"I think one of the hardest nuts to crack is that we have traditionally depended on suppressive fires to enable our maneuver. Will we have the ability to conduct suppression on suspected adversary positions, or will ROE demand clearly identifiable targets? Against a foe using a Hizbollah style defense, suppression would be the best way to get dispersed maneuver forces close enough to uncover the small enemy elements, especially those that will use the population as cover. Absent active suppression, we have to "lead with our chin" and allow them the first shot (basically an ambush) before going in. If the adversary has the advantage of choosing to initiate combat, it will be tough going, especially during initial assault/insertion phases. This is especially true if he is armed with a fair number of simple G-RAMMs, or coastal anti-ship missiles."
Blog Posts
SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
What followed from Operation Desert Shield has been a Twenty Years War against Iraq. Or at least Twenty Years and Counting. Although the end of this long war now seems in sight, some analysts believe America's troubles in Iraq are destined to extend well beyond December 31, 2011.
Some readers of this blog, along with many soldiers who have recently fought in Iraq, were not born when Operation Desert Shield began. With that thought in mind, we should pause on this 20th anniversary to contemplate whether the Twenty Years War was inevitable and whether it represented the best (least cost, least risk) choice available to U.S. policymakers.
In March 1991, President George H.W. Bush and his advisers opted for a Treaty of Versailles type settlement after the liberation of Kuwait. Saddam's regime was allowed to stay but was isolated and punished. Many at the time called for a Tokyo Bay solution -- a march to Baghdad, the removal of the regime, and presumably some sort of occupation. Bush the Elder and his advisers rejected that, explaining that such a course exceeded their mandate and would fracture the coalition they had assembled.
As the Twenty Years War has revealed, Bush the Elder's Versailles settlement didn't work any better than its namesake after World War I. In 2003, Bush the Younger attempted to finally bring the low-level war to an end by executing the Tokyo Bay option. The result was much pain and still no certainty that the Twenty Years War is really coming to an end.
Were there any other realistic options? Could Bush the Elder have opted for a Congress of Vienna instead of Versailles? Just as the European powers brought in Talleyrand to the Congress of Vienna and eventually allowed France a largely equal say after the Napoleonic Wars, should the United States and the other victors after the Kuwait war have worked with Saddam to establish a stable regional settlement? Iranian power still needed balancing, a role Iraq had played in the 1980s, and one Iraq still needs to play. By passing on a Congress of Vienna solution, did Bush the Elder pass up an opportunity to turn Iraq from a liability into an asset?
We have to assume that Bush, James Baker, and Brent Scowcroft, all experienced realists, were fully aware of the Congress of Vienna option. The obvious problem was that from a U.S. perspective, Saddam was simply too toxic to deal with. In order to generate public support for a military offensive to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait -- which at the time many feared would become another Battle of the Somme -- Bush had to amplify Saddam's evil impression. That succeeded in generating support for the offensive. But it ruled out a Congress of Vienna after the war. In theory, the Clinton administration could have made a fresh diplomatic approach to Iraq. But the cost at the time of maintaining the Versailles settlement seemed low while the political risk of approaching Saddam was deemed too high.
War termination is a messy subject. The Twenty Years War goes on. Happy Anniversary!
------
Writing in Small Wars Journal, Gregory Conti and Jen Easterly, both U.S. Army lieutenant colonels, discussed the problems the military faces recruiting "cyber warriors" into the newly created Cyber Command, which aims to "conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to ... ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries."
Yet Conti and Easterly note that Cyber Command will recruit from an already tiny pool of cybersavvy talent, a pool made even smaller by Cyber Command's requirement that its soldiers pass security clearances, polygraph examinations, and drug screening. Meanwhile, Cyber Command will have to compete with the likes of Google for talented techies who may not find military culture all that inviting. It should come as no surprise to eventually find Cyber Command mostly staffed by highly-paid civilian contractors rather than uniformed soldiers or career civil servants.
Cyber Command's recruiting difficulties are a microcosm of the broader troubles the military, especially the Army, now faces. The all-volunteer military has been a success and should be retained. But evidence continues to mount that the Army has grown as big as it can under the all-volunteer system. If circumstances ever required a significantly larger Army, Army leaders and U.S. society would have to get used to an Army of much lower quality at the margin. Deploying such a force, especially into stability operations, would entail taking greater risks and paying higher costs.
The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Independent Panel report called for an overhaul in the military's personnel system. The report concluded that compensation costs for the all-volunteer force have exploded and are no longer sustainable. Active-duty head count has declined from 2 million in 1991 to 1.37 million in 2009. Yet in spite of this 32 percent decline in head count, military personnel costs (in constant 2005 dollars) have grown from $122 billion in 1991 to $130 billion in 2009 ($60,939 per head in 1991 versus $94,533 per head in 2009, adjusted for inflation).
Even with this vast expansion in soldier compensation, the Army has had to reduce enlistment standards to fill its ranks. According to the QDR Independent Panel, these reduced standards include raising the maximum enlistment age to 42; accepting more recruits without high school diplomas, with criminal records, and in Category IV (low mental aptitude) on the Armed Forces Qualification Test; and increasing the numbers of noncitizens serving. The overall population of the United States is growing, but the cohort qualified and —to volunteer for military service is shrinking. (Seventy-five percent of American youth are ineligible for military service for physical, mental, or educational reasons, or due to criminal records.) The prime recruiting base seems to be narrowing by geographic area and to families of veterans, increasingly turning military service into a "family guild."
Immediately after taking office, Defense Secretary Robert Gates directed the Army and Marine Corps to increase their headcounts in response to the pressures of Iraq and Afghanistan. Regrettably, this decision collided with the evaporating pool of suitable military recruits. The Army recently released a report that studied suicide prevention and the Army's mental-health issues. The report revealed a broader range of rising high-risk behaviors and criminality in the Army's ranks. Part, maybe most, of the increasing incidence of suicide in the Army is related to the strain of wartime deployments. But the report noted that 68 of the 120 suicides (57 percent) the Army suffered during the first half of 2010 were to soldiers who had zero or one deployment.
Click through to read more ...
Presidents and Their Generals: A Conversation with Eliot Cohen - Q&A. When President Obama fired General Stanley McChrystal and sent General David Petraeus to Kabul in his stead, he wrote the latest chapter in a long narrative of civil-military tensions in America.
Ebb Tide - Seth Cropsey. American's many post-Cold War land wars have obscured important strategic truths, among them the real value of the U.S. Navy.
Caught on a Lee Shore - Dakota L. Wood. Redefining the strategic niche of the Marine Corps may be the key to a future as glorious as its past.
In the Army Now - Richard A. Lacquement, Jr. The Army's reluctant embrace of counterinsurgency and stability operations is the right choice. Now comes the hard part: to institutionalize it.
Up in the Air - Richard B. Andres. The Air Force is in a tailspin, and a fundamental strategic myopia is the reason.
Benevolent, Adaptable and Underappreciated - Jeff Robertson. A technology-enabled temptation to shorten the tether on Coast Guard operations threatens the future of a uniquely resourceful organization.
Unreserved Support - Paul McHale. A former Congressman makes the case for giving the Active Reserves their due.
Two good reads at the US Army War College's
Strategic Studies Institute:
Organizing To Compete in Political Terrain by Dr. Nadia Schadlow.
In this analysis, the author identifies some of the continuing obstacles to
achieving civil-military integration in war. She argues that there are continuing
disagreements about who should lead the shaping of the political landscape in
war and that while doctrine has advanced in this area, good doctrine does not
guarantee the effective execution of governance-related tasks. Sound operational
approaches are required as well.
Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It Is and Why We Need It
by Dr. Anna Simons
Moving beyond "unity of effort" and "unity of command," this monograph identifies
an overarching need for "unity of vision." Without someone at the by Dad.
helm who has a certain kind--not turn, not frame, but kind--of mind, asymmetric
confrontations will be hard (if not impossible) to win. If visionary generals
can be said to possess "coup d'oeil," then unity of vision is cross-cultural
coup d'oeil. As with strategic insight, either individuals have the ability
to take what they know of another society and turn this to strategic--and war-winning--effect,
or they do not. While having prior knowledge of the enemy is essential, strategy
will also only succeed if it fits "them" and fits "us." This means that to convey
unity of vision a leader must also have an intuitive feel for "us."
Both works are well worth a look. They're eminently relevant to current
issues and the broader practice of small wars, and are written by authors we respect a
great deal.
----------------
Yesterday I attended a presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies delivered by Robert Work, the Undersecretary of the Navy. Work, a retired Marine Corps colonel and a former analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, discussed the prospects for the U.S. Marine Corps after Afghanistan (see also this SWJ entry).
Work made it clear that he and the Navy Department are planning to return the Marine Corps to its naval roots. Most important, Work defended the amphibious assault mission and asserted that the Navy Department will ensure that the Marine Corps will be prepared to execute a two-brigade amphibious assault even as adversaries acquire more sophisticated precision weapons.
Work explained that the United States needs to maintain substantial power projection capabilities -- including the ability to execute large-scale amphibious assaults -- if it wishes to maintain the credibility of its security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Work dismissed the argument that large opposed amphibious assaults are obsolete because the United States hasn't performed one since Inchon. Work explained that the circumstances of the Cold War resulted in large forward deployments of U.S. ground and air forces, thus temporarily removing the requirement for large combined arms power projection capability. In the future by contrast, the closing of overseas bases will renew the requirement for combined arms power projection capability, including large amphibious assaults. Work believes that large amphibious assaults will be extremely rare events. But, according to Work, allies will not consider U.S. security guarantees to be credible if the U.S. does not retain and exercise this capability.
In his speech earlier this year to the Navy League, Defense Secretary Robert Gates wondered how opposed amphibious assaults will be viable when adversaries possess precision munitions, known as "G-RAMM" -- guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles. Work said that he and his colleagues are preparing a formal response to Gates.
Work gave a brief outline of that response. First, an adversary G-RAMM capability requires sensors (radar) and an electronic command and control network. Work expressed confidence that U.S. joint forces will be able to achieve electronic network dominance over an adversary in an amphibious objective area. Second, Work noted the difficulty of defending against a modern amphibious assault. Concentrated adversary forces, either at a landing site or in a mobile reserve, will be vulnerable to U.S. precision attack. U.S. landing forces, by contrast, aided by platforms such as V-22, LCAC, and EFV, have a very wide variety of insertion options. In addition, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have allowed the Marine Corps to perfect distributed operations, which will also be an effective technique during amphibious assaults. Finally, Work is counting on the participation of Air Force long-range strike and Army parachute BCTs as force multipliers in a joint campaign.
A panel discussion that followed shed a little rain on Work's presentation.
Click through to read more ...
Despite the "end" of U.S. combat in Iraq -- as announced by President Obama yesterday -- significant challenges remain in the country including terrorism, economic development, broader security and governance. Since its founding in 2007, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) has been a leading voice on U.S. policy toward Iraq and on how to care for Iraq war veterans. CNAS continues to develop and promote pragmatic analysis to help shape and elevate the national debate.
Continue on for CNAS Expert Commentary on Iraq...
The updated directive is classified; unclassified portions of the document are included in the linked news release.
More at PKSOI Perspectives.
Download the Guide to National Security Issues.
Download the CSAF's Vector.
More at The Washington Post.
More at American Forces Press Service.
Petraeus Puts Protecting People at Strategy's Center - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service
People are at the center of the counterinsurgency guidance the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan issued yesterday. Army Gen. David H. Petraeus said the guidance will take "learn and adapt" to heart as the mantra for counterinsurgency, and added that he will learn and adapt his guidance in the weeks and months ahead. Petraeus issued the Army's counterinsurgency manual when he was commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He refined that strategy when he served as the commander of Multinational Force Iraq, and later as commander of U.S. Central Command.
The guidance recognizes that the decisive terrain in Afghanistan is what the military calls the the "human terrain" -- the population where counterinsurgency operations are taking place. "The people are the center of gravity," Petraeus wrote in the guidance issued yesterday. Separating the Taliban and other enemy groups from the people and protecting them from threats is the way forward, he said.
Meeting and understanding the people is the main mission for military forces and international civilian organizations in the country, the general said. He wants servicemembers to conduct foot patrols and talk with the people. "Take off your sunglasses," Petraeus wrote. "Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting face to face, not separated by ballistic glass or Oaklys." NATO and Afghan forces have to live among the people to carry out the counterinsurgency strategy, the general's guidance states. "We can't commute to the fight," he wrote. The idea of NATO troops living among the people and with the Afghan units they support is key. For example, a U.S. military police unit partners with Afghan police in the southern city of Kandahar. By living with them, the unit's members understand the people they work with and can adjust as needed, Petraeus explained.
The general also addressed the need for effective government and for countering corruption. "The Taliban are not the only enemy of the people," he wrote. "The people are also threatened by inadequate governance, corruption and abuse of power -- recruiters for the Taliban." The counterinsurgency guidance tells servicemembers and civilians to work with the Afghan government to strengthen the institutions of the state, and make them responsive to the needs of the people. But the guidance is not all velvet glove; it also calls for NATO and Afghan partners to pursue the enemy relentlessly.
"When the extremists fight, make them pay," Petraeus wrote. "Seek out and eliminate those who threaten the population. Don't let them intimidate the innocent." Protecting the population means doing just that, the guidance says, but killing and injuring civilians works to the enemy's advantage. Petraeus called on troops to fight with discipline and to respect Afghan property. "If we kill civilians or damage their property in the course of our operations, we will create more enemies than our operations eliminate," he said.
The guidance also says that taking territory and then leaving it will not win the battle. Coalition and Afghan forces must take and hold an area to allow international and Afghan government organizations to stabilize the area. Jobs and good government will win the battle in the long run, the general wrote, and servicemembers and civilians must think in the long run. Money is ammunition in a counterinsurgency, the guidance notes. And just as aimed fire is more effective than spraying rounds, so too is investing in the right places with the right people, Petraeus said. The general said he wants servicemembers and civilians to show the Afghan people the values the international community holds dear.
"We are engaged in a tough endeavor," he said. "It is often brutal, physically demanding and frustrating. All of us experience moments of anger, but we must not give in to dark impulses or tolerate unacceptable actions by others." Finally, Petraeus said he wants people to use their heads, and to use initiative. "In the absence of guidance or orders, figure out what the orders should have been and execute them aggressively," he wrote.
As the Independent Panel noted, recent QDRs have failed to fulfill their assigned task, namely to take a 20-year view of national security goals, emerging security trends, and required military and government capabilities required over that time horizon to defend United States interests. Instead of being a thorough review of long-term strategy and requirements, recent QDRs have been glossy advertisements defending the current Pentagon program. The 2010 QDR was a particularly woeful effort. At the time it was released, I described it as "a no news QDR" and "incomplete staff work" that correctly identified some emerging security issues but avoided any significant recommendations to address those challenges.
The Independent Panel report does what the 2010 QDR failed to do. It challenges the Congress to reorganize its oversight committees related to national defense. It calls on the Executive to restructure its departments and authorities so it can efficiently implement a whole-of-government approach to policy planning and execution (which includes getting all relevant departments to be expeditionary). It calls for renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific theater, an increase in U.S. naval power, and much greater air force and naval long-range strike capability. It calls for a total scrub of the military's personnel, training, education, and compensation systems. New weapons should be delivered in no more than 7 years, even if that means capping weapon system capabilities in the first "A" models.
Finally, the Independent Panel concluded that the QDR process itself is broken, has run its course, and should be abandoned. That conclusion is very likely true. But the panel's recommended fix is the clunker I mentioned above.
Click through to read more ...
MoI Holds First Ever ANP Provincial Commanders Seminar - Clinton Atkins, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan Public Affairs.
The Ministry of Interior, the branch of the Afghan government responsible for Afghan National Police development and operations, held its first ever Provincial Commanders Seminar July 31 and will last five days at the Border Police Facility.
ANP leadership from every province and border zone attended the seminar where key note speakers such as Minister of Interior Bismillah Khan Mohammadi and Assistant Commanding General for the Combined Training Advisory Group-Police Brig. Gen. Carmelo Burgio offered words of wisdom and guidance to boost the spirits and leadership abilities of 34 provincial commanders, six zone commanders and five MoI department directors.
Through the course of the five days, the seminar will cover in-depth on leadership, management of change, future challenges for police, police education, recruiting, training and assignment of police personnel. They will also discuss gender issues, community policing and anti-corruption as a challenge to Afghan police forces.
Continue on for more...
More at The Quatto Zone.
"Pursuing gun control of the law abiding citizen to curtail the illicit activities of insurgents in Iraq is a frustrating dilemma that have parallel arguments in even our peaceful society in the U.S. Do we take away the ability of a citizen to protect himself and his family until help can arrive, or do we allow the insurgent/criminal take advantage of the helpless law abiding citizen without this protective right?"
"I worked with the initial push to stand up the Iraqi Police Force and saw the reactive versus proactive tendencies of their culture. Literally, the Police were viewed as the report takers and body receivers of those that were killed. Even after returning a few years and continuing the mentoring of the Police Force, the fact was that the Police were responders of incidents and could do little to initially protect its citizens the critical few minutes that were needed to protect life. An armed citizen and his neighbors could save his family during the time of the crisis until help comes."
More at Kings of War.
Topics include:
1) Pakistan's game,
2) Are overseas bases worth the risk?
Pakistan's Game
Of all the players in the Afghan game, Pakistan is running up the highest score. For several decades, Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan has remained largely unchanged, regardless of who was running the country. That policy is to support Afghanistan's Pashtuns in their seemingly genetic resistance to outside control (outside in this case extends to any government located in Kabul). By supporting Pashtun autonomy, Pakistan establishes for itself a security buffer zone on its northwest frontier, which comes with a friendly auxiliary army -- the Afghan Taliban -- as a bonus.
For nearly nine years, U.S. officials have pleaded with Pakistan to suspend support for the Afghan Taliban and allow Afghanistan to unite under a central government. Pakistani officials have provided a variety of verbal responses to these entreaties but have not changed their policies toward the Afghan Taliban, whose military capability inside Afghanistan only seems to grow.
The United States cannot achieve its goals in Afghanistan while the Afghan Taliban's sanctuaries in Pakistan remain open. The Pakistani government refuses to close or even isolate those sanctuaries. Yet the massive U.S. foreign-assistance pipeline to Pakistan remains open. Why?
U.S. policymakers have seemingly concluded that they have more options and less risk by engaging Pakistan. They tried isolating Pakistan and found that course was neither wise nor sustainable. As a result, the Washington has opted to shower Pakistan with aid and hope that persistent persuasion will eventually result in greater Pakistani action against the Afghan Taliban.
The result has been a spectacular strategic success for Pakistan. Development aid from the United States has never been greater. The United States will deliver long-embargoed F-16 fighters to Pakistan and is providing other upgrades to Pakistan's armed forces. Along with this has come a de facto U.S. security guarantee against the perceived threat from India. Pakistan's diplomatic leverage over the United States has given it a free hand to work with China to upgrade its nuclear complex. Meanwhile, Pakistan's proxy forces in southeast Afghanistan are successfully defending the security buffer zone. Pakistan's dominant position has forced Afghan President Hamid Karzai to virtually sue for peace. This could result in an ethnic partition of Afghanistan that would secure Pakistan's main objective in the conflict.
With its winning position, Pakistan's current task is to arrange a stable end-state that avoids a backlash from the losers. Pakistan and the United States are in a largely zero-sum relationship over Afghanistan. Pakistan's leaders must fashion a settlement (however temporary) that allows the United States to save face, that maintains the U.S. aid pipeline, and that keeps the de facto security guarantee in place. U.S. officials should hope that Pakistan manages the endgame as well as it has managed the rest of the match.
Click through to read more ...
More at Defense News.
by Christopher Paul
The Department of Defense has decided to change the name of military psychological operations (PSYOP) and this is a good thing. I make this assertion despite concerns about the name change raised by others in this space (See The Branch Formerly Known as PSYOP and PSYOP: On a Complete Change in Organization, Practice, and Doctrine).
Although most psychological operations are no more than messages and broadcasts aimed at changing the opinions, attitudes, or behavior of foreign citizens, officials or troops, they have come to have a sinister connotation in the minds of U.S. citizens and policymakers alike. The very term PSYOP summons dark thoughts of orbital mind control lasers, dastardly propaganda, or deception.
In truth, the vast majority of contemporary PSYOP are based on wholly truthful information. PSYOP personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan prepare air-dropped leaflets, develop posters and handbills, make radio broadcasts, and operate loudspeaker trucks. They carry messages ranging from what enemy soldiers should do in order to safely surrender (dropped as leaflets during the opening days of the war in Iraq) -- to posters or radio spots with the phone number for a tip line Afghan citizens can use to report Taliban activity. Changing the name of these useful efforts is good; eliminating the possibility of them including falsehood would be even better.
Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel - Findings and recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, as presented to Congress on July 29, 2010.
Joint Statement - William J. Perry and Stephen J. Hadley before the House Armed Services Committee.
The Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel is a bipartisan congressional panel charged with conducting an assessment of the assumptions, strategy, findings, and risks described in the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR, a report required by law and provided by the Defense Department to Congress, is intended to assess the national security environment over the next 20 years and identify the defense strategy, forces, and resources required to meet future challenges.
After the Department of Defense issued this year's QDR on February 1, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Congress constituted an independent panel to review the report as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010. Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley served as co-chairs on the Panel, and the Department of Defense asked the U.S. Institute of Peace to facilitate the Panel's work.
On July 29, 2010, the Panel delivered its final report to Congress.
The co-chairs of a select, bipartisan panel testified that their study of the Defense Department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) found that without needed reform the All-Volunteer Force may be unsustainable and that the nation needs a new national security strategic planning process that better incorporates civilian departments and agencies. Former National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry met with the House Armed Services Committee about their now-public report, "The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century."In their testimony, they summed up the panel's warning that:"The aging of the inventories and equipment used by the services, the decline in the size of the Navy, escalating personnel entitlements, increased overhead and procurement costs, and the growing stress on the force means that a train wreck is coming in the areas of personnel, acquisition, and force structure.""In addition, our nation needs to build greater civil operational capacity to deploy civilians alongside our military and to partner with international bodies, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations in dealing with failed and failing states."Co-Chair William J. Perry said, "Without immediate attention, the military faces a major impending crisis. The cost of our All-Volunteer Force has grown dramatically to the point that if left alone we will likely face a reduction in force structure, a reduction in benefits, or a compromised All-Volunteer Force. Our All-Volunteer Force is unsurpassed in today's world and if Americans want it to continue to secure the United States, hard choices must be made."The panel found that the United States must adopt two new complementary approaches in meeting future national security strategies. Recent experience has shown that U.S. government civilian departments and agencies lack the requisite capabilities and capacities to deploy alongside military forces in uncertain settings and deal with many of the issues necessary to establish stable peace. The panel urges both Congress and the White House to adopt a "whole of government" approach that would strengthen civilian capabilities by developing a deployable civilian force to help prevent or respond to overseas crises. These capabilities would become a key enabler for further developing our Comprehensive Approach capabilities which would improve our abilities to work with selected allies/partners, select international organizations, and, when possible, Nongovernmental and Private Voluntary Organizations (NGOs/PVOs) in crisis settings.Co-Chair Stephen J. Hadley said, "We found that the growing number of civilian government agencies working in stability and reconstruction operations has had far less experience and training in operating in insecure environments than they need and deserve. We call for a National Commission on Building the Civil Force of the Future because until civilian institutions develop the capacity to move promptly overseas to operate with military forces in unstable environments, the full weight of stability operations will fall on the military's shoulders."The review panel makes several explicit recommendations related to the QDR, including calls to:Reactivate the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, to study whether our Congress and the current committee structure put in place decades ago is properly organized to legislate and oversee implementation of national security efforts given the diverse and different security challenges of the 21st century.Establish a National Commission on Building the Civil Force of the Future to help identify what needs to be done to ensure our civilians can operate effectively in partnership with our military forces.Issue an Executive Order signed by the president that clarifies interagency roles and responsibilities for whole of government missions.Establish a National Commission on Military Personnel, modeled after the 1970 Gates Commission, to provide momentum and a roadmap to modernize the military personnel system.Set up a standing Independent Strategic Review Panel to review the U.S. national security strategic environment and provide recommendations to the Congress, White House and its various departments and agencies on how to address the range of threats confronting our nation. This will aid in forming a truly comprehensive national security strategic planning process.Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel - Findings and recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, as presented to Congress on July 29, 2010.