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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

Stop Lecturing Karzai

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 04/03/2010 - 8:32am | 14 comments

Publicly Criticizing the Afghan President Hurts the U.S. - Michael O'Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, Washington Post opinion

Just four days after President Obama's surprise visit to Kabul, Afghan President Hamid Karzai gave a major speech complaining that heavy-handed international actions tarnished last year's presidential election, diminished his legitimate status as clear winner and risked making the foreign military presence resemble the imperialist invaders of yesteryear.

Karzai went too far. His comments were unfair and risked encouraging critics of the Afghanistan mission who want to portray foreign forces as unwelcome. But his remarks were also a predictable result of American browbeating. Historically, negative treatment of the Afghan leader has produced these sorts of reactions. Kabul and Washington are partners in the effort to create a stable, democratic state; they should understand that public displays of rancor are best avoided...

More at The Washington Post.

Karzai Blames Foreigners for Afghan Vote Fraud - Voice of America

Afghan President Rebukes West and U.N. - New York Times

Karzai Rails Against Foreign Presence - Washington Post

Karzai Blames Western Officials for Election Fraud - Los Angeles Times

Karzai Calls Clinton to Clarify Critical Remarks - Voice of America

In Call, Karzai Tries to Clarify a Diatribe - New York Times

Karzai Clarifies Remarks that Sparked White House 'Concern' - Washington Post

President Karzai Lashes Out - New York Times editorial

The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare

by Dave Dilegge | Sat, 04/03/2010 - 8:01am | 0 comments

Find linked the Center for Military History's online book The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775-2007 edited by Richard G. Davis.

This book contains selected papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians. The fifteen papers selected for this publication are not only the best of those presented, but they also examine irregular warfare in a wide and diverse range of circumstances and eras.

Together, they demonstrate how extremism was intimately connected to this type of warfare and how Americans have, at different times in their history, found themselves acting as insurgents, counterinsurgents, or both. The titles of the papers themselves reflect how often the U.S. Army has engaged in such irregular operations despite a formal focus on conventional warfare. Using imperial British and Italian examples, several presentations also underline how the ease of conquering lands is often no indication of the level of effort required to pacify them and integrate them into a larger whole.

H/T Carl Prine via FB. Thanks ink slinger.

This Week at War: It's Karzai's Show Now

by Robert Haddick | Fri, 04/02/2010 - 8:11pm | 2 comments

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Note to the White House: You don't own Karzai -- he owns you,

2) The Afghan campaign is now about reputation, not terrorism.

Note to the White House: You don't own Karzai -- he owns you

In the March 26 edition of this column, I warned that bargaining with the Taliban for a settlement in Afghanistan would open a fissure between Afghan and U.S. interests. But it should be clear that such a new fissure would join others that are already cracking up U.S.-Afghan relations. What the Obama team needs to determine is whether it can achieve its objectives in Afghanistan while its relations with President Hamid Karzai crumble.

On March 29, the New York Times described another crack in the foundation. According to the story, an angry Karzai, after having been de-invited to meet with President Barack Obama at the White House, invited Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Kabul to deliver an anti-American speech at the presidential palace. Ahmadinejad's speech occurred while Defense Secretary Robert Gates was visiting U.S. troops in the country.

The piece went on to discuss a lunch meeting at his palace during which Karzai declared that "the Americans are in Afghanistan because they want to dominate his country and the region." According to the article, Karzai asserted that he could reach a settlement with the Taliban but that U.S. officials are preventing that in order to prolong the war and their military presence in the region.

It is expected that Karzai, like any leaders in his position, would wish to demonstrate to his compatriots that he is not a mere crony of a foreign power. But Karzai wasn't shy about delivering a similar message in a November 2009 interview with PBS's Newshour, whose audience includes the Washington establishment: "[T]he West is not here primarily for the sake of Afghanistan. It is here to fight the war on terror.... We were being killed by al Qaeda and the terrorists before Sept. 11 for years, tortured and killed; our villages were destroyed, and we were living a miserable life. The West didn't care nor did they ever come." It appears as if the Obama team should not count on receiving any gratitude from Karzai.

How can Karzai, the leader of an incredibly poor and dependent country, get away with antagonizing the U.S. government?

Click through to read more ...

U.S. Looking for Leaders in Afghan Army

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 04/01/2010 - 10:53am | 2 comments

U.S. Looking for Leaders in Afghan Army - Jim Michaels, USA Today.

... After eight years and billions of dollars spent on building Afghanistan's military, coalition officials have concluded a lack of quality leaders is now the biggest obstacle to creating a fighting force capable of standing on its own...

The commander in charge of training the Afghan army into a force capable of taking over for coalition troops, Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, has ordered that development of leadership skills be a top priority.

"It's more important than equipment," Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top allied commander here, said in an interview. "It's more important than doctrine. It's more important even than ideology."

And it may be the single most important factor that decides whether the Taliban is defeated and the U.S. military can go home, experts say...

Much more at USA Today.

AEI Somalia Online Briefing

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 04/01/2010 - 10:10am | 0 comments

Via E-mail: Please join American Enterprise Institute Resident Scholar, and Director of the Critical Threats Project, Frederick W. Kagan on Monday, April 5, 2010 from 1:30 to 2:30 pm for a live online video briefing on the terror threat from Somalia. Also contributing to the discussion will be Critical Threats Analyst Christopher Harnisch who will discuss the Somali terror group al Shabaab.

While American efforts to combat international terrorism continue to focus on the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, other regions have become safe havens for militant Islamist groups. This terror threat became a reality when an operative of an al Qaeda franchise based in Yemen tried to blow up a Detroit-bound plane with nearly three hundred people on board, on Christmas Day 2009.

Today, a terror threat is growing in Somalia, across from Yemen on the Gulf of Aden. A militant Islamist group called al Shabaab (resembling a hybrid of al Qaeda and the Taliban) has explicitly threatened to attack the United States. This terror group has established radical Islamist administrations that govern large parts of southern Somalia -- more territory than any other militant Islamist group in the world. It operates terrorist training camps, views itself as part of the global jihad led by Osama bin Laden, has dozens of operatives from the United States and Europe, and has followed through on previous threats made against Somali targets. The threat posed by al Shabaab is real and imminent, and Americans should not be surprised if the group tries to attack the U.S.

To obtain viewing information for the briefing, please e-mail [email protected].

Please e-mail your questions for Fred Kagan and Chris Harnisch during the briefing to either [email protected] or [email protected].

Kandahar Campaign Rife with Pitfalls

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 04/01/2010 - 6:17am | 0 comments

U.S. Campaign to Reform Kandahar is Rife with Pitfalls - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

The coming battle for control of this ancient crossroads city will be the toughest challenge of the war in Afghanistan - not because it will be bloody, necessarily, but because it will require the hardest item for U.S. commanders to deliver, which is an improvement in governance.

Kandahar is the heartland of the Pashtun people - a place of competing tribes and clans, of hidden wealth accumulated from drug trafficking and smuggling, and of notorious power brokers symbolized in the public mind by Ahmed Wali Karzai, the leader of the provincial council and brother of Afghanistan's president.

Reforming the local government is like disassembling a pyramid of pick-up sticks. One wrong move and the whole pile collapses. Yet if the United States accommodates the existing power structure, it will appear to be condoning corruption here - a bad message for the public in Afghanistan and America alike...

More at The Washington Post.

Unruly Clients: The Trouble with Allies

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/30/2010 - 7:17pm | 8 comments

Unruly Clients: The Trouble with Allies - Dr. Steven Metz, World Affairs.

When Congress approved a massive, five-year assistance package for Pakistan in the fall of 2009, much of it earmarked for strengthening the country's military and security forces, Pakistani leaders reacted by immediately biting the hand that was trying to feed them. During a talk in Houston, former President Pervez Musharraf slammed the conditions in the bill, asserting that Pakistan knew better than the United States how to root out terrorists. General Ashfaq Kiyani, the Pakistani army chief, labeled the offer of support "insulting and unacceptable." Members of the Pakistani parliament called the $7.5 billion appropriation "peanuts." Some of this grumbling may have been for show, another example of Pakistan's finely honed skill at extracting more and more money from the United States, but it also reflected a cynicism and sense of estrangement on the part of the Pakistani elites. And in this regard the episode highlights a central flaw in American security strategy: reliance on allies whose perceptions, priorities, values, and objectives tend to be quite different from our own...

Much more at World Affairs.

The Predator War

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/30/2010 - 6:39pm | 6 comments

Via e-mail from Dr. Amitai Etzioni, University Professor and Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University:

Jane Mayer made the liberal case against drones in The New Yorker (October 26, 2009). We provide a blow by blow response here (Joint Force Quarterly) and discuss the issue on Talk of the Nation, here. Everyone is entitled to human rights, but we cannot wait for terrorists to strike before we go after them. And, although little known, the US military has a carefully crafted procedure for determining which drone strikes are allowed and which would cause too much collateral damage.

The onus for avoiding collateral damage altogether is on the terrorists. They have to stop exploiting their status as civilians, stop using civilians as human shields, and homes--as headquarters, as locations to store ammunition and for snipers to ply their deadly trade. (For more, see Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy [Yale 2007] and our website.)

Dr. Etzioni's e-mail requested comments concerning this issue.

MCU MES Lecture Series

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/30/2010 - 3:58pm | 0 comments

Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University is pleased to announce that the audio from the MES AfPak Lecture Series third session, "Afghanistan: War of Necessity or Quagmire" presented by Ambassador Peter Galbraith, is now available at Middle East Studies' Marine Corps University website.

The next lecture in the series presented by Professor Shah Mahmoud Hanifi's entitled "Pashtun Counter-Narrative" is scheduled for 1400-1530, 5 April 2010 in room 164/166 of Gray Research Center, 2040 Broadway St, MCB Quantico. More details will follow for subsequent presentations. This is the fourth lecture in a series entitled "A Multidisciplinary Approach to the AfPak Region and Its People" being hosted by Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University.

In About-Face, Marines Embrace Web 2.0

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/30/2010 - 12:50pm | 1 comment

In About-Face, Marines Embrace Web 2.0 - Nathan Hodge, Danger Room.

Last summer, the U.S. Marine Corps took a draconian approach to Web 2.0, issuing a sweeping ban on Twitter, Facebook, MySpace and other social media sites from its networks.

In an order issued yesterday, the service changed course, issuing guidelines to encourage "responsible and effective use" of social networking technology. "The Marine Corps embraces and strives to leverage the advances of internet-based capabilities," the directive states. "... effective immediately, internet-based capabilities will be made available to all MCEN [Marine Corps Enterprise Network] users."

In addition to opening up YouTube and Google tools, it encourages Marine organizations to create a better online presence...

Much more at Danger Room.

Special Warfare "Threefer"

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 03/29/2010 - 8:08pm | 12 comments

Three recent articles in Special Warfare recommended via e-mail (Hat tip to COL Dave Maxwell):

The Great UW Debate by Colonel David M. Witty.

The Special Forces community has been trying to articulate a definition for unconventional warfare, or UW, for well over 50 years. The pages of previous issues of this magazine are full of articles discussing the definition and scope of UW. The community's failure to clearly state a concise definition of UW to itself, the Army, the joint force, and other government agencies makes it appear that it is at best, doctrinally adrift, or at worst, intellectually lacking. Given the increased emphasis on irregular warfare and the fact that UW is one of the five IW activities, the SF community needs to agree on what UW is or risk losing credibility.

Effective Use of FID: Expands SF Influence by Captain Stephen C. Flanagan.

During the past six years of combat rotations to Iraq, United States Army Special Forces have refined their lines of operation, or LOOs, to meet the ever-evolving challenges presented on the battlefield of counterinsurgency, or COIN. The LOOs directed by combined joint special-operations task forces, or CJSOTFs, in Iraq and Afghanistan have varied greatly over time and have included: targeting enemy networks, conducting tribal engagements, conducting information and psychological operations, conducting combined lethal operations and developing networks of influence. However, one LOO that has remained the constant emphasis for the 10th SF Group in shaping the battlefield in Operation Iraqi Freedom is the conduct of foreign internal defense, or FID.

The Lion, the Starfish and the Spider by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Bruce E. DeFeyter.

Today policy-makers, law-enforcement officials and military leaders struggle to come up with innovative ideas for neutralizing terrorist organizations and their activities. One such idea, not given much thought until after Sept. 11, is attacking terrorist financing structures, methods and sources. Attempting to destroy terrorists by denying them financing or interrupting their money stream is unlikely to succeed as a sole point of effort for at least three reasons. First, organizationally, terrorists are structured to slip behind, around and underneath centralized organizations, rules and bureaucracies. Second, terrorist organizations can conduct operations for literally pennies on the dollar, and any serious effort to interrupt these financially insignificant activities will have serious second- and third-order effects on the larger financial community. Third, even with the thousands of laws enacted and the historically unprecedented cooperation between partner nations, terrorism continues to escalate by nearly every conceivable measure. Bluntly put, counterterrorism financing reform simply doesn't work.

The Other Side of the COIN

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 03/29/2010 - 1:49pm | 0 comments

The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq - Kenneth M. Pollack and Irena L. Sargsyan, Washington Quarterly.

The United States is leaving Iraq. Both the U.S. administration and the Iraqi government have made that clear. In 2008, the United States and Iraq signed a security agreement allowing U.S. troops to stay only until the end of 2011, and in February 2009, President Barack Obama announced that he intended to reduce U.S. forces in Iraq to just 50,000 and to end their combat mission by August 2010. But how the United States leaves is of tremendous importance for the region, the international community, and above all, for the future vital U.S. interests.

Iraq has made remarkable progress since the worst days of its civil war in 2006. Security has improved enormously, democratization has gained a foothold, and democratic pressures have forced Iraqi politicians to change their methods, if not necessarily their goals. Iraq's micro economies have begun to revive and foreign investment is beginning to pick up. But as countless policymakers and commentators have pointed out, these gains are fragile and reversible. All of the tensions that propelled the country into the maelstrom of civil war during the initial years of bungled reconstruction remain, as do the memories of the many horrific acts committed. As numerous scholars of civil war have noted, these lingering fears typically make the resumption of civil war uncomfortably likely in cases like Iraq, unless an external great power is —to serve as peacekeeper and mediator during the critical early years when the new, fragile state must build institutions capable of providing effective governance and public safety.

Indeed, candidate Obama correctly argued that when the United States prematurely turned away from Afghanistan to focus on Iraq in 2002--2003, the result was the near collapse of the new Afghan government and the resumption of widespread civil strife. Even if it is to focus on Afghanistan, if the United States turns away from Iraq prematurely, it would have dire consequences for Iraq, whose fragile government will be more likely to fail, and for the United States, because success in Iraq is vital to U.S. interests...

Much more at Washington Quarterly.

Obama Makes a Surprise Visit to Afghanistan

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 03/28/2010 - 2:59pm | 0 comments

Obama Makes a Surprise Visit to Afghanistan - Helene Cooper, New York Times.

President Obama made a surprise trip to Afghanistan on Sunday, his first visit as commander in chief to the site of the war he inherited and has stamped as his own. Air Force One landed at nighttime at Bagram Air Base after a 13-hour nonstop flight for a visit shrouded in secrecy for security reasons; Mr. Obama quickly boarded a helicopter for the trip to Kabul, landing at the presidential palace for talks with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan.

Gen. James L. Jones, the National Security adviser, told reporters aboard the flight to Bagram that Mr. Obama would try to make Mr. Karzai "understand that in his second term, there are certain things that have not been paid attention to, almost since day one." Gen. Jones said those things included "a merit-based system for appointment of key government officials, battling corruption, taking the fight to the narco-traffickers," which, "provides a lot of the economic engine for the insurgents." ...

More at The New York Times.

Obama Makes Unannounced Trip to Afghanistan - Laura King and Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

President Obama flew into Afghanistan's capital Sunday on an unannounced visit, his first trip as president to a country where tens of thousands of new U.S. troops are being deployed this year. Obama last visited the country in 2008 as a presidential candidate. Previous attempts to visit Kabul during his presidency were cancelled because of weather problems, according to White House officials. Afghanistan, along with neighboring Pakistan, are probably the largest foreign-policy challenges of Obama's presidency, and he has overseen a troop buildup of about 50,000 forces since he took office.

Obama was meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose relations with the West were badly strained last year by his fraud-tainted reelection. Karzai has been told unequivocally by the United States that he must clean up corruption in his government, a message Obama was to reiterate, according to aides. Security concerns dictated that secrecy surrounded the trip, which was not announced until after the president was on the ground...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Obama Presses Karzai to Fight Afghan Corruption - Jennifer Loven, Associated Press.

President Barack Obama is pressing Afghan leader Hamid Karzai to crack down on corruption in his country while also strengthening the judicial system and promoting good governance. Obama met with Karzai at the presidential palace in Kabul during an unannounced visit to Afghanistan on Sunday. The White House said later than Karzai will come to Washington on May 12 for more talks.

Obama said Afghanistan has made progress in the military campaign against insurgents and improved services to Afghans. Obama is expected to spend several hours in Afghanistan before beginning the long flight back to Washington...

More at The Associated Press.

Iraq Election Results

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/27/2010 - 7:55am | 1 comment

Ayad Allawi's predominantly Sunni alliance won Iraq's national election, narrowly edging out Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's list to become the largest bloc in the country's next parliament, and kicking off a scrum among political and religious blocs to form a majority government. The Allawi upset threatens to end the lock on power that Iraq's majority Shiites have enjoyed since 2003 after decades of oppression under the Sunni-led government of Saddam Hussein, and could severely test the country's fragile institutions. In the two weeks between the March 7 election and the vote tallies Friday, Shiite politicians warned of violence should their parties lose the election.

-- Wall Street Journal

Nearly three weeks after Iraq's elections, the coalition of former prime minister Ayad Allawi emerged with the most seats in the parliament Friday but fell far short of a majority. The results signaled the start of another protracted phase of uncertainty for this country's fledgling political system. Allawi's coalition won two seats more than that of his fiercest competitor, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Maliki refused to recognize the results and said he would challenge them in court. Even if Maliki's challenges fail, it will probably take several months for a new government to form.

-- Washington Post

The secular party of Ayad Allawi, a former interim prime minister once derided as an American puppet, won a wafer-thin victory in Iraq's election, setting the stage for a protracted period of political uncertainty and possible violence that could threaten plans to withdraw American troops. The outcome, announced Friday, was immediately challenged by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and his supporters in the State of Law coalition, who hurled accusations of fraud and made vague references to the prime minister's power as commander in chief. Several parties have cried fraud as their fortunes waxed or waned in the slow vote count, an ominous reminder of an Iraqi political culture where winning is everything and compromise elusive.

-- New York Times

Allawi's Coalition Wins Most Seats in Iraqi Election - Voice of America

Upset Vote Reshapes Iraq - Wall Street Journal

Allawi's Bloc Wins Most Seats in Parliamentary Elections - Washington Post

Secular Bloc Wins Most Seats in Iraq - Los Angeles Times

Allawi Edges PM Maliki in Iraq Election - Christian Science Monitor

Secular Challenger Allawi Claims Iraq Election Win - Associated Press

Allawi's Victory in Iraq Election Sets Up Period of Uncertainty - New York Times

Recount Call as Allawi Wins Iraq Election - The Times

Allawi Expected to Start Coalition-Building Talks in Iraq - Voice of America

Election Results: Reactions From Around Iraq - New York Times

This Week at War: Is it Time to Cut a Deal in Afghanistan?

by Robert Haddick | Fri, 03/26/2010 - 5:56pm | 1 comment

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Bargaining in Afghanistan will open up new fissures,

2) Killer drones: our friends today, our worst fear tomorrow.

Bargaining in Afghanistan will open up new fissures

The New York Times reported on March 22 that Afghan President Hamid Karzai met with a delegation representing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of one of the three main insurgent groups fighting against the government and international military forces in the country. According to the Washington Post, Hekmatyar's opening bid was a 15-point plan calling for the withdrawal of foreign military forces over the course of six months beginning in July, the appointment of an interim council to govern the country, a new constitution, and new national and local elections.

Before the arrival of Hekmatyar's delegation, Karzai scheduled a peace conference for late April, which he hopes a broader range of insurgent groups, factions in parliament, and civil society organizations will attend.

One should not make too much of these developments. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's August 2009 assessment of Afghanistan rated Hekmatyar's force as the weakest of the three groups he is fighting. McChrystal also concluded that Hekmatyar has no geographical objectives and is just hoping to bargain for a role in a future Taliban government.

However, some bargaining process, even if notional, has likely begun. The various actors onstage in Afghanistan -- Karzai and his allies, the various insurgent factions, elements of Pakistan's government, and the U.S. government -- will each make their own assessment of what could constitute an acceptable deal and whether continued fighting will get them closer or further away from their goals.

The U.S. "surge" of reinforcements is designed to increase the coalition's bargaining leverage. Neither Karzai nor U.S. President Barack Obama's team will see much reason to scale back their current objectives until this autumn when the results of the summer fighting season are in. Coalition leaders are hoping that continued attrition of Taliban leaders, both from ground combat and from drone strikes, might compel some of those leaders to seek a truce. From the Taliban's perspective, each summer's escalation of combat brings a new opportunity to apply political pain on electorates in Europe and North America. The Taliban's dominant factions -- the Quetta Shura led by Mullah Mohammed Omar and the Haqqani network -- will likely also wait to see whether this summer's combat might drive some less-committed coalition members out of the fight.

Although battlefield results should influence bargaining strategies, such logic might not apply in this case.

Click through to read more ...

Pentagon Revamps Afghanistan Deployments

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/26/2010 - 9:56am | 10 comments

Pentagon Revamps Afghanistan Deployments - Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

The Pentagon is revamping the way it deploys troops to Afghanistan, putting in place a new system that will return units to the same parts of the country so they can develop better regional expertise and closer relationships with local Afghan power brokers.

Senior military officials say the "Campaign Continuity" initiative will determine the specific provinces and regions where many of the 30,000 soldiers and Marines who are being sent to Afghanistan as part of the Obama administration's retooled war strategy will end up serving.

The plan represents a significant change for the military, which has long rotated its combat forces through both Afghanistan and Iraq...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Holding Pakistan

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/26/2010 - 8:29am | 2 comments

Holding Pakistan: The Second Phase of Pakistan's Counterinsurgency Operations - Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, Foreign Affairs.

Summary: Conventional wars are won by capturing territory, but counterinsurgencies are won by holding it. Rather than rushing to open new fronts against the Taliban, Pakistan must now focus on keeping the territory it has already cleared.

Much more at Foreign Affairs.

Army Learning Concept 2015 and the TSLC

by Martin Dempsey | Wed, 03/24/2010 - 6:22am | 5 comments

In my last SWJ blog entry, I introduced the Army Learning Concept 2015 being "championed" by the TRADOC G3. Following up on that post, I want to briefly highlight our discussions on this subject during last week's TRADOC Senior Leader Conference.

What resonated most clearly was the shared agreement that in order to increase rigor, maintain relevancy, and prevail in the competitive learning environment we have to change. Our current models have not kept pace with the rapid pace of change, the demands of Soldiers rotating in and out of the fight, and a continuous influx of Soldiers with significant "digital literacy."

We all recognize the challenge and are working to adapt our learning models. We're changing our assumptions to look at the problem differently, because we know we can't afford to come up with the same solutions. We're reaching out to those both inside and outside the military to help in this effort. I've asked the TRADOC G3 to draft a white paper that we'll circulate among the communities of interest in the next 90 days. I welcome views from across the force on ways to ensure we get this right.

GEN M. Dempsey

SWJ Editor's Note: The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command conducted a Senior Leader Conference last week. We asked TRADOC to provide us short "snap-shots" from the SLC for posting here. General Martin E. Dempsey is TRADOC's Commanding General.

Who's Running the Information War?

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/24/2010 - 5:45am | 0 comments

Gates Seeks Review of Information Programs - Craig Whitlock, Washington Post.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has ordered a review of the military's information operations programs in response to allegations that private contractors ran an unauthorized spy ring in Afghanistan.

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said Tuesday that Gates had instructed a small group of senior officials to determine whether there were any "systemic problems" with the operations, which include electronic warfare, psychological operations and other noncombat programs and have a budget this year of more than $500 million.

Gates's decision was prompted by reports that a senior Defense Department official, Michael D. Furlong, hired contractors to run a $24 million intelligence-gathering program to track down suspected insurgent leaders in Afghanistan. The program was shut down late last year after the CIA and some military officials complained that Furlong was operating an off-the-books spy network...

More at The Washington Post.

Caution Lights for the Military's 'Information War' - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

It has become commonplace since Sept. 11, 2001, to speak of the "war of ideas" between Muslim extremists and the West. But there has been too little attention paid to the U.S. military's mobilization for this war, which is often described by the oxymoronic phrase "information operations."

To populate this information "battle space," the military has funded a range of contractors, specialists, training programs and initiatives - targeted on the hot wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the broader zone of conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia. Gen. David Petraeus, the Centcom commander who oversees that region, has been one of the military's most vocal proponents of aggressive information operations.

The potential problems were highlighted on March 14, when the New York Times revealed that a Pentagon official from the "strategic communications" realm had funded contractors to gather intelligence in Afghanistan. Last week also brought a report by The Post's Ellen Nakashima that the military, in an offensive information operation, had shut down a jihadist Web site that the CIA had been monitoring for intelligence purposes. In both cases, it seemed the military was wandering into the covert-action arena traditionally reserved for the CIA...

More at The Washington Post.

JFCOM Likes Navy IW Plane

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/23/2010 - 7:31am | 3 comments

JFCOM Likes Navy IW Plane - Greg Grant, Defense Tech.

The quest for a low-cost, low-tech, irregular warfare aircraft to provide ground pounders with long loitering, on-call recon and strike got a big boost recently when Joint Forces Command's Gen. James Mattis threw his support behind the Navy and Air Force "Imminent Fury" effort.

Mattis told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week that he was taking a personal interest in the classified project, being run chiefly out of the Navy's Irregular Warfare Office, that is looking at small turboprop aircraft for ground support. The sought after design falls somewhere between the Vietnam era OV-10 Bronco and A-1 Skyraider. It must stay aloft for a long time for surveillance needs but also have the punch to provide precise fire support when needed; a true "over the shoulder" aircraft for small ground units doing distributed operations in remote locations.

Mattis thinks using top-line fighter jets for close air support to troops patrolling rural villages in Afghanistan is overkill. As he diplomatically puts it: "Today's approach of loitering multi-million dollar aircraft and using a system of systems procedure for the approval and employment of airpower is not the most effective use of aviation fires in this irregular fight," he told the SASC...

More at Defense Tech.

SWJ Theses Time (Part 2)

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 03/22/2010 - 6:56am | 0 comments

Every so often Small Wars Journal receives master theses or articles based on a master thesis written at our professional military education institutions. We recently received two of particular interest and share them with you here

A District Approach to Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency - Naval Postgraduate School Master of Science thesis by Major David S. Clukey, U.S. Army.

Abstract:

Since the initial invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the United States (U.S.) military have lost the initiative and become sedentary in Afghanistan. This case study analysis considers if ISAF and the U.S. military are appropriately employing the current disposition of military forces to maximize effects against the insurgency in Afghanistan. This study objectively compares and contrasts the current ISAF and U.S. strategy with a district level FID/COIN methodology. This study explores why it is necessary to approach the problem at the district/village level to enhance the security, control, and influence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA), and to eliminate systematically the conditions that have supported the insurgency in Afghanistan.

No Child Left Behind: COIN Strategies to Deny Recruitment of Adolescent Males in the Southern Philippines - Naval Postgraduate School Master of Science thesis by Major Herbert A. Daniels, U.S. Army.

Abstract:

Severing the link between the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Jolo population is critical to destroying the terrorist organization. The U.S. support to Philippine Security Forces (PSF) has helped to capture or kill the ideological cadre of the ASG but fails to prevent younger rebels from taking their place. While PSF continue to aggressively pursue the ASG, the U.S. has provided abundant assistance to improve the livelihood of the Jolo population. Positive results from the U.S.-supported development can be observed through increased access to healthcare and education. However, the strategy may fail to target a key demographic of the Jolo population, adolescent males, who currently make up approximately 80% of the ASG's estimated population of 400 rebels. To prevent their recruitment by the ASG, operations and development on Jolo must not marginalize adolescent males. The warrior traditions of the native Tausugs on Jolo present a challenge when it comes to addressing the needs of adolescent males and encourages their participation in the security and development of Jolo vice participation in rebellious or illicit activities.

Also see:

SWJ Theses Time -- (Part I)

Turning a COIN Problem into a Solution -- NPS Thesis at SWJ

Best Defense Wins National Magazine Award

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/20/2010 - 10:35pm | 0 comments

Via Foreign Policy's Joshua Keating on Tom Ricks's The Best Defense - The Best Defense has won the 2010 Digital National Magazine award for best blog! We second Joshua's take on Tom's efforts - Congratulations to Tom as well as the incredible community of readers who've helped make this blog a must-read.

This Week at War: Is This the Week Mexico Lost the Drug War?

by Robert Haddick | Fri, 03/19/2010 - 8:34pm | 4 comments

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Is this what defeat looks like?

2) Reining in rogues? Or stifling initiative?

Is this what defeat looks like?

On March 13, in two separate but seemingly coordinated attacks, gunmen in Juárez, Mexico, killed two employees of the U.S. Consulate, along with the husband of one of the employees. They were gunned down in their cars while returning from a children's party. Although in recent years U.S. citizens and government employees have died in the crossfire of Mexico's drug wars, this deliberate attack on U.S. government employees in Mexico signals a further escalation in the conflict. FBI agents investigating the murders guessed that the murders were meant to "send a message" to both the Mexican and U.S. governments.

The vast majority of the killings in Juárez and elsewhere in Mexico are the result of gangs battling for control of drug distribution markets. But the escalation of Mexico's violence began in December 2006 when President Felipe Calderón decided to attack the drug cartels which in his view were challenging the state's authority. The government's offensive has resulted in a complex, multisided, and violent scramble for markets, coercive power, and political influence.

What message did the gunmen intend to send with the murder of the consulate workers? It is a message easily recognized by students of irregular warfare. Insurgents competing with the government for influence over the population have pain as one of the principal tools in their toolbox. Apply the pain in a terrifying manner against even the most imposing symbols of authority -- in this case the U.S. government -- and political results may follow.

In Juárez, this tactic might be working.

Click through to read more ...

UW Recommended Reading

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/17/2010 - 10:37pm | 0 comments

Developing a Common Understanding of Unconventional Warfare by Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic, US Army, Special Operations Command Central, in the latest issue of Joint Force Quarterly.

The current USSOCOM- and USASOC approved UW definition is significant for several reasons. First and foremost, it provides instant clarity to decisionmakers. With clarity come credibility, confidence, and trust, all of which are essential in the relationship between the special operations community and senior decisionmakers. Secondly, this definition brings a degree of accountability previously absent from this topic. Specifically, it ensures that individuals and organizations possess the associated professional knowledge and operational capabilities to claim proficiency in UW.

Developing a Common Understanding of Unconventional Warfare at JFQ.

*Hat tip to Colonel Dave Maxwell

SWJ Blog via Kindle

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/17/2010 - 5:46pm | 5 comments

Those of you out there on the edge of alternate distribution models and the Burger

King approach to your media your way will be happy to know that SWJ Blog

is now available

via Kindle.

The savvy and sharp-eyed among you have already noticed the RSS feed, Twitter,

and Facebook options in the left menu bar. Sophisticated new media users,

please

send your constructive suggestions so we can continue to dial in our delivery.

Curmudgeons, ask your grandkids about this stuff.

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