Blog Posts

Petraeus opens up a second front -- taking on his critics in Washington.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Petraeus fights on a second front -- inside the Beltway

2) United States teaches Mexico counterinsurgency -- quietly

Petraeus fights on a second front -- inside the Beltway

The Taliban are not the only insurgents Gen. David Petraeus must battle. The U.S. commander in Afghanistan is fighting on a second front inside the Washington Beltway, battling anonymous policymakers who seem to be waging an insurgency against his preferred war strategy. The "key terrain" of this battle is the mind of President Barack Obama. The president's looming decisions on who will fill numerous key vacancies inside the Pentagon will play a major part in who wins the war over Afghanistan policy.

The latest exchange of fire occurred in late October when Petraeus declared that an operation to clear Taliban insurgents from key strongholds west of Kandahar was proceeding "more rapidly than was anticipated." A few days after his Kandahar briefing, anonymous Pentagon snipers fired back at Petraeus's rosy assessment, concluding that "[t]he insurgency seems to be maintaining its resilience" and that inside the White House there is "uncertainty and skepticism" over the general's account of the operation. For Petraeus, it is apparently easier to chase the Taliban from Kandahar province than it is to suppress resistance in Washington.

But Petraeus has been gaining ground as well. While in Australia, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that come next autumn, the Taliban may be in for a rude surprise when they find "American forces are still there, and still coming after them." Even more importantly, a story this week from McClatchy revealed that the Obama administration has a new message about its timeline for Afghanistan. The administration's new spin is that U.S. forces will be in Afghanistan through 2014, downplaying the previous emphasis on the July 2011 start time for withdrawals.

Although Petraeus should take comfort from this change in the White House message, the upcoming NATO summit in Portugal also likely played a role in the new spin. By emphasizing its troop commitment to Afghanistan through 2014, the U.S. delegation to the summit hopes to bolster its case for other NATO countries to re-up their participation in that same tour of duty.

After his long deliberation in 2009 over what to do about Afghanistan, Obama largely granted the Afghan Surge Faction (Gates, Petraeus, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen) what it wanted. But he also made clear his resistance to a long-term commitment: "I'm not doing long-term nation-building. I am not spending a trillion dollars."

Is he now abandoning that resistance?

Click through to read more ...

The Battle of Wanat Study - 12 November focus at the U.S. Army's STAND-TO!

The Battle of Wanat Study

What is it?

The Contemporary History on the battle of Wanat is a study written by the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The study focuses on the July 13, 2008, battle in Afghanistan's Waigal Valley during which nine American Soldiers died and 27 were wounded defending their small outpost against a much larger force of insurgents armed with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons. CSI conducted an extensive study on the actions that took place at Wanat in order to provide a transparent look at ourselves as an Army, identify lessons learned, and implement those lessons learned across the force. Lessons learned greatly enhance the preparedness of our leaders and increase success during combat. The contemporary history on Wanat can be viewed here.

What has the Army done?

The Combat Studies Institute, a subordinate organization of the U.S. Army's Combined Arms Center - Leader Development and Education (CAC LD&E), has provided a comprehensive look at the battle and actions at every level, from the Soldiers on the ground up through the chain of command. This study looks at the event from a variety of different perspectives, to include official Army investigations, and interviews with Soldiers and leaders who were there. In addition, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has created two new publications after the events at Wanat that are aimed at capturing lessons in similar circumstances. Those publications are: Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan Handbook No. 09-37, published in June of 2009; and Small-Unit Operations Leader's Reference No. 09-38, published in September of 2009.

What does the Army have planned?

In addition to the Contemporary History, CSI has also constructed a "virtual staff ride" of the battle of Wanat to facilitate learning for Intermediate Level Education (ILE) students and throughout the Army. Other elements of CAC are also involved in helping the Army learn from this battle. The Combined Arms Center - Training (CAC-T) will provide these lessons as part of their programs, products and services delivered Army-wide through the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), at the Combat Training Centers, and through interactive training scenarios in its Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2) software. CAC will also facilitate open discussion on the topic through professional Army blogs and social media sites.

Why is this important to the Army?

We are a continuously learning organization, focused on building a balanced Army capable of prevailing against hybrid threats. CSI produces timely and relevant military research publications and contemporary operational history for the Army that feeds our learning process. We know from experience that institutional growth comes from looking at an event such as the battle of Wanat from all aspects. Historical studies are the mechanisms that help us do that.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Understanding counterinsurgency strategy, so do we get it or not? Gail Harris of the International Relations and Security Network thinks COIN strategy is frequently talked about but also frequently misunderstood and that a better grasp of its broad-spectrum approach to warfare is warranted. What say you?

Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson, co-chairs of the bipartisan National Fiscal Commission, made news yesterday when they released their proposal to dramatically cut the federal government's fiscal deficits. Their proposal called for a $100 billion cut to the Defense Department's top line in 2015, a 15% cut from the Pentagon's February 2010 spending plan for 2015 of $666 billion.

To accomplish this cut, Bowles and Simpson describe a variety of illustrative ideas, including pay freezes, cuts to contractors, overseas base closing, cuts to procurement (they seem to have a particular grudge against the Marine Corps), cuts to research, and more.

Implied in the Bowles/Simpson suggestions is an assumption that the United States in 2015 will still be fighting a medium-sized war in Afghanistan or somewhere else. The Pentagon Comptroller's budget projection out to 2015 includes a $50 billion placeholder for "overseas contingency operations (OCOs)," a sum large enough for a multi-brigade stabilization operation. Retaining that assumption of open-ended ground combat consumes half of the savings that Bowles and Simpson wish to achieve.

As a corollary, the Bowles/Simpson list does not include any savings through headcount reductions. The Congressional Budget Office has calculated that returning the Army to its pre-2007 size would save over $92 billion over 10 years. General James Conway, the recent Commandant of the Marine Corps, expected that after Afghanistan, the Marine Corps' headcount would shrink by 27,000, saving $20-25 billion over ten years.

The Bowles/Simpson proposals for Pentagon savings are not "risk neutral." By protecting ground forces and assuming ongoing stabilization wars, they place a priority on mitigating risks from failed states and ungoverned spaces. But by instead cutting procurement and research, the proposals ask the country to accept higher risks from emerging peer competitors like China and higher risks to its alliances in East Asia and around the Persian Gulf.

The Bowles/Simpson cuts are merely illustrative and will no doubt be ignored by policymakers. But Bowles and Simpson have affirmed the principle that all of the federal government's functions will have to contribute to deficit reduction if policymakers are to agree on a grand budget deal. $100 billion in 2015 is, at least for today, the Pentagon's share. The question now is how to apportion the geostrategic risks the country is —to take.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Dazzling New Weapons Require New Rules for War - Washington Post opinion. BLUF: Are we beyond a need for "laws for war"? David Ignatius argues that they have never been needed more.

Jefferson's Army of Nation Builders - New York Times opinion. BLUF: Some argue that our emphasis on nation-building is harming our conventional warfighting capabilities. Dominic Tierney, with a focus on education at the U.S. Military Academy, argues that we require a "multi-purpose military" in keeping with the soldier's role as a builder, not just a destroyer.

World War I -- known at the time as "The Great War" - officially ended when the Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919, in the Palace of Versailles outside the town of Versailles, France. However, fighting ceased seven months earlier when an armistice, or temporary cessation of hostilities, between the Allied nations and Germany went into effect on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month. For that reason, November 11, 1918, is generally regarded as the end of "the war to end all wars."

 

In November 1919, President Wilson proclaimed November 11 as the first commemoration of Armistice Day with the following words: "To us in America, the reflections of Armistice Day will be filled with solemn pride in the heroism of those who died in the country's service and with gratitude for the victory, both because of the thing from which it has freed us and because of the opportunity it has given America to show her sympathy with peace and justice in the councils of the nations..."

Continue on for Veterans and Remembrance Days at Small Wars Journal...

I came across the following essay by John Robb (Brave New War, Small Wars Foundation Advisory Board) posted on his Global Guerrillas page. I found it interesting, thought provoking and worth sharing. John has granted Small Wars Journal permission to repost here:

Continue on to read more about Momentum...

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Happy Birthday Devil Dogs!

The 2010 United States Marine Corps Birthday Message, from Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen James F Amos, marking the 235th birthday of the Marines. Join Marines and their supporters worldwide as they wish the Marine Corps a Happy 235th Birthday on November 10, 2010.

The Marines' Hymn

From the halls of Montezuma, to the shores of Tripoli,

We fight our country's battles in the air, on land and sea.

First to fight for right and freedom, and to keep our honor clean;

We are proud to claim the title of United States Marine.

Our Flag's unfurled to every breeze from dawn to setting sun.

We have fought in every clime and place, where we could take a gun.

In the snow of far off northern lands and in sunny tropic scenes, You will find us always on the job, the United States Marines.

Here's health to you and to our Corps, which we are proud to serve.

In many a strife we've fought for life and never lost our nerve.

If the Army and the Navy ever look on heaven's scenes,

they will find the streets are guarded by United States Marines.

General Lejeune's Marine Corps Birthday Message - U.S. Marine Corps

Admiral Mike Mullen: Marine Corps Birthday, Nov. 10 - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Michael Cummings, friend of SWJ and co-blogger of On Violence, recently published a noteworthy essay in the New York Times's "At War" series entitled Where Did God Go in Afghanistan?

Ten thousand feet over Fort Benning, Ga., and I was praying for my life. Literally. I was about to jump out of a C-130 airplane to earn my Airborne "wings." I desperately wanted my chute to open. Under my breath, I whispered Isaiah 40:31: "but those who hope in the LORD/will renew their strength./They will soar on wings like eagles." At service the day before, the minister had handed out bookmarks inscribed with that passage.

In that plane, I imagined myself sprouting wings and floating safely to the ground.

Remember the Sons of Iraq?

A Review of Michal Harari's SoI Briefing

by Daniel R. DePetris

Most of the contention in Iraq over the past seven months has dealt with the inability of Iraqis to form an inclusive national government (although that apparently has changed with the formation of a unified Shia block). With both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi refusing to moderate their demands, this concern is undoubtedly warranted. However important, this debate fails to analyze the full extent of Iraq's political climate. Michal Harari at the Institute for the Study of War attempts to improve this shortsightedness by expanding the discourse to a seemingly forgotten issue: the future of the Sons of Iraq (SoI) program. How did the Sons of Iraq originate, how effective is the program, and what can the U.S. do to help address the program's deficiencies in the future? While Harari's briefing is just a short history of the policy, it nonetheless provides some straightforward answers to these otherwise difficult questions.

In Iraq, the situation was anything but calming in 2006 and 2007. As Harari explicitly clarifies in his report, Iraq was quickly falling prey to a tumultuous and bloody civil war between its Sunni and Shia communities. Insurgents were launching daily attacks in Baghdad and across the country; hundreds of American soldiers were losing their lives; and thousands of Iraqis were held hostage to the constant terror on the streets. Sensing that a change in strategy was desperately needed, American commanders embarked upon a new counterinsurgency strategy with a two-step approach: 1) a surge of U.S. troops in Iraq's most dangerous neighborhoods and 2) the co-opting of Sunni tribal leaders that were increasingly becoming disillusioned by Al'Qaeda's violent agenda. It was this tribal outreach effort that led to the infamous Sons of Iraq program.

The result was nothing short of remarkable. Violence decreased to levels that were not seen in Iraq since the very beginning of the U.S. invasion, and Al'Qaeda militants were further disenfranchised by the mainstream Sunni population. These successes, however, were quickly accompanied by more problems. With violence in Iraq down, the Sons of Iraq were no longer needed in a full capacity. The program, now controlled and paid for by the Iraqi Government, was transforming into a burden for Baghdad rather than a tool.

Unfortunately, the burden continues to this day. Tens of thousands of SoI members are still without full employment, despite the Iraqi Government's pledge to provide police positions and vocational training for the Sunni paramilitary force. As of March 2010, only 40 percent of SoI's were fully transitioned into full-time jobs. Others have been struggling to collect their paychecks, and the Iraqi bureaucracy tasked with managing the SoI transition is so bogged down with administrative friction that Baghdad has been unable (or perhaps unwilling) to hold their end of the bargain.

But perhaps the biggest disappointment is the prevalent gap of trust between the predominately Sunni SoI and the Shia-led caretaker government in Iraq. Harari notes that "Elements within Prime Minister Nuri-al Maliki's government have long distrusted the SoI's, fearing they would threaten government authority." SoI's, in part, have responded with ferocity of their own, accusing Maliki's administration of discriminating against them based on their sectarian affiliations. The question now becomes how to reconcile these differences. Unfortunately, Iraqis are not addressing the question as if it was a top priority, despite the looming insurgent violence in the background.

It is this lack of a recommendation that diminishes the substance and credibility of Harari's piece. For all of Harari's research expertise, she simply states that the United States needs to insert itself more aggressively in the entire process, "keeping a close watch on the transition process and assisting in finding alternative employment." Yet Harari neglects to mention how the U.S. could possibly perform such a role in a substantial way. Given that America's combat mission has officially ended, effectively intervening in the SoI program would appear to be a tall order for the 50,000 troops who are responsible for other priorities. The Iraqi Government, newly empowered, could perhaps look upon an American intervention as a sign of foreign meddling; or worse, a deliberate violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

Whichever recommendations are effective, Washington and Baghdad would be wise to lend due attention to the Sons of Iraq. It was the brave work of these young men that helped rescue Iraq from a full-fledged civil war. Passing the buck or simply ignoring the issue would negate all of the personal sacrifices that the SoI have made in the last four years. With the news that Shia politicians have finally settled on Nouri al-Maliki for their Prime Ministerial choice, and with a new Iraqi Government hopefully in the works, whoever leads the country should double-down on the issue. Either transition the SoI into full employment, or maintain the program in hostile areas.

Daniel R. DePetris is an M.A. candidate in the Political Science Department at Syracuse University. He is a contributor to the Small Wars Journal.

Editor's Note: This opinion piece represents a review of Michal Harari's SoI Briefing, conducted by SWJ friend the Institute for the Study of War. The original piece can be found here.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Stabilisation Unit and DCDC Launch Joint Doctrine Note on Security Transitions - UK's Stabilisation Unit (H/T Josh Paul for the e-mail). From the SU web site:

The Stabilisation Unit (SU) and the MOD's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) launched a Joint Doctrine Note on security transitions. This heralds a milestone in civilian-military co-operation and is the first time a civilian agency has directly co-developed joint doctrine. The doctrine has also had significant input from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department of International Development (DFID) and the Cabinet Office.

The document has already contributed to planning for the transition of the international military presence in Afghanistan and is being drawn on by other international agencies interested in peacekeeping and stability operations, including NATO, the US Army's PKSOI and the UN's DPKO.

Charlotte Morris from the SU's lessons team headed the civilian side of the project and called the doctrine note a watershed moment for HMG, "This project shows how guidance can be strengthened by drawing on the combined expertise that civilian and military specialists have to offer. Actively drawing on colleagues with a range of in-country experiences and testing the findings through a scenario based planning experiment is a huge step forward from seeking collaboration for policy coherence sake alone."

Lt Col Paul Armitage of DCDC further added: "The vast amount of interest shown by a number of countries and organisations has been impressive; it highlights the relevance and timeliness of this particular document. The fact that it has been produced collaboratively simply strengthens the product and adds greater credibility to the output. I have no doubt that more collaborative documents will be produced over the coming years."

Security transition has been highlighted as a challenging component of contemporary stabilisation and peacekeeping operations, which if handled badly can plunge a country deep into crisis. The Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) informs decision makers and staff working on security transitions, drawing on evidence from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Timor Leste, Kosovo and Haiti.

The note frames transition as a political as well as technical process and demonstrates that principles of political focus, legitimacy, capability and sustainability can help to ensure transition supports the wider political process. This is different from previous approaches which have often cast security transition as a purely logistical process focussed on training and equipping of host nation security personnel. The note concludes that the outcome of any transition lies ultimately in the hands of the host nation and is context specific.

The document complements existing guidance including JDP 3-40 (Security & Stabilisation: The Military Contribution), the Stabilisation Unit's Stabilisation Guidance Notes and DFID's work on state-building and peace-building and security and justice development.

Coordinated planning and implementation across the security and justice sector in support of the wider transitional process is seen as key to securing stable transition. Further recommendations from the note include the importance of collaborative working of UK military and civilian agencies as part of a multinational and inter-agency comprehensive approach.

The document was developed through participation in the Multinational Experiment 6 process, a US Joint Forces Command-led process, during which numerous international military and civilian experts provided advice on the concept development. This culminated in a planning experiment in June facilitated by Stabilisation Unit's Planning and Lessons Team and involving over 100 personnel representing government departments, military, academia and NGOs from over 10 partner countries.

To read the document, please click here.

Stabilisation Unit and DCDC Launch Joint Doctrine Note on Security Transitions.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

The midterms were a signal that time may be running out for the Obama team's war plans.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) The midterm election may make the Afghan war an orphan

2) Are amphibious assaults obsolete?

The midterm election may make the Afghan war an orphan

In sharp contrast to 2006 and 2008, when weariness over the Iraq war boosted the fortunes of Democrats, national security issues played virtually no role in the 2010 U.S. midterm elections. This year, with economic and financial problems paramount, the long war in Afghanistan received nary a mention during the campaign. Adding to the silence over the war is the perception that there exist few substantial differences on Afghan policy; Republican leaders generally endorse President Barack Obama's "surge" strategy and will watch from the sidelines as Obama ponders his withdrawal options next year.

The conventional wisdom is that even if a more left-wing Democratic caucus on Capitol Hill grumbles at Obama's Afghan policy, Republicans will provide the administration with the support it needs. This view also holds that the Pentagon will largely get what it wants. Although some new libertarian-leaning Republicans might be mild Pentagon skeptics, the arrival of the new, mostly pro-defense Republican delegation in Washington, combined with the generally bipartisan workings of the House and Senate Armed Services committees, should mean that the Pentagon's programs and Obama's strategy for Afghanistan are safe.

Are there any reasons to question this conventional wisdom? Might defense spending come under the knife in spite of the Republican wave? And might Obama be left alone to deal with Afghanistan, without political cover on either flank?

New Republican members will soon receive a test on how serious they are about actually cutting spending. Their election platform pledges to cut $100 billion in domestic discretionary spending during their first year in office. The new majority in the House of Representatives can, in theory, approve such cuts. But getting the Democrat-controlled Senate to agree is another question. If Republicans are actually serious about negotiating a compromise on spending, Senate Democrats are likely to ask for some meaningful contribution from the Pentagon in exchange for deep cuts to domestic programs.

Where in the Pentagon's budget could appropriators find immediate and meaningful cuts? Defense Secretary Robert Gates has already attempted to get ahead of this process by proposing cuts to his department's overhead. But he wants any such savings reinvested in weapons purchases, meaning no net reduction of the Pentagon's budget.

Under this scenario, congressional policymakers may for the first time have to reckon with the financial costs of the Afghan campaign. Just as the newly-elected congressmen and senators were celebrating their victories, Chinese warships, aircraft, and marines were conducting a large live-fire exercise in the increasingly disputed South China Sea. This exercise occurred while Secretary of State Hillary Clinton toured the region, just prior to the president's own arrival in Asia.

Very few policymakers from either party will be —to cut U.S. air and naval spending in the face of China's military buildup, particularly with policymakers already struggling with perceptions among Asian allies that U.S. military power in East Asia is waning. But due to the ongoing commitment in Afghanistan, Congress can't cut ground forces either. To the extent that Congress is serious about making a deal on spending cuts and that a political deal will require cuts in both domestic and Pentagon programs, the tradeoff between Afghan war costs and security and alliance relationships in places like East Asia will become increasingly apparent.

In the near-term, the conventional wisdom will be correct: Political gridlock will reinforce the status quo. For now, the new Congress will fully support Pentagon funding, both for Afghanistan and for modernization. As a corollary, little but token domestic spending cuts are likely.

But as the pressure to cut spending clashes with the need to bolster confidence in the U.S. commitment to Asia, the Afghan war may become an orphan. If Democrats push for disengagement (an inclination Obama already shares), it should be no surprise to see few Republicans complain. Least of all those Republicans hoping for Obama's job in 2012.

Click through to read more ...

U.S. Must Stand Vigilant in Face of New Threats, Flournoy Says

By Terri Moon Cronk

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Nov. 5, 2010 -- Extremist networks are melding together, unsafe technologies are rapidly increasing, and the United States must stand vigilant in the face of these threats, the undersecretary of defense for policy said here yesterday.

U.S. troops are fighting in Afghanistan today because the region has been a breeding ground of "plausible" threats of massive harm to Americans, Michí¨le Flournoy told the World Affairs Council.

Continue on for the entire article...

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

From this year's "Marine Corps" issue of the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings magazine, here are three timely essays on current and future force structure, doctrine, and operations:

Hitting the Beach in the 21st Century -- Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR (ret)

Versatility in the Age of Uncertainty -- Lieutenant General George Flynn, USMC

Taking Counterinsurgency to the Countryside (members only) -- Captain Jeffry Kausek, USMC

Expanding our base here beyond military and into the bigger tent of small wars practitioners is very important to us. Though this gives us some pause....

(Nothing follows...)

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot by Eric T. Olson, Strategic Studies Institute Letort Papers.

Even under the best circumstances, reconstruction in counterinsurgency is a difficult endeavor. The most critical tasks are numerous and complex. Many participating agencies must undertake missions that fall well out of their existing core competencies or operate in environments that are completely unfamiliar to them. The involvement of multiple agencies who are not accustomed to working together makes coordination difficult. And all this must take place in an environment where an armed, violent foe, who understands the disadvantage to him of a successful reconstruction effort, is determined to go to almost any length to resist progress or destroy what has been accomplished. If the counterinsurgent understands what needs to be accomplished and to what end, and he has a plan and can mount a coordinated effort to execute that plan, reconstruction can indeed then become one of the array of key weapons that do not shoot that are available to the counterinsurgent. Even as a weapon that does not shoot, reconstruction can end up being dangerous to the hunter as well as the hunted. A coordinated, skillfully executed reconstruction program is essential to a manageable security environment and strong national institutions that have the confidence and the support of the people. But reconstruction that is mismanaged, bungled, and obviously ineffectual not only represents a lost opportunity to advance the cause; it also may well put a weapon in the hands of the insurgent.

Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot.