Small Wars Journal

Blog Posts

SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 12/15/2008 - 6:42pm | 0 comments
US Accuses Britain Over Military Failings in Afghanistan - Tom Baldwin and Michael Evans, The Times

The performance of Britain's overstretched military in Afghanistan is coming under sustained criticism from the Pentagon and US analysts even as Gordon Brown ponders whether to send in further reinforcements.

Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary who has been asked to remain in his job under Barack Obama, is understood to have expressed strong reservations about counterinsurgency operations in British-controlled Helmand province.

He has already announced plans for a surge of 20,000 US troops into Afghanistan but Mr Brown, who was given a bleak progress report when he visited Afghanistan at the weekend, is said to be reluctant about committing another 2,000 British troops on top of the 8,400 already there.

More at The Times.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 12/15/2008 - 11:21am | 4 comments
From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century - Frank Hoffman, Center for a New American Security

One of the most important national security challenges facing the next president of the United States will be preserving America's maritime power. The U.S. Navy has been cut in half since the 1980s, shrinking steadily from 594 to today's 280 ships. The fleet size has been cut by 60 ships during the Bush administration alone, despite significantly increased Pentagon budgets.

Several naval analysts and commentators, including the observant Robert Kaplan, have argued that America's present naval fleet constitutes an "elegant decline" or outright neglect. A former Reagan administration naval official contends that our current maritime policy and investment levels are "verging towards unilateral naval disarmament."

This is something of an overstatement. The American naval fleet is still substantially larger than any other, and has unmatched global reach and endurance. The U.S. Navy's aggregate tonnage is the equivalent of the next 17 international navies, of which 14 are U.S. allies, and our power projection capabilities retain a 4:1 advantage in missiles. Looking simply at overall naval ship totals may not be the most accurate measure of naval power, but it is an historical standard of measurement. By that criterion, the U.S. Navy has not been this size since World War I, when Britain's Royal Navy was the guarantor of the global commons.

While one can debate whether today's Navy is sized properly, there is little doubt that U.S. maritime capabilities are critical to the execution of any national security strategy. The so-called American Century has largely been coterminous with the U.S. Navy's mastery of seapower. In a global economy that is increasingly interdependent and dependent on the security of the global highways of international trade, maritime security will remain a vital national interest...

From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 12/14/2008 - 4:20pm | 0 comments

High Noon Saloon & Brewery

Located in the historic Great Western Manufacturing Building, Leavenworth, Kansas.

Plucked from the Small Wars Council's Non-Virtual Community forum -- in the spirit of the 3Bs of deep thinking -- basements, bars, and backyards; this forum is to facilitate local get-togethers. Council members have met in DC, Arlington, Quantico, Ft. Leavenworth, Ft. Hood, Ottawa and even Estonia. The skinny has it that additional non-virtuals are planned in even more exotic locations - can you believe that? Any-hoot, if you are near Leavenworth this Wednesday, the 17th of December, take a break and join in the fun and great conversation. H-hour is 1800. Be there or be square and check this thread (Council members only) for updates.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 12/14/2008 - 9:37am | 0 comments
Report Spotlights Iraq Rebuilding Blunders - James Glanz and Christian Miller, New York Times

An unpublished 513-page federal history of the American-led reconstruction of Iraq depicts an effort crippled before the invasion by Pentagon planners who were hostile to the idea of rebuilding a foreign country, and then molded into a $100 billion failure by bureaucratic turf wars, spiraling violence and ignorance of the basic elements of Iraqi society and infrastructure.

The history, the first official account of its kind, is circulating in draft form here and in Washington among a tight circle of technical reviewers, policy experts and senior officials. It also concludes that when the reconstruction began to lag - particularly in the critical area of rebuilding the Iraqi police and army - the Pentagon simply put out inflated measures of progress to cover up the failures.

In one passage, for example, former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell is quoted as saying that in the months after the 2003 invasion, the Defense Department "kept inventing numbers of Iraqi security forces - the number would jump 20,000 a week! 'We now have 80,000, we now have 100,000, we now have 120,000.' "

More at The New York Times and read 'Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience' in full via the NY Times.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 12/14/2008 - 9:13am | 0 comments
We're back after ~18 hours of darkness. Sunspots, pesky old Al Qaeda, that annoying wing beating Amazonian butterfly, and maybe a little of our technical incompetence were to blame for our big server corruption. But it appears we have fully restored and haven't lost any existing content, just the opportunity cost of not getting that revelation that someone was going to provide in a blog comment or Council post while pondering deep thoughts on a Saturday night. Oh well. Now that it's Sunday morning, no need to hold that thought any longer. Have a cup of coffee and let it fly. We are mission capable once again.

And while you are at it, do your last minute shopping through those little Amazon links on the top right. Free money for us, no cost to you. Clearly, we are in need of some technical help.

by Robert Bateman | Sat, 12/13/2008 - 10:41am | 3 comments
Recently on an e-mail based discussion group in which I participate, there was some extended debate about how much language training was enough and which was more important, language training or history/culture education, for deploying soldiers. It was an informed and interesting squabble, with practitioners from every American war since Korea piping in with opinions and points of evidence. Then one fellow, a former-soldier-turned-photojournalist named Jim, plopped down the Truth. His simple formulation? "It's a people thing."

Now I am not a big one for the whole "emotional" thingeemabob. In most debates I want footnotes, documentation, and fracking proof for everything. People who know my history know this about me. But there are limits, and Jim's simple statement hit the mark. Sometimes, some very rare times, you don't need proof. You don't need evidence. You need only know how to feel, and be human. Jim, I knew instantly, was right.

So here I suspend. Watch this video.

No, wait. STOP. Backstory first. Because, as you all know, I'm Mr. Context.

OK, so a few years ago this doofus Seattle kid, a 20 something named Matt, decided he wanted to see the world. He took off, and it being the internet age and all, he updated his friends with short snippet videos from all over. The hook was that all of his friends firmly believed that this fellow, Matt, was quite possibly the worst dancer in all of human history.

They were probably right.

But because young Matt had a sense of humor, the snippet videos he sent to his friends from around (that time) South and SE Asia, were all of him dancing his somewhat, ahhhh, unique "dance" in various locals.

Then somebody tied all the videos together. It went "viral"...meaning that people across the planet watched it. Millions upon millions of them. Including some very saavy marketers at an Australian gum company called "Stride." They wrote to Matt and said, "Hey mate, like to do it again on our dime?" So Matt went around the world again, doing his doofy dance. That video was even bigger. Matt was inundated with mail, and Stride saw a global marketing boost, so they (being Aussies) said, "Double down mate." And Matt fused the two...all of the e-mail he had from around the planet...people who loved his video, and a travel expense account that his unemployed butt could have never supported.

This video was the upshot:

Where The Hell is Matt?

And THIS, ladies and gentlemen, is what we fight for. Or at least it is one part of what I fight for. Your mileage may vary, but for me, the vision of the world that this dumb-ass, 20-something, no-talent Muldoon gave us through his genius is enough. Our world is farked up, or at least large parts of the world...the parts that we Soldiers (and our brothers, the Marines) see, are often farked up. But young Matt, with this effing magnificent, transcendent, unifying-the-whole-goddamned-planet vision, which he demonstrated to the world all by his lonesome far better (judging by the 26 million hits on this video) than DoD, or State, or than any part of our government ever has, is a vision of the planet that represents what I want for our collective future.

My friend Jim is right. "It's a People Thing."

I hope this is what you fight for as well. Regardless of your nationality.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 12/13/2008 - 2:48am | 0 comments

Secretary Gates Urges Greater Balance in Military Capabilities

by Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, in a Foreign Affairs magazine article, calls on the defense establishment to recognize the importance of low-intensity, irregular capabilities and unconventional thinking to succeed in the war on violent extremism.

The outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan will set the stage for the United States' ability to deal with future threats, Gates wrote in an article called "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," published in the magazine's January/February issue.

"To be blunt, to fail -- or to be seen to fail -- in either Iraq or Afghanistan would be a disastrous blow to U.S. credibility, both among friends and allies and among potential adversaries," he wrote.

While calling it "irresponsible" not to look ahead to future conventional and strategic threats, Gates said the defense establishment can't lose sight of today's pressing requirements in the process.

The secretary expressed frustration over the Defense Department's budget and bureaucracy, calling them overly committed to conventional modernization programs. He urged balance, as spelled out in the new National Defense Strategy, which gives equal focus to nonconventional capabilities and know-how.

"My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support ... for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors," he wrote. Gates extended blame to the Pentagon bureaucracy, Congress and the defense industry.

Direct military force will continue to play a role in the prolonged, worldwide, irregular campaign against terrorists and other extremists, Gates acknowledged.

"But over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory," he said. "Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit."

Those goals won't happen overnight, he conceded. Instead, they'll require "the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies," he wrote.

While the United States isn't likely to face the exact circumstances taking place in Iraq or Afghanistan any time soon, Gates said, it should expect to encounter challenges elsewhere in the world. When facing these, Gates advised taking the indirect approach whenever possible. Building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces can prevent problems from turning into crises that require direct U.S. military intervention, he wrote.

The secretary, a staunch advocate of the "soft" as well as the "hard" elements of national power, lauded renewed emphasis on State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development capabilities. But even with more funding and manpower channeled to those organizations, Gates said, he doesn't envision a day when military commanders won't be tied in some way to security and stability missions.

He cited "impressive strides" the military has made in recent years to support those missions. These include steep increases in special operations funding and personnel, advances in the Air Force unmanned aerial operations programs, and a new Navy expeditionary combat command and restoration of its units capable of operating on rivers.

Meanwhile, he added, new counterinsurgency and Army operations manuals and a new maritime strategy incorporate lessons learned in recent operations.

Gates pointed to vivid reminders of the dangers insurgencies and failing states continue to present if not adequately addressed. These threats and others the United States is likely to face in the future are too big and too potentially catastrophic to be overlooked today, Gates wrote.

"The kinds of capabilities needed to deal with these scenarios cannot be considered exotic distractions or temporary diversions," he said. "The United States does not have the luxury of opting out because these scenarios do not conform to preferred notions of the American way of war."

This is first article in a series based on Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates' article, A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, published in the January/February 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 12/12/2008 - 8:01pm | 0 comments
As a follow-on to this August entry on the SWJ Blog and Small Wars Council discussion thread on the Minerva Project, we received the following nice note from Corrie at the Stanford Humanities Center. A skeptical viewpoint based on historical analysis? Hmmm, might resonate with some of our crowd.

I saw the SWJ Minerva Project entry and thought you might be interested in an essay written by a Stanford history Prof. who has some reservations about the project. History Professor Priya Satia wrote the essay for the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) which has set up an on-line platform where invited scholars post their concerns and arguments relating to the Minerva Project. In her essay, Satia explains that the DoD's appeal to scholars is a misguided attempt to involve academics without fully considering the consequences of the act. Satia uses her history expertise to illustrate her point and explains that the British military was involved in a similar situation in the Middle East following WWI.

Read the entire SSRC essay, The Forgotten History of Knowledge and Power in British Iraq, or Why Minerva's Owl Cannot Fly, or this short story about Prof. Satia's involvement with the SSRC.

BTW, our friends at the American Anthropological Association aren't big fans of Minerva either. They seem pretty well dead-set against anything to do with DoD. But it is still wise to grasp the well-reasoned reservations that academia has about the project. It is, after all, engagement, which must be done on mutually acceptable terms.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 12/10/2008 - 8:37pm | 0 comments
Building a Military for the 21st Century

New Realities, New Priorities

by Lawrence J. Korb, Peter Juul, Laura Conley, Major Myles B. Caggins III and Sean Duggan; Center for American Progress

The next administration will have to contend with two wars, a military readiness crisis, recruitment and retention problems, mounting equipment shortages, and an out-of-control defense acquisition process.

Read the Full Report - Download the Executive Summary - Overall Recommendations for the Department of Defense - Budget Recommendations - Interactive: Design Your Own Defense Budget

In a little over one month, a new administration will have the opportunity to manage a significant realignment of U.S. defense and national security priorities. To be sure, this process will not occur in a vacuum. Today's security imperatives and budgetary realities will require the next administration to make hard decisions and difficult trade-offs on competing visions of the military and its role in implementing national security strategy. These trade-offs will have wide-ranging consequences for the size and structure of the force, and what procurement and modernization options are feasible in order to advance overall U.S. national security interests.

Pentagon planners have already begun to warn the incoming administration about the choices it will have to make. A Pentagon advisory group recently notified the president-elect's office that the Department of Defense, "cannot reset the current force, modernize and transform in all portfolios at the same time. Choices must be made across capabilities and within systems to deliver capability at known prices within a specific period of time."

Full Report.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 12/10/2008 - 5:35pm | 0 comments

Africa Command Welcomes Army Component

Southern European Task Force cased its old colors, ending the airborne chapter of its history, and uncased its new colors signifying acceptance of its new mission as the Army component in support of US Africa Command in a ceremony here today. The ceremony followed an official announcement by the US and Italian governments Dec. 3 in Rome that SETAF would become US Army Africa.

"We are honored and privileged to be the first members of US Army Africa," Army Major General William B. Garrett III, SETAF commanding general, said. "This is a huge responsibility, as our decisions and actions will establish the foundation that others will build upon in the years ahead."

Army General William E. "Kip" Ward, commander of US Africa Command, and Army General Carter Ham, commander of US Army Europe and 7th Army, attended the ceremony, which highlighted SETAF's long, proud history.

"I welcome all of you to the US Africa Command team," Ward said. "I am confident that this great command is up to the challenge."

Garrett, who was promoted from brigadier general to major general earlier today, said that while SETAF's mission has changed, its relationship with the command's Italian partners will not.

"The enduring relationship between the United States and Italy will only get stronger; new opportunities will spring from common objectives and a shared vision for a prosperous Africa," he said.

SETAF, stationed in Italy since 1955, has a long history of operating on the African continent and working with African nations. During the past 15 years, SETAF has provided crisis response, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance on the continent.

During the next year, SETAF soldiers will learn and grow to lay the foundation for future success as US Army Africa, Garrett said. This foundation includes building and strengthening relationships with African army organizations, along with national and international partners, to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, he said.

by Dave Dilegge | Wed, 12/10/2008 - 3:47am | 0 comments
Via Galrahn at Information Dissemination - The US Naval Institute is now blogging. So far, so good. Glad to see USNI in the blogosphere.

Also - check out Information Dissemination's main page for a lively discussion of piracy issues and Secretary Gates' recent Foreign Affairs article entitled A Balanced Strategy.

And while I'm at it - check out Seven Questions: Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper on How to Kick Pirate Booty at Foreign Policy.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 12/09/2008 - 8:19am | 0 comments
Sons of Iraq: A Vote of Confidence for Reconciliation

by Adam Weinstein, MNC-I Public Affairs

Sons of Iraq: A Vote of Confidence for Reconciliation (Full PDF Article)

In early November, as U.S. Soldiers looked on, Baghdad-based members of the Sons of Iraq got their monthly paychecks from a new boss: the Iraqi government.

"It was a critical step in the turnover of the mostly Sunni volunteers from Coalition to Iraqi control. And the Baghdad transfer has become a model for similar moves in four other key provinces," according to Lt. Col. Jeffrey Kulmayer, the chief of reconciliation and engagement for Multi-National Corps - Iraq. "The government is doing the right thing. Baghdad has gone quite well, and we expect that the rest of the provinces will do the same."

The Sons of Iraq, one of the war's good-news stories, occupy what Maj. Gen. Michael Ferriter, the deputy commanding General of MNC -- I, calls "the leading edge of reconciliation." A few years ago, many of the group's members considered Coalition forces their enemies; some fought against U.S. troops and their allies. But in June 2007, armed militiamen in Anbar province found they shared a goal with the Coalition: taking back their neighborhoods from al Qaeda in Iraq. "We helped organize them and eventually began to fund them to provide critical infrastructure and security throughout Anbar," said Ferriter, "and it quickly spread to many of the other provinces."

Sons of Iraq: A Vote of Confidence for Reconciliation (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 12/09/2008 - 8:07am | 0 comments
US Army Training and Doctrine Command Change-of-Command Ceremony

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Fort Monroe, VA, Monday, December 08, 2008.

Today, we pay tribute to the career and achievements of one Army leader, welcome another, and reflect on the ways that this command has transformed itself and the Army.

General Scott Wallace's retirement and relinquishment of this command brings to a close nearly four decades of training, mentoring, and leading soldiers at every level. The arc and trajectory of that career -- culminating in the changes General Wallace has led here in TRADOC -- in many ways tracks the story of the U.S. Army over the past two generations...

by Dave Dilegge | Mon, 12/08/2008 - 8:12pm | 0 comments
Just spent an absolutely great 24 hours plus -- a 2 1/2 hour dinner last night with COIN Leadership Seminar panelists Colonel Steve Davis, Colonel Dave Maxwell and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling; moderator Colonel Dan Kelly, MCTAG Director Colonel Scott Cottrell and SWJ partner in crime Bill Nagle.

Great conversation on complex issues led into today's seminar -- adding into the mix an informed and experienced audience made for quite a day. We will have more on this later as we sort through the notes for an AAR and format the video of today's panel discussion as well as the Q&A for CD and web posting.

With that, I'll leave you with a couple of pics and the opening remarks of LTC Paul Yingling...

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 12/08/2008 - 7:26pm | 6 comments
Delegate Beyond Point of Comfort

by Ken White

The tendency in the United State Armed Forces to micromanage is inimical to competency in combat and has adverse implications for doctrinal development. We should train to eliminate it yet instead we tacitly -- some would say overtly -- encourage it.

Colonel Daniel S. Roper, Director, USA/USMC COIN Center, 10 Dec 07 Iraq visit briefing (extract):

Delegation. OODA loop so tight, if capabilities, lethal or non-lethal, (e.g., AH, $, Intel, PSYOPs) not pushed to executor, may miss window of opportunity. Delegate beyond point of comfort. (emphasis added)

Why should such an obvious thing have to be said?

Because our egos are so large that we discard the lessons of history and sometimes even our training for our own determination of what is required and we know we cannot trust our subordinates to do it our way? Since we have been successful, obviously our way is correct...

That may be unfair and it certainly does not apply to all but it does apply to many; more importantly, we often forget it does not have to be our way to be correct and when we do remember that, we recall that our subordinates are not as capable as we'd like. Thus we eschew delegation and micromanage. We do this in the face of historical precedent in all our wars that this is practiced on entry and is discarded as dangerous as we gain experience in that war. See First Manassas or Kasserine Pass and compare those with later unit and soldier actions at Yellow Tavern and penetrating the Siegfried Line in the same wars.

I applauded when I was told that had been stated by Colonel Roper. Seemed like a long overdue observation to me. I have watched the progress of micromanagement in the Armed Forces of the United States since World War II. Watched it with considerable fear and trepidation. Even got to operate under it for many years...

While my comments apply to all four services and to the Department of Defense as an entity, I am more familiar with the US Army and will address just it in detail...

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 12/07/2008 - 1:48pm | 0 comments
Council member Cavguy (Major Niel Smith at the USA / USMC COIN Center) recommends Understanding Airpower: Bonfire of the Fallacies by Colin Gray.

A great balanced paper on the capabilities and limitations of airpower... Read it all, some sacred cows get slain, both for groundpounders and airpower advocates...

This study rests upon two vital assumptions, both of them anathema to post-modern minds. First, it believes that historical truth can be found, or at least approached. Second, it believes in the utility of ambitious theory. The discussion here flatly rejects the proposition that "history" simply comprises competing "fables" told by historians with interests and attitudes.

Similarly, it dismisses almost out-of-hand the belief that one theory is worth about as much as any other, which is not very much. This analysis seeks to find plausibly verifiable truth and, as a consequence, to identify error, the "fallacies" in the secondary title. To understand airpower, most especially American airpower, is a task imbued with high significance for national and international security. But, this task is harassed and frequently frustrated by both unsound history and incompetent theorizing. The problem is that those who debate airpower typically seek the history that they can use to advantage, not the history that strives honestly to be true. As for the theory of airpower, it never did take off safely; it continues to fly in contested skies or to taxi indecisively on the runway. No single short study can aspire to correct for 90 years of poor history and shoddy theory, but it can at least make a start.

The hunter who seeks to find and slay fallacies about airpower finds himself in a target-rich environment. Paradoxically and ironically, airpower's most forceful advocates, from the time of Billy Mitchell (1920s) to the present, also have served as its worst enemies. The prime loser has been US national security.

Understanding Airpower: Bonfire of the Fallacies by Colin Gray

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 12/07/2008 - 12:16pm | 0 comments
A Combat Vet's Reading List - Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement has the list, and a damn good one it is.

Larry Gwin, former US Army captain, Silver Star, Purple Heart, XO of Alpha Co., 2/7 Cav, 1st Cav Division, veteran of the Ia Drang battles of 1965 and author of Baptism: A Vietnam Memoir, spent many years trying to understand war and find some context for his own horrific combat experience by exploring war literature. It is useful exercise, because in this manner the combat veteran may learn from other people, find commonality in what they write, ease the alienation and find his or her place in history. It is an important part of the post-combat normalization process. Make that post-combat normality transcendence process. There is the risk of obsession, but if that is an issue, take it up with your shrink.

In any case, Larry got bored the other morning, drafted his quick combat reading list, and emailed it. A couple of his buddies, on an email list that runs from Guadalcanal through Korea and Vietnam to Petraeus' Baghdad staff and the Afghan Counterinsurgency Academy, added to it...

A Combat Vet's Reading List at Forward Movement.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 12/07/2008 - 11:25am | 0 comments

Via the Center for a New American Security:

On December 5, as part of our ongoing discussion with veterans returning from the front line, the Center for a New American Security was pleased to feature Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling for the latest installment in our Voices from the Field Project. The discussion focused on the need to internalize valuable insight from our experienced junior officers and the importance of decentralized decision making throughout the ranks. LTC Yingling described the need for 'adaptive leadership' specifically from returning veterans and further outlined institutional changes to re-incentivize the military's internal promotion structure. However, Yingling stressed junior officers should not wait for institutional adaptation. Instead veterans should better integrate first-hand combat experience into the central dialogue regarding the future of American forces. In his often cited article A Failure in Generalship published in the Armed Forces Journal, LTC Yingling describes the role of the general in preparing and executing effective and adaptive warfare for the 21st century:

To prepare forces for war, the general must visualize the conditions of future combat. To raise military forces properly, the general must visualize the quality and quantity of forces needed in the next war. To arm and equip military forces properly, the general must visualize the materiel requirements of future engagements. To train military forces properly, the general must visualize the human demands on future battlefields, and replicate those conditions in peacetime exercises.

To listen to LTC Paul Yingling's opening remarks, please click here.

And for those in the DC Metro area on Monday:

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Leadership Seminar. On 8 December 2008 the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW) will host a Counterinsurgency Leadership Seminar at Little Hall (Base Theater), Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia, featuring Colonel Stephen Davis (USMC), Colonel David Maxwell (USA) and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling. This seminar is cosponsored by CIW, US Joint Forces Command Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) and Small Wars Journal (SWJ).

Seminar Panel Members. Colonel Stephen Davis, USMC. Col Davis is currently the Deputy Commander of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. Previously, Col Davis commanded Regimental Combat Team 2 in Iraq. Colonel David Maxwell, USA. COL Maxwell is currently the G-3 (Operations Officer) of the US Army Special Operations Command. Previously he commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, USA. LTC Yingling is the Commander of 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery and is currently deployed to Iraq performing detainee operations. He has served two previous tours in Iraq and has also deployed to Bosnia and Operation Desert Storm.

Moderator. Colonel Daniel Kelly, USMC. Col Kelly is the Director of the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare. He has held a wide variety of command and staff billets and participated in numerous operations to include Operations Restore Hope / Continue Hope (Somalia), Operations Allied Force / Joint Guardian, (Kosovo) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF I and II).

COIN Leadership Seminar - Information Paper and Map

by Paul Yingling | Sun, 12/07/2008 - 9:47am | 0 comments
Bob Andrews is the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. As a Special Forces officer, he conducted intelligence, long-range reconnaissance and covert operations during two tours in Vietnam. He later served in senior positions at the Central Intelligence Agency and on the staff of Senator John Glenn. A former defense industry leader and author of three books and numerous articles, he returned to government in 2001 as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. In 2006, he became Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security. until his appointment as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army in 2007.

Along with John Paul Vann, Bob co-authored two insightful studies on counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam in 1965. Motivational Training in Counterinsurgency: A Proposal offers practical advice to tactical units in developing host-nation security forces. These observations included "protect the villages upon completion of securing operations conducted by regular forces" and "promote the idea of participation in civic affairs."

What the motivational study is to tactics, Harnessing the Revolution in South Vietnam is to strategy. The authors begin with an analysis of the political situation in Vietnam, including the assessment that "a popular political base for the Government of South Vietnam does not now exist" and recommend "establishment of a country team advisory unit."

In reading these works, I recalled Phillip Larkin's Annus Mirabilis.

Sexual intercourse began

In nineteen sixty-three

(which was rather late for me) -

Between the end of the Chatterley ban

And the Beatles' first LP.

Counterinsurgency is surely among the world's oldest professions. The knowledge we need to win lies in the memories of our veterans, old and new. Our task in building the capabilities to fight the wars of the 21st century is a much a task of remembering as it is of innovating.

Paul Yingling

Commander, 1-21 FA

J5, Task Force 134

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 12/07/2008 - 9:46am | 0 comments
December's Armed Forces Journal is online and here's the lineup:

Terror at the Border by Robert Killebrew

With American attention diverted to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the economic crisis and a hard-fought national election, national security experts have largely overlooked the bitter countercartel war in Mexico. But that war, which is beginning to overlap the US border, is only the forerunner of an even more serious threat. Sometime in the near future a lethal combination of transnational terrorism and criminal gangs is going to cross the US border in force. According to some, it already has, and we haven't even noticed.

Learning from Lawrence: Lawrence the Insurgent by Robert Batement

Of late, there are quite a few people who have taken to quoting T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia. The quotation presented above is seen almost every day now, on military briefings and in State Department papers, in news articles and in public statements from people involved in all aspects of our effort. In the eyes of many, Lawrence, it seems, holds the answer to our dilemmas - in our efforts to suppress an insurgency and helping develop a democracy.

Transition Strategy: If Iran Goes Nuclear by Joseph Collins

Iran and its nuclear program will be a top issue for the Obama administration. Both US political parties have declared an Iranian nuclear weapons capability to be "unacceptable." We all believe that we would better off if we lived in a world of fewer nuclear powers, and if erratic and ambitious states such as Iran did not develop nuclear weapons.

Flashpoint: Buccaneers are Back by Peter Brookes

The thought of pirates usually evokes Hollywood blockbusters involving swashbuckling buccaneers, tropical isles and buried treasure marked on a tattered map with an "X." To those mindful of history, piracy might conjure up notions of the Barbary pirates, who sailed the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean, raiding coastal towns, capturing merchant ships (some American), and ransoming or enslaving their crews in North African ports. Strikingly, some two centuries later, piracy at sea is back - with a vengeance.

Talk, Without Preconception by Thomas Momiyama

The US stands as an uncontested superpower, albeit serendipitously with the demise of the USSR and despite being incessantly denounced and challenged by rogue states and insurgency factions. America's stature is questioned domestically and abroad for its "unilateral" invasions and tactically vexing deployment and engagement of military assets in the Near and Middle East under debatable political judgments. Nonetheless, America's de facto superpower status destines it to the role of leading the world into peace and freedom. President-elect Barack Obama must reckon that role in his long-range vision of the nation.

Fighting Words by Ralph Peters

If our troops shot as wildly as our politicians and bureaucrats fire off words, we'd never win a single firefight. The inaccurate terminology tossed about by presidents and pundits alike obscures the nature of the threats we face, the character of our enemies and the inadequacies of our response. If we cannot, or will not, label our opponents, their cause and their motivations correctly, how can we forge an efficient and effective national strategy?

More at Armed Forces Journal.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 12/07/2008 - 4:35am | 0 comments

'Day of Infamy' Lives On In Memory - Timothy Warren, Washington Times

Sixty-seven years after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Edward K. Walker Jr. of Alexandria still "vividly" remembers watching the bombs fall, with little understanding then of the infamous role the event would play in history.

"I just climbed up on the roof to see what was happening, much to my mother's consternation," said Mr. Walker, who was 9 at the time. "I didn't really know what was happening. I just thought it was interesting to watch."

Mr. Walker, the son of a naval officer stationed at Pearl Harbor, later spent 38 years in the Navy, retiring in 1988 as a rear admiral.

He is one of a dwindling number of people who witnessed the forces of Imperial Japan nearly deliver their intended knockout blow to the US Pacific Fleet at its Hawaiian base on Sunday, Dec. 7, 1941. Some of them will be present for the annual wreath-laying at the Navy Memorial on Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest in remembrance of those who died.

More at The Washington Times.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 12/06/2008 - 6:03pm | 0 comments
Thanks Herschel

One of the very few times SWJ takes a hard and fast opinion - after all - Bill and Dave are Soldiers of the Sea - or something like that... BDA - not encouraging here doggies... Now back to our regular programming...

Victory at Sea: Navy Routs Army in 109th Meeting - Associated Press

by Dave Dilegge | Sat, 12/06/2008 - 8:09am | 9 comments

Our favorite anti-COIN Colonel, Gian Gentile, and yet SWJ friend - go figure that one out, continues his personal crusade in this recent International Herald Tribune opinion piece - Mired in 'Surge' Dogma.

Here are some tidbits (regular SWJ and Abu Muqawama readers are well familiar with this drum beat):

The US Army and other parts of America's defense establishment have become transfixed by the promise of counterinsurgency...

The promise of counterinsurgency is to turn war into a program of social-scientific functions that will achieve victory...

The current US counterinsurgency program rests on the dubious assumption that the surge in Iraq was a successful feat of arms...

The recent uptick in bloodshed shows that the war is not over...

Yet influential American counterinsurgency experts have simply co-opted the counter-Maoist model. There is no originality - or at least a serious consideration for very different alternatives...

Many army officers and Department of Defense thinkers seem to be able to think only about how to apply the perceived counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq to Afghanistan...

Perhaps under the Obama administration, the army and the greater defense establishment will embrace creativity instead of dogma and at least consider other options. If not, our way ahead has already been decided for us...

Come on Gian, be part of the solution here - not the problem, and give General Petraeus and company credit where credit is due - no one - read - no one - is suggesting plopping down the Iraq model onto Afghanistan and even the most ardent counterinsurgency proponent freely admits we must maintain our military capabilities across a "full spectrum" of possible scenarios. I'd like you to at least acknowledge that we must maintain a reasonable capability to conduct COIN when all is said and done. I served through the post-Vietnam denial of all things "irregular" -- and look at where that got us.

by Dave Dilegge | Sat, 12/06/2008 - 8:06am | 0 comments
Adam Elkus at Rethinking Security - Ludic Spaces and National Security:

A while ago, Michael Tanji came up with the concept of Think Tank 2.0--a geographically dispersed and eclectic network that collaborate online in a series of salon-like discussions. Since then, I've been entertaining a similar idea--the ludic space...

If we consider operational doctrines and theories of national security as kinds of narratives battling for control, we may do well to construct ludic structures where we can construct meaning from the play, competition, and the continuous exchange and modification of narratives about the future. Small Wars Journal is a kind of ludic space existing in the boundaries between the military, academia, and the media. It drives discussion on military issues because it provides a freewheeling, multi-dimensional exchange from individuals of many different backgrounds...

More at Rethinking Security.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 12/05/2008 - 3:55am | 0 comments
First up - a tip of the hat to Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal for brining this to our attention.

In the January / February 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has a paper entitled A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age.

Summary: The Pentagon has to do more than modernize its conventional forces; it must also focus on today's unconventional conflicts -- and tomorrow's.

The defining principle of the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy is balance. The United States cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything. The Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs.

The strategy strives for balance in three areas: between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies, between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States' existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces, and between retaining those cultural traits that have made the US armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done.

More at Foreign Affairs and The Captain's Journal.