing world, cities will be the main battlefields in fights between military/police units and "hybrid" opponents. "Global cities" such as New York, Tokyo, London, and Mumbai have become prime targets for terrorists, networked insurgents, and criminal organizations. Operations in global cities carry a special weight because of the strategic compression created by globalization, and pervasive communication networks—raising the significance of what would ordinarily be considered purely tactical counterterrorism operations.

In our previous pieces "Postcard from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege" and "Preventing Another Mumbai: Building a Police Operational Art" we've explored the operational level of police and counterterrorism response. While military doctrine for operations is sophisticated and battle-tested, police operational doctrine has lagged behind. Counterterrorism response—situated in a complex operational space (opspace)—can now be considered as part of the operational level of maneuver, the midlevel point where strategic objectives are implemented on the theater level. Genuinely operational doctrine for this unique form of engagement is underdeveloped, consisting of an ungainly mishmash of police, military, and emergency response tactical doctrine.

Police Operational Art for a Five-Dimensional Operational Space (Full PDF Article)

Mistakes Were Made

How Not to Conduct Post-Conflict Management and Counterinsurgency

by Dr. Wm J. Olson

Mistakes Were Made (Full PDF Article)

We are awash in how-to manuals on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and how we should successfully do the next Iraq or Afghanistan, presumably because we got the first attempt wrong. While the various manuals, hints, cheat sheets, doctrines, wiring diagrams, proposals for the reform of the 'whole of government', and all the paraphernalia of post-conflict management pouring forth from every think tank, government research institute, and now-knowledgeable 'expert' are not totally useless, they are virtually impossible to make sense of or implement if one could. If for no other reason than they are mutually exclusive, navel-gazing, self-referential, and voluminous. But they also miss the point, misdirect, misinform, and muddy the waters. They are all after the fact, what we should have done not what we did. So, what follows is a 'How Not To' manual. As such, it will have no audience, no following, no conclusions, and no effect.

The first part of what follows is a quasi-case study of decisions to invade Iraq and to a lesser degree the evolution of responses there and in Afghanistan. It concentrates on the context for war with Iraq and the Bush Administration's arguments for war with Iraq. This is not a study in lessons learned. Partly because I was not involved in the processes leading up to the invasion of Iraq, although on the margins I was one of those voices that questioned the thinking behind the decision making. I am also not a big believer in 'lessons learned'. History is not kind on the subject. Long experience in government in playing in and watching similar efforts as well as a lifetime scholarly interest in how governments screw up guide my thoughts and have 'taught' me that we do not learn lessons. We might identify them, but if they do not coincide with our prejudices and inclinations and skill sets, we discount the lesson or fail to take it into account or enlist the wrong ones. And lastly, there are significant cognitive obstacles to learning lessons from complex events that are inherent and unavoidable and whose operation at a given moment and throughout is beyond awareness before the fact and recondite at best afterwards.

Mistakes Were Made (Full PDF Article)

The US Air Force and Irregular Warfare

Success as a Hurdle

by Captain Daniel L. Magruder, Jr.

The US Air Force and Irregular Warfare (Full PDF Article)

The Air Force's difficulty transforming to support irregular forms of warfare is the most pressing issue facing the institution today. The United States Army, Marines Corps, and special operations forces rely on the Air Force's ability to deliver desired effects on the battlefield. Current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are harbingers regarding the ascendance of low-intensity conflict (LIC). Irregular warfare (IW) is yet another classification of war and the use of asymmetric tactics are generally ascribed to it. Colin Gray, a preeminent strategist states that irregular warfare "calls for cultural, political, and military qualities that are not among the traditional strengths of Americans." For the Air Force, adapting to a bifurcated strategic environment is a challenge. To be sure, the Air Force has provided the nation with decades of unparalleled excellence in pursuit of air dominance. The point is not to quibble over whether the Air Force can perform its mission in large-scale conventional warfare, but to the degree to which the institution adapts to contemporary security threats. It is a matter of focusing resources and investing in ideas that optimize the unique characteristics of airpower while at the same time meet the traditional expectations of an air force. Three aspects composing Air Force identity influence the institution's ability to meet organizational demands: the pursuit of technology, a culture of individualism, and the theory of progressive airpower. In fact, the factors facilitating the Air Force's institutional success simultaneously limit its ability to adapt to irregular warfare.

The US Air Force and Irregular Warfare (Full PDF Article)

America's Strategic Intent Applied in South Asia

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Scott

America's Strategic Intent Applied in South Asia (Full PDF Article)

Secretary of Defense Gates, in his prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 27 January 2009 stated, "There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan". The Secretary of Defense went on to describe the linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan and that any solution will have to take both nations, and the rest of the region, into account. More importantly, the Administration signaled that it will increase the level of U.S. combat forces deployed to Afghanistan and refine its support to Pakistan in order to achieve a more stable environment in that region. Acknowledging the linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan in any strategic engagement is an improvement in our understanding of the region.

Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (VUCA) define the world we live in. Afghanistan and Pakistan are an example of the strategic dilemma facing the international community in the VUCA world. The strategic dilemmas facing the U.S., and by extension the rest of the world, defined by their intractable nature and characteristics, have driven many to approach them as "problems" that can be solved. The U.S. will not succeed in lessening either the number or nature of strategic dilemmas, if it continues to attempt to solve them as it has in the past. We must change the manner in which we view the paradigm that is the VUCA world from one of solving problems to one of managing strategic dilemmas.

America's Strategic Intent Applied in South Asia (Full PDF Article)

Information Counterrevolution

by Adam Elkus, Small Wars Journal

Information Counterrevolution (Full PDF Article)

When Iranians took to the streets to protest vote-rigging by their nation's theocratic-military dictatorship, the West was more transfixed by the medium rather than the message. Many journalists fixated on the supposedly revolutionary usage of social media technology by the Iranian protestors, their diaspora supporters, and the bloggers who relayed their messages to the outside world. According to the narrative that developed, Twitter and other microblogging tools offer unprecedented real-time access to crisis situations like the Iranian uprising, giving social media users a vast information advantage over those who rely on traditional forms of media such as magazines and network television.

One writer worried that this self-selecting "information elite" could use their power to rapidly access information and form opinions to influence public views and policy. His concerns, while thoughtful, are ultimately misplaced. Instead of creating a new information elite, Twitter has added another dimension to the longtime problem of the tactical information junkie. Tactical open-source information culled from social media is only useful if it is filtered for white noise, integrated within a sound long-range conceptual frame, and mediated by a mature community of users. As RAND Corporation scientist David Ronfeldt insightfully noted, the real information elite will be those who use networks—both technological and social—to effectively contextualize this tactical information and exploit it.

The purpose of this article is not to bash Twitter, social networking, or blogs, but to critically examine problems in the open-source information ecosystem that "infoenthusiasts" largely ignore and explore possible solutions to the data glut. Twitter and other microblogging tools may not lead to an information elite, but they can undoubtedly be part of a crowdsourced solution.

Information Counterrevolution (Full PDF Article)

Third-Generation Gangs and Criminal Insurgency in Latin America

 

by Dr. Hal Brands, Small Wars Journal

Third-Generation Gangs and Criminal Insurgency in Latin America (Full PDF Article)

In May 2006, a previously obscure gang known as the First Capital Command (PCC) threw Sao Paulo into chaos. Over a period of five days, the PCC attacked hundreds of public buildings and private businesses, murdered policemen and civilians, and brought life in South America's largest city to a standstill. The scope of the violence clearly overwhelmed state and local authorities, and order was restored only after negotiations with the gang's leader, a man named Marcola. All told, the incident demonstrated that the PCC—rather than the government—effectively ruled large parts of Sao Paulo. As one Brazilian security official put it, "The sad reality is that the state is now the prisoner of the PCC."

Roughly a year and a half earlier, another Latin American gang staged an even more shocking display of its power and ruthlessness. In December 2004, members of Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, stopped a bus in Chamalecon, Honduras, and proceeded to massacre 28 passengers. As Ana Arana relates, the killings were as notable for their apparent randomness as for their gruesomeness. "The slaughter had nothing to do with the identities of the people onboard; it was meant as a protest and a warning against the government's crackdown on gang activities in the country."

Both the December 2004 incident in Honduras and the May 2006 attacks in Sao Paulo are part of a broader trend in Latin America: the rise of sophisticated, internationally-oriented, and extremely violent gangs. These "third-generation gangs," as they are often called, participate in the drug trade and myriad other illicit economies, and use violence and corruption to undermine the state. They increasingly straddle the line between crime and insurgency, and constitute a dire and growing threat to internal stability in the region. This phenomenon is most pronounced—and most remarked upon—in Central America, but it has spread well beyond the isthmus and now plagues countries from Mexico to Brazil.

Third-Generation Gangs and Criminal Insurgency in Latin America (Full PDF Article)

Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose

A Contrarian View

by Dr. Donald Stoker, Small Wars Journal

Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose (Full PDF Article)

The American conventional wisdom is of the all-powerful, all-knowing, invincible insurgent. Insurgencies always win; it is pointless to resist them. The archetype is the black pajama-clad Vietcong guerrilla triumphing over supposed American imperialism in Vietnam. The truth, in the case of Vietnam, as with insurgencies in general, is much different.

Insurgencies generally lose, not win. The Dupuy Institute, using a database for an ongoing research project that includes 63 post-World War II insurgencies, found that the insurgents only win 41% of the time.

Insurgencies do win, and most of the writing and talking about insurgencies (which is often very good) focuses on what insurgencies do to win, or how to conduct an effective counterinsurgency. More often, insurgencies lose, and sometimes their defeats are a result of the inherent weaknesses of insurgencies, or of their own actions. There are six critical reasons why insurgencies lose, curses brought down upon their own houses, and not induced by counterinsurgent forces. But first, we need to lay the groundwork for our discussion.

Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose (Full PDF Article)

Enhancing the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force to Satisfy the Needs of the Uncertain Global Security Environment

by Major Vincent A. Ciuccoli and Dr. David A. Anderson, Small Wars Journal

Enhancing the Security Cooperation MAGTF (Full PDF Article)

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has developed the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) concept of force employment that will enable partner nations to foster stability in their respective regions. The USMC is prepared to be the solitary architect of this force; however the proposed employment of the SC MAGTF is a bold unilateral endeavor. A regionally focused security cooperation force is the ideal employment construct for the Department of Defense (DOD) but it must sufficiently integrate United States government agency capabilities and incorporate joint force multipliers. This paper analyzes the potential requirement for a specialized DOD security cooperation force and determines whether a joint and interagency venture will further enhance and legitimize the US Marine Corps' current employment concept. The aim of this paper is to develop a significant contribution to the format of the SC MAGTF in order to ensure its success and permanent establishment within the regional civil-military arsenal.

Enhancing the Security Cooperation MAGTF (Full PDF Article)

Not So Fast, Amigas y Amigos

 

by Colonel Robert Killebrew, Small Wars Journal

Not So Fast, Amigas y Amigos (Full PDF Article)

The United States has always had mixed feelings about our relationship with Central America, so when the Honduran Army sent President Manuel Zelaya packing last week, we joined with a chorus of regional leaders, including Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez, in condemning the soldier's putsch.

But now that we've exercised our moral indignation, we ought to step back and take a deep breath. As reports continue to come in, it appears that it was Zelaya, not the army, that was most egregiously breaking the law. The president was apparently involved in his own takeover, against the courts and Honduran Congress, and was about to stage a Chavez-style referendum" on ballots printed in Venezuela and looted from an army warehouse where they were being safeguarded. The army's move was legitimized by the Honduran Supreme Court and applauded by the Congress, which has appointed a stand-in president until regular elections this November.

Certainly we deplore military coups, just as we deplore sin. But in the tangled web of Central American politics, Honduras has long been the U.S.' most staunch ally. Among the four states from Nicaragua north, it has tried hardest to convert from a military-run banana republic to a constitutional democracy and, until just the other day, with some success. It supported U.S. trainers in the Salvadoran civil war. It houses an American military joint task force. At our request, Honduran soldiers fought in Iraq. So while the verdict must be that military takeovers are bad, surely in this case there are extenuating circumstances for a faithful ally, particularly since the bottom-line issue seems to have been the survival of its constitutional form of government.

Not So Fast, Amigas y Amigos (Full PDF Article)

From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats

The Coming Revolution in Civil Military Relations

by Dr. Tony Corn, Small Wars Journal

From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats (Full PDF Article)

The irrelevance of International Relations theory to the conduct of foreign policy has received renewed attention since 9/11. Though lamented by a few, this state of affairs has been on the whole lauded by a profession by now unreflexively committed to evaluating the degree of originality" of any academic research on one criteria only: its degree of policy irrelevance.

Much less has been written on the irrelevance of civil-military relations theory for the conduct of military policy -- and for a good reason: outside of military circles, few people are even aware of the existence of this obscure sub-field which has been an intellectual backwater for the past generation. If you like the proverbial insularity of IR theory, you have to love the intellectual in-breeding permeating a field cultivated by two dozen practitioners mono-maniacally obsessed with the civilian control of the military," and who keep plowing their ever-shrinking plot seemingly unaware of the law of diminishing returns.

In the academic pecking order, specialists of civil-military relations rank toward the bottom - somewhere between sports sciences and gender studies; yet, over the years, this little-known academic tribe has managed to yield a disproportionate influence on military culture through its role in the equally little-known domain of professional military education (PME).

From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats (Full PDF Article)

The Navy's Gators

An Endangered Species?

by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong, Small Wars Journal

The Navy's Gators: An Endangered Species? (Full PDF Article)

For over five decades the nuclear powered Aircraft Carrier has been the center of naval strategy and policy for the United States of America. In the 1950's the big guns of the gray-hull battleships had been America's capital ships since the Spanish American War. In the six decades that the battleships ruled the seas they brought the United States from a regional power to a global leader in the bipolar world of the Cold War. The Carrier and its embarked air-wing have dominated the oceans, littorals, and near-shore, taking the United States to its current position as the world's lone Superpower. In the post-Cold War world, filled with asymmetric threats, a global war on terrorism, and the prospect of mounting regional stability operations, it is time for the Sea Services to re-evaluate what they consider their capital ship. In the 21st century the busiest and most important naval vessels, and therefore our capital ships, are the Amphibious Assault Ships, known affectionately by their Sailors and Marines as The Gators.

Throughout the United States Navy's 233 year history strategy and policy have dictated what vessel was the focus of our nation's shipbuilding plans. The early Navy was based around the strategic concept of guerre de course, and its missions of commerce protection and commerce raiding. The result was an American Navy based around Humphrey's Fast Frigates as the capital ship. As the nation left the age of sail and the littoral warfare of the Civil War behind us, and began to move toward the world's stage, it became clear that a blue water fleet was required. Visionaries like CAPT A.T. Mahan helped lead to a fleet dominated by battleships and the battlefleet. After years of struggle against the battleship mafia" by men like ADM Moffet, World War II dramatically demonstrated the importance of the Aircraft Carrier. The struggle against the Soviets placed it and the Air Wing as the central vessel of the time. American naval strength throughout history has been ensured by the ability to recognize when new strategic challenges present themselves. It is time to consider what asset best accomplishes the strategic missions of the new century as a guide to identify today's capital ship and shipbuilding priority.

The Navy's Gators: An Endangered Species? (Full PDF Article)

The People in Arms

A Practitioner's Guide to Understanding Insurgency and Dealing with it Effectively

by Colonel G. L. Lamborn, Small Wars Journal

The People in Arms (Full PDF Article)

Since Clausewitz's day, many thinkers, military and civilian, have written about the problem of insurgency or, as Clausewitz put it, the people in arms." Unfortunately, on the one hand, many of these works were written at the level of the political scientist or sociologist, and were therefore largely theoretical, and thus of little interest to the tactician. On the other hand, many works were purely tactical in nature -- useful to the man at squad or platoon level, but lacking any broader theoretical context to explain why what is observed exists. These tactical manuals thus became formulaic" -- in such and such a circumstance, do this." But explanations of why a particular insurgency came to be, or its specific dynamics or vulnerabilities, have generally been given short shrift or ignored entirely. Thus, many tactical books are long on how to conduct kinetic" activities, but woefully short on what really matters about dealing effectively with insurgencies. The theoretical books are long on what ought to be done, but often lack an operational perspective that would provide some idea as to how to go about doing what is recommended.

Clausewitz himself admits (Chapter 26) that his understanding of the people in arms" was limited, though he states that the importance of this form of conflict would grow with the passage of years. Clausewitz evidently did not understand that the people in arms" was to become far more than merely a useful adjunct of conventional operations, such as the partisan or resistance movements in Napoleon's day or in Nazi-occupied Europe. From peasant uprisings and relatively unfocused tribal warfare in remote areas of the globe during the nineteenth century, irregular warfare has evolved into a distinct species of conflict with its own rules" and dynamic. Unfortunately, many senior Western military officers, trained in the strategy and tactics of conventional warfare, are slowly (sometimes very painfully) learning that the rules" of conventional warfare as taught at Sandhurst, West Point, or Saint-Cyr do not necessarily apply to insurgency.

The author has been a student and observer, and sometimes a participant, in various insurgencies since his initiation" in Vietnam in 1969. What is presented in this work is a distillation of those experiences and studies gathered over approximately forty years on four continents, to include some firsthand experience with the contemporary American struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as some experience in working with insurgent movements in the 1980s. This short work is intended to give the reader an understanding of the true nature of insurgency and a glimpse at the reasons why we have not always dealt with it effectively. If the reader gains some insight into insurgency, and can apply his knowledge intelligently, Jimmy Doolittle's wish will come true: we will start fighting more from the neckline up -- and less from the neckline down.

The People in Arms (Full PDF Article)

Turkey's Border Porosity Problem with PKK

by Berfu Kiziltan, Small Wars Journal

Turkey's Border Porosity Problem with PKK (Full PDF Article)

The porosity of the border between Turkey and Iraq has been a pressing issue in combating PKK terrorism. The fact that the PKK has moved considerable material and personnel support through that border is undisputed, as is the fact that absent such support, the PKK would pose a far less menacing threat to the safety of the Turkish people. Since it took arms in the 1970s, the PKK has used the mountainous border area between the two countries to establish bases of operations from which it has launched attacks. It is estimated that the loss of lives within the Turkish army is higher than 6.000 in fighting with the terrorist group, PKK. In order to decrease casualties and build an effective system of border monitoring utilization of UAVs is a must. While employing UAVs has several limitations as well as disadvantages, their advantages outweigh its drawbacks.

Border porosity could be broadly defined as the high permeability of a land, sea or maritime border to illegal trespassing or hauling of personnel or material as a result of inadequate or inefficient border security and monitoring. UAVs are defined as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry lethal or nonlethal payloads.

In combating PKK terrorism, border porosity should receive increased attention chiefly because the PKK keeps the bulk of its forces and resources in hideouts in Qandil Mountains, which lie further south of the border. The choice of Qandil Mountains is no coincidence, as it is relatively more secure for the PKK than the immediate vicinity of the border, and because the rugged terrain rarely provides a ground for operations for the Turkish military. In addition, Turkey faces several political challenges both at home and abroad while conducting cross-border military operations against the PKK, and in this regard, the fact that the Qandil Mountains lie south of the border provides the PKK practical as well as tactical advantages. Before we can eliminate the PKK completely, we should first deny the organization's access to Turkish territory through the border. Once that is accomplished, the raids on Turkish military outposts along the border will dramatically decrease in number, and the majority of the PKK's resources will be confined to the Kurdish-controlled Northern Iraq.

Turkey's Border Porosity Problem with PKK (Full PDF Article)

Counterinsurgency

Is Air Control" the Answer?

by Major Angelina M. Maguinness, Small Wars Journal

Counterinsurgency: Is Air Control" the Answer? (Full PDF Article)

Within the last few years, many airpower theorists advocated for the creation of a more air-centric approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. They point to modern airpower successes as the central component in military strategies, such as the successes in Bosnia in 1995, in Kosovo in 1998, and in the air policing operations conducted over Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Other airpower proponents decry the lack of air-mindedness" and the short attention given to airpower in the 2007 United States (US) Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency. They call for a truly joint COIN doctrine that recognizes and leverages airpower's combat capabilities instead of relegating its use solely to support for ground forces.

Many of these arguments are reminiscent of the early airpower zealots who believed airpower's emerging technical capabilities promised less costs in money, lives, and resources with equal or better results than the use of large armies. Airpower, however, is not a cure-all in COIN, as demonstrated by Britain's foray into colonial policing from 1919 to 1939. These lessons are applicable today, as military leaders continue to explore alternatives and supplements to existing American COIN strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. While there is no doubt airpower plays a prominent role within COIN strategy, airpower's most prudent use should not be as a primarily offensive weapon but as a component within a restrained combined arms approach.

Counterinsurgency: Is Air Control" the Answer? (Full PDF Article)

Common Analytic Standards

Intelligence Community Directive # 203 and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence

by Lieutenant Colonel Von H. Pigg, Small Wars Journal

Common Analytic Standards (Full PDF Article)

On 21 June 2007, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), signed and implemented Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) Number 203, Analytic Standards," governing the production and evaluation of intelligence analysis and analytical products. ICD 203 articulates the mission and commitment of all analytic elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) to meet the highest standards of integrity and rigorous analytical thinking. The DNI, via ICD 203, established doctrinal requirements designed to improve the quality, relevance of and confidence in the analysis and conclusions of intelligence products produced for policy makers and military commanders. As the Marine Corps' service component intelligence agency and member of the IC, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) at Quantico adopted the promulgated analytic standards, along with a required self-evaluation program. Rigid application of the standards, combined with critical self and other IC evaluations will ensure MCIA and the entire USMC intelligence apparatus consistently produces timely, objective, multi-source based intelligence products resulting from sound analytic tradecraft practices. The purpose of this article is to examine the reasoning and rationale for prescribed IC Analytical Standards and how MCIA is implementing the standards and overcoming implementation challenges for the purpose of improving intelligence support to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Air Ground Task Force(s) (MAGTFs), USMC supporting establishments as well as the IC at large.

Common Analytic Standards (Full PDF Article)

The Seven Deadly Questions

 

How to Think about Mexico and Beyond

by Roger Pardo-Maurer, Small Wars Journal

How to Think about Mexico and Beyond (Full PDF Article)

Quick Quiz

By the beginning of the new counterinsurgency strategy and arguably a turning point of the War in Iraq (late 2006 - early 2007), which country after the United States and Great Britain had the next largest combat-related loss of citizens in Operation Iraqi Freedom?

The answer is - Mexico .

Blood is indeed thicker than water, or at least thicker than the Rio Grande. If ever proof were required of how our two peoples have become intertwined in ways we can hardly begin to imagine, one could hardly do better than to point to the fact that Mexico, or rather, the people of Mexico, were in effect an invisible member of the Coalition.

A Country Taken for Granted

Since the Spanish-American War, the grand strategy of the United States has been to rely on stability in the Western Hemisphere in order to pursue its interests in Europe and Asia. If Mexico is not already our most vital strategic relationship, it will become so over the next generation: as a trade partner, as a source of demographic and cultural renewal, and as a pillar of our strategic worldview so taken-for-granted that it is difficult to imagine how things could be otherwise.

How to Think about Mexico and Beyond (Full PDF Article)