Two days ago, the Economist posted this report on the My Lai Inquiry (H/T to Pete) on their YouTube channel. See also Calley's My Lai Apology.The US Army conducted its own, secret inquiry into the massacre of civilians in Son My, South Vietnam on March 16th 1968, The My Lai Massacre. Tape-recordings were made of the more than 400 witnesses. Now, for the first time, these recordings can be heard along with the photographic evidence compiled by Lt General Peers and his inquiry team.
Blog Posts
SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
by Robert Haddick | Tue, 03/16/2010 - 11:53am | 9 comments
Yesterday, U.S. Joint Forces Command released its Joint Operating Environment 2010 report (JOE). JOE is an ambitious document, an attempt discuss a broad range of 25-year global trends, all in less than 75 pages. Topics range from demographics, economics, and the environment, to regional security issues, and then on to advice on how U.S. military forces should prepare for war in the 21st century. Each of JOE's numerous topics merits a book-length treatment. JOE's authors deserve praise for providing a useful executive summary of these trends and for discussing their implications for global security.
It is inevitable that observers will have their gripes with a few parts of JOE. Here are mine:
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 03/14/2010 - 1:59pm | 2 comments
Joint Operating Environment 2010
Foreword
While U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Operating Environment (JOE) in no way constitutes U.S. Government policy and must necessarily be speculative in nature, it seeks to provide the Joint Force an intellectual foundation upon which we will construct the concepts to guide our future force development. We will likely not call the future exactly right, but we must think through the nature of continuity and change in strategic trends to discern their military implications to avoid being completely wrong. These implications serve to influence the concepts that drive our services' adaptations to the environments within which they will operate, adaptations that are essential if our leaders are to have the fewest regrets when future crises strike.
In our guardian role for our nation, it is natural that we in the military focus more on possible security challenges and threats than we do on emerging opportunities. From economic trends to climate change and vulnerability to cyber attack, we outline those trends that remind us we must stay alert to what is changing in the world if we intend to create a military as relevant and capable as we possess today. There is a strong note of urgency in our efforts to balance the force for the uncertainties that lie ahead. The JOE gives focus to those efforts which must also embrace the opportunities that are inherent in the world we imperfectly foresee.
Every military force in history that has successfully adapted to the changing character of war and the evolving threats it faced did so by sharply defining the operational problems it had to solve. With the JOE helping to frame future security problems and highlighting their military implications, the Chairman's companion document, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), answers the problems we have defined, stating how the Joint Force will operate. Taken together, these documents will drive the concept development and experimentation that will, in turn, drive our evolutionary adaptation, while guarding against any single preclusive view of future war. None of us have a sufficiently clear crystal ball to predict fully the changing kaleidoscope of future conflicts that hover over the horizon, even as current fights, possible adversaries' nascent capabilities, and other factors intersect.
We will update the JOE in a year or two, once we have a sufficiently different understanding to make a new edition worthwhile. If you have ideas for improving our assessment of the future security environment and the problems our military must solve to provide relevant defense for our country and like-minded nations, please forward them to J-5 (Strategy), Joint Forces Command.
J.N. Mattis
General, U.S. Marines
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command
-----
Joint Operating Environment 2010 -- Full Document
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 03/14/2010 - 7:06am | 24 comments
At Afghan Outpost, Marines Gone Rogue or Leading the Fight against Counterinsurgency? - Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post.... The Marines are pushing into previously ignored Taliban enclaves. They have set up a first-of-its-kind school to train police officers. They have brought in a Muslim chaplain to pray with local mullahs and deployed teams of female Marines to reach out to Afghan women.The Marine approach - creative, aggressive and, at times, unorthodox - has won many admirers within the military. The Marine emphasis on patrolling by foot and interacting with the population, which has helped to turn former insurgent strongholds along the Helmand River valley into reasonably stable communities with thriving bazaars and functioning schools, is hailed as a model of how U.S. forces should implement counterinsurgency strategy.But the Marines' methods, and their insistence that they be given a degree of autonomy not afforded to U.S. Army units, also have riled many up the chain of command in Kabul and Washington, prompting some to refer to their area of operations in the south as "Marineistan." They regard the expansion in Delaram and beyond as contrary to the population-centric approach embraced by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, and they are seeking to impose more control over the Marines...
More at The Washington Post.
by Robert Haddick | Fri, 03/12/2010 - 6:03pm | 26 comments
Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:
Topics include:
1) Could "repetitive raiding" replace counterinsurgency?
2) A painful decade has improved civil-military relations.
Could "repetitive raiding" replace counterinsurgency?
After the last decade's costly experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, future U.S. leaders will very likely wish to avoid another nation-building effort that requires the suppression of a stubborn insurgency.
But wishing rarely makes problems go away. There might, hypothetically, be another occasion when a "rogue" regime needs to be removed in the interests of either regional stability or basic human rights. Is there an alternative to post-removal counterinsurgency and nation-building? And what about Colin Powell's "Pottery Barn rule" -- "you break it, you own it" -- referring to the United States' moral obligations to Iraq after the 2003 invasion?
Writing in Armed Forces Journal, Bernard Finel, a senior fellow at the American Security Project, rejects the Pottery Barn rule and offers an alternative to counterinsurgency, namely "repetitive raiding." Finel explains his proposal this way:
[T]he vast majority of goals can be accomplished through quick, decisive military operations. Not all political goals are achievable this way, but most are and those that cannot be achieved through conventional operations likely cannot be achieved by the application of even the most sophisticated counterinsurgency doctrine either. As a consequence, I believe the U.S. should adopt a national military strategy that heavily leverages the core capability to break states and target and destroy fixed assets, iteratively if necessary. Such a strategy -- which might loosely be termed "repetitive raiding" -- could defeat and disrupt most potential threats the U.S. faces. While America's adversaries may prefer to engage the U.S. using asymmetric strategies, there is no reason that the U.S. should agree to fight on these terms.After explaining why the United States should fight on its own terms rather than those that favor the adversary, Finel then applies the economic concept of marginal benefit versus marginal cost to discuss the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. Finel argues that in both cases, the United States achieved most of its war objectives very early on. Cumulative costs at those points in the campaigns were trivial compared with what they would eventually become. In both wars, the United States stayed on in an attempt to achieve the remaining war objectives, paying massive marginal costs for the last few marginal benefits.
Click through to read more ...
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/12/2010 - 5:09pm | 91 comments
It's the Tribes? That's Stupid. - Lieutenant Colonel John Malevich, Canadian Army -- U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, Combined Arms Center Blog.
When you are a stranger in a strange land, you need to be aware of, and hold on to, and be proud of your culture. In my experience you can become susceptible to myth and unfounded fears of a super warrior that you have not yet engaged. I was chatting with a young Afghan who, full of Pashtun bravado said to me "westerners were from a feminine culture," because we spent the majority of our economic activity on goods and services and not on weapons of war and the military. Being one half Irish and one half Yugoslavian culturally speaking, I am not inclined to walk away from a fight and "them sounded like fighting words to me." I asked my Pashtun buddy to show me how westerners greet each other. He extended his hand in a wave. I pointed out the open hand and said, "do you know why we do that? The open hand shows the other westerner that 'I have no weapons;' so, I won't try to kill you, this time." It seems we are not such an effete culture after all, my Pashtun friend!
In our ninth year of insurgency in Afghanistan it seems that we are turning to romantic notions and silver bullets to extricate ourselves from what seems like an unending conflict. The latest great hope is the tribes. The idea being that if only we could mobilize them, we would be halfway to a solution to this insurgency.
I think that this approach smacks too much of military orientalism. We seem to be looking for the Jean Jacque Rousseau "noble savage." Or in modern terms, I would call it the "Avatar Effect" or "Last Samurai last hope." In the search to find a way out we are pinning our hopes on the weakest link in the Afghan conflict chain.
Click through to read more ...
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/12/2010 - 8:17am | 0 comments
The Joint Warfighting Conference is now open for registration.
Navy MC2 (AW) Nikki Carter
USJFCOM Public Affairs
Online registration is now available for the fourth annual Joint Warfighting Conference being held May 11 - 13 at the Virginia Beach Convention Center.
U. S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), the U.S. Naval Institute, National Defense Industrial Associations Greater Hampton Roads Chapter and the local AFCEA Hampton Roads and Tidewater chapters will host the event.
Navy Capt. John Polowczyk, USJFCOM's business manager, said the Joint Warfighting Conference theme is, "Combatant and Coalition Commanders: What Will They Need Five Years From Now?" During the two-and-a-half day event panel discussions will explore this theme, also to be reflected in industry booths on the exhibit floor.
Polowczyk said key command personnel will be at the USJFCOM booth throughout the three-day event to discuss different aspects of the command's mission in an open-forum setting.
He encourages USJFCOM staff members, and other DoD and community members, to register for the conference.
"This gives the command the ability to show industry and academia what we are doing and what they can do to help us achieve that," he said. "It is also equally important for USJFCOM staff to see what's going on and how they can integrate what they are doing into the bigger picture."
The booth also will provide information to industry and academia on how to partner with USJFCOM and to answer questions about employment opportunities at USJFCOM.
For more information, or to register for the conference, visit the Web site at http://www.jointwarfighting.org.
by Robert Haddick | Thu, 03/11/2010 - 10:33am | 6 comments
The case of Colleen R. LaRose, a.k.a. "JihadJane," shows significant weaknesses in the decentralized model of terror organization. Ever since Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri went into isolation, the fear in the West has been that terror conspirators would use a decentralized, bottom-up model to organize their actions. According to this theory, it is useless, and even counterproductive, to expend resources focusing on bin Laden and "al Qaeda Central." Dispersed, decentralized, and self-radicalizing cells, with no connection to al Qaeda Central, would continue the fight. The fearful assumption was that there would be no way for law enforcement authorities to monitor and prevent such dispersed bottom-up terror cell formation before attacks occurred.
LaRose thought that a blonde-haired, blue-eyed, United States passport holder (which she is) could be a highly useful counter-surveillance asset to a jihadist terror cell. Where she and her co-conspirators erred badly was in their use of the internet to communicate. As the U.S. District Court's indictment of LaRose makes clear, the U.S. government, along with allied governments around the world, is very effectively using electronic surveillance to uncover terror conspiracies. The cases of Major Hasan and Umar Abdulmutallab are not exceptions; electronic surveillance and other intelligence gave advance warnings, which authorities discarded due to bureaucratic failings.
The decentralized terror model results in poor tradecraft, poor training, easy electronic monitoring, little internal security, and easy police penetration. Organizations typically address such weaknesses through institutional measures such as appointing quality leaders, establishing and enforcing higher standards, instituting training programs, removing incompetent personnel, etc. In other words, establishing central control. Al Qaeda can't do these things, or at least not very easily.
Proponents of the decentralized, self-organizing model will assert that a decentralized, self-organizing network is highly capable of learning, perhaps even faster than a centralized one. Possibly, but the assumption of rapid learning seems to require that the prospective terror cells have unfettered and secure electronic communications. That is clearly not the case.
What's a conspirator to do? Go back to "dead drops," chalk marks on walls, and whispered conversations on park benches? Is that how to advance the global jihad in the 21st century?
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/11/2010 - 8:41am | 2 comments
State Department Plans 7 New Posts in Public Diplomacy - Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times.The State Department plans to create seven new senior positions to ensure that a public-diplomacy perspective is always "incorporated" in policymaking around the world, as well as to respond quickly to negative coverage of the United States in foreign media.In an ambitious strategy that goes beyond any previous efforts to reach out to other countries, the Obama administration "seeks to become woven into the fabric of the daily lives of people" there, its top public-diplomacy official said Wednesday."We must do a better job of listening, learn how people in other countries and cultures listen to us, understand their desires and aspirations, and provide them with information and services of value to them," said Judith A. McHale, undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs...
More at The Washington Times.
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/10/2010 - 8:38pm | 0 comments
The US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center is pleased to host Associate Professor Daryl Youngman, Kansas State University, and Lieutenant Colonel John Malevich, COIN Center Branch Chief for COIN, on a COIN Center Webcast 1000 CST, (1100 EST), (1600 ZULU) on Thursday, 11 Mar 2010.
Their briefing, based on a soon to be publish paper, is entitled 'Re-Evaluating the Afghan Balance of Power and Culture of Jihad'. The presentation, as will the paper, challenges our preconceived notions of the role that tribe, government and mullah play in Afghanistan and questions the wisdom of trying to win our counterinsurgency campaign without first conducting a critical examination of the root cause of the insurgency in Afghanistan.
Those interested in attending may view the meeting on-line at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.
If you are having trouble connecting please contact Mr. Kirk Hicks at 913-684-5198 or DSN 552 so he can resolve your issue.
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/09/2010 - 9:58pm | 2 comments
In Marjah, New Gains Could Offer Escape From Tragic Past - Mohammad Elyas Daee and Abubakar Siddique, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.Azizullah Khan might be this town's best example of civic-mindedness.He is a middle-aged farmer here, at the center of a recent large-scale military effort against the Taliban, in Afghanistan's volatile Helmand Province.His dedication to community under the most trying of circumstances earned him the respect of Marjah's locals, who long depended on his pharmacy in the town's dusty bazaar as their only health-care option.When news came that Afghan President Hamid Karzai would be visiting on March 7, following the anti-Taliban operation carried out by Afghan and NATO forces, it was Khan who was entrusted to speak for Marjah's residents. With their marketplace in ruins as a result of the offensive, the feeling was that Khan would be well-suited to present their demands and concerns based on firsthand experience.Addressing the president inside the community's main mosque, Khan peppered his message with salutations and blunt grievances, even reminding the Afghan leader of his oft-repeated promises to step down if he failed to deliver security and services."We are not asking you to resign, but our patience is running thin," Khan told the only president that Afghans have ever elected. "For the past eight years the warlords have been ruling us. Their hands have been stained with the blood of innocents and they have killed hundreds of people. Even now they are being imposed on the people in the name of tribal and regional leaders. People are afraid to convey the real feelings of locals because they sense themselves to be in danger from all sides."Khan pleaded for the government to ensure security, remove any military presence from schools and private homes, compensate locals for losses resulting from the recent fighting, and help rebuild schools, clinics, and irrigation canals.His most impassioned and telling appeal, however, was for Karzai to avoid repeating a past mistake: Do not hand over control of local affairs to former militia commanders or other "people with influence."The plea, met with cheers and nods of approval by the hundreds of locals assembled at the mosque, highlights a window of opportunity that has been opened in Marjah, a town that in many ways is a microcosm of what has gone wrong in much of southern Afghanistan...
Much more at RFE/RL.
by Dave Dilegge | Tue, 03/09/2010 - 12:42pm | 0 comments
The Small Wars Foundation (Small Wars Journal's non-profit parent organization), along with several government and private sector cosponsors, is conducting a small Tribal Engagement Workshop (TEW) on 24-25 March in Fredericksburg, Virginia.
The objectives of this workshop are to: (1) Evaluate the value and feasibility of a tribal engagement approach in Afghanistan (2) Assess what secondary effects adoption of a tribal engagement approach would have on the political and military situation and (3) Identify the operational components of a tribal engagement approach in Afghanistan.
Particular issues we hope to address include:
- Is a tribal approach, and by extension a bottom-up approach, viable and feasible in Afghanistan?- What are the baseline requirements at the international (NATO / ISAF / UN), national and operational levels to enable a tribal approach in Afghanistan?
- Is a tribal approach suitable for Afghanistan as whole, or only for certain geographical / tribal regions?
- How would a tribal engagement approach compliment and integrate with other NATO / ISAF efforts at the national, regional and district government levels?
- What conditions are required in Pakistan to enable a tribal approach in Afghanistan?
- What is the relationship of a tribal approach to other efforts in Afghanistan to include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stabilization and foreign internal defense operations / programs? What needs to be done to ensure these efforts are mutually supporting?
- What are both the desirable and the feasible / attainable construct of units / organizations to conduct tribal engagement?
- What are the operational (intelligence, logistics and command and control for example) and training requirements to adequately support a tribal engagement approach?
- What alternatives exist, other than tribal engagement, in implementing a bottom-up approach in Afghanistan?
The TEW will consist of three sessions conducted over a two-day period as described below:
Introductory Remarks, Keynote Address, Panel Discussions and "Charge" to Participants: One half a day plenary of formal briefings, panel discussions and Q&A covering the workshop agenda, objectives, methodology and subject matter expert presentations on tribal engagement and Afghanistan.
Tribal Engagement Working Groups: One day (plus) of guided / facilitated discussion by subject matter expert participants structured to specifically address the workshop objectives and document insights, observations and recommendations.
Working Groups Brief Out: Two hours of briefings and Q&A on working group findings.
While we are keeping the number of participants relatively small to facilitate the "work" in the working group session (and we have some physical space limitations) we do have the need for some additional (5-10 people) tactical and operational representation (both civilian and military) by personnel who have experience (especially in Afghanistan) and / or other expertise in regards to tribal engagement or other local bottom-up approaches. Again, we have some limitations as to the number of participants so we cannot entertain "sit in and listen" requests for this event.
SWF/SWJ cannot provide funding for travel or per diem -- though there are no other costs associated with the workshop -- breakfast and lunch will be provided on both days and dinner on the first.
If you think you have what we are looking for (and we have to be selective in order to have a manageable event) and are interested please e-mail me (Dave Dilegge) at ddilegge (at symbol) smallwarsjournal.com, with TEW Information in the subject line, and I'll provide additional details. Comments below are closed for this post.
by Martin Dempsey | Tue, 03/09/2010 - 10:57am | 5 comments
Army Learning Concept for 2015 - Thinking Soldiers -- Learning Army!!
The operational environment is exceptionally complex with an expanding array of threats. Increased competitiveness is the norm. Recognizing that fact means that in order to prevail in future conflict we must first win in the competitive learning environment.
To that end, we are developing an Army Learning Concept to describe a 2015 learning environment that will be more effective in meeting the needs of our Soldiers and leaders. Derived from major themes of the Army Capstone Concept and the Army Leader Development Strategy, it will provide the basis for building and adapting our learning models and future information needs while ensuring we still deliver the high-quality content our Soldiers need and deserve.
The Army Learning Concept for 2015 will guide all Soldiers and leaders through a continuum of learning for the duration of their careers. We are going to cut the chaff and augment the most effective aspects of our current learning system while ensuring relevant and rigorous training and education is available and accessible, and not just on the institutional side of the Army. This is a shared responsibility between the operating and generating force as we lead the Army into a future characterized by its persistent learning environment.
SWJ Editor's Note: The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a Senior Leaders Conference this week. While invited, SWJ could not attend due to scheduling conflicts. That said, we've asked TRADOC to provide us short "snap-shots" from the SLC for posting here. General Martin E. Dempsey is TRADOC's Commanding General.
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 03/08/2010 - 11:24am | 2 comments
2010 International Women of Courage Award - U.S. Department of State.Secretary Clinton announced the 10 winners of this year's International Women of Courage (IWOC) award. On March 10, Secretary Clinton will present the awards to the honorees at the Department of State.
The awardees are:
Shukria Asil of Afghanistan for promoting government responsiveness to the needs of women.
Colonel Shafiqa Quraishi of Afghanistan for integrating women into the government and police force.
Androula Henriques of Cyprus for fighting human trafficking.
Sonia Pierre of the Dominican Republic for ending discrimination based on country of origin and the human rights abuses of statelessness.
Shadi Sadr of Iran for advocating for women's legal rights and an end to execution by stoning.
Ann Njogu of Kenya for seeking social transformation and being at the forefront of reforms in Kenya.
Jansila Majeed of Sri Lanka for strengthening rights for internally displaced persons.
Sister Marie Claude Naddaf (a.k.a. Sister Marie Claude) of Syria for working for social services for women.
Jestina Mukoko of Zimbabwe for documenting human rights abuses.
Much more, to include biographies, at The U.S. Department of State.
A Woman of Courage: Col. Shafiqa Quarashi - By Staff Sgt. Sarah Brown, NTM-A / CSTC-A.
Calm, quiet and poised, Col. Shafiqa Quarashi doesn't give the impression of a passionate defender of women's rights, that is, until she speaks. With her voice ringing with conviction, Shafiqa boldly tells an audience full of females that they will never get their rights by sitting at home; they have to go out and get them, to demand them."No one will give your rights to you as a gift, you have to take them. Who is saying women can't do anything. We can do everything, anything you want," she said. "We have to fight against corruption and those who are against women working." It is with speeches like this, given at the Ministry of Interior's International Women's Day recognition ceremony March 4, that it's easy to see why Shafiqa, an Afghan National Police office, was selected as a 2010 International Woman of Courage.The award, presented by U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, will be presented to 10 women from around the world March 10 at the State Department; 75 women were nominated from more than 70 countries including Zimbabwe, Iran, Republic of Korea, Kenya, Syria, Dominican Republic and Sri Lanka...Much more at NTM-A / CSTC-A.
by Robert Haddick | Mon, 03/08/2010 - 9:23am | 2 comments
Last Friday's New York Times had a story about the U.S. government's support for the Somali government's effort to drive the Al Shabab militia out of Mogadishu. According to the article, U.S. security assistance in Somalia is no secret. The issue is what role the U.S. Department of Defense currently has in Somalia, what role it will have in the future, and whether there will be any significant role for U.S. general purpose ground forces in the security assistance missions in Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere in the region.
According to the article, U.S. surveillance drones are in the air over Mogadishu. The article describes a Somali government motor pool containing rows of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and gun trucks, presumably refurbished with U.S. assistance. The article also discusses a six-month military training program that has recruited thousands of young Somali men, transferred them to military training camps in neighboring countries, and returned them to participate in an upcoming government offensive against Al Shabab. Finally, the article mentioned training for Somali intelligence officers and logistical support for an African Union peacekeeping force that is supporting the Somali government.
But what is the U.S. military's current role in Somalia? "This is not an American offensive," said Johnnie Carson, the assistant secretary of state for Africa. "The U.S. military is not on the ground in Somalia. Full stop." However, the article did quote an anonymous U.S. official who forecast future American air support and direct action missions in Somalia.
Over the past two decades, the U.S. government has tried, with sketchy results, just about every approach to mitigating risk from Somalia. Previous strategies have included a large-scale humanitarian intervention, benign neglect, air strikes, small scale raids, support to warlords, and support for an invasion by Ethiopia. The latest iteration appears to be a methodical and comprehensive foreign internal defense campaign, presumably conducted mostly by other government agencies and contractors.
U.S. special operations forces may soon play a larger role for a time inside Somalia. Across the water in Yemen, they are likewise supporting the FID mission there. The results from the latest efforts in Somalia and Yemen may determine whether this OGA/SOF FID (and perhaps UW) approach will be the new strategy preference for U.S. policymakers. After Iraq and Afghanistan, will the U.S. enter a "post-COIN" era? Will the current operations in Somalia and Yemen be the model for the future? And what future roles should the general purpose ground forces prepare for?
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/06/2010 - 9:42pm | 5 comments
The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad
Book Review by Lieutenant Junior Grade Robert J. Bebber
Download the full article: The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad
How is it the United States failed to see a growing insurgency within Iraq after a lightning fast victory over Saddam Hussein's military in 2003? In his book, Mr. Steven K. O'Hern does a valuable service by detailing America's intelligence failure. Despite the massive undertakings of the 9/11 Commission and other "post 9/11" intelligence reviews, major flaws still plague our intelligence system. These flaws place our uniformed service members at risk and undermine our national security.
Mr. O'Hern served as the director of the Strategic Counterintelligence Directorate (SCID) of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) for six months in 2005. The primary mission of the SCID was to identify and locate insurgents who were conducting attacks against Coalition Forces. It was mainly a human intelligence (HUMINT) operation, collecting information from Iraqis who were recruited and trained for the task.
O'Hern traces our intelligence failure in Iraq to three general areas: lack of emphasis and appreciation of HUMINT, the "stovepipe" structure of our intelligence community (i.e., agencies' keeping intelligence to themselves and not sharing it with one another), and the inability/unwillingness to acknowledge threats until after they have manifested. Much was made of the pre-9/11 era's "wall" between intelligence agencies in law enforcement and national security, who intentionally or by prohibition did not share intelligence. This failure led to the inability of analysts to "connect the dots," which might have better warned us of an impending terrorist attack. Despite the restructuring of America's intelligence community, O'Hern says we have failed to learn our lesson. "The single largest hindrance to effectively understanding and acting on intelligence is the intelligence community's collective failure to share information," (p. 208). Frequently, military intelligence units conducting operations do not share their information, creating overlap or even causing units to work at cross purposes.
Download the full article: The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad
Lieutenant Junior Grade Robert Jake Bebber is an Information Warfare Officer stationed at Navy Information Operations Command, Maryland. He served as the Information Operations officer for a Joint Provincial Reconstruction Team in Khost Province, Afghanistan in 2008. He holds a doctorate in Public Policy from the University of Central Florida.
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/06/2010 - 4:17pm | 6 comments
In Afghan War, Letting Women Reach Women - Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times.... These are not your mother's Marines here in the rugged California chaparral of Camp Pendleton, where 40 young women are preparing to deploy to Afghanistan in one of the more forward-leaning experiments of the American military.Next month they will begin work as members of the first full-time "female engagement teams," the military's name for four- and five-member units that will accompany men on patrols in Helmand Province to try to win over the rural Afghan women who are culturally off limits to outside men. The teams, which are to meet with the Afghan women in their homes, assess their need for aid and gather intelligence, are part of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's campaign for Afghan hearts and minds. His officers say that you cannot gain the trust of the Afghan population if you only talk to half of it."We know we can make a difference," said Capt. Emily Naslund, 26, the team's executive officer and second in command. Like the other 39 women, Captain Naslund volunteered for the program and radiates exuberance, but she is not naí¯ve about the frustrations and dangers ahead. Half of the women have been deployed before, most to Iraq...
More at The New York Times.
Also see Half-Hearted: Trying to Win Afghanistan without Afghan Women - Captain Matt Pottinger, Hali Jilani, and Claire Russo, Small Wars Journal.
by Robert Haddick | Fri, 03/05/2010 - 5:48pm | 18 comments
Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:
Topics include:
1) Mullen finished off the Powell Doctrine,
2) What is Burma learning from the nuclear "rogues"?
Mullen finished off the Powell Doctrine
After a long illness and years of neglect, Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally euthanized the Powell Doctrine. Mullen administered the coup de grí¢ce in a speech he delivered on March 3 at Kansas State University.
During his tenure as chairman, Gen. Colin Powell stated the principles he thought the U.S. government should follow when contemplating the use of military force. According to Powell, the situation should involve a vital national security interest. There should be a clear and obtainable objective. A clear exit strategy should be planned from the beginning. The action should have broad political support. The military plan should employ decisive and overwhelming force in order to achieve a rapid result. And the country should use force only as a last resort. Powell's principles were no doubt the product of his negative experiences as an officer during the Vietnam War and the results of Operation Desert Storm, which seemed at the time to be a vindication of his ideas.
Needless to say, the deployments of U.S. military force this decade have obeyed precious few of these guidelines. Powell wrote his doctrine in an attempt to keep the United States from thoughtlessly involving itself in ill-defined and open-ended military quagmires. But critics have argued that modern irregular adversaries have exploited gaps the doctrine left uncovered. By this view, rigid adherence to the Powell Doctrine would prevent the United States from having any effective response to irregular warfare challenges. Neither the Bush nor Obama administrations have followed its precepts.
So what is the new Mullen Doctrine? For the chairman, the issue of whether the United States will employ military force has long been settled. The issue now is how the United States should apply its national power. Mullen summed up his views this way:
Click through to read more ...
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/05/2010 - 8:44am | 9 comments
Caveat emptor. Received the email below from John, complete with
his apropos signature line (personal info redacted). His thorough
YouTube Channel is evidence of
his commitment to this "science" and features an eclectic set of clips and soundtracks
in the mix along with his rigorous explanation of the topic. I'm
shocked, shocked that DoD
and DARPA refused comment. One would think that after all the experimentation
to come up with a technological nose that can out-rover Fido, they might open their
aperture to lower tech alternatives. They may get more of these unsolicited
proposals than we do so a little slack might be due, but they are better
staffed.
Happy weekend.
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/05/2010 - 5:20am | 1 comment
Engagement Pays Off in Philippines Terror War - Al Santoli, Washington Times.... The recent captures and killings of feared Abu Sayyaf Group leaders in the southernmost Philippine islands, such as Sulu and Basilan, are part of the military's success at using community engagement by local military units. Local intelligence tip-offs by community residents and the rejection of the ASG's terror tactics by the vast majority of Muslim Filipinos have been the key to success.In recent years, the U.S. military employed a civil-affairs-style approach to counterterrorism, especially the successful counterinsurgency strategy used by Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander in Iraq and later U.S. Central Command leader, and being adapted in the current surge in Afghanistan. Even before U.S. forces used local engagement programs, allied militaries such as those in the Philippines were using similar techniques such as engaging with local communities...
More at The Washington Times.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/04/2010 - 3:23pm | 0 comments
Iraq on the Eve of Elections - Marisa Cochrane Sullivan and James Danly, The Institute for the Study of War.The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has published a detailed backgrounder on this Sunday's parliamentary elections, Iraq on the Eve of Elections, by Marisa Cochrane Sullivan and James Danly. ISW's 15 page report offers analysis and likely outcomes from two Iraq experts who have written about the region extensively."Our report details the precarious position Prime Minister Maliki is in at the moment because he is surrounded by rivals seeking to unseat him," said former U.S. Army officer and ISW Fellow James Danly. "It is likely that this election will be viewed as legitimate but it is the period of government formation that follows the vote which will be messy," Mr. Danly concluded."In an emerging democracy like Iraq, the second election is often the most important test for a peaceful transfer of power and the reason why so many are watching this election closely," explained ISW Research Director, Marisa Cochrane Sullivan.Mrs. Cochrane continued, "This publication also highlights the fact that Sunnis, Shi'as and Kurds in Iraq have the opportunity to express their political will via democratic processes rather than through violence."
More at The Institute for the Study.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/04/2010 - 3:03am | 0 comments
Mullen Urges More 'Soft Power' in Afghanistan - John J. Kruzel, American Forces Press Service.The nation's top military officer expressed concern today that U.S. government agencies other than the military have been slow to expand their role in Afghanistan. Speaking to an audience at Kansas State University here, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, underscored the need for a "whole-of-government" approach to Afghanistan, with greater input from so-called "soft power" agencies such as the State Department."My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren't moving fast enough in this regard," Mullen said. "U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent on the generals and admiral who lead our major overseas commands, and not enough on the State Department."Mullen's remarks at the Landon Lecture echoed a familiar refrain that the United States should seek balance in military and nonmilitary efforts, a tack that represents a departure from what Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has referred to as a "creeping militarization" in American foreign policy. The chairman embraced requests by Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton for more funding and greater emphasis on soft power, suggesting that deployment of U.S. troops should depend on other government agencies' readiness to engage...
More at American Forces Press Service.
Joint Chiefs Chairman Readjusts Principles on Use of Force - Thom Shanker, New York Times.
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, laid out new principles Wednesday for how to use the military in meeting contemporary threats, saying that overwhelming force can be counterproductive if used recklessly.In a careful recalibration of well-known principles set forth years ago by a predecessor, Gen. Colin L. Powell, Admiral Mullen said the military "must not try to use force only in an overwhelming capacity, but in the proper capacity, and in a precise and principled manner."Speaking at Kansas State University, he pointed to new rules restricting the use of combat force in Afghanistan, where civilian deaths caused by American troops and American bombs have outraged the local population and made the case for the insurgency. That kind of restraint, at the insistence of the field commander there, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, has been criticized in some quarters as reneging on the so-called Powell Doctrine, which favored overwhelming force to achieve unambiguous victories...More at The New York Times.
Top U.S. Military Official Outlines Tempered Approach to War - Julian Barnes, Los Angeles Times.
The U.S. military must use measured and precise strikes, not overwhelming force, in the wars it is likely to face in the future, the nation's top uniformed officer said Wednesday in outlining a revised approach to American security.The view outlined by Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, differs both from the doctrine of overwhelming force advanced by Colin L. Powell, a onetime Joint Chiefs chairman, and the "shock and awe" approach of former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. "There is no single, defining American way of war," Mullen argued. "It changes over time, and it should change over time, adapting appropriately to the most relevant threats to our national security."Mullen's views, presented in a speech at Kansas State University, mirror the latest U.S.-led offensive in Afghanistan, a showcase effort in which troops in Marja are trying not only to seize control of territory but to obtain influence over the local population in a bid to break the hold of insurgents. His comments are significant because the Joint Chiefs chairman under the Constitution serves as the president's chief military advisor...More at The Los Angeles Times.
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/03/2010 - 6:45am | 5 comments
The Next Battles for Marja - Joshua Foust, New York Times opinion.This year will be the third in a row that tens of thousands of new United States troops have arrived in Afghanistan with plans to "clear, hold and build" areas controlled by the Taliban. Those previous surges have achieved little success at holding or building, as the international coalition and Afghan government have inevitably failed to come up with realistic plans for what happens after the fighting is done. Is the campaign in Marja destined for the same fate?The international coalition's strategic goal for Afghanistan is to build "an enduring stable, secure, prosperous and democratic state." Only by focusing on the messy medium-term stages of reconstruction - those months, and possibly years, after the fighting dies down - do we have any chance of achieving such a goal. In this regard, Marja presents us with four distinct hurdles...
More at The New York Times.
by Niel Smith | Mon, 03/01/2010 - 6:45pm | 0 comments
Major Nate Springer, the current operations officer at the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center, penned an excellent blog post about the need for Soldiers and Marines to develop personal relationships with locals in a counterinsurgency environment. He writes:
Success in Afghanistan hinges on the ability of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to establish close personal relationships with the local Afghan population we are chartered to protect. Please note I did not say only leaders should maintain these relationships. I said everyone. These relationships must be genuine, with actual emotional investment and trust extended on each side. It is not simple. It is tricky to befriend those we are unsure of.
Americans start out at a young age learning classic adages like "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you." Our time-honored golden rule has worked in every situation for me - until I got to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan the rule should read, "Do unto the Afghans as the Afghans do unto each other." We should not expect them to embrace our approach simply because we believe we are efficient problem solvers. They see our approach as hasty and arrogant. We encroached on their culture so we must adapt and learn to collaborate in a more personal way. Our cultures are disparate but we can do this. My men and I have done it.
The Afghan men I encountered in rural Eastern Afghanistan weren't interested in our technology, desire to achieve quick results, attain immediate information, or solve their problems today. They were interested in what we were made of on the inside. They looked to see if we were for real or were just faking it, if we cared about them and could be trusted, and finally, why we were interested in them in the first place.
As I have studied Afghanistan through both my own experience and through extensive reading, I have identified a common theme. Gaining and maintaining personal relationships is the critical element necessary to be successful in a population-focused strategy ... The personal relationships we make and maintain with the Afghans we encounter in our Areas of Operation are directly related to our success or failure.
The question remains on how we leverage these relationships long term, beyond the 12 (or 7) month rotation of combat units. Comment over at the COIN Center blog, which has been really provocative lately.
by Robert Haddick | Mon, 03/01/2010 - 3:17pm | 4 comments
Writing in yesterday's Washington Post, Mike McConnell -- a retired U.S. Navy vice admiral, former director of the National Security Agency, and former director of national intelligence -- called on the United States to prepare for cyber warfare. McConnell calls for developing a capability to deter cyber attacks (presumably through the threat of retaliation) and to develop the capabilities and policies to apply preemption against cyber aggressors who aren't persuaded by deterrence.
Nuclear deterrence kept the peace during the Cold War. Data mining and drone hits may be keeping al Qaeda at bay. But fixing America's vulnerability to cyber attack will be much more complicated. And disruptive -- it may require the "Balkanization" of the World Wide Web and a de facto government seizure of the country's telecommunications infrastructure.
In his essay, McConnell reminds us of some features of the internet that currently make deterrence theory impractical. Anonymity is built into the current structure. It is difficult to retaliate (or bring legal action) if one cannot identify the perpetrator. A new, redesigned, and security-conscious World Wide Web could require user authentication. But many would be un—to use such a system. After a cyber "Pearl Harbor," some governments may require the addition of security features that defenders of privacy and individual liberty have thus far resisted. The result could be the breakdown of the World Wide Web into a multitude of internets that, due to security features, will not link to each other.
The private sector telecommunication firms that provide the backbone of the internet have made enormous capital investments on which they expect a return. Further innovation in telecommunication will require further capital investments, which won't occur unless these firms have a prospect of making reasonable returns on those investments. These firms want a mass, unified market, not Balkanization. Governments, responsible for national security, will have a different perspective. McConnell calls for the two sides to work together on the security problem. But if a cyber "Pearl Harbor" happens first, de facto nationalization might be the result.
Finally, McConnell mentions deterrence but doesn't get explicit on how the U.S. would or should employ retaliation (assuming it could find an attacker in the first place). Assuming legal and diplomatic remedies in a certain case are meaningless, must the U.S. respond to a cyber attack only with cyber retaliation? Once again, the analogy to the Cold War breaks down. The U.S. built a nuclear arsenal as large as it needed and made it clear that it held at risk assets that adversaries valued. The U.S. did what it needed to do to achieve "escalation dominance." In cyber warfare, the U.S. is on the losing side of escalation dominance. With a very high density of computers and telecom systems, the more a cyber war escalates, the more the U.S. will suffer.
However, the U.S. retains (at least for now) its dominance in purely military responses. Will U.S. cyber deterrence doctrine contemplate the use of Tomahawk cruise missiles or B-2 strikes in response to a large-scale cyber attack? If an attack doesn't go "bang," is it war?
McConnell's essay urges action on cyber defense. But there are a lot of cyber players inside the U.S. and they have a long list of things to work out with each other. I'm not counting on progress any time soon -- and that probably won't be fast enough.