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Marine Corps Commandant General James Conway made some headlines at his August 24th press conference with his remarks on the July 2011 Afghanistan withdrawal plan and his views on the "don't ask, don't tell" policy. Missed in most stories were his views on the Marine Corps' future missions and required force structure.

As one might expect, Conway strongly defended the requirement for a two-brigade amphibious assault capability. He termed it a U.S. "asymmetric advantage" and a necessary hedge against the likelihood that the United States will not have overseas bases convenient to all future military crises.

And in order to keep the amphibious assault option credible, Conway voiced his support for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a program he termed "beleaguered" and which he acknowledged was absorbing a large fraction of the Marine Corps' acquisition budget. Conway explained that if the new-and-improved set of EFV prototypes fails its trials or if this version of the EFV is otherwise killed, the Marine Corps is still going to need some method of moving infantry through the ocean at 25 knots to a hostile shore from over the horizon (at least 12-14 miles out).

Later, Conway dug in deeper. He flatly rejected the idea of the Marine Corps relinquishing any of its roles and missions. Conway defended the Marine Corps' continued need to be ready for "small wars," combined arms mechanized operations, and the full range of amphibious missions.

Where will the money come from? Conway explained what he is —to give up:

I think in time, after Afghanistan, that 202,000 Marines in a peacetime Marine Corps is probably too many. People are expensive. I don't know that we could keep 202,000 Marines constructively occupied ... So we need something out there in the out years, but in no way would we accept that we're going to build a less capable Marine Corps ... I don't see that we're going to eliminate, in a vertical slice, any of our capabilities ... There will be less Marines eligible to deploy when we have a smaller Marine Corps in peacetime than there are today. That's the only place that I would say that we would be less capable of responding to the call from the secretary.

It is refreshing to see Conway protecting the Marine Corps from Parkinson's Law -- rather than having what he would see as a bloated peacetime headcount diverted to increasingly wasteful purposes, Conway would rather build a smaller, higher quality force, and one with the proper equipment for future challenges. At an average annual personnel cost of nearly $95,000 per head, cutting the 27,000 Marines added since 2001 would free up $2.5 billion per year for a variety of other uses.

Whether the next generation of Marine Corps leaders shares Conway's views on peacetime end-strength remains to be seen. And if the Marine Corps shows a willingness to save money on headcount, might that cause the Navy and Air Force to cast a hungry gaze at a future peacetime Army?

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Officials Note Low Insurgent Morale in Afghanistan - From an International Security Assistance Force News Release

KABUL, Afghanistan, Aug. 25, 2010 -- Intelligence reports indicate some pockets of low insurgent morale, with some insurgent fighters reluctant to keep fighting and some refusing to assume district commands when commanders are captured or killed, International Security Assistance Force officials in Afghanistan said today.

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Continue on for details concerning the Society for Military History 2010-2011 Edward M. Coffman First-Manuscript Prize Competition.

Continue on for an American Forces Press Service recap as well as news links concerning General James Conway's press briefing yesterday. Discussion topics include a continued USMC presence in Afghanistan and the effect of the announced 2011 withdraw date on Taliban operations and strategy.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links...

Continue on for an American Forces Press Service recap as well as organizational and news links concerning Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell's, Commander of NATO Training Mission Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan, update on Afghan Security Forces progress during a "DoD Live" bloggers roundtable today.

That is the conclusion of an article by Dexter Filkins in today's New York Times.

According to the story, late last year the Afghan government and top Afghan Taliban leaders had met in Dubai and perhaps elsewhere, to establish conditions for formal peace negotiations. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the second-ranking Taliban leader, was involved in these talks. But in February, Pakistan's security services apprehended Baradar in Karachi and then picked up another 22 Afghan Taliban leaders inside Pakistan. Many of these leaders were subsequently released while Baradar is still "relaxing" at an ISI safe house.

Pakistani officials told Filkins that they picked up Baradar and the other Afghan Taliban leaders in order to break up their negotiations with the Afghan government:

"We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us," said a Pakistani security official, who, like numerous people interviewed about the operation, spoke anonymously because of the delicacy of relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. "We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians."

Commentary

This article is an embarrassment to U.S. officials. U.S. policymakers have always acknowledged Pakistan's central role in any settlement of the Afghan war. But it does not look good for U.S. officials when the Pakistani government breaks up peace talks between Afghans, while Pakistan receives billions in U.S. assistance and the Taliban kill several U.S. soldiers every day in Afghanistan.

Second is Pakistan's increasingly brazen declaration of its duplicity. Statements such as, "We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians" would seem to leave little doubt that the Pakistani government keeps the Afghan Taliban a functional military force. Such statements make it difficult for U.S. officials to explain why it is so important for the U.S. to accelerate its war effort in Afghanistan and simultaneously keep Pakistan an "ally."

Finally we should wonder why these Pakistani officials revealed this story and these statements to Filkins. Pakistani officials have no doubt already privately made it clear to Afghan Taliban leaders, Afghan government leaders, and U.S. officials that Pakistan will allow no settlement process to occur without Pakistan's participation and approval. Why then did they think it necessary to repeat this message publicly in the New York Times, embarrassing Obama administration officials as they did so?

Perhaps these Pakistani officials want everyone to understand that they will control the end game in Afghanistan. By undermining the U.S. war effort, they are arranging to get their wish.

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Bob Schieffer, CBS News "Face the Nation", spoke with the Commander for U.S. Forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno on the future of Iraq after last U.S. combat brigade left the country.

Odierno: U.S. Combat Mission in Iraq 'Unlikely' After Sept. 1

By Army Sgt. 1st Class Michael J. Carden

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22, 2010 -- It is unlikely the U.S. military will resume a combat mission in Iraq after Sept. 1, the top U.S. military commander there said today, citing progress in Iraq's government and security forces.

Army Gen. Ray Odierno appeared on Sunday news talk shows today to discuss the U.S. mission in Iraq, as its combat role officially ends there Sept. 1. It would take a "complete failure" of Iraqi forces, he said, for that mission to change.

"We don't see that happening," Odierno said on CNN's State of the Union. "[Iraqi forces] have been doing so well for so long now that we really believe we're beyond that point.

"They continue to grow," he added. "We continue to see development in their planning, their ability to conduct operations. We continue to see political development, economic development, and all of these combined together will start to develop an atmosphere that means better security."

The final U.S. combat brigade crossed the border into Kuwait last week after more than seven years of fighting. About 50,000 U.S. troops are scheduled to remain there until the end of 2011 to serve in an "advise and assist" role, training Iraqi security forces. U.S. forces peaked at more than 170,000 boots on the ground there during the 2007 troop surge.

Odierno said that President Barack Obama's Iraq strategy is well underway, and that the remaining 50,000 troops will pull out on time.

But U.S. involvement in Iraq beyond 2011 is possible, the general said. Such support would be at the request of the Iraqi government and would likely involve "technical" assistance. It would be similar to agreements the United States has with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, he explained.

"It's about [Iraq] technically developing ... protecting their air space, their sea and their land borders," Odierno said on CBS's Face the Nation. "If the government of Iraq requests that from us, we would certainly consider that."

The U.S. military would consider providing combat troops, too, Odierno added, explaining that the United States wants a long-term relationship with Iraq. Obama and his national security advisors would determine the policy if such a request was made, the general said.

"If [Iraq's government] ask us, that they might want us to stay longer, we would certainly consider that," he said. "That's part of our developing a long-term strategic partnership with them. That includes the security aspect."

Terrorism continues to be a threat in Iraq, the general said, but extremist actions involve attempts to disrupt government and political processes. And despite last week's bombing of an Iraqi army recruiting station in Baghdad, security forces are proven and more than capable of protecting their people, he said.

"We've been slowing turning [security] over to [Iraqi forces] for over a year," Odierno said. "For the past four or five months, they've had the lead, and they have been conducting security operations, and they've been able to sustain that at a level that I think is acceptable."

While optimistic about the shift in the U.S. mission in Iraq, Odierno said it could be five years before a U.S. victory there can be assured.

"We've made lots of progress here," he said. "To say whether we've won the war or not, we can see that in three to five years, as we see how Iraq turns out. I think we can call operations a success, but in terms of winning the war, we've certainly seen some great bravery from our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who've served here."

More:

Odierno: Iran Funding Extremists in Iraq - Voice of America

Odierno: Iraq Troops Fit for Duty - Wall Street Journal

U.S. Troops in Could do Battle, But Very Unlikely - Los Angeles Times

General: Iraqis Will be Ready for U.S. Withdrawal in 2011 - Washington Times

U.S. Could Lend Assistance to Iraq After 2011 - USA Today

U.S. Troops Unlikely to Resume Combat Duties in Iraq - Associated Press

Odierno: U.S. Ready to Resume Iraq Combat Role if Needed - Reuters

U.S. Unlikely to Resume Iraq Combat Role - United Press International

U.S. Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended Barring Disaster - Bloomberg

Odierno: Iraq Failure Could See Combat Role Resume - Agence France-Presse

General David Petraeus gave CBS News' Katie Couric his evaluation of Afghan President Hamid Karzai in an interview broadcast last week.

Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) spoke with Bob Schieffer on the progress being made after the troop surge in Afghanistan and gave his personal outlook on the country's status after the July 2011 withdrawal date.

Bob Schieffer comments on Melvin Laird, the long ago Secretary of Defense who's worried about the all-volunteer army he created and where we are in Afghanistan.

Greg Mortenson, author of "Three Cups of Tea," has built 150 schools in Afghanistan putting thousands of Afghan children in school, most of them girls. Bob Schieffer spoke with him on that and his role as a U.S. military advisor.

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In a New York Times news analysis piece, "As Mission Shifts in Iraq, Risks Linger for Obama", Peter Baker examines the "symbolism" of the withdrawal of U.S. combat units against the backdrop of continued risks in Iraq to include the "political impasse" and a "continuing insurgency". Also see "As U.S. Scales Back Role in Iraq, Attacks and Political Deadlock Persist" by Leila Fadel of the Washington Post.

Here's the fifth edition of Small Wars Journal's Saturday Night Quote (SWJ SNQ). Kudos to Mac McCallister - and we reached back a bit for this one. In the commentary section of SWJ Blog entry "It's the Tribes? That's Stupid" Mac had this to say:

"After nine years of adventure learning I'd think that we would have embraced the fact that Afghanistan requires more than just one truth, one approach, one technique, and one way of attracting allies or killing bad guys...or are we too comfortable with being a one-trick pony?"

The Autumn issue of Naval War College Review is now available online. Here are several selected articles that should be of interest to the SWJ community:

The Most Daring Act of the Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare - Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong, U.S. Navy.

As the American military confronts the challenges of the twenty-first century there is a great deal of discussion of counterinsurgency, hybrid conflict, and irregular warfare. In military history none of these concepts are new. Much of the recent scholarship and writing on these forms of warfare has focused on today's operations ashore, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there are significant implications for naval warfare as well. The leaders of the sea services stated in the "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" that "preventing wars is as important as winning wars."1 If the U.S. Navy is going to embrace this belief as it sails deeper into the twenty-first century, development of naval irregular warfare will become vital to its future success and relevance...

Taming the Outlaw Sea - Admiral James G. Stavridis and Lieutenant Commander Richard E. LeBron, U.S. Navy.

... Somali pirates are armed opportunists who stem from a permissive and enabling environment formed by a weak state and who engage in a business enterprise subject to risk-and-reward calculations that can be influenced by the international community. The international community, including various governmental and nongovernmental organizations, as well as private enterprises, has an opportunity now to work together and exert the necessary influence both at sea and ashore to shift the calculus of piracy from profitable enterprise to futile folly...

A Private Security Solution to Somali Piracy? The U.S. Call for Private Security Engagement and the Implications for Canada - Christopher Spearin.

Canada's naval response to Somali piracy has been a mixed affair. On the positive side, in recent years the Canadian Navy has successfully dedicated a significant level of resources to countering Somali piracy: the destroyer HMCS Iroquois, the frigates HMCS Calgary, Ville de Québec, Winnipeg, and Fredericton, and the oiler HMCS Protecteur. Collectively, these vessels operated effectively alongside the ships of several other navies, especially those of the U.S. Navy, that together form the various international flotillas confronting Somali pirates. The Canadian Navy's level of involvement has been no mean task, because of the great distances involved, its limited number of surface combatants, and its other responsibilities...

Much more to read at Naval War College Review

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In a New York Times op-ed today, "Making Afghanistan More Dangerous", SWJ contributor (here and here) Jason Thomas discusses President Hamid Karzai's order to phase out foreign private security companies in Afghanistan.

What will the war on terror look like after Afghanistan?

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) How to be a good covert warrior,

2) Karzai orders his guests to leave.

How to be a good covert warrior

An Aug. 14 New York Times article explains the U.S. government's latest attempt to develop a sustainable long term global strategy against insurgent and terror groups. In the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, John Brennan, President Barack Obama's counter-terrorism adviser, now vows to use a discrete "scalpel" instead of a brazen "hammer." But the counterterrorism scalpel U.S. officials now hope to employ comes with its own set of problems and new challenges for policymakers.

In an essay for Small Wars Journal, Robert Bunker, a consultant to law enforcement and an adjunct professor in security studies at California State University, reminds us why democracies, especially self-conscious ones like the United States, are so unsuited for the dirty work of dealing with modern insurgencies. After a providing a brief history of brutality in recent insurgencies, Bunker sums up the consequences for democracies like the United States who have intervened:

Within this broader context, the ugly truth that insurgencies are brutal must never be forgotten. Democracies have little stomach for them because too many gray areas exist-the just causes are quickly tarnished, allegations of war crimes and actual war crimes take place on all sides, and, as in all conflict and war, the indigenous populations caught in the middle suffer the most.

For a determined insurgent, brutality is a weapon that intimidates members of the security forces and portions of the population that may consider supporting the government. When third parties like the United States intervene with large troop deployments, insurgents employ brutality to demoralize U.S. elites and the public. Even when U.S. military forces are responsible for a small fraction of civilians killed, the ugly images of the struggle on televisions back home are unsettling and, in the end, make the campaign unsustainable.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. policymakers deployed large numbers of ground troops with the goal of providing stability while indigenous security forces were trained and fielded. This "hammer" as Brennan described it is now broken and won't be used again anytime soon. But with al Qaeda cells lurking in Yemen's backcountry and elsewhere, Obama and his team have concluded that looking away is not an option either. Thus, the "scalpel," the employment of covert raids, secret air strikes, and proxy fighters, be they government soldiers or tribal allies. The "scalpel" is an attempt to fight out of sight. And out of sight, they hope, means out of mind, to the media, the public, and political opponents.

Click through to read more ...

Civil-Military Relations: Theory and Practice, by Joseph Collins, is a review of American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era edited by Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider and Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations by Jason K. Dempsey.

Civil-military relations are a hardy perennial in the study of politics, international relations, and interagency policymaking. In the Clinton era, we worried about a military too big for its camouflaged britches and a potential "crisis" in civil-military relations. Compounding the strife was statistical proof that the officer corps increasingly self-identified as Republicans. In the post-9/11 era, we worried about an overly reticent military leadership whose professional expertise was muffled by civilians, who allegedly micromanaged military plans and operations. Much of the recent analysis reads like a political version of People magazine with larger than life admirals and generals—Anthony Zinni, William Fallon, and David Petraeus, for example— jousting with cabinet officers and making "power plays." Retired officers have created their own controversies, endorsing political candidates and even calling for the resignation of cabinet officers. Often absent from these vivid articles are an analysis of the theoretical foundations of civil-military relations or accurate data on what the military actually thinks and believes. Two new books do a great job in filling in some of those blanks. Both books came from officers associated, as I was years ago, with the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. All three of the authors are from the Military Academy's "second graduating class," alumni officers who came back to teach at the Academy and then returned to the Army to reinforce its corps of Soldier-thinkers...

Much more at NDU Press.

Katie Couric spoke with General David Petraeus, Commander ISAF, today while in Afghanistan to broadcast the CBS Evening News With Katie Couric, Afghanistan: The Road Ahead. Couric asked Petraeus if the U.S. would be —to play a role in the process of negotiating with the Taliban in order to end the war in Afghanistan. Their sit-down interview will broadcast tonight at 6:30 P.M. ET.

A Vision of Alternative Futures Symposium (via STAND-TO! e-mail)

What is it?

The Army Capabilities Integration Center's Future Warfare Division is sponsoring a symposium entitled "A Vision of Alternative Futures," Nov. 3-4, in McLean, Va. The symposium will focus on challenges facing the military and how they might affect the future of armed conflict. In doing so, Future Warfare Division is seeking a diverse group of participants from academia and industry who are —to write papers on grounded projections of future armed conflict and submit them for possible presentation at the symposium.

Why is this important for the Army?

Theories about the character of future warfare must be grounded in knowledge of emerging threats to national security. For example, prior to 9/11, national defense concepts were based on an assumption that conventional threats would come from hostile nations. In hindsight, this assumption was flawed; the real and emerging threats to national security were coming from non-state actors.

But the character of future warfare is not limited to emerging or sudden threats to national security, it is also affected by the underlying assumptions the military operates within. In a future where defense costs and response timelines will likely be constrained, the Army must continually examine assumptions governing its concepts and long-term planning; as well as "weak signals" developing in a global operating environment to better prepare for future strategic surprise.

What will the Army do?

A thorough study of contemporary conflict in an historical perspective is needed to help frame future challenges to national and international security, analyze underlying assumptions, and identify "weak signals" in a global operating environment to build relevant capabilities to meet those challenges.

Potential areas for study could include expanded globalization and evolution of science, technology, and engineering developments; what "weak signals" futures analysts got right (or wrong) in the past; where conflicts are likely to rise and where stability is likely to take root; social, economic, or environmental trends likely to affect future armed conflicts; the changing global demographics and generational values and their impact on future conflicts and forces.

What continued efforts does the Army have planned for the future?

The symposium will seek to explore factors that may impact armed conflict in the future. Outcomes drawn from the presentations will be used to help guide Army concept, capability, training, and leadership development. Following the symposium, papers will be posted online. Some travel funding may be available. For further details email the point of contact.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command released The U.S. Army Operating Concept 2016-2028 yesterday. The concept describes how future Army forces conduct operations as part of the joint force to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies in the future operational environment. It describes the employment of Army forces in the 2016-2028 timeframe with emphasis on the operational and tactical levels of war. In addition to describing broadly how Army headquarters organize and direct the employment of their forces, the concept describes the major categories of Army operations and identifies the capabilities required of Army forces to guide and prioritize future force development. Moreover, TRADOC identifies combined arms maneuver and security operations as the service's core contributions to the joint force.

Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University has posted the audio from the MES AfPak Lecture Series ninth session, "The Politics of National Reconciliation in Afghanistan" presented by Professor Robert Crews. Resources and information pertaining to this lecture series are available at the MES at MCU website.

The U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center will be hosting Mr. Jack L. Colwell, co-founder of the Regional Police Academy for Kansas City, MO. He will be briefing from the COIN Center on Wednesday, 25 Aug 2010 at 1000 CST, 1100 EST, 1600 ZULU. The briefing is entitled "Anicom S3 The Four Quadrants of COIN". Those interested in attending may view the meeting on-line at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links...

Spencer Ackerman's interview with General David Petraeus is now posted at Wired's Danger Room.

Joshua Foust's newest article, "Migrating violence in the Caucasus", is now posted at PBS.