Blog Posts

SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

And the EBO beat (debate) goes on...

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 11/22/2008 - 8:21am | 1 comment

Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, has again kindly permitted SWJ to post a Point - Counterpoint that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

First up; from SWJ, this 14 August 2009 memo by General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Attached are my thoughts and Commander's guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

This brings us to January's JFQ Point - Counterpoint in reaction to General Mattis's memo. First, from Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, (ret.) - EBO: There Was No Baby in the Bathwater.

We should not be surprised that one of our most combat-seasoned and professionally informed leaders, General James Mattis, USMC, who commands U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), recently issued a memorandum that calls for an end to the effects-based operations (EBO) nonsense that has permeated much of the American defense community for the past 6 years. Nor should we be surprised that other leaders with similar operational experience promptly applauded General Mattis' actions. They all saw effects based operations as a vacuous concept that has slowly but surely undermined professional military thought and operational planning. One can only hope that the general's action, coupled with a similar effort by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in 2007,will halt the U.S. military's decade-and-a-half decline in conceptual thinking.

U.S. Air Force Colonels Paul M. Carpenter and William F. Andrews take issue in Effects Based Operations - Combat Proven.

The USJFCOM directive to "turn off" EBO concepts is not well advised. Although the command has vigorously pursued development of EBO concepts, over time efforts have rendered a valuable joint concept unusable by promising unattainable predictability and by linking it to the highly deterministic computer-based modeling of ONA and SoSA. Instead of pursuing a constructive approach by separating useful and proven aspects of EBO and recommending improvements, USJFCOM has prescribed the consumption of a fatal poison. General Mattis declares that "the term effects-based is fundamentally flawed... and goes against the very nature of war."

We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force. A very successful wartime concept is sound and remains an effective tool for commanders. It is valuable for commanders to better understand cause and effect - to better relate objectives to the tasks that forces perform in the operational environment. While there are problems associated with how EBO has been implemented by some organizations, they can be easily adjusted. As a military, we must understand the value of EBO, address concerns in its implementation, and establish a way ahead to gain the benefits and avoid the potential pitfalls of the concept.

The current issue of the U.S. Army War College's Parameters also reprints the General Mattis memo in article format with a counter by Tomislav Z. Ruby entitled Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever.

Whether effects-based operations (EBO) and the effects-based approach to planning have led to negative warfighting results is a topic well worth our collective time and study. In fact, it is a healthy activity of any defense institution to question and evaluate its doctrine, policy, and procedures. The current debate on EBO brought about by General James N. Mattis's memorandum to US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directing the elimination of the term from the command's vocabulary has not put the issue to rest. Quite to the contrary, the Mattis memo reinvigorated the debate, and this article aims at being part of that debate. Effects-based operations are not dead. No one individual can kill a concept, and this concept has staying power. When the underlying rationale for General Mattis's decision is analyzed, one can see that EBO as a concept for planning will be around for some time.

A lively discussion concerning EBO can be found at SWJ's Small Wars Council.

Rogue Cousins Agree - Important Weekend Reading

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/21/2008 - 10:47pm | 1 comment

Via e-mail and Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama - some important weekend reading - Strategy for the Long Haul: An Army at the Crossroads by Andrew Krepinevich at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. An excerpt from the Preface follows:

The United States faces three primary existing and emerging strategic challenges that are most likely to preoccupy senior decision-makers in the coming years:

- Defeating both the Sunni Salifi-Takfiri and Shia Khomeinist brands of violent

Islamist radicalism;

- Hedging against the rise of a hostile or more openly confrontational China and the potential challenge posed by authoritarian capitalist states; and

- Preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear-armed regional powers.

Addressing these specific challenges should be at the forefront of the incoming administration's strategic calculations, particularly during the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which will help shape US defense strategy, planning, and force structure over the next twenty years.

Read the full report here and the presentation slides here.

Down South Blogging

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/21/2008 - 10:18pm | 0 comments

Lieutenant General William Caldwell (aka Frontier 6), Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, is not the only senior military officer who has embraced blogging -- just found out from the good folks at Defense Media Activity (DoD Bloggers Roundtable) that Admiral James Stavridis, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, is an active blogger too. Check out his SOUTHCOM Commander's Blog and his recommendations on the ten books and one movie for understanding Latin America and the Caribbean.

I'm surprised we missed this blog -- and we've probably missed some more - let us know of any other senior officer blogs out there on the 'Net. Thanks.

Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/21/2008 - 3:35am | 1 comment

Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (PDF - 33.5 MB) is the fourth unclassified report prepared by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in recent years that takes a long-term view of the future. It offers a fresh look at how key global trends might develop over the next 15 years to influence world events. The report is not meant to be an exercise in prediction or crystal ball-gazing. Mindful that there are many possible "futures," the report offers a range of possibilities and potential discontinuities, as a way of opening our minds to developments that might otherwise be missed.

Several preliminary assessments are listed below:

1. The whole international system - as constructed following WWII - will be revolutionized. Not only will new players - Brazil, Russia, India and China - have a seat at the international high table, they will bring new stakes and rules of the game.

2. The unprecedented transfer of wealth roughly from West to East now under way will continue for the foreseeable future.

3. Unprecedented economic growth, coupled with 1.5 billion more people, will put pressure on resources - particularly energy, food, and water - raising the specter of scarcities emerging as demand outstrips supply.

4. The potential for conflict will increase owing partly to political turbulence in parts of the greater Middle East.

As with the earlier NIC efforts - such as Mapping The Global Future 2020 - the project's primary goal is to provide US policymakers with a view of how world developments could evolve, identifying opportunities and potentially negative developments that might warrant policy action. The NIC also hopes this paper stimulates a broader discussion of value to educational and policy institutions at home and abroad.

In the News:

Nuclear Arms, Scarce Resources as Seeds of Global Instability - Washington Post

NIC Expects Al Qaeda's Appeal to Falter - New York Times

NIC: Sun Setting on the American Century - The Times

NIC Says US Influence will 'Substantially' Decline - Daily Telegraph

The Year 2025: Oil, Dollar Out; Russia, Islam In - Associated Press

US Power, Influence will Decline in Future, Report Says - CNN News

US Influence Will Fade By 2025 - CBS News

US Global Dominance 'Set to Wane' - BBC News

Intelligence Study Sees Risks in Rapid Global Power Shift - McClatchy

US Clout Down, Risks Up by 2025 - Reuters

Nuclear War Threat to Grow by 2025 - Agence France-Presse

Europe: a Hobbled Giant - Financial Times

New US Intelligence Report: A Gloomy Future - Military Watch

Obama's War

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/21/2008 - 2:54am | 0 comments

Obama's War - Clifford May, National Review opinion

American troops in Afghanistan are fighting what will soon become Barack Obama's war - not just because he will inherit it, but also because he has claimed it. This is "the right battlefield," Obama has said. The war in Afghanistan "has to be won."

How can that mission be accomplished? Extensive interviews with American military commanders, European diplomats, and Afghan officials lead to this conclusion: Although we are not currently defeating the Taliban and other belligerent groups in Afghanistan, we can prevail - if the incoming administration is prepared to fully resource a sophisticated counter-insurgency strategy similar to that implemented by General David Petraeus in Iraq.

A subtle and often misunderstood point: The war in Iraq was not turned around by "surging" more troops into the country to do more of the same. Rather, the key was transitioning to counterinsurgency - COIN - a form of warfare that requires many boots on the ground.

More at National Review.

Keep Gates

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/21/2008 - 2:38am | 0 comments

Keep Gates - Peggy Noonan, Wall Street Journal opinion

Reappointing Robert Gates as secretary of defense would be magnanimity with a purpose, a show of something better than cleverness, and that is wisdom.

We are at war, in two countries. The stakes don't get much higher....

What does Mr. Gates bring to this? Two years, next month, of success, and a professional lifetime of experience and knowledge. He is a bipartisan figure of respect—truly an object of across-the-board admiration. He is not part of the old crew that got us into war and bungled it but the new crew that stabilized it and created progress. And the point is to keep him not only for continuity, which may be virtue enough in a difficult and dynamic situation, but for his particular gifts and acumen.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

A Framework for Success in Iraq

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/21/2008 - 2:27am | 0 comments

A Framework for Success in Iraq - Michael Gerson, Washington Post opinion

A war that once seemed likely to end in a panic of helicopters fleeing the American Embassy now seems destined to conclude as the result of a parliamentary process. A landmark status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) -- requiring the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraqi cities by the end of June and from Iraq itself by the end of 2011 -- is headed for a final reading in the Iraqi parliament next week.

The approval of the SOFA would leave a chapter of history decorated with paradoxes. President Bush -- who once called withdrawal timelines "arbitrary" and "unacceptable" -- ends his term accepting them. President-elect Barack Obama will inherit a more peaceful Iraq because of policies he strongly opposed. And the Iraqi government -- so often criticized by Americans as weak and ineffectual -- is now asserting its sovereignty in a decisive manner, for good or ill.

More at The Washington Post.

The General

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/20/2008 - 6:52pm | 1 comment

Brian Bennett begins The General, Time Magazine, by reviewing the former concerns about LTG Odierno's kinetic old school style as the antithesis of COIN (an opinion commonly held here):

When Ray Odierno took over the top military post in Iraq from General David Petraeus in September, there was a lot of hand-wringing among folk at defense think tanks in Washington worried that he was the wrong man for the job. They pointed to Odierno's reputation from his first tour in Iraq, in 2003, as a heavy-handed division commander who had neither a grasp of the subtleties of fighting an insurgency nor the political acumen to sell his ideas back home. Some correspondents who covered Iraq in the months after the fall of Saddam Hussein also came away with that opinion.

But rightly spends the bulk of his article discussing the remarkable outcomes

from the in-stride transformation of an agile, adaptable leader. The Anbar

Awakening is not the only amazing 180 of this operation writ large, and we're

glad to be on the same team as great leaders of principle, vision, and open

minds.

But the doubters didn't take into account the evolution of Odierno's thinking during his second tour in Iraq, in 2006, when he helped develop the military's surge strategy--which contributed hugely to the reduction of violence in much of the country. Petraeus sold Washington on the surge, but it was Odierno who gave him something to sell. "It is clear that by late 2006, he was as important as Petraeus, if not more important, because he was the guy on the ground," says Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution.

The success of the surge has led to a reassessment of Odierno, 54. Retired General Jack Keane, who consulted closely with Odierno on the surge in late 2006, was so impressed that he later used his powerful connections in the Administration to push for promoting Odierno to Petraeus' job. "He went through a complete metamorphosis," says Keane. "He educated himself and became the pre-eminent operational commander we have in conducting irregular warfare."...

Much more at Time.

Book Review - The Devil We Know

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/20/2008 - 4:15pm | 1 comment

A review of:

The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower

by Robert Baer. Published

by Crown, 2008.

Reviewed by:

Thomas (Tom) P. Odom

LTC US Army (ret)

Author,

Journey Into Darkness: Genocide In Rwanda

A good friend of mine lent me this book to read with the caution, "This will

piss you off." I was not sure exactly what he meant by that remark but I took

the book. I liked Bob Baer's first book and have recommended it to others.

After reading this one, Baer's latest, I would recommend it but with some very

strong cautions. I will address those later. For now, let me highlight its

strengths...

America's Best Leaders

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/20/2008 - 10:54am | 0 comments

America's Best Leaders: US Junior Officers, Military - Anna Mulrine, US News and World Report

They have been called upon to serve in bloody and complicated wars on two fronts, many for more than half of their short careers. As a result, lieutenants and captains often have more combat experience than the generals who command them. "They are wise beyond their years," Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said about junior officers in an address this year to the Army War College. "We owe them our attention and our time." He urged their superiors to listen to them and called upon junior officers to question their superiors as well.

And they have. Indeed, the experience of junior officers has occasionally created strained relationships with senior leadership. Many have been frustrated by what they view as a lack of accountability at the highest levels of leadership. "It has created some tension," says Nathaniel Fick, author of One Bullet Away: the Making of a Marine Officer and a platoon leader in Iraq in the spring of 2003. "A private who loses a rifle gets into more trouble than a general who loses a war."

Much more at US News and World Report.

World Grapples with Pirate Problem

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/20/2008 - 5:15am | 2 comments

20 November

World Grapples with Pirate Problem - Peter Spiegel and Henry Chu, Los Angeles Times

The Saudis chose to negotiate. The Indian navy opened fire. The US Navy said shipping companies should do more to protect their vessels, and the ship owners said governments should guard the high seas.

But everyone wants the barely functioning government of Somalia to control the pirates who sail from its ports to seize the cargo ships and tankers that ply past.

Mightily armed, but slightly baffled, 21st century civilization appears to have no collective answer to piracy, a scourge once considered banished into history.

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Continue on for more on the piracy problem off the Horn of Africa...

David Kilcullen Joins CNAS as a Senior Fellow

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/19/2008 - 6:45pm | 0 comments

CNAS Press Release - 19 November 2008 - David Kilcullen Joins CNAS as a Senior Fellow.

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is pleased to officially announce that Dr. David Kilcullen has joined CNAS as a senior fellow. Kilcullen was a non-resident senior fellow with CNAS for more than a year and collaborated with CNAS on Iraq and Afghanistan reports, as well as violent extremism and grand strategy Solarium projects in 2007 and 2008.

Kilcullen's position as the Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, will conclude in December 2008, at which time he will also become a partner at the Crumpton Group, a Washington, D.C.-based strategic advisory firm...

ISAF Campaign Plan Summary

by John A. Nagl | Wed, 11/19/2008 - 1:50pm | 2 comments

I was struck during my recent visit to Afghanistan by an impressive understanding of counterinsurgency principles in the International Security Assistance Force and at subordinate headquarters (See In Afghanistan, 'New Spirit' To Confront The Taliban at NPR).

At the request of the small group of think-tankers I was travelling with, General David McKiernan's headquarters has agreed to release an unclassified version of the ISAF Campaign plan specifically for posting on Small Wars Journal. Things I find particularly interesting in this plan include the upfront acknowledgement that this is a counterinsurgency (vice peacekeeping) campaign (obvious to us, but hugely important in the NATO context); the addition of "Shaping Operations" to the classic "Clear, Hold, Build" COIN methodology; an acknowledgment that in this still critically under-resourced theater, ISAF cannot be strong everywhere and must therefore prioritize areas to clear and hold (a point Dave Kilcullen made well on Sunday with Fareed Zakaria); and the overt emphasis on buildling Afghan governance capability and capacity as the objective of all of our operations.

How to Fix Afghanistan

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/19/2008 - 1:40pm | 0 comments

Embedded video from CNN Video

Fareed Zakaria (CNN) talks with Dr. David Kilcullen and Dr. Barnett Rubin about the best possible way to proceed in Afghanistan.

Global Trends 2025

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/19/2008 - 4:37am | 5 comments

Panel Foresees Lesser US Role - Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times

The top US intelligence panel this week is expected to issue a snapshot of the world in 2025, in a report that predicts fading American economic and military dominance and warns of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

The predictions come from the National Intelligence Council (NIC), part of Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell's office.

The NIC report, a draft copy of which is titled "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World," is slated for release as early as Thursday.

The report also predicts "a unified Korea" is likely by then, and that China will be the world's second-largest economy and a major military power.

"The United States will remain the single most powerful country, although less dominant," according to a "working draft" of the document obtained by The Washington Times. "Shrinking economic and military capabilities may force the US into a difficult set of tradeoffs between domestic and foreign-policy priorities."

More at The Washington Times.

Parameters Autumn 2008 Issue

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/18/2008 - 6:52pm | 1 comment

The Autumn 2008 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.

Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.

Here is the line-up:

In This Issue - Parameters Editors

Tying US Defense Spending to GDP: Bad Logic, Bad Policy by Travis Sharp

As the war in Iraq drags into its sixth year and cumulative spending approved by the Congress for the "global war on terrorism" surpasses $850 billion, both the American public and security experts are becoming increasingly concerned about the present and future direction of US defense spending. One proposal under consideration is to allocate the defense budget each year as a specific percentage of America's gross domestic product (GDP). Advocates of this approach typically recommend pegging "base" Department of Defense (DOD) spending, which excludes both supplemental appropriations for ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and Department of Energy-administered nuclear weapons activities, at four percent of GDP.

USJFCOM Commander's Guidance for Effects-based Operations by James N. Mattis

Herein are my thoughts and commander's guidance regarding effects-based operations (EBO). This article is designed to provide the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and among our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever by Tomislav Z. Ruby

The Next Wave of Nuclear Proliferation by Nader Elhefnawy

In recent years record oil prices, long-term concerns about fossil fuel supplies (particularly oil), and worries about the contributions of fossil fuels to the accumulation of greenhouse gases such as carbon and methane have helped revive interest in nuclear energy production. Indeed, it has become commonplace to advocate renewed investment in nuclear energy production in the United States. There has been, however, little consideration as to what a global turn to nuclear energy on an enlarged scale would actually entail, let alone the security implications of such.

A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipolar World by Michael Lind

The United States is a superpower in search of a strategy. Following the end of the Cold War, no new grand strategy has won the bipartisan support that underpinned America's strategy of containment from President Truman to President Reagan. Enthusiastic promoters of globalization occasionally argue that international trade will be a panacea for conflict, at least among developed nations. The neoconservative vision of unilateral US global hegemony always lacked adequate military forces and funding to realize its ambitious goals. Now, in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the hegemony strategy also lacks public support. Most critics of the hegemony strategy, however, have failed to propose a credible alternative capable of guiding US national security.

Contractors: The New Element of Military Force Structure by Mark Cancian

Mercenaries," "merchants of death," "coalition of the billing," "a national disgrace" all have been used to describe the use of contractors in war. The extensive use of contractors on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan has engendered strong emotion and calls for change. An ever-expanding literature and much larger volume of opinion pieces have led the discussion, most expressing shock and disappointment that such a situation has occurred. Unfortunately, little of this literature is useful to planners trying to design future forces in a world characterized by extensive commitments and limited manpower. The purpose of this article is to examine what battlefield contractors actually do, consider how we got to the situation we are in today, and provide force planners with some useful insight regarding the future.

Why Contractor Fatalities Matter by Steven L. Schooner

The true US death toll in Iraq and Afghanistan recently reached the 6,000 threshold. But that is not what the media are reporting and as a result, the public remains generally unaware. At the end of July 2008, mainstream media reported that 4,673 service members have died in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Counting only military fatalities, however, understates the human cost of America's engagements in these regions by nearly a fourth. On the modern, outsourced battlefield, contractors are sustaining injuries and fatalities in increasing numbers. Specifically, the losses chronicled in The Washington Post's ongoing "Faces of the Fallen" series fail to recognize the little-known fact that, as of 30 June 2008, more than 1,350 civilian contractor personnel had died in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of US military and political operations. Another 29,000 contractors have been injured; more than 8,300 seriously. Yet contractor fatalities (and injuries) remain generally outside the public's consciousness.

Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War by Daniel S. Roper

Though policy initiatives since the attacks of 11 September 2001 have positively influenced certain agencies and processes within the US government in their efforts to secure America, some steps have worked at cross purposes and limited the nation's effectiveness in countering the threats it faces. One entrenched policy that inhibits clear analysis and understanding of the threat is the continued framing of this global struggle as a "War on Terrorism" (WOT). Words have consequences in shaping understanding and framing potential courses of action. The broad use and narrow connotations of the term WOT have cultivated a widespread, erroneous intellectual paradigm for dealing with both terrorism and insurgencies. This false strategy conflates a single tactic into the overall characteristic of a diverse number of enemy organizations, who exercise terrorism as just one tool. Continuing to frame the conflict as a war against terrorism alone serves to mischaracterize the enemy, obscures an understanding of the techniques they employ, distorts the challenges posed, and impedes the development and implementation of a strategy for countering their impact.

Time for a New Strategy by William McDonough

On 10 January 2007, during an address to the nation, President George W. Bush announced the United States' third strategy to achieve several goals in Iraq. The goals were to improve security conditions; develop Iraqi Security Forces' capabilities and transfer security responsibilities to the Government of Iraq (GoI); assist GoI efforts to draft, enact, and implement key legislative initiatives; assist full expenditure of budgets; and help the GoI provide essential services to its people. This strategy, known as The New Way Forward or more commonly as the Surge Strategy, established a 12- to 18-month timeframe to achieve these objectives. The strategy reiterated the Administration's long-term goal of a unified, federal, and democratic Iraq that could govern, defend, and sustain itself, and be an ally in the war on terrorism.

Commentary and Reply

Review Essay

Book Reviews

CJCS Guidance for 2008-2009

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/18/2008 - 6:06pm | 0 comments

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, released his guidance for 2008-2009 on 17 November.

S. Dawn Casey of Talk Radio News Service on a recent press briefing by Admiral Mullen:

This is the first administration transition during wartime in forty years, and traditionally, a crisis will occur during that period, said Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a press briefing at the Pentagon.

Mullen said he believes it's critical to pursue all the issues in the CJCS Guidance memorandum, which includes defending vital National interests in the broader Middle East; Resetting, Reconstituting, and Revitalizing our Forces; and properly balancing our global strategic risk. In addition to these issues, he said, there is a whole range of other global concerns such as tensions in Eurasia and Africa, and the impact of the economic crisis.

Excerpts from an e-mail by Admiral Mullen to members of the Joint Staff follow.

My top three priorities have remained the same:

1) Defend our Vital National Interests in the Broader Middle East.

2) Reset, Reconstitute and Revitalize our Armed Forces.

3) Properly Balanced Global Strategic Risk.

We must also prepare for the arrival of a new Commander-in-Chief. President-elect Obama is forming a transition team to prepare for his leadership of the Defense Department. As I said to you in my transition guidance, I expect us all to support his team to the very best of our ability - staying responsive to their requests for information, while at the same time executing faithfully the policies of this administration.

Mullen Issues Guidance Listing Priorities for Joint Staff - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

Dealing with the greater Middle East, avoiding the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, resetting the forces and speeding up the Joint Staff are among the priorities the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has set for the coming year.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen issued his guidance for the coming year yesterday. Some of the guidance has not changed since last year, when Mullen first took office, some has been fine-tuned after the experiences of the past year, and some new items have made the list.

The chairman said he issued the guidance to give the 1,500 members of the Joint Staff the path ahead and to prioritize the strategic objectives for the future...

Talking With the Taliban

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/18/2008 - 9:44am | 0 comments

Talking With the Taliban by Paul McLeary at Aviation Week's Ares

There's been a lot of talk lately about opening negotiations with the Taliban—or at least trying to pull in the "reconcilables" while continuing to kill the "unreconcilables"—which has created a lot of back and forth in hotbeds for debate about counterinsurgency tactics and procedures, like the Small Wars Journal and Abu Muquwama blogs...

I recently spoke with Nathaniel Fick, a former Marine officer who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and later taught at the counterinsurgency school in Kabul, and who is currently a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, who thinks that negotiating with the Taliban right now is a bad idea. "If we open negotiations with the Taliban right now, we will be doing so from a position of weakness," he says. "The trick for the next administration is to take the tactical and operational and strategic steps to get us into a position of strength where negotiation is an option."

John Nagl, a former army Lieutenant Colonel also at the Center for a New American Security, told me that in the near term, what he sees as most crucial for finding a solution to the Afghan mess is the need for "confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan" that could be very useful in allowing Pakistan to focus more exclusively "on the Taliban insurgency in its midst and the continuing problem of al Qaeda. None of these things by itself is going to turn the tide. A combination of all of them with additional resources has the potential to be enormously helpful."...

Much more at Ares.

Here There Bee (More) Pirates...

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/18/2008 - 9:40am | 1 comment

Here There Bee (More) Pirates... and Might the Obama Administration Take Them Out? By Kenneth Anderson at Opinio Juris

Somali pirates strike again, this time hijacking a Saudi-owned tanker off the coast of Kenya. The running stand off with the hijacked ship carrying arms and a Ukrainian crew continues; Russia announces that it repelled an attack on a different Saudi vessel...

Might piracy be a relatively easy place for the Obama administration to demonstrate its approach to use of force, multilateralism, and international law? No use of force question is ever truly easy - law of unintended consequences always in effect - but clearly this is a rising issue, and one in which the vessels of many nations have been attacked and continue at risk....

Much more at Opinio Juris - Kenneth poses some good questions at this post and is seeking those with operational experience to comment.

Gang Threat Could Top Al Qaeda

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/18/2008 - 8:56am | 2 comments

Danger Room Debrief: Gang Threat Could Top Al Qaeda, Mr. President-Elect by Noah Shachtman at Wired Magazine's Danger Room

... Today we hear from John P. Sullivan, the co-founder of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group. He's a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, focusing on emerging threats. Sullivan co-edited Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network.

While the public and media are occupied with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the potential conflict with Iran, the downward spiral in Pakistan, and a global economic meltdown, a new, rapidly-evolving danger - narco-cartels and gangs - has been developing in Mexico and Latin America. And it has the potential to trump global terrorism as a threat to the United States...

Much more at Danger Room.

Obama Dips Into Think Tank For Talent

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/17/2008 - 5:34pm | 1 comment

Obama Dips Into Think Tank For Talent - Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal

The Center for a New American Security, a small think tank here with generally middle-of-the-road policy views, is rapidly emerging as a top farm team for the incoming Obama administration.

When President-elect Barack Obama released a roster of his transition advisers last week, many of the national-security appointments came from the ranks of the center, which was founded by a pair of former Clinton administration officials in February 2007.

The think tank's central role in the transition effort suggests that its positions -- which include rejecting a fixed timeline for a withdrawal from Iraq -- will get a warm reception within the new administration.

Michele Flournoy, who co-founded the center with Kurt Campbell, a former Clinton National Security Council and Pentagon official, now serves as its president. She is one of two top members of Mr. Obama's defense transition team and is likely to be offered a high-ranking position at the Pentagon. Some Obama advisers say she could eventually be tapped as the nation's first female defense secretary...

Much more at The Wall Street Journal.

Interview With General George Casey

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 11/16/2008 - 9:22pm | 0 comments

Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, has again kindly permitted SWJ to post an item that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

Colonel Gurney and Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman of Joint Force Quarterly interviewed Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General George Casey at his Pentagon office -- get an early read of this interview here at SWJ.

National Security and The Long War

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 11/16/2008 - 4:27pm | 0 comments

For Nation at War, Gates Seeks Smooth Transition - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is approaching the presidential transition unlike any of his predecessors.

He has ordered hundreds of political appointees at the Pentagon canvassed to see whether they wish to stay on in the new administration, has streamlined policy briefings and has set up suites for President-elect Barack Obama's transition team just down the hall from his own E-ring office.

Gates's efforts to ensure a smooth changeover during the first wartime presidential transition in 40 years mark a consensus-oriented style that has won him strong support inside and outside the Pentagon.

Search