Blog Posts

Testing starts in November at Eglin, so it probably won't be in stores by Christmas. No word yet on the munitions put the punch is spec'd to be about that of a round from a grenade launcher.

Hot off the heels of our very enjoyable

night with Dave Kilcullen:

The Marine Corps Association Foundation is hosting its 4th Annual Dinner on

Wednesday,

17 November at the Crystal Gateway Marriott, featuring Dr. David Kilcullen, author

of "Counterinsurgency" and "The Accidental Guerrilla" as the speaker. Dr. Kilcullen

has also served as an advisor to Condoleezza Rice and to General David Petraeus,

USA, on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. A reception kicks off the evening

at 1800 and is followed by dinner at 1900. Cost is $45 for MCA/MCAF members and

$60 for non-members.

Register

here or call 703-640-0174.

Nothing more follows in the "continue reading.." link.

Q&A: U.K.-French Defence Treaty - BBC News

Factbox: U.K. and France Agree on Military Cooperation - Reuters

Anglo-French Defence Treaty: At a Glance - Daily Telegraph

The "South Atlantic Question" in French-British Plan - BBC News

Britain, France Sign Historic Defense Pacts - Voice of America

France and Britain Sign Defense Agreements - New York Times

France, U.K. Sign Treaties, Unprecedented Military Cooperation - Washington Post

Britain and France Sign Landmark 50-year Defence Deal - The Guardian

France and U.K. Sign Defence Pacts - Financial Times

Leaders Hail U.K.-France Agreement - BBC News

Cameron Hails 'New Chapter' in U.K.-France Military Cooperation - Daily Telegraph

France is the U.K.'s 'Natural Defence Partner' Says Liam Fox - BBC News

France and Britain Forge New Path with Treaty - Christian Science Monitor

U.K., France Move Closer on Defense - Wall Street Journal

British Combat Troops to Come Under French Command - Daily Telegraph

U.K., France to Pool Defense Assets, Share Costs - Associated Press

France, U.K. Agree to Unprecedented Military Cooperation - Reuters

Britain and France to Seal Defence Pact - The Guardian

Britain, France Embark on New Defence Partnership - Sydney Morning Herald

U.K., France to Share Nuclear-Test Facilities, Carriers - Bloomberg

Cameron and Sarkozy to Sign Nuclear Deal - The Times / Australian

U.K., France Boost Military Cooperation - Wall Street Journal

PM and Sarkozy to Unveil New Defence Era - Financial Times

Anglo-French Deal Rewrites Military History - The Independent

Fox: Anglo-French Military Force Makes 'Perfect Sense' - Daily Telegraph

U.K. and France Agree to Joint Nuclear Testing Treaty - BBC News

Will Franco-British Cooperation on Defence Lead to an E.U. Army? - BBC News

What U.K.-France Defence Link Means - BBC News

Closer Alliance with France Good for Britain - Daily Telegraph opinion

French-U.K. Defence Treaty Born of Necessity - BBC News opinion

Cheese-eating Surrender Monkeys? Non - Daily Telegraph opinion

Technology-sharing can provide one side or the other with a beneficial short-cut that it would not otherwise have had. But if the two governments wish to achieve substantial cost savings from cooperation -- which would translate into greater military power than they would otherwise be able to afford -- the two sides will have to agree on how to use specialization and economies of scale to their mutual advantage. This would mean, for example, the British specializing in submarine production with the French specializing in armored vehicle production. But in order to get specialization and economies of scale to work, both sides will have to acquire very high levels of trust in the other. Just as difficult, each side will have to be —to arrange the demise of certain politically-influential but uncompetitive defense industries in order to achieve the benefits of specialization and economies of scale in those capabilities that each does best.

Both governments feel the financial pressure to get more military capability out of increasingly scarce defense funding. Both sides may also feel the need to diversify away from excessive reliance on the United States for security. But the major benefits from this effort at cooperation will take many years to arrive. Each side will have to slay important and influential industries and learn to "trust his life" to the other. Neither will be easy nor will happen any time soon, if ever.

by Matt Armstrong (Cross-posted at MountainRunner)

This is the first in a series of posts that will explore our world of disappearing boundaries -- from geographic to linguistic to time to organizational -- that create new opportunities and challenges to agenda setting and influence. Wikileaks, as an exemplar non-state actor in this world of "now media," requires analysis beyond the superficial and polarized debate common in today's coverage of both the organization and the material it disseminates. The MountainRunner Institute is working to convene a series of discussions with experts across the spectrum, including (ideally) someone from Wikileaks, to discuss the role and impact of actors like Wikileaks and the evolving informational and human landscape. If you are interested in more information or in participating, email me at [email protected].

In 1927, H.G. Wells wrote that modern communication "opened up a new world of political processes" where "ideas and phrases can now be given an effectiveness greater than the effectiveness of any personality and stronger than any sectional interest."* Nearly ninety years later, this remains true with both the speed of communication and the consequences of failure far greater than possibly even Wells could have anticipated. Influence has become democratized with nearly anyone potentially capable of setting the agendas of world leaders -- take for example a pastor in Florida or a person with a camera phone capturing the death of a woman in Tehran. So to has disruption become democratized to the point governments no longer need to be involved to severely impact economic, political or military interests. "Sectional interests" once divided by geography, culture, language, nationalism or ideology can be now convened and aligned with great effectiveness as the past barriers often become little more than footnotes.

Today, it is difficult and often impractical to distinguish between news consumer and creator, between mediums of information, or between audiences that have evolved to "stakeholders" and "participants." Technology made "old media" and "new media" now quaint artifacts of a past struggle of segregation based on first platforms and then business models. Instead of "old" and "new", we have Now Media operating across evaporating borders of technology or distance and time, within and across fluid associations and affinities, and flattens (even obliterates) hierarchies while bypassing and even co-opting traditional gatekeepers of information.

Continue on for much more...

Continue on for more traveling with Nick....

BBC interview with Dr. David Kilcullen. Issues discussed include WikiLeaks (Apache video), Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (Taliban targeting of ISAF sources).

Topics include:

1) Karzai speeds up the end-game

2) How to handle a troublesome China

Karzai speeds up the end-game

Afghan President Hamid Karzai took two actions this week that seemed deliberately designed to anger his U.S. sponsors. During a stormy meeting with Gen. David Petraeus, he reaffirmed his previous decision to expel the foreign security contractors which provide security for aid and development projects in the country (Karzai later granted a two-month delay to the shutdown). He then nonchalantly confirmed that he and his staff receive "bags of money," amounting to millions of dollars, on a regular basis from the Iranian government

This one-two punch from Karzai seems specifically designed to undermine Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy. Non-governmental aid organizations are already planning to shut down developments projects as the security contractor deadline looms; for U.S. officials, these development efforts are a major part of winning over the Afghan population. And Karzai's matter-of-fact acknowledgement of Iran's payoffs seems designed to anger and embarrass officials in Washington and perhaps even undermine U.S. public support for the war effort. By undermining U.S. plans, Karzai's actions may be speeding up the end-game for the U.S. campaign.

According to the New York Times, the meeting between Karzai and Petraeus on Oct. 24 to discuss the security contractors ended abruptly with Karzai storming out of the room. At a news conference the next day, Karzai angrily blamed U.S. government support for the contractors for causing the deaths of Afghan civilians. When then asked about Iranian payments to his chief of staff, Karzai replied, ""They do give us bags of money -- yes, yes, it is done ... We are grateful to the Iranians for this."

U.S. officials have sought to maneuver around the increasingly unreliable Karzai by dealing directly with local Afghan leaders. The president's suspension of the private security contractors is his reaction to this gambit; it will centralize the flow of development assistance through the ministries he and his team control and reduce sources of cash and favors in the Afghan provinces not under Kabul's control.

The establishment of a patronage relationship between Karzai and Tehran is logical for both sides and unsurprising. With the United States inevitably heading for the exit, Karzai has an obvious need to diversify his external support. As a neighboring power, Iran has an interest in obtaining influence within Afghanistan. What was surprising was Karzai's use of this revelation to antagonize U.S. officials and flagrantly flaunt his independence from their plans.

Karzai's seemingly deliberate attempt to speed up the end-game for the U.S. campaign is now increasingly evident. Perhaps he fears U.S. officials will be too successful establishing rivals to him. Or perhaps he fears that the longer the U.S. campaign goes on, the more chaotic conditions will become and the less control he will have over his own fate.

Whatever his reasoning, this week's events were evidence that Karzai is not only preparing for a post-American Afghanistan, he seems to be taking steps to hasten its arrival. One wonders how Karzai's new gambits fit into the U.S. campaign plan and what adjustments to that plan U.S. policymakers might now have to make.

Click through to read more ...

General James F. Amos, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps, issued his Commandant's Guidance on Wednesday. Of particular interest to the Small Wars Journal community of interest and practice are items concerning consolidating and strengthening Irregular Warfare organizations, improving USMC integration with non-DoD agencies, institutionalizing Red Teaming, operationalizing the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group, embracing Marine Corps Special Operations Command, developing Marine Corps University into a world class institution, increased officer and enlisted PME, institutionalizing the RAO / FAO program, and emphasis on improving distributed operations capabilities.

U.S. Marine Corps Commandant's Planning Guidance 2010

Update:

Commandant Spells Out Priorities for Corps - Marine Corps Times

Commandant Vows to Make Corps Lighter, More Mobile - Stars and Stripes

Commandant Sets Marines on Course for Future - San Diego Union Tribune

Read the entire monograph at INSS.

Don't Abandon COIN - Defense News editorial. Commentary argues that now that America isn't fighting two major COIN operations it's time to change training. Yet the Army must take care not to shift too much, turning its back entirely on COIN.

In Understanding America's Contested Primacy, a new report he wrote for CSBA, Edelman argues that for all of the significant challenges the United States faces over the medium term, no other power or alliance of powers is likely to displace the United States from its perch. Nor, according to Edelman, is a multipolar world likely to arrive anytime soon, a world which would find the United States one of several equals competing for political power while defending clashing spheres of influence. After thoroughly analyzing the positions and prospects of the United States and other competing powers, Edelman concludes that for all of America's problems, all of the other pretenders to the throne have it even worse. Thus, although the U.S. will never again have it as easy as it did in the 1990s, neither is the world slipping back to another unstable multipolar pre-1914 era.

Edelman was inspired to write this report as a response to the National Intelligence Council's 2008 Global Trends 2025 project, which forecast a sharp decline in the relative influence of the United States and the arrival of an increasingly chaotic multipolar world. Contributing to this hypothesis was the investment firm Goldman Sachs with its BRIC label of supposedly rising economic and political powers (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Edelman also notes that at the end of every decade since World War II, a new theory has arrived to explain why the United States will soon drop off the top position on the podium.

After reviewing the history of the "declinism" literature, Edelman turns to an analysis of the BRIC countries, Europe, Japan, and the United States itself. Edelman discusses the looming social and economic challenges many of these countries will face, in most cases the result of damaging demographic imbalances (by comparison, a relatively minor problem for the U.S.). Edelman grants that Brazil, India, and China will gain in relative power. But he concludes that they and the others will at best be regional players and will not likely gain the economic, military, diplomatic, or "soft" power to become global poles of influence challenging the global position of the United States.

Edelman's report overstates the linkage of demographics to national power. It is no longer 1815 or 1944; national military power no longer correlates with the number of military aged males. And the size of the working age population is only one factor determining economic output and the size of the tax base. Wide variations in worker productivity will do as much or more to determine economic and social clout, along with a country's generation of globally-influential "soft power."

Also largely missing from Edelman's report is much discussion of non-state actors and what the possible decline in the authority of nation-states relative to self-organized groups may mean. Non-state actors are not likely to be contenders for global primacy any time soon. But their disruptive second- and third-order effects merit discussion.

As a challenge to the declinist conventional wisdom, Edelman's report is a welcome addition to the discussion of grand strategy. I recommend reading it.

The Starfish Irregular Warfare Education and Training portal is a globally accessible, web-based community of interest maintained by U.S. Joint Forces Command. It was founded on principles followed by other successful COIs such as Intellipedia. Small Wars Journal / Council was also used as a model and provided advice.

Getting started is a two step process -- registration at HARMONEWeb.org ("Request Membership" or sign in if already a member) and then registration (via Joint Knowledge Online) at the Starfish Irregular Warfare Education and Training portal. The second step is not instantaneous as it requires approval from the site's administrator -- in my case (requested during normal working hours) it took less than a couple of hours before my approval e-mail with password was received.

Information from the Starfish factsheet follows:

Starfish seeks to create a collaborative and leaderless education and training platform that fosters cross-community sharing of IW best practices, lessons learned, research, lesson plans and curricula. Starfish encourages active participation from multinational partners, the interagency community and academia, realizing that it, like many other successful web-based COIs, will require the cooperation from professional military education institutions, the combatant commands, the services and individual warfighters with past and recent IW experience.

Three active worksites reside within the Starfish portal:

Education worksite: A collaborative forum for developing IW learning and for challenging doctrine, best ideas and processes from inside and outside the Department of Defense establishment.

Training worksite: A collaborative forum for IW training development to support operations and programmatic training initiatives.

Irregular Warfare Training Community of Interest (IW TCOI) worksite: An organizational point for the IW TCOI's monthly meetings, which provide a venue for collaboration and coordination among the training community on relevant IW training related issues pertaining to the execution of current and future military operations.

Current technical capabilities include: Document libraries, internal resource library, discussion forums, blog, teleconferencing and chat, and key links.