Small Wars Journal

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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

How to Win in Afghanistan
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/14/2008 - 6:29am | 5 comments
How to Win in Afghanistan - Michael O'Hanlon, Wall Street Journal opinion

The war in Afghanistan is not going well, and the critical problem is the same one that dogged our efforts in Iraq for years: grossly inadequate troop levels. Western troop totals there have just inched over 60,000, while Afghan security forces total some 140,000. Let's put this into perspective: We are trying to do with 200,000 personnel what it took 700,000 soldiers and police (plus 100,000 "volunteers") to accomplish in Iraq. But Afghanistan is even larger than Iraq, and more populous.

President-elect Barack Obama has wisely promised an increase in US forces for Afghanistan. But his proposed minisurge of perhaps 15,000 more troops, on top of the 30,000 Americans and 30,000 NATO personnel now there, will not suffice as a strategy. More is needed.

To be sure, it is not all about numbers. As Gen. David Petraeus has already underscored, Afghanistan is not Iraq, and what worked in one place may not succeed in another. Among other things, the Pakistan sanctuary enjoyed by Taliban fighters, as well as partisans supporting Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other warlords, complicates the Afghan situation enormously. That said, basic principles of counterinsurgency and stabilization do have a general applicability across missions. The size of security forces always matters.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Emerging Threats and Hybrid Warfare
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/13/2008 - 9:05pm | 5 comments

Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, when not closely following the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile, seeks out the best and brightest for their views on the potential threats we may face in the not so distant future -- and of course any such search leads to Frank Hoffman.

Colonel Gurney has, again, kindly -- and we, again, greatly appreciate this -- granted SWJ permission to post Frank's Hybrid Warfare and Challenges that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

The U.S. military faces an era of enormous complexity. This complexity has been extended by globalization, the proliferation of advanced technology, violent transnational extremists, and resurgent powers. America's vaunted military might stand atop all others but is tested in many ways. Trying to understand the possible perturbations the future poses to our interests is a daunting challenge. But, as usual, a familiarity with history is our best aid to interpretation. In particular, that great and timeless illuminator of conflict, chance, and human nature Thucydides—is as relevant and revealing as ever.

In his classic history, Thucydides detailed the savage 27-year conflict between Sparta and Athens. Sparta was the overwhelming land power of its day, and its hoplites were drilled to perfection. The Athenians, led by Pericles, were the supreme maritime power, supported by a walled capital, a fleet of powerful triremes, and tributary allies. The Spartan leader, Archidamius, warned his kinsmen about Athens' relative power, but the Spartans and their supporters would not heed their king. In 431 BCE, the Spartans marched through Attica and ravaged the Athenian country estates and surrounding farms. They encamped and awaited the Athenian heralds and army for what they hoped would be a decisive battle and a short war.

The scarlet-clad Spartans learned the first lesson of military history—the enemy gets a vote. The Athenians elected to remain behind their walls and fight a protracted campaign that played to their strengths and worked against their enemies. Thucydides' ponderous tome on the carnage of the Peloponnesian War is an extended history of the operational adaptation of each side as they strove to gain a sustainable advantage over their enemy. These key lessons are, as he intended, a valuable "possession for all time."

In the midst of an ongoing inter-Service roles and missions review, and an upcoming defense review, these lessons need to be underlined. As we begin to debate the scale and shape of the Armed Forces, an acute appreciation of history's hard-earned lessons will remain useful. Tomorrow's enemies will still get a vote, and they will remain as cunning and elusive as today's foes. They may be more lethal and more implacable. We should plan accordingly.

One should normally eschew simplistic metanarratives, especially in dynamic and nonlinear times. However, the evolving character of conflict that we currently face is best characterized by convergence. This includes the convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic and nonkinetic, and combatants and noncombatants. So, too, we see the convergence of military force and the interagency community, of states and nonstate actors, and of the capabilities they are armed with. Of greatest relevance are the converging modes of war. What once might have been distinct operational types or categorizations among terrorism and conventional, criminal, and irregular warfare have less utility today.

Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.), is a retired Marine infantryman who serves as a research fellow in the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Phila, PA.

JFQ - Point - Counterpoint - SWJ Early Exclusive
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/12/2008 - 5:44pm | 0 comments

Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, has been closely following the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile and our guest commentators here on Small Wars Journal. For SWJ newcomers or the uninitiated - this debate has centered on the kinds of threats the U.S. will face in the period ahead and how U.S. ground forces should prepare for those threats.

Colonel Gurney has kindly -- and we greatly appreciate this -- granted SWJ permission to post a Nagl-Gentile "point-counterpoint" that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

Without further ado here it is:

POINT: Let's Win the Wars We're In by John Nagl

A stunning if predictable development in the military community over the past 2 years has been the backlash against the promulgation of counterinsurgency learning in the midst of the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. These wars have spurred long-overdue changes in the way the U.S. military prepares for and prioritizes irregular warfare. These changes are hard-won: they have been achieved only after years of wartime trials and tribulations that have cost the United States dearly in money, materiel, and the lives of its courageous Service-members.

Yet despite the relatively tentative nature of such changes, there are already those who predict grim strategic outcomes for America if its military, particularly the Army, continues the process of adaptation. Gian Gentile, the vocal Army critic of counterinsurgency adaptation, has written that a "hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency puts the American Army in a perilous condition. Its ability to fight wars consisting of head-on battles using tanks and mechanized infantry is in danger of atrophy." He is not alone in his views. Three brigade commanders in the Iraq War wrote a white paper warning about the degradation of seldom used field artillery, declaring that the Army is "mortgaging [its] ability to fight the next war" by neglecting the requirements for combined arms operations. The Army Secretary, Pete Geren, and Chief of Staff, General George Casey, both assert that the Army is "out of balance" in part because of "a focus on training for counterinsurgency operations to the exclusion of other capabilities." Prominent civilian thinkers in the academic community have presented similar arguments. With such dire warnings, one might forget that there's a war on right now...

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

COUNTERPOINT: Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars by Gian Gentile

The U.S. Army officer corps has not seriously debated the content of the many doctrinal field manuals (FM) published over the past 2 years (for example, FM 3--24, Counterinsurgency, FM 3--0, Operations, and FM 3--07, Stability Operations and Support Operations). Though these manuals have been successfully pushed through the bureaucratic lines of the Army's senior leadership, few other officers raised questions about the wisdom of employing American military power to build nations where none exist or where an American military presence is not wanted. Instead, the Army has been steamrolled by a process that proposes its use as an instrument of nationbuilding in the most unstable parts of the world. Nationbuilding, rather than fighting, has become the core function of the U.S. Army.

The Army under the Petraeus Doctrine "is entering into an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous - with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier's repertoire." The implication of this doctrine is that the Army should be transformed into a light infantry-based constabulary force designed to police the world's endless numbers of unstable areas. The concept rests on the assumption that the much- touted "surge" in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over...

Colonel Gian P. Gentile, USA, is Director of the Military History Program at the United States Military Academy.

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Gates: One More Year?
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/11/2008 - 2:17pm | 1 comment
You know how we feel here at SWJ - looks like the President-Elect might feel the same way. Moreover, and while not written in stone, Mr. Gates may just well add one more year on that countdown watch he keeps in his pocket. From Yochi Dreazen at the Wall Street Journal:

President-elect Barack Obama is leaning toward asking Defense Secretary Robert Gates to remain in his position for at least a year, according to two Obama advisers. A senior Pentagon official said Mr. Gates would likely accept the offer if it is made.

No final decision has been made, and Obama aides said other people are also under serious consideration for the defense post, one of the most highly coveted in any new cabinet. Several prominent Democrats, including former Clinton Navy Secretary Richard Danzig and former Clinton Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, are also being considered.

The decision on retaining Mr. Gates will be the clearest indication to date of the incoming administration's thinking about Iraq and Afghanistan...

More at The Wall Street Journal. Now, what's this purple thing you are talking about Spencer? Also see Spencer's Another Year's Worth Of Gates?

Veterans Day 2008
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/11/2008 - 1:00am | 0 comments

Veterans Day, 2008

A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America

On Veterans Day, we pay tribute to the service and sacrifice of the men and women who in defense of our freedom have bravely worn the uniform of the United States.

From the fields and forests of war-torn Europe to the jungles of Southeast Asia, from the deserts of Iraq to the mountains of Afghanistan, brave patriots have protected our Nation's ideals, rescued millions from tyranny, and helped spread freedom around the globe. America's veterans answered the call when asked to protect our Nation from some of the most brutal and ruthless tyrants, terrorists, and militaries the world has ever known. They stood tall in the face of grave danger and enabled our Nation to become the greatest force for freedom in human history. Members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard have answered a high calling to serve and have helped secure America at every turn.

Our country is forever indebted to our veterans for their quiet courage and exemplary service. We also remember and honor those who laid down their lives in freedom's defense. These brave men and women made the ultimate sacrifice for our benefit. On Veterans Day, we remember these heroes for their valor, their loyalty, and their dedication. Their selfless sacrifices continue to inspire us today as we work to advance peace and extend freedom around the world.

With respect for and in recognition of the contributions our service members have made to the cause of peace and freedom around the world, the Congress has provided (5 U.S.C. 6103(a)) that November 11 of each year shall be set aside as a legal public holiday to honor America's veterans.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim November 11, 2008, as Veterans Day and urge all Americans to observe November 9 through November 15, 2008, as National Veterans Awareness Week. I encourage all Americans to recognize the bravery and sacrifice of our veterans through ceremonies and prayers. I call upon Federal, State, and local officials to display the flag of the United States and to support and participate in patriotic activities in their communities. I invite civic and fraternal organizations, places of worship, schools, businesses, unions, and the media to support this national observance with commemorative expressions and programs.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirty-first day of October, in the year of our Lord two thousand eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-third.

GEORGE W. BUSH

Remembrance Day 2008
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/11/2008 - 1:00am | 0 comments

Remembrance Day 2008

Remembrance Day -- also known as Poppy Day, Armistice Day (the event it commemorates) or Veterans Day -- is a day to commemorate the sacrifices of members of the armed forces and of civilians in times of war, specifically since the First World War. It is observed on 11 November to recall the end of World War I on that date in 1918. The day was specifically dedicated by King George V, on 7 November 1919, to the observance of members of the armed forces who were killed during war; this was possibly done upon the suggestion of Edward George Honey to Wellesley Tudor Pole, who established two ceremonial periods of remembrance based on events in 1917.

Common British, Canadian, South African, and ANZAC traditions include two minutes of silence at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month (11:00 am, 11 November), as that marks the time (in the United Kingdom) when armistice became effective.

In Australia Remembrance Day is always observed on 11 November, although the day is not a public holiday. Services are held at 11am at war memorials in suburbs and towns across the country, at which "Last Post" is sounded by a bugler and a one-minute silence is observed.

The Story and The Reaction, So Far...
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/10/2008 - 5:18pm | 0 comments
Secret Order Lets US Raid Al Qaeda in Many Countries - Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, New York Times

The United States military since 2004 has used broad, secret authority to carry out nearly a dozen previously undisclosed attacks against Al Qaeda and other militants in Syria, Pakistan and elsewhere, according to senior American officials.

These military raids, typically carried out by Special Operations forces, were authorized by a classified order that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld signed in the spring of 2004 with the approval of President Bush, the officials said. The secret order gave the military new authority to attack the Qaeda terrorist network anywhere in the world, and a more sweeping mandate to conduct operations in countries not at war with the United States.

In 2006, for example, a Navy Seal team raided a suspected militants' compound in the Bajaur region of Pakistan, according to a former top official of the Central Intelligence Agency. Officials watched the entire mission - captured by the video camera of a remotely piloted Predator aircraft - in real time in the CIA's Counterterrorist Center at the agency's headquarters in Virginia 7,000 miles away.

More at the New York Times, The Times, and Daily Telegraph.

The Old Gray Blabbermouth - Max Boot, Commentary's Contentions

The New York Times continues its series of articles exposing top-secret US operations in the War on Terror. Today's installment, as Abe mentioned, describes US Special Operations incursions into Syria, Pakistan, Somalia, and other countries under the terms of an executive order signedby President Bush.

Portions of these revelations have already been leaked in the past, making this piece less harmful than previous Times classics such as this 2005 article in which the Paper of Record exposed secret wiretapping of terrorists. Or this article from the Washington Post which exposed the CIA's overseas prisons in which top terrorists were held. But it's bad enough.

I can't help thinking that such operational details never would have been revealed in a war--say World War II--that the editors of these newspapers believed was worth fighting.

More at Contentions.

Pentagon Counterterror Teams Go Deep - Jeff Stein, Congressional Quarterly

It's interesting to speculate on why the expanded operations of Pentagon counterterror teams surfaced in the New York Times today. But one of them has to be that the noses of CIA and State Department officials remain severely out of joint from an initiative launched right after the 9/11 attacks by President Bush and then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

According to the Times, a 2004 order identified "15 to 20 countries, including Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and several other Persian Gulf states, where Qaeda militants were believed to be operating or to have sought sanctuary, a senior administration official said."

Soon enough, American ambassadors, who are supposed to be the top US official in a foreign country, grew increasingly annoyed by Pentagon "cowboys" zipping in and out, congressional committees heard.

But if only because the State Department, and the CIA, couldn't keep DoD out of their sandboxes, they have been supporting the operations, the Times said.

More at Congressional Quarterly.

"Secret Order" to Target al Qaeda Not So Secret - Bill Roggio, The Weekly Standard's The Blog

The New York Times tells us today that the Bush administration granted approval for the US military "to use new authority to attack the Qaeda terrorist network anywhere in the world, and a more sweeping mandate to conduct operations in countries not at war with the United States." The US military used this "broad, secret authority to carry out nearly a dozen previously undisclosed attacks against Al Qaeda and other militants in Syria, Pakistan and elsewhere," the Times reports.

But anyone who has been remotely following operations against al Qaeda and its allied terror groups has long been able to deduce the US government has granted approval for the military and CIA to attack high value targets outside of the hot zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. This was one of the worst-kept "secrets" because the high-profile nature of the operations can't remain hidden.

With very little time and effort, I tracked down seven of these so-called secret attacks. One of the most brazen attacks occurred in the country of Madagascar in January 2007. That's right, Madagascar. US special operations forces from the hunter killer teams of Task Force 88 (back then it was called Task Force 145, the name has likely changed yet again) killed Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, one of Osama bin Laden's brothers-in-law who has deep roots in al Qaeda as a financier and facilitator.

More at The Blog.

Did Secret Orders Keep US Commandos in Somalia? - David Axe, Wired's Danger Room

Fifteen years ago, a botched Special Forces raid targeting warlords in Mogadishu resulted in the deaths of 18 US servicemen and hundreds of others. The battle, recounted in the book and film Black Hawk Down, cut short an ambitious peacekeeping plan for war-torn Somalia.

Since then, US special operators have returned to the lawless East African country, thanks to secret orders approved in 2004 by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President George W. Bush, and reported yesterday in the New York Times. So now, the question becomes: How often have those commandos been in Somalia, and how long have they stayed?

More at Danger Room.

Girl, 13, is Iraq's Latest Suicide Bomber
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/10/2008 - 1:36pm | 0 comments
Girl, 13, is Iraq's Latest Suicide Bomber - Philippe Naughton, The Times

A 13-year-old girl became Iraq's latest suicide bomber today, killing four people at a security checkpoint in the town of Baquba.

On a day of renewed violence, at least 31 people were killed in a double bombing at a Baghdad market, the deadliest attack to rock the Iraqi capital in months. The attackers first detonated a car bomb in the Sunni district of Adhamiyah, hitting a minibus carrying girls to school. As a crowd gathered to help the girls, a suicide bomber ran in and blew himself up.

The Interior Ministry said that 31 people were killed and 71 wounded in the deadliest to hit Baghdad since June 17 when 51 people were killed in a car bombing in the Al-Hurriya district.

In the Baquba attack, the girl blew herself up at a checkpoint manned by members of the Sunni Muslim 'Awakening' councils, which have led the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq. Four men, including a leading Sunni militiaman, were killed and 15 civilians wounded.

More at The Times.

US Plans Expansion of Afghan Airfield
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/10/2008 - 9:45am | 1 comment
US Plans Expansion of Afghan Airfield To House Special Army Aviation Unit by Walter Pincus, Washington Post

The Bush administration's plans to increase the US military role in Afghanistan include a $100 million expansion next year of the Kandahar airfield, to accommodate aircraft working for Task Force ODIN, the once-secret Army fighting units that have been successful in Iraq.

The US Army Corps of Engineers, according to a notice issued Thursday, has set Wednesday as the "tentative" date for putting out the contract to design and build a secure area for the aircraft. It will have facilities, hangars, ramps and taxiways "for up to twenty-six (26) generic Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft with shelters at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan."

Task Force ODIN -- the acronym derives from "observe, detect, identify and neutralize" -- is named for the chief Norse god of art, culture, war and the dead. The Army put the ODIN concept together last year to tackle the problem of roadside explosions, which had become the main method of attacking military and truck convoys. In September, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told Congress that he wanted to replicate the ODIN units in Afghanistan as soon as possible.

More at The Washington Post.

SWJ Trivia Time: Boots on the Ground
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/10/2008 - 4:31am | 0 comments
H/T Scott Nestler for pointing out this New York Times piece by William Safire.

... Infantry footwear has been slogging though mud for centuries, but boots on the ground is a relatively new expression. Earliest citation that Matthew Seelinger, chief historian of the Army Historical Foundation, can find is in an April 11, 1980, article in The Christian Science Monitor. During the Iranian hostage crisis, plans for a rescue operation were made in the Carter administration, and there were worries that the Soviet Union would intervene. "Many American strategists now argue that even light, token US land forces - 'getting US combat boots on the ground' " - as the four-star general Volney Warner put it - "would signal to an enemy that the US... can only be dislodged at the risk of war." The vivid figure of speech soon triumphed over the formal "infantry in the field."

More at The New York Times.

Happy Birthday Marines
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/10/2008 - 3:05am | 0 comments
General Lejeune's Birthday Message

MARINE CORPS ORDERS

No. 47 (Series 1921)

HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS

Washington, November 1, 1921

759. The following will be read to the command on the 10th of November, 1921, and hereafter on the 10th of November of every year. Should the order not be received by the 10th of November, 1921, it will be read upon receipt.

(1) On November 10, 1775, a Corps of Marines was created by a resolution of Continental Congress. Since that date many thousand men have borne the name "Marine". In memory of them it is fitting that we who are Marines should commemorate the birthday of our corps by calling to mind the glories of its long and illustrious history.

(2) The record of our corps is one which will bear comparison with that of the most famous military organizations in the world's history. During 90 of the 146 years of its existence the Marine Corps has been in action against the Nation's foes. From the Battle of Trenton to the Argonne, Marines have won foremost honors in war, and in the long eras of tranquility at home, generation after generation of Marines have grown gray in war in both hemispheres and in every corner of the seven seas, that our country and its citizens might enjoy peace and security.

(3) In every battle and skirmish since the birth of our corps, Marines have acquitted themselves with the greatest distinction, winning new honors on each occasion until the term "Marine" has come to signify all that is highest in military efficiency and soldierly virtue.

(4) This high name of distinction and soldierly repute we who are Marines today have received from those who preceded us in the corps. With it we have also received from them the eternal spirit which has animated our corps from generation to generation and has been the distinguishing mark of the Marines in every age. So long as that spirit continues to flourish Marines will be found equal to every emergency in the future as they have been in the past, and the men of our Nation will regard us as worthy successors to the long line of illustrious men who have served as "Soldiers of the Sea" since the founding of the Corps.

JOHN A. LEJEUNE,

Major General Commandant

75705--21

Mexico's Criminal Insurgency
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 11/09/2008 - 10:52am | 0 comments
Mexico's Criminal Insurgency - John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, Defense and the National Interest

Grenades are thrown at popular gatherings. Mutilated corpses flood the morgues. Heavily armed gunmen blast police to shreds with high-powered automatic weapons. Just another day in Iraq or Afghanistan? No-all of the events described occur regularly in Mexico. Our southern neighbor is imploding under the weight of a criminal insurgency just as dangerous any crew of bomb-tossing jihadists--an insurgency that may soon envelop our borders.

Mexico has always struggled with crime and corruption, but its present troubles can be traced to the mid-90s downfall of the Colombian cartels. Those mega-cartels, epitomized by the excess of Pablo Escobar, directly threatened the Colombian state and lost. As nature abhors a vacuum, the gap was filled by Mexican drug cartels bolstered by gargantuan drug profits. These cartels burrowed into the superstructure of the Mexican state, corrupting the poorly paid civil servants and police officers that make up the Mexican bureaucracy. Those who refused to take a bribe earned a bullet to the brain for their scruples. The cartel evolution in political and financial affairs was matched by a rise in military power, as the narco-gangs built up a capable cadre of enforcers poached from the Mexican military's Special Forces. These men, known as the Zetas, enabled the cartels to gain a tactical advantage against the poorly equipped Mexican local and state police.

Worst of all, the sheer size of the black economy--$40 billion as estimated by Stratfor's George Friedman--strangles legitimate enterprise and concentrates power in the hands of a few narco-warlords. These criminal enterprises amass power and legitimacy as the Mexican state loses the trust of its citizens. As a result, Mexico's periphery has become a lawless wasteland controlled largely by the drug cartels, but the disorder is rapidly spreading into the interior. In a cruel parody of the "ink-blot" strategy employed by counterinsurgents in Iraq, ungoverned spaces controlled by insurgents multiply as the territorial fabric of the Mexican state continues to dissolve.

More at Defense and the National Interest.

Report Details Attack on GIs in Afghanistan
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 11/09/2008 - 10:12am | 0 comments
Report Details Attack on GIs in Afghanistan - Kent Harris and Joseph Giordono, Stars and Stripes

The Army's official report on the July battle in Afghanistan that killed nine paratroops and wounded 27 others is filled with details of heroism, desperation and a calculated risk gone wrong.

It begins with the decision to close down an "extremely vulnerable" combat outpost nearby and relocate to Wanat, a move discussed by the brigade for more than a year.

Ten months of coordination with Afghan officials about the land allowed militants to plan an attack "that only required refinement once the land was occupied."

On July 9, in the early morning darkness, the US troops and 24 Afghan paratroops established the vehicle patrol base.

Each day, locals warned the US troops of an impending attack.

"There was intelligence an attack would occur," the report found, "but this was to be expected for the Waygal District."

Troops expected a "probing attack" of around 20 militants. Instead, at around 4:20 a.m., the force of 200 enemy launched a complex, well-organized attack that first targeted the troops' heavy weapons.

More at Stars and Stripes.

CJTF-101 Report Dated 13 August 2008 - Part 1

CJTF-101 Report Dated 13 August 2008 - Part 2

Military Review: November - December 2008 Issue
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 11/08/2008 - 7:30pm | 0 comments

Since 1922, Military Review has provided a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs. Subsequently, publications have proliferated throughout the Army education system that specialize either in tactical issues associated with particular Branches or on strategic issues at the Senior Service School level. Bridging these two levels of intellectual inquiry, Military Review focuses on research and analysis of the concepts, doctrine and principles of warfighting between the tactical and operational levels of war.

Military Review is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. Military Review also supports the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Military Review is printed bimonthly in English, Spanish and Portuguese and is distributed to readers in more than 100 countries. It is also printed in Arabic on a quarterly basis. Widely quoted and reprinted throughout the world, it is a readily available reference at most military and civilian university libraries and research agencies.

Here is the November - December 2008 lineup:

Enable from Overwatch: MNF-Iraq by General Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. Army

The MNF-Iraq commander's operating guidance emphasizes "how we think," "how we operate," and "who we are."

The Strategy of Protracted People's War: Uganda by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda

President Museveni presents thoughts and observations on the future of Africa and the moral factor in revolutionary warfare.

Rethinking IO: Complex Operations in the Information Age by Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, U.S. Army Retired

The Army lacks dexterity with war's moral domain. Today's highly complex conflicts demand recovering a holistic approach.

Irregular Warfare Information Operations: Understanding the Role of People, Capabilities, and Effects by Lieutenant Colonel Norman E. Emery, U.S. Army

Current operating environments require balancing IO efforts against the enemy with those efforts intended to influence populations.

Georgia: The War Russia Lost by Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D.

The Strategic Studies Institute's expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world examines the ramifications of Russia's recent posturing.

China's Electronic Long-Range Reconnaissance by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, U.S. Army Retired

China's ongoing use of "patriotic hackers" may represent electronic reconnaissance for putting cyber-war theory into practice.

On Metaphors We are Led By by Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, Ph.D., U.S. Army Retired

Caring for mild traumatic brain injury is challenging for the military and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Sports medicine's "best practices" can revolutionize treatment of such injuries for Soldiers.

Sociocultural Expertise and the Military: Beyond the Controversy by Pauline Kusiak, Ph.D.

While using academics for military ethnographic analysis may be controversial, it can foster better security.

Revisiting Modern Warfare: Counterinsurgency in the Mada'in Qadaby by Lieutenant Colonel David G. Fivecoat, U.S. Army, and Captain Aaron T. Schwengler, U.S. Army

French Colonel Roger Trinquier's 1964 book Modern Warfare has relevant lessons for 21st-century counterinsurgency.

How Jesse James, the Telegraph, and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 Can Help the Army Win the War on Terrorism by Peter E. Kunkel, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)

History teaches that a cashless battlefield can translate into less violence and a quicker restoration of stability.

Planning Full Spectrum Operations: Implications of FM 3-0 on Planning Doctrine by Major Glenn A. Henke, U.S. Army

Phasing military operations has proven to be a defunct heuristic for effectively meshing logical lines of operations in COIN.

Relooking Unit Cohesion: A Sensemaking Approach by Major Geoff van Epps, U.S. Army

With the days of Army COHORT units more than two decades past, cohesion has become an afterthought.

Reconstruction: A Damaging Fantasy? by Amitai Etzioni, George Washington University

If we cannot put our own house in order, is it realistic to think we can do it for another country, especially when that country's culture is significantly different?

Book Reviews

Contemporary readings for the professional.
Obama's Pentagon-in-Waiting
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 11/08/2008 - 5:48pm | 0 comments
Obama's Pentagon-in-Waiting - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent

The rumor started to spread last week. if Sen. Barack Obama won the presidential election, Michele Flournoy would resign from the Center for a New American Security Thursday following the election. Friday at the latest.

It's not difficult to understand why the talk circulated. Flournoy boasts an enviable resume. A veteran of the Clinton Pentagon, she worked on counter-proliferation issues before playing a large role in shaping the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, an overview of defense strategy and its implementation.

After leaving government service, Flournoy took a high-profile job at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a prominent Washington policy organization, before co-founding the Center for a New American Security, an increasingly influential defense think tank, in 2007.

It's not just Flournoy. CNAS, as it's known, is widely considered a likely feeder for the Obama Pentagon, though the organization disputes this — preferring to bill itself as nonpartisan. What CNAS does not dispute is that, over the course of the past two years — overnight, in Washington terms — it has emerged as an energetic center for studying contemporary defense issues, including Iraq, counterinsurgency and the national-security effects of climate change.

More at The Washington Independent.

Center for a New American Security

How Much Counterinsurgency Training?
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/07/2008 - 4:52pm | 0 comments
How Much Counterinsurgency Training? - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent

The instructor called up the slide on an gigantic screen, so that the nearly 200 students in the lecture hall could see. The lesson was about the effect of leadership on the durability of insurgencies. One example was Al Qaeda. The slide asked: "If UBL" - meaning Osama bin Laden - "dies, is the insurgency dead?" The next example was the American Revolution. "If George Washington dies, is the revolution dead?"

The instructor, Mark Ulrich, explained that his efforts were geared toward getting the class to think about insurgencies in objective and clinical terms. "Again: clinical!" Ulrich practically yelled just before putting the slides on the projector. "Think clinical. Don't think 'terrorism-bad.' That whole thing, 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter,' that's not clinical. That's emotional."

If this were any other academic setting - a New England liberal arts college, for example - and a tweedy professor tacitly compared bin Laden to George Washington, no matter how loosely, he would find himself targeted by Fox News for the sin of moral equivalence. But Ulrich is largely inoculated against such charges. He's an Army lieutenant colonel and Iraq veteran assigned to the joint Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center.

This center, now nearly two-years old, was developed to embed the lessons of counterinsurgency warfare into the architecture of a military that, at senior levels, still appears resistant to such methods of fighting. Many senior staff fear these tactics would mean bogging the country down in bloody conflicts and eroding traditional military skills.

Yet Ulrich and the Counterinsurgency Center are dedicated to ensuring that the military doesn't repeat the mistakes of the post-Vietnam era, when the military purged counterinsurgency from its institutional memory on the mistaken assumption that such a move would prevent U.S. involvement in such conflicts. Instead, this move guaranteed that the military would have to reinvent the wheel in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Approximately 160 officers and enlisted men from around the US military, along with visiting soldiers from Canada and Australia, attended the 2008 Counterinsurgency Leaders' Workshop this week, at Ft. Leavenworth, to hear Ulrich, the main lecturer, better explain the mission and the enemy many of them have already fought. The conference offered a window into the ways in which the military is changing to absorb counterinsurgency - and, in some ways, how it is resisting that change.

Much more at The Washington Independent.

New Administration to Realign Priorities
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/07/2008 - 3:02pm | 1 comment
New Administration to Realign Priorities in Iraq, Afghanistan - Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal

The election of Barack Obama will trigger a significant realignment of US national-security priorities, with Afghanistan and Pakistan gaining in prominence as resources are redirected from Iraq.

US policy in the two regions has been shaped by the Bush administration's decision to commit the bulk of the nation's military and financial resources to Iraq, where the ouster of Saddam Hussein set off a prolonged civil war, rather than to Afghanistan. The focus on Iraq left the Afghanistan mission chronically short of troops and money.

The incoming Obama administration sees the challenges differently. Aides said Mr. Obama is likely to deploy tens of thousands of additional US troops to Afghanistan, where security conditions have worsened markedly in recent months and attacks by the Taliban and others have risen. They said Mr. Obama also would devote more attention to neighboring Pakistan, whose support is seen as crucial to defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda and stabilizing Afghanistan.

With security conditions in Iraq continuing to improve, the Pentagon announced Wednesday that a combat brigade of about 4,000 troops from the 101st Airborne Division would leave Iraq six weeks sooner than planned. Several more brigades are expected to leave by next summer.

Those moves free up more troops for use in Afghanistan.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Soldiers in the Blogosphere
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/07/2008 - 6:26am | 0 comments
Major Jakob Bruhl is an active duty Army officer currently attending the Air Command and Staff College. He's interested in how the Army can make better use of some of the newer web technologies - such as blogs - to communicate with the people we're sworn to protect.

Have some ideas or opinions on this issue? If yes, then head on over to Soldiers in the Blogosphere and share them with Major Bruhl.

Afghan Government Reaches Out to Tribes
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/06/2008 - 8:24pm | 0 comments
Afghan Government Reaches Out to Tribes - Jim Michaels, USA Today

Afghanistan's government has stepped up efforts to win the cooperation of tribal leaders to try to build security at the village level and fend off the Taliban. The strategy has the backing of coalition forces and is similar to a successful effort in Iraq, where powerful tribal leaders turned on al-Qaeda.

"We're coming back to recognize tribal leadership, to empower and acknowledge them as leaders within their communities," said US Army Brig. Gen. Michael Tucker, deputy commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, the tribal movement started in Anbar province, west of Baghdad, and eventually spread throughout the country. It helped isolate al-Qaeda from the local population.

"We need to leverage the tribal system in Afghanistan as was done in Iraq," said US Gen. David McKiernan, the top NATO commander in Afghanistan...

... "The Taliban are anti-tribal," ... "They are trying to destroy the tribal structures. ... This gives the Pakistani and Afghani governments a crowbar" to drive a wedge between the Taliban and the general population.

More at USA Today.

Godspeed for a Full Recovery Paula Lloyd
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/06/2008 - 6:10pm | 3 comments
Via e-mail from Noah Shachtman at Danger Room and on the DR Blog.

A social scientist in the Army's controversial Human Terrain program was en route to Brooke Army Medical Center in Texas after being set on fire in and apparent Taliban attack in Afghanistan. It's the third time in five months that a Human Terrain Team member has been killed or seriously wounded.

Paula Lloyd was interviewing locals in the southern village of Maywand on Tuesday as part of her duties in a Human Terrain Team, which embeds civilian cultural experts into U.S. combat units. She approached a man carrying a fuel jug and they began talking about the price of gas. Suddenly, the man doused Lloyd in a flammable liquid and set her on fire. She suffered second- and third-degree burns over 60 percent of her body, a Human Terrain source told Danger Room.

The injuries could have been worse. Lloyd's teammate immediately threw her into a nearby water source to douse the flames, then Lloyd was sped to a nearby medical facility. Fortunately, the first doctor to treat her was a U.S. Army burn specialist. After being stabilized, Lloyd was evacuated to the military's Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany and is now en route to Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio. Lloyd is in "stable, but guarded condition," the source said.

The Taliban took credit for the attack on their website. The Taliban has a long history of setting women on fire as a way of punishing them for perceived immodesty.

More at Danger Room and Reuters. Our best wishes to Paula and prayers for a speedy and full recovery and our heartfelt thanks for her service to our Nation and humankind.

SWJ will provide updates as more information becomes available.

HTS Members Killed in the Line of Duty:

Michael Bhatia, a social scientist team member assigned to the Afghanistan Human Terrain Team (HTT) AF1, in support of Task Force Currahee based at FOB Salerno, Khowst Province, was killed on 7 May 2008 when the Humvee he was riding in was struck by an IED. Michael was traveling in a convoy of four vehicles, which were en route to a remote sector of Khowst province. For many years, this part of Khowst had been plagued by a violent inter-tribal conflict concerning land rights. Michael had identified this tribal dispute as a research priority, and was excited to finally be able to visit this area. This trip was the brigade's initial mission into the area, and it was their intention to initiate a negotiation process between the tribes.

Nicole Suveges, a social scientist team member assigned to the Iraq Human Terrain Team (HTT) IZ3, in support of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division based at FOB Prosperity, Baghdad, Iraq, was killed on 24 June 2008 when a bomb exploded at the District Council building in southern Sadr City where she was attending a meeting of the District Advisory Council, which was scheduled to elect a new chairman. Nicole had almost completed a PhD in political science at Johns Hopkins University. Her dissertation was titled "Markets & Mullahs: Global Networks, Transnational Ideas and the Deep Play of Political Culture." Formerly, she served in Sarajevo as an Army Reservist in support of SFOR/NATO. For the past two years, Nicole had worked in Iraq, initially as a project lead for polling and later as a subject matter expert for Multinational Corps Iraq (MNCI).

Update:

Pray for Paula Lloyd - Christopher Albon, War and Health

Our Thoughts are with Paula Lloyd and Her Family - Drew Conway, ZIA

Learning from Experience in Afghanistan
by John A. Nagl | Thu, 11/06/2008 - 7:03am | 0 comments
Learning From Experience: Afghanistan stabilized after 9/11. Let's get back to what was working. By Clare Lockhart at Slate.

Clare Lockhart is the director of the Institute for State Effectiveness and co-author, with Ashraf Ghani, of Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World. She spent some three years on the ground in Afghanistan and continues to work to revitalize U.S. strategy in that country. This Slate article is an excellent example of learning from the past about the part of counterinsurgency most of us understand least well: the economic and governance lines of operation.

Both candidates for the U.S. presidency pledged to make Afghanistan a top priority. The war there now tops the news on a daily basis with tales of the devastating hardships of the Afghan people and the deaths of Afghans and NATO soldiers. The untold story is that Afghanistan was well on its way to stability in 2004. It is essential that President Obama understands why the nation slipped into chaos. The challenge now is to win the peace...

Learning From Experience at Slate.

Australian Strategic Corporals
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/06/2008 - 6:57am | 0 comments
The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor - Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre online book by Bob Breen and Greg McCauley.

This book describes the work of strategic corporals and their teams in two violent and devastated cities in the developing world: Baidoa in Somalia in 1993, and Dili in East Timor in 1999. Both cities had been destroyed by conflict and their citizens traumatised and displaced. In each case, the United Nations endorsed the deployment of international troops to take control. In Baidoa, Australian troops operated under American command to strict defensive ROE, seeking to protect the distribution of humanitarian aid. In Dili, under Australian command and empowered by a UN mandate, Australian troops had the freedom to take whatever measures were required to stabilise the situation, including the use of lethal force...

... In both situations—in Baidoa in 1993 and in Dili and along the East Timor--West Timor border in 1999--2000—junior leaders and small teams had to make decisions carefully with higher level consequences in mind. The ROE were essential decision-making tools, but also effectively increased the pressure on the soldiers to make the right decision when they anticipated danger or were faced with an immediate threat. There are numerous anecdotes illustrating the challenges they faced, many of which remain untold. Those that were recounted have been included in this book, remarkable stories that bespeak the danger and isolation in which many of the most critical decisions were made by young soldiers. The narrative adds context to these decisions and necessarily reflects on their aftermath, consequences and, most critically, the lessons they contain.

The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor

Saving Afghanistan
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/05/2008 - 9:27pm | 1 comment
Saving Afghanistan: Why the Iraq Strategy isn't the Answer - Dan Green, Armed Forces Journal

Last fall, I returned from a six-month deployment to Iraq with the Navy, in which I worked as a tribal and leadership engagement officer in the Fallujah area. By the end of my deployment, Fallujah had changed from an area rife with al-Qaida's presence and upward of 750 security incidents a month to one where al-Qaida was on the run and security incidents were down to about 80 a month. I saw what was needed to convincingly defeat an insurgency as we worked with local tribes and Iraqi security forces to clear and hold each of Fallujah's 10 neighborhoods and numerous surrounding villages.

As security became the norm in the city, the educated middle-class re-asserted its leadership, and the men with guns who had so long dominated politics in the post-Saddam era transitioned to a civilian-controlled police force. By the end of my tour, engineers, architects, teachers and doctors were dominating the city council's meetings, asking for more power and authority from US forces to administer their affairs as we began initial planning to draw down our forces.

As much as it heartened me to witness the positive changes taking place in Fallujah, it also saddened me because it demonstrated just how inadequate our efforts are in Afghanistan and how far away we are from victory. It also prompted me to reflect upon my time in Afghanistan, where I worked as a political officer with the State Department for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 2005 and 2006 and on the strategies that are now being talked about to stabilize Afghanistan...

Much more at Armed Forces Journal.

Lost Lessons of Counterinsurgency
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/05/2008 - 6:16pm | 0 comments
Congratulations are in order for Major Niel Smith (many of you know him as Cavguy on the Council), US Army, for submitting the winning entry in this month's Armed Forces Journal essay contest. His entry, Lost Lessons of Counterinsurgency, is indeed one fine read.

The book that most changed my career path was The Army and Vietnam by Andrew Krepinevich. Krepinevich's book fundamentally altered the approach I took as a company commander during my second Iraq tour in 2006.

When I returned to Germany in 2004, fresh from my first 15-month tour in Iraq, I was convinced there had to be a better way to fight this kind of conflict. A year of operations in Baghdad and three months fighting the first Sadr rebellion made it clear to me that our strategies and methods were inadequate to meet the demands of the environment. As a new company commander, I had an obligation to become as educated as possible on counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, I didn't know where to begin. As an armor officer, my professional military education to this point included great detail on how to fight at the National Training Center or in the Fulda gap but contained absolutely nothing on counterinsurgency...

Much more at Armed Forces Journal.

A New US Policy for Syria
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/05/2008 - 1:54pm | 0 comments
A New US Polciy for Syria: Fostering Political Change in a Divided State by Seth Kaplan. Orgininally published by the Middle East Policy Council, this article is posted here with permission of the author and the publisher.

Seth Kaplan is a business consultant to companies in developing countries as well as a foreign-policy analyst. His book Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development (2008), critiques Western policies in places such as Pakistan, Somalia, Congo (Kinshasa) and West Africa, and lays out a new approach to overcoming the problems they face (More at the Fixing Fragile States official web page).

From A New US Policy for Syria:

The American foreign-policy establishment seems deeply divided over how to deal with Syria. No one in Washington doubts that Damascus plays a pivotal role in the Middle East, helping to shape events in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine while influencing calculations in Jerusalem, the capital of its principal foe, and Tehran, the capital of its principal ally. But there is considerable disagreement within Washington on how to approach Damascus.

Should Syria be isolated until its economy and its leadership crack under the strain, as the Bush administration has long favored? Should it, to use fashionable parlance, be forced into a "hard landing" - bullied into abandoning its disruptive behavior on the regional stage and softening its internal political complexion? Or should the United States help Syria achieve a soft landing, as many commentators outside the White House now propose? Should engagement with President Bashar al-Asad's authoritarian regime be the order of the day, with carrots as well as sticks employed to persuade Syria of the benefits of a more cooperative relationship with its neighbors and the West and of more democracy at home?

This debate seems set to run indefinitely...

Much more at A New US Polciy for Syria: Fostering Political Change in a Divided State.

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