Blog Posts

Topics include:

1) Hoping for the best, planning for the worst in Iraq

2) How to fight an insurgency-cartel

Hoping for the best, planning for the worst in Iraq

On Aug. 31, U.S. President Barack Obama announced the end of the American combat mission in Iraq. After expressing his gratitude to the soldiers who served there, Obama could scarcely hide his eagerness to "turn the page" on to other subjects, most notably the shambling U.S. economy. Obama promised a long-term American commitment to Iraq, the implementation of which he will no doubt fully delegate to others. The U.S. government now foresees an impressively powerful Iraqi army, almost ready to defend the country on its own when the last U.S. soldier leaves in December 2011. But this is Iraq, where political chaos, coups, and civil war never seem far from the surface. What strategies might the U.S. government have on the shelf should any of Iraq's numerous political fault lines erupt?

Writing for ForeignPolicy.com, Colin Kahl, deputy assistant defense secretary for the Middle East, describes the U.S. government's vision of its long-term relationship with Iraq. According to Kahl, the existing Strategic Framework Agreement, signed in November 2008, establishes the foundation for the long-term relationship after December 2011. Beyond 2011, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad will establish an Office of Security Cooperation, similar to other such offices the U.S. government maintains with other allies in the region.

This office's principal task will be to further develop the higher-level combat and institutional capacities of the Iraqi military. In a recent briefing, Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero, the deputy commanding general for advising and training in Iraq, described plans to transition the Iraqi Army from a constabulary counterinsurgency force to a high-end conventional force focused on defending against the threat from Iran. The first installment of this transition includes an Iraqi purchase of $13 billion in weapons from the United States, which will include 140 M1 main battle tanks, similar to those used by the U.S. military. The Iraqi Air Force seeks to purchase 18 F-16 fighter-bombers from the United States. As an initial test of its emerging conventional capability, Barbero discussed the Iraqi Army's plan to conduct a large-scale combined-arms training exercise in April 2011.

Although Barbero had high praise for its tactical leadership and combat experience, he made it clear that by 2012 the Iraqi Army will not have the conventional capability to defend the country's borders. Nor will the Iraqi Air Force have the capability to defend the country's airspace.

In his FP piece, Kahl listed Iraq's unresolved political fissures. These include simmering Arab-Kurdish tension, the still-separate and powerful Kurdish peshmerga militia, the status of the Sons of Iraq militias, and the unsatisfactory political inclusion of Iraq's Sunni Arabs. Overlaying all these problems is a government that inspires little confidence from either the people or potential foreign partners and investors.

Kahl and Barbero have described the future U.S.-Iraqi relationship if all goes smoothly. What are the U.S. government's plans if one or more of Iraq's political fault lines ruptures? In such a scenario, how will the United States protect its interests in the region and prevent adversaries from exploiting an unfortunate opportunity? Happily, the United States now has a bounty of personal relationships in Iraq it did not have seven years ago. In a worst-case scenario, those relationships could be trump cards. But who in the U.S. government is thinking about how to play that hand?

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Growth of The Iraqi Security Forces

DoD Live

By Lt. Gen. Michael D. Barbero

Along with most of you, I have been watching the ongoing political developments in Iraq closely, but what I've been watching even more closely are the growing capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces. After seven years of hard and dangerous work, and the certification of the election results, the ISF is ready to take on full responsibility for the internal security of Iraq. Although there continue to be random high profile attacks, the overall violence trends remain encouraging with incidents down more than 90 percent since the height of the U.S.-led surge and down about 50 percent since the ISF took over security responsibility for the cities last June.

On Sept. 1, 2010, Operation Iraqi Freedom will become Operation New Dawn. By that time U.S. forces will be reduced to 50,000, but it's important to understand that this does not signify any reduction in U.S. commitment to the people of Iraq. Rather, it signifies the readiness of the ISF to take on the full breadth of the internal security mission here. As U.S. forces across the country transition from combat operations to advising and assisting, the importance of continued training and professionalization of the ISF will truly come into focus.

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Remarks of President Barack Obama Oval Office Address on Iraq Washington, D.C. August 31, 2010 (As released by the White House) (Voice of America)

Good evening. Tonight, I'd like to talk to you about the end of our combat mission in Iraq, the ongoing security challenges we face, and the need to rebuild our nation here at home.

I know this historic moment comes at a time of great uncertainty for many Americans. We have now been through nearly a decade of war. We have endured a long and painful recession. And sometimes in the midst of these storms, the future that we are trying to build for our nation -- a future of lasting peace and long-term prosperity may seem beyond our reach.

But this milestone should serve as a reminder to all Americans that the future is ours to shape if we move forward with confidence and commitment. It should also serve as a message to the world that the United States of America intends to sustain and strengthen our leadership in this young century.

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The Last Day of OIF

Boys, so many of you did not make it to see this day. Honestly, I never thought that I'd see this day. I love y'all and miss you much. I don't know what is going to happen tomorrow. Iraq is still a mess, but, officially, the U.S. heavy involvement is done.

Today is a strange day. The Army promoted me to major. Andy Hilmes is about to be a battalion commander. Can you believe that? I'm gonna be who I set out to be. I promised y'all that I would do my best. I stayed the course.

I wish that y'all were all here to see it. I wish that I could write a letter to each one of you, but I can't. There's too many- 30 of y'all to date not counting Afghanistan. I'm gonna start at the beginning.

SSG Stevon A. Booker 34, of Apollo, Pennsylvania

Killed by enemy fire in Iraq during a raid into Baghdad. He was assigned to A Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment, Fort Stewart, Georgia. Died on April 5, 2003.

Book,

Damn brother. It was nine years ago that you and I had staff duty together. I was the cocky West Point grad, rugby player, and 2LT; you were the even cockier tank commander. I loved hanging out with you that night, and I appreciated you taking me under your wing. Dude, you helped me so much as a young officer- your words on leadership and the technical aspects of tanks seared into my memory to this day.

Yeah, you beat me to Baghdad by two days. You were the second tank on the original Thunder Runs. Bobby Ball was leading. After you got shot, we continued on to finish the job. I was close behind flanking first from the west into Baghdad on the 7th. Gilliam was never the same. I suppose that none of us were ever the same.

We took down Baghdad and headed home. Iraq descended into chaos. Your mom and sister showed up to your memorial. I almost lost it. Your sister's smile is as loud as yours. I saw your ghost and shadow in one moment.

Brother, a lot has happened since we last met. Iraq went downhill fast. 3ID was called again and again and again to fix it. For a bit, I was Wildbunch's XO. Then, I moved over to the 82nd to lead some paratroopers. We fixed Iraq as best as we could. Now, it's up to the locals.

I realize that you were probably watching over us this whole time, but I just wanted to write you tonight.

With much love and respect,

Michael

Major James Michael Few is an active duty armor officer with multiple tours to Iraq in various command and staff positions. Currently, he is Editor of Small Wars Journal.

But the Pentagon's problem of cyber defense more closely matches the paradigm of insurgency/counterinsurgency than the Cold War structure of deterrence through the threat of retaliation. Saturday's Washington Post article on cyber defense replayed all of the recent arguments of counterterrorism versus counterinsurgency, this time played on the World Wide Web.

The Washington Post article was an interesting follow-up to Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn's essay on cyber defense in Foreign Affairs, which I covered in my last column at Foreign Policy. The anonymous Pentagon officials in Saturday's article discussed a much more aggressive offensive response to cyber threats compared to Lynn's description in Foreign Affairs. Unwittingly mimicking the 2002 debate over what the U.S. should do about Saddam Hussein's Iraq, these officials discussed the possibility of preemptive cyber strikes against threats lurking inside computer servers located in foreign countries. Other analysts responded with concerns over the legality of such preemptive attacks and speculation whether diplomacy with the countries hosting those servers might be a more effective course.

The parallels with terrorism and insurgency are plain. Cyber insurgents hide amongst "the people" and use the anonymity and the design of the internet to mask their location. According to the Washington Post article, many U.S. officials are unsatisfied with a purely defensive (can we call it pre-9/11?) approach. Similar to advocates of a pro-active "counterterrorism" approach, they favor preemptive raids on emerging cyber threats. In contrast, a "cyber counterinsurgency" approach may be sprouting. This group could be concerned that an aggressive "cyber counterterrorism" approach could have damaging unintended consequences on neutral computer systems, driving their operators away from U.S. interests. Just as with real counterinsurgency, the foreign-located servers are the "population" and "key terrain," which the U.S. must strive to get on its side. And in a guerilla war over computer servers, the U.S. presumably has more to lose than do the insurgents.

Deterrence and retaliation doesn't seem the right model for cyber war. Instead, the emerging debate over cyber defense seems to be a replay of this decade's debates over terrorism and insurgency. Is it a law enforcement problem or a military problem? Pure defense, regardless of how "active," doesn't seem enough; the anonymous attackers have too much of an advantage. Thus calls for preemptive cyber attacks, shutting down threats before they can do crippling damage to the U.S. But are such preemptive attacks legal and might they have unintended consequences, driving more servers to cease cooperating with the U.S.? After Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgents may have another battle to fight, this time "war amongst the servers."

"President Barack Obama will address the American people on Tuesday about the new advisory and training role for the U.S. military in Iraq. Mr. Obama's speech from the Oval Office comes after a visit with U.S. troops at Ft. Bliss, Texas and private visits at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington with soldiers wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan."

"The president is expected to explain to Americans what the U.S. has accomplished in Iraq since 2003, underscore a continuing commitment to Iraq's stability, and pay tribute to the sacrifices by American military personnel."

News

Obama to Address U.S. on Iraq Transition Today - Voice of America

Obama's Speech on Iraq Carries Political Pitfalls - Washington Post

Obama Must Walk Fine Line In Iraq Speech - Reuters

Tuesday Marks Formal End of U.S. Combat Mission in Iraq - Voice of America

Biden Arrives in Iraq to Mark Troop Drawdown - Voice of America

Biden to Meet with Top Iraqi Politicians - Washington Post

No Letup in Iraq for Some Military Forces - Washington Times

Iraqis Move to Protect Themselves from Violence - Washington Post

Mysterious Killings Spread Panic in Iraq - Los Angeles Times

Fearing the Future, Few Iraqis Cheer U.S. Departure - Associated Press

U.S. Ends Combat In Iraq But Instability Lingers - Reuters

Analysis: U.S. Hopes for Iraq Collided with Reality - Associated Press

Restoring Names to Iraq War's Unknown Casualties - New York Times

Embedistan: Reporting With or Without the Military - New York Times

Opinion

The End of the Iraq Mission - Minnesota Public Radio interview

Iraqis Need Post-war Commitments - Washington Post editorial

Suing Mr. Rumsfeld - Washington Post editorial

Iraq's 'Milestone' - Washington Post opinion

In Korea, a Model for Iraq - New York Times opinion

A Fog of Ambiguity - Washington Post opinion

Nation Building Works - New York Times opinion

Iraq after U.S. Combat Forces Withdraw - Los Angeles Times opinion

Abandoned in Baghdad - New York Times opinion

Winding Down the Iraq War, and Avoiding Civil War - Los Angeles Times opinion

This monograph is based on interviews with David Galula's surviving family and friends as well as archival research. It places Galula's two great books in the context of his exposure to Mao's doctrine of revolutionary warfare in China, the French Army's keen interest in counterinsurgency in the second half of the 1950s, and the transmission of French doctrine to the U.S. military in the early 1960s. It also discusses home-grown American counterinsurgency pioneers like General Edward Lansdale, who promoted Galula's American career and encouraged him to write a book. It details the counterinsurgency fever of President John F. Kennedy's administration, a nearly forgotten episode. Galula died in relative obscurity at the age of 49 in 1967. He had the odd historical luck of not having been a part of the counterinsurgency fever of his day, but of ours instead. Both those who think counterinsurgency has been embraced uncritically and those who think it has not been followed enough will find intellectual ammunition in Galula--and food for thought in the relationship of his ideas to his time.

Read the entire monograph at SSI.

In our effort to establish and strengthen this foundation, we are working with the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Education to develop a system based on education, training, and experience to ensure enduring leadership solutions throughout the ANSF. This system will serve as the cornerstone of professional training and education for future security in Afghanistan and the region.

"The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. And that's just sad."

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) The Pentagon's cyberdefenders get a hopeless mission,

2) Can deterrence work on al Qaeda?

The Pentagon's cyberdefenders get a hopeless mission

In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn reveals Operation Buckshot Yankee, the Pentagon's effort to counter what Lynn terms "the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever." In 2008, a foreign intelligence service, which Lynn doesn't identify, slipped malicious software code onto a flash drive. This flash drive was subsequently inserted into a U.S. military laptop computer in the Middle East, spreading an infection across both classified and unclassified Defense Department networks. The infection was designed to extract information from these networks and deliver it back to the foreign intelligence service. Lynn describes the Pentagon's response to this incident as "a turning point in U.S. cyberdefense strategy" and a catalyst for wide-ranging reforms.

According to Lynn, more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are attempting to break into U.S. networks. Lynn believes that a dozen determined hackers, if they found a vulnerability to exploit, could steal the U.S. military's plans, blind its intelligence systems, or disrupt its military operations. On the current cyber battlefield, offense is dominant, with U.S. cyberdefenders constantly lagging behind.

Lynn states, "[T]he United States cannot retreat behind a Maginot Line of firewalls or it will risk being overrun." In this case, the threat of punishing retaliation doesn't apply -- cyber attackers hide their identities and mask the origins of their attacks.

The U.S. government's first response has been to get organized. The military's cyber operations have been collected into a Cyber Command, purposely co-located with the National Security Agency (NSA). Next, the Pentagon has extended its cyber expertise to its network of essential outside contractors and to critical civilian infrastructure that the Pentagon requires for its operations. Finally, the Pentagon is establishing cyber defense alliances with the Department of Homeland Security and selected foreign allies.

These are all logical steps that the government always takes when it faces a new persistent problem. Yet by Lynn's description of the problem, the Pentagon faces an unending siege on terms very unfavorable for those responsible for its cyber defense. Lynn and his colleagues are placing their hopes on an improved model of "active defense." In addition to standard computer "hygiene" (anti-virus software and firewalls), the Pentagon now works with the NSA's signal intelligence capabilities to anticipate intrusions, classify them when detected, prevent them from making a penetration, and if all of else fails, chase down and quarantine threats after they make it inside.

Although Lynn disparages a defensive Maginot Line mentality, the "active defense" he describes sounds like soldiers forever on the ramparts. Lynn aims to deter hackers by denying them the benefits of an attack. But as long as there is no cost for attacking, there is no reason to stop trying. Lynn and his colleagues hope that better cooperation within the U.S. government, and with the technology industry, computer researchers, and foreign allies, will ensure that the United States maintains its technological edge and thus the success of its cyber defenses. Regrettably, in spite of these resources, the U.S. faces a whole world of intruders and should not count on any enduring qualitative advantage over its adversaries. And that world of intruders can keep attacking without cost or risk until they slip by the defenders.

What is the answer? Lynn describes it near the end of his article:

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Much more at the Marine Corps Gazette.

Update

Commentators Decry Afghan Debate - Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Australia Needs Honest Debate on Afghan War - Sydney Morning Herald

We Will Stay in Afghanistan Beyond 2014 - Hearld Sun

Aussie Troops Stay Put in Afghanistan - Sydney Morning Herald

Diggers Treading a Trigger Wire - The Australian

Read the entire essay at NPS.