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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/16/2008 - 1:49pm | 1 comment

Gates Highlights Role of Diplomacy, Development in U.S. Foreign Policy - John Kruzel, AFPS

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates yesterday said diplomacy and development should lead American efforts abroad, and he warned against a "creeping militarization" of U.S. foreign policy.

"Broadly speaking, when it comes to America's engagement with the rest of the world, it is important that the military is -- and is clearly seen to be -- in a supporting role to civilian agencies," he said.

In a speech interrupted several times by rousing applause, Gates told the audience at a dinner organized by the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign that America cannot simply "kill or capture our way to victory" over the long term.

"What the Pentagon calls 'kinetic' operations should be subordinate to measures to promote participation in government, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies and among the discontented from which terrorists recruit," he said.

In remarks imbued with a spirit of cooperation between the departments of Defense and State -- a relationship that in the past has been marked by contention, Gates said -- the defense secretary hailed his working relationship with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had presented him the group's leadership award earlier in the evening...

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C. , Tuesday, July 15, 2008 (Full Text)

Excerpts:

War on Terror

Over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. What the Pentagon calls "kinetic" operations should be subordinate to measures to promote participation in government, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies and among the discontented from which terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideology.

Failing States

I believe the most persistent and potentially dangerous threats will come less from emerging ambitious states, than from failing ones that cannot meet the basic needs - much less the aspirations - of their people.

U.S. Reputation Abroad

In my travels to foreign capitals, I have been struck by the eagerness of so many foreign governments to forge closer diplomatic and security ties with the United States - ranging from old enemies like Vietnam to new partners like India. Nonetheless, regard for the U.S. remains low amongst the populations of many key nations - especially those of our moderate Muslim allies.

This is important because much of our national security strategy depends on securing the cooperation of other nations, which will depend heavily on the extent to which our efforts abroad are viewed as legitimate by their publics. The solution is not to be found in some slick PR campaign or by trying to out propagandize al-Qaeda, but through the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.

Plus-up Civilian Agencies

It has become clear that America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long - relative to what we traditionally spend on the military, and more importantly, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world. Though I cannot pretend to know the right dollar amount - I do know it's a good deal more than the one percent of the federal budget that it is right now. Because the numbers we are talking about are relatively small compared to the rest of government, a steep increase in these capabilities is well within reach - as long as there is the political will and wisdom to do it.

Afghanistan Challenge

The vastly larger, more complex international effort in Afghanistan presents a different set of challenges. There are dozens of nations, hundreds of NGOs, universities, development banks, the United Nations, NATO, the EU - all working to help a nation beset by crushing poverty, a bumper opium crop, and a ruthless and resilient insurgency. Getting all these different elements to coordinate operations and share best practices has been a colossal - and so far an all too often unsuccessful - undertaking.

Shift to Building Capacity

Repeating an Afghanistan or Iraq - forced regime change followed by nation-building under fire - may be unlikely in the future. What is likely though, even a certainty, is the need to work with and through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster.

Militarization in Foreign Policy?

Overall, even outside Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has become more involved in a range of activities that in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations. This has led to concern among many organizations - including probably many represented here tonight - about what's seen as a creeping "militarization" of some aspects of America's foreign policy.

This is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment. As a career CIA officer I watched with some dismay the increasing dominance of the defense 800 pound gorilla in the intelligence arena over years. But that scenario can be avoided if - as is the case with the intelligence community today - there is the right leadership, adequate funding of civilian agencies, effective coordination on the ground, and a clear understanding of the authorities, roles, and missions of military versus civilian efforts, and how they fit, or in some cases don't fit, together...

Civilian vs. Military Roles

Broadly speaking, when it comes to America's engagement with the rest of the world, it is important that the military is - and is clearly seen to be - in a supporting role to civilian agencies. Our diplomatic leaders - be they in ambassadors' suites or on the State Department's seventh floor - must have the resources and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign policy.

The challenge facing our institutions is to adapt to new realities while preserving those core competencies and institutional traits that have made them so successful in the past. The Foreign Service is not the Foreign Legion, and the U.S. military should never be mistaken for a Peace Corps with guns.

U.S. Leadership

In closing, I am convinced, irrespective of what is reported in global opinion surveys, or recounted in the latest speculation about American decline, that around the world, men and women seeking freedom from despotism, want, and fear will continue to look to the United States for leadership.

As a nation, we have, over more than two centuries, made our share of mistakes. From time to time, we have strayed from our values; and, on occasion, we have become arrogant in our dealings with others. But we have always corrected our course. And that is why today, as throughout our history, this country remains the world's most powerful force for good - the ultimate protector of what Vaclav Havel once called "civilization's thin veneer." A nation Abraham Lincoln described as mankind's "last, best hope." For any given cause or crisis, if America does not lead, then more often than not, what needs to get done simply won't get done.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/16/2008 - 8:02am | 0 comments
Shaping the Iraq Inheritance

By Colin Kahl, Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, Center for a New American Security

Synopsis:

American policy in Iraq will undergo two critical transitions throughout the remainder of 2008 and into early 2009: movement to a new U.S. posture in Iraq; and a wartime transition to a new administration. It is vital that both are handled in a way that best advances U.S. interests in Iraq and the region. Yet neither is being paid sufficient attention. Shaping the Iraq Inheritance outlines America's interests in Iraq and the region, analyzes recent security and political trends, presents a framework for understanding U.S. strategic options, and makes recommendations for how the Bush administration, the military, and Congress can best prepare for the dangerous period ahead.

The report places America's interests in Iraq within a regional and global context, and suggests that the United States must simultaneously attempt to avoid a failed state in Iraq while not strategically over-committing to Iraq. The report examines current security and political trends, and suggests that success in Iraq requires additional steps toward political accommodation and improved governance. The report then outlines a policy of conditional engagement—a strategy that initiates a phased, negotiated redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq while conditioning residual support to the Iraqi government on continued political progress—and argues that it offers the best chance of achieving sustainable stability in Iraq while balancing U.S. commitments worldwide.

Finally, the report outlines steps that must be taken to smooth the handover of Iraq policy from this administration to the next. The Bush administration must prioritize preparation in three areas over the next six months: the development of an interagency transition plan; enhancing the situational awareness of both the Republican and Democratic Presidential candidates and their top national security advisers on Iraq; and hand-tooling personnel transitions for senior positions critical to Iraq policy and operations.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/16/2008 - 8:01am | 3 comments
The Frontline Country Team

A Model for Engagement

By Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute

Foreward:

For over sixty years, the United States has sought to build the capabilities of its allies and security partners. This is a mission that has accelerated since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and it is one that any administration, be it Democratic or Republican, will inherit in January 2009. As a longstanding strategic goal, building partnership capacity has also dredged up a series of contradictions and conundrums for American policymaking, as officials attempt to foster governance without fueling dictatorships, engage "frontline states" without becoming enmeshed in their internal feuds, and manage the details of convoluted international partnerships from the confines of Washington. Resolving these contradictions - or at least mitigating them - is the principal ongoing challenge of American security cooperation programs.

In this report, we provide a critique of the development and current practice of American security cooperation programs, as well as a modest proposal for how they may be improved in the future. We find that many of the authorities and instruments for engagement already exist, but that they may be more effectively harnessed if leadership is devolved from Washington to the "frontline country team," in which the ambassador is responsible for coordinating and directing American policy. We argue that the country team is the point at which the rubber of American policy hits the road and where it will ultimately succeed or fail.

As we prepared this report, we benefited tremendously from the insight, advice, and support of several friends and colleagues. Our colleague Gary J. Schmitt both worked with us to develop the frontline country team concept and, in his capacity as director of the American Enterprise Institute's Program on Advanced Strategic Studies, provided crucial support to get this project off the ground. Col. Robert Killebrew (USA, Ret.) was a key partner as we developed the "frontline country team" proposal, as well as the seminar game in which we tested it. A wide number of current and former U.S. diplomats, soldiers, and officials provided crucial input based upon their experiences in the field and in Washington. The Smith Richardson Foundation generously provided support for the Indonesia seminar game. This project could not have been completed without the tireless efforts of AEI research assistants Tim Sullivan and Catherine Hamilton. Needless to say, all errors and omissions in this report are those of the authors.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 07/15/2008 - 7:03pm | 4 comments
Heroes of Ramadi, Tal Afar to Get First Star by Jeff Schogol, Stars and Stripes.

Army Cols. Sean B. MacFarland and H.R. McMaster Jr. have been selected for brigadier general pending Senate confirmation, officials said.

MacFarland was commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division in May 2006 when the unit was sent to Ramadi, then one of the worst places in Iraq for US troops.

During his tenure in Ramadi, MacFarland's troops worked with local tribes and established combat outposts to take the initiative away from the insurgents...

McMaster, then commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, ordered his troops to treat detainees humanely, reached out to local Sunni Arabs to separate them from the insurgents, and he established patrol bases throughout the city, The Washington Post reported in 2006.

In late 2005, he launched Operation Restore Rights to take back the city from insurgents.

By the time the unit left in early 2006, the mayor of Tal Afar wrote a letter to the commander of US troops in Iraq praising the regiment...
by Dave Dilegge | Tue, 07/15/2008 - 6:32pm | 0 comments

Got the following in an e-mail today - will follow up here as I hope to get a spot on a Thursday teleconference with the author of the report...

(Links and emphasis by SWJ)

Dear Dave,

In a post about AFRICOM last year, you wrote: "Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right." Refugees International is releasing a report this Thursday, July 17 that lays out recommendations for the US to get AFRICOM right, and much of it has to do with the interagency collaboration you proposed.

The report also analyzes the ways in which US foreign aid in Africa—and the world over—is becoming increasingly militarized, in some cases to the detriment of long-term security and humanitarian and development investment. On Thursday, July 17 at 12pm ET, there will be a phone briefing on the report with the report's author, Mark Malan, and Ken Bacon, President of Refugees International.

In the report, Mark Malan (Peace Building Program Manager for Refugees International and former head of research for Kofi Annan's International Peacekeeping Centre in Ghana) asserts that AFRICOM is enabling the Department of Defense to take over funds that were previously managed by the State Department and USAID. For example, the percentage of Official Development Assistance that the Pentagon controls has skyrocketed from 3.5% to nearly 22% in the past decade, while the percentage controlled by USAID has shrunk from 65% to 40%.

The report argues Pentagon programs in Africa fund immediate, short-term security programs rather than the broader US commitment to aid the growth of prosperous, stable countries. For example, more than half of the FY09 requested budget for Foreign Military Financing in Africa is for just two countries -- Djibouti and Ethiopia -- that are considered key partners in the continental War on Terror. As a result, 17 African Union member states have refused to host AFRICOM operations on their soil, viewing the US agency as an occupying force rather than a solution to long-term stability and security needs.

In spite of AFRICOM's drawbacks, however, Refugees International contends that AFRICOM could have an extremely positive impact on the region. A meaningful collaboration among the State Department, USAID and the Defense Department could kill three birds with one stone: help the US and African nations to fight terrorism, assist African countries with sustainable economic development, and build goodwill on the ground among humanitarian agencies, African legislators and civilians.

The report will be available for download at 12 am, July 17 at www.refugeesinternational.org.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 07/15/2008 - 6:07pm | 0 comments
Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, was revised and approved 8 July 2008 and supersedes JP 3-57, dated 8 February 2001; and JP 3-57.1, dated 14 April 2008.

Continue on for a summary of contents and changes...

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 07/14/2008 - 9:03pm | 0 comments

British Army Major General Barney White-Spunner, General Officer Commanding, Multi-National Division-Southeast, speaks via satellite with reporters at the Pentagon on developments in Basra, 14 July 2008.

Rear Admiral Patrick Driscoll, Spokesman for MNF-I, and Major General Abdul Karin Khalaf, Spokesman for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, provide an operational update on 13 July 2008.
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 07/14/2008 - 6:30pm | 4 comments
The Demise of Secretary Wynne

By J. Bernhard "Jon" Compton

Recently I was privileged to witness a small piece of history. While visiting a friend at the Pentagon, I stood next to the office door of Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne as he left the building for the last time. After he left, and while all the rooms were still empty, I was given a quick tour of the offices. Surrounded by giant paintings of airpower, it was difficult not to reflect upon the current situation and how he got there.

My friend is Special Assistant to Secretary Wynne, Dr. Richard Andres, and once the Secretary had left, we sat down and had a long discussion on current topics. Rick and I have discussed our opinions on air power and the military many times before, and while I consider myself to be service agnostic, Rick is very much biased toward the Air Force, and I think with good reason.

Something I've often heard Rick say, and I believe he is correct, is that the Army does not understand air power. Often their plans minimize its use, and their after action reports under report its effectiveness. Case in point, the surge in Iraq. While sitting in Ricks E ring office, he asked me point blank whether or not I believed a 20% increase (or "surge") in troop strength could really make much difference to the situation. It was obviously a baited question, but it wasn't one I had to think about much. To my mind, the increase could not have been that effective; there had to have been some fundamental doctrinal change in order for that small an increase to have had the dramatic effect that it's had. Prior to this discussion, I'd already been pondering the issue for some time...

by Bill Caldwell | Sun, 07/13/2008 - 5:11pm | 1 comment
Yesterday our Nation lost one of our finest leaders, Tony Snow, who passed away at age 53 after a long struggle with cancer. Tony was a man who was deeply committed to his faith, family, and to his fellow man. Tony also passionately supported our men and women serving in uniform and was deeply moved anytime he had the opportunity to speak with them and hear the stories of their bravery and sacrifice.

I had the honor of communicating with Tony on a weekly basis while I was assigned to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) as the chief spokesman. During this extraordinarily challenging period of time Tony continually provided me, and everyone else, with a renewed sense of pride in our mission. As a personal friend and mentor, he was an adamant supporter of our efforts to communicate all that was being accomplished by the Coalition Force and the Iraqi people during a very tumultuous period in our Nation's history. Even though his own health was failing, he provided us in Iraq with a renewed sense of purpose and enthusiasm every time we spoke.

Tony leaves behind a loving wife, Jill and three beautiful children, son Robbie and daughters, Kendall and Kristi. I would ask each of you to keep Jill and the children in your thoughts and prayers.

He also leaves behind a legacy of character in leadership, compassion for the hurting, and commitment to serving others. Each of us who had the honor of knowing him has been deeply enriched by his friendship.

I think the following clip by Bret Baier, Fox News correspondent, summarizes the enduring legacy Tony left behind for us all.

George Washington once said "Few men have virtue to withstand the highest bidder."

Tony Snow was one of those few men.

Bill Caldwell

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 07/13/2008 - 12:18pm | 2 comments
... read this one - An Army That Learns by David Ignatius of The Washington Post. Here are the opening paragraphs:

The U.S. Army has done something remarkable in its new history of the disastrous first 18 months of the American occupation of Iraq: It has conducted a rigorous self-critique of how bad decisions were made, so that the Army won't make them again.

Civilian leaders are still mostly engaged in a blame game about Iraq, pointing fingers to explain what went wrong and to justify their own actions. That's certainly the tone of recent memoirs by Douglas Feith, the former undersecretary of defense, and L. Paul Bremer, the onetime head of the Coalition Provisional Authority. These were the people making policy, yet they treat the key mistakes as other people's fault. Feith criticizes Bremer and the CIA, while Bremer chides former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the military for ignoring his advice that the United States didn't have enough troops.

The Army can't afford this sort of retroactive self-justification. Its commanders and soldiers are the ones who got stuck with the situation in Iraq and had to make it work as best they could. And this internal history, published last month under the title "On Point II," testifies to the Army's strength as a learning organization. (This study covers May 2003 to January 2005. An earlier volume, "On Point," chronicled the initial assault on Baghdad.)...

Key Quote

Politicians repeat, ad nauseam, the maxim that "those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it." The U.S. Army is that rare institution in American life that is actually putting this precept into practice.

Links

On Point - Through 1 May 2003.

On Point II - May 2003 to January 2005.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 07/13/2008 - 11:58am | 0 comments
One could argue, quite reasonably, that there is much to improve in regards to civil-military relations within the US Government and, in particular, the US Department of Defense. For those who work for or with the Pentagon bureaucracy and despair at the seemingly endless red-tape and inane processes - take heart - things could be worse. This is evidenced in a recent Standpoint opinion piece entitled The MoD -- Unfit for Purpose by Anonymous. Based on several e-mails received by SWJ we are quite confident that Anonymous is who he says he is -- a military officer who has worked several years at the UK Ministry of Defence. Here are several excerpts -- have a stiff drink before reading the entire article at the link and be sure to peruse the comments that follow...

... Most people still believe that the MOD is essentially a military organisation. It is not. It is an organisation dominated numerically, culturally and structurally by civil servants and consultants, many of whom are unsympathetic to its underlying purpose or even hostile to the military and its ethos. You just have to spend a few days at the MOD before you realise that the culture there is not just non-military, but anti-military...

The contrast with the US Department of Defense could not be greater. The Pentagon is a first-rate military organisation (at least in terms of status) where the MOD is not. At the Pentagon, every military person is expected to be in uniform; and it's the civilians who feel and recognise that they are the supporting cast. Military officers are frequently loaned to other ministries such as the State Department and they continue to wear their uniforms there. The reverse is true in the UK where the Civil Service and its "unions" not only resist the wearing of uniforms but also any systematic secondments (as opposed to hand-picked placements) from the military.

The MOD has slipped from being one of the top five ministries to one of second or even third rank. Moreover, even if our top generals wanted to oppose some aspect of defence policy, they would find the MOD's structure is now rigged so that civil servants increasingly come between them and the government...

Worse still, the civil servants who now dominate the MOD are a different breed from those who staffed it in the 1980s. In those days there were still many civil servants who had served in the Second World War or Korea, or who had at least done national service. They respected and understood the armed services; they believed an effective military was important and had usually learnt essential skills of leadership and management. They were loyal to the Queen (then the head of the Civil Service), to the Civil Service itself and to its code, and to the service arm they were working for. They have all gone.

Their successors tend to see the services as a tiresome anachronism, peopled by unsympathetic, old-fashioned social types. For many of them the MOD, with its part-time minister, is merely a stepping stone to greater things...

Because the services haven't had the budget increases they need to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is running out of everything. We're running out of trucks, for instance. And when things break they aren't being replaced. Increasingly one gets the impression that the civil servants don't care if the forces are broken - their careers will not be affected. But it may also be that some civil servants and a body of politicians, from both Left and Right, would actually be happy for the military to be broken in Iraq and Afghanistan. Then they will have truly achieved the Europeanisation of Britain's armed forces along the lines of a purely defensive "UK Defence Force". War will somehow have been abolished - until, of course, it returns at a time of our enemies' choosing.

Read the entire article at Standpoint.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 07/12/2008 - 7:57pm | 10 comments
We've all heard humorless America-haters promote themselves by announcing, As Thomas Jefferson said, "Dissent is the highest form of patriotism."

The first problem with that self-righteous bull is that Jefferson never said it. On the contrary, he warned of the dangers of political dissension carried to extremes.

The earliest traceable provenance of the slogan goes back to an obscure 1960s lefty who just made it up.

Dissent can be patriotic - it's essential to have an ongoing public debate about the major issues confronting us. But that dissent must be based on facts, not sloppy emotions.

Instead, we get dissent worn as a fashion statement. And fanatic dissent (as Jefferson noted) is the enemy of a democratic system.

--Ralph Peters

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 07/11/2008 - 7:18pm | 4 comments
John Bennett of Defense News (subscription required) has reported "on DC talk" that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) John Young, and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities) Michael Vickers may survive the transition from the Bush to a McCain or Obama administration.

"The next president will inherit the most daunting security environment" an incoming commander in chief has ever been handed, said Michí¨le Flournoy, a former top Pentagon strategic planner in President Bill Clinton's administration. "America has not had a grand strategy since the end of the Cold War." Not since the Vietnam War have so many US troops been involved in shooting wars during a presidential transition.

Either Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., or Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., will inherit the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, plus a number of troubled weapon programs and other military challenges.

There is talk in Washington that the new president should consider keeping some Bush appointees on after he takes office, at least until his nominees are confirmed.

Good choices all - hopefully transition reality will turn this DC chatter into concrete action.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 07/11/2008 - 5:26pm | 0 comments
The United States Institute of Peace - Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations - posted a Metrics Framework today on the USIP web page.

USIP describes the framework as follows - USIP-developed methodologies for measurement of the transformation from war to peace were recently used at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and the US Army War College (AWC). At FSI, classes in the Integrated Conflict Analysis Framework (ICAF) are part of courses that aim to build an interagency community of professionals trained to participate in reconstruction and stabilization operations. ICAF incorporates USIP's conflict transformation framework, which tracks drivers of conflict and institutional performance. At the AWC, a recent workshop used USIP's measurement framework for a hypothetical scenario on Chad.

Dennis Skocz, a specialist on strategic planning and professional development, lauded the USIP framework. "The concepts are clear, intuitive, and flexible. Aspects of a conflict that might be ignored using a stove-piped approach to lining up tasks come out through the analysis, allowing for a holistic response to situations that typically involve many 'moving pieces,'" he said. "As for the metric framework, it's an idea whose time has clearly come. It combines the sophistication that comes from almost two years of development along with a foundation in the conflict analysis that USIP has pioneered."

Also posted this month - Integrated Security Assistance: The 1207 Program by Robert M. Perito.

In January 2008, the US Departments of State and Defense requested that the United States Institute of Peace conduct an independent assessment of the process by which projects funded under Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Acts of FY 2006 and FY 2007 were developed, reviewed, and approved for funding. They asked that the study include recommendations for changes in the application and approval procedures to ensure that project proposals were reviewed through an efficient, transparent, and well-understood interagency process. The Institute agreed to conduct the study because the 1207 program is an example of the US military's growing involvement in integrated "whole-of-government" approaches to US security assistance programs. The study is based on interviews with staff members of the Senate and House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees and representatives from the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, and the US Agency for International Development.

And on Iraq - USIP Dialogue on Media and Conflict in Iraq Spawns Call for Partnership. (Full text in English) (Full text in Arabic)

USIP convened a groundbreaking conference on media and conflict in Iraq in Istanbul May 14-16, 2008. The event was part of the Institute's Iraq and its Neighbors project and was co-hosted by the Center for Sustainable Peace at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul.

Participants included media executives from Iraq and across the region. These executives, who represented entertainment, news, citizen media and new media technology, met with officials from the Iraqi government and international experts to explore media's effect on the conflict and vice versa.

The participants called for "a partnership between a government committed to freedom of expression and media committed to responsible use of the means of communication" to enable both to weather the current conflict and look forward to a more peaceful future.

The meeting resulted in a two-page "Istanbul Declaration" featuring specific recommendations whose implementation should be feasible within the next five years.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 07/11/2008 - 7:45am | 0 comments
Yesterday's Inside the Pentagon had an excellent overview of current efforts underway in the Department of Defense to address issues associated with Irregular Warfare - Joint Panel Blesses New Concept for Defeating Terrorist Networks by Fawzia Sheikh (subscription required -- visit Inside Defense News Stand for a special access offer).

Here are several highlights from the article:

(1) A new draft Defense Department Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) for Defeating Terrorist Networks, which is being drafted to help implement DOD's broad vision for irregular warfare, won a key endorsement from the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB).

(2) US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) will continue as the lead sponsor of the JIC.

(3) The idea behind the Defeating Terrorist Networks JIC is to take "a more holistic approach to tackling the root causes of these networks."

(4) USSOCOM is also leading the development of three other intertwined JICs: Counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare.

(5) The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept describes how future Joint Force Commanders may conduct protracted irregular wars to meet national strategic objectives in the 2014 to 2026 time frame. The latest JICs connected to Irregular Warfare are in their infancy and "don't have a lot of flesh on the bones yet."

(6) The Unconventional Warfare JIC describes destabilization of foreign nations that pose a threat to US forces. Foreign Internal Defense has to do with training and equipping foreign forces to battle an actual or threatened insurgency in a foreign state. While work has just begun on the Counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare JICs, the next-most advanced concept following Defeating Terrorist Networks is Strategic Communications. US Joint Forces Command, in conjunction with US Strategic Command and USSOCOM, are leading the development of the Strategic Communications JIC.

(7) The Strategic Communications JIC will describe how a Joint Force will Conduct Strategic Communications activities in eight to 20 years.

Visit Inside Defense News Stand for a special access offer. Also see Inside Defense's The Insider, a twice-weekly report on the Defense Department, Congress and the defense industry.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 07/10/2008 - 7:29pm | 0 comments

Major General Michael Oates, Commander of Multi-National Division-Center, and 10th Mountain Division, speaks with reporters at the Pentagon, providing an operational update on 10 July 2008.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 07/10/2008 - 6:06pm | 0 comments
Iran's Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities by Keith Crane, Rollie Lal and Jeffrey Martini; Rand Corporation Monograph.

Iran is one of the United States' most important foreign policy concerns. It has also been an extraordinarily difficult country with which to engage. Ironically, while the leadership has been hostile to the United States, Iranian society has evolved in ways friendly to the United States and US interests. This monograph assesses current political, ethnic, demographic, and economic trends and vulnerabilities in Iran. For example, the numbers of young people entering the Iranian labor force are at an all-time high. The authors then provide recommendations for US policies that might foster trends beneficial to US interests. For example, greater use of markets and a more-vibrant private sector would contribute to the development of sources of political power independent from the current regime. The authors finally note a need for patience. Even if favorable trends take root, it will take time for them to come to fruition.

Rand Press Release:

The United States should pursue a mixed strategy toward Iran, using a variety of means to promote favorable social developments within the country and at the same time exploiting vulnerabilities in the nation's political, economic and demographic conditions, according to a study issued today by the Rand Corporation.

However, Iran's vulnerabilities are "not extraordinary" and have become less severe over the last decade as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other Iranian leaders have consolidated their power.

"The United States can use Iran's vulnerabilities to advance US goals, but expectations should be kept low," said Keith Crane, the study's lead author and a senior economist at Rand, a nonprofit research organization. "This is going to be a long-term proposition. Although economic and social forces within Iran are pushing for liberalization, the current regime has been able to maintain its hold on power."

Despite hostile rhetoric expressed by Iranian leaders toward the United States, Iranian society has a generally favorable view of the United States, partly because there is a large population of Iranians living in America, Crane said. Although it faces many problems, the current Iranian regime is likely to resist external pressure for change. It may, however, become more democratic over time, as economic, political and demographic pressures from within force the government to respond to popular desires for a more democratic state.

The Rand report is based upon an assessment of the ethnographic, political and economic literature about Iran, in addition to official Iranian government statements and monitored blogs maintained by Iranians. Economic assessments from the Central Bank of Iran and the International Monetary Fund also were a part of the material assessed.

The study recommends that US policy should be crafted with the goals of fostering conditions for a more democratic Iranian society, weakening the ability of the Iranian government to crack down on dissenters, and penalizing the Iranian government for policies that harm the United States...

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 07/10/2008 - 5:49pm | 2 comments

Charlie Rose Show - A conversation with two former Secretaries of State, James Baker and Warren Christopher, about the war powers debate.

National War Powers Commission - Miller Center of Public Affairs

The Miller Center's National War Powers Commission, co-chaired by former Secretaries of State James A. Baker, III and Warren Christopher, Tuesday recommended that Congress repeal the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and substitute a new statute that would provide for more meaningful consultation between the president and Congress on matters of war. In a report released Tuesday after 13 months of study, the Commission concluded that the War Powers Resolution of 1973 has failed to promote cooperation between the two branches of government and recommended that Congress pass a new statute -- the War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 -- that would establish a clear process on decisions to go to war. The Miller Center impaneled the National War Powers Commission in February 2007. This bipartisan commission met seven times, interviewing more than 40 witnesses about the respective war powers of the president and Congress.

Put War Powers Back Where They Belong - Baker and Christopher, NYT opinion

The most agonizing decision we make as a nation is whether to go to war. Our Constitution ambiguously divides war powers between the president (who is the commander in chief) and Congress (which has the power of the purse and the power to declare war). The founders hoped that the executive and legislative branches would work together, but in practice the two branches don't always consult. And even when they do, they often dispute their respective powers. A bipartisan group that we led, the National War Powers Commission, has unanimously concluded after a year of study that the law purporting to govern the decision to engage in war — the 1973 War Powers Resolution — should be replaced by a new law that would, except for emergencies, require the president and Congressional leaders to discuss the matter before going to war. Seventy years of polls show that most Americans expect Congress and the president to talk before making that decision, and in most cases, they have done so.

Ex-Secretaries: New War Powers Policy - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post

The 1973 War Powers Resolution is ineffective, possibly unconstitutional and should be repealed, two former secretaries of state said yesterday in proposing new legislation to govern the war-making powers of the president and Congress. "The rule of law is undermined and is damaged when the main statute in this vital policy area is regularly questioned or ignored," former secretary James A. Baker III said of the existing law. Baker, along with former secretary Warren Christopher, headed an independent, bipartisan commission that spent the last year examining the issue.

Report Urges Overhaul of the War Powers Law - John Broder, New York Times

Two former secretaries of state, concluding that a 1973 measure limiting the president's ability to wage war unilaterally had never worked as intended, proposed on Tuesday a new system of closer consultation between the White House and Congress before American forces go into battle. Their proposal would require the president to consult senior lawmakers before initiating combat expected to last longer than a week, except for covert operations or rare circumstances requiring emergency action, in which case consultation would have to be undertaken within three days.

Fixing How We Go to War - David Broder, Washington Post opinion

Just shy of eight years after they squared off in the Florida recount battle, James A. Baker III and Warren Christopher have joined forces to clean up one of the ugly legacies of Vietnam -- the misguided piece of legislation called the War Powers Act. Passed in 1973, when Congress was mightily frustrated with the undeclared war in Southeast Asia, that statute is proof of the adage that hard cases make bad law. Cases don't come any harder than Vietnam, and the War Powers Act has turned out to be one of the worst bills ever to reach the president's desk and be signed into law.

Repeal the War Powers Act - Michael Barone, US News & World Report opinion

I tend to be cynical about proposals advanced by bipartisan panels of the great and the good. But I'll make an exception for the National War Powers Commission sponsored by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. The commission was chaired by former Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher and included former Democratic members of Congress Lee Hamilton, John Marsh, and Abner Mikva and former Republican Sen. Slade Gorton (Marsh presumably counts as a Republican, since he served in the Ford White House and was secretary of the Army in the Reagan administration). Other members: Republicans Carla Hills, Edwin Meese, and Brent Scowcroft; Democrats Anne-Marie Slaughter and Strobe Talbott; and retired Adm. J. Paul Reason. In its admirably brief and well-written report, the commission calls for repealing the War Powers Act of 1973 and replacing it with a War Powers Consultation Act that would require the president to consult with a new bipartisan, bicameral Joint Congressional Consultation Committee.

Commission Recommends War Powers Overhaul - National Public Radio

A bipartisan commission is recommending new legislation that would foster more consultation between the president and Congress before the nation goes to war. The proposed legislation would replace the War Powers Act, passed in 1973 by a Vietnam-weary Congress that wanted to check the president's ability to initiate an unpopular war. Observers of all political persuasions have called the 1973 resolution vague and impractical. The National War Powers Commission, led by former secretaries of state James Baker and Warren Christopher, recommends creating a joint congressional committee with whom the president would have to consult before sending troops into conflict. The full Congress would have 30 days to ratify any military action.
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/09/2008 - 10:35pm | 0 comments

Major General Kevin Bergner, MNF-I Spokesman, and Rear Admiral Kathleen Dussault, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan Commander, speak with reporters in Baghdad on 9 July 2008.
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/09/2008 - 7:58pm | 0 comments
Worlds of Enemy Combatants

By Michael Innes - Cross-posted at CTLab

On 3 July, The New Republic's TNR Conversation with Josh Patashnik hosted the Brookings Institution's Benjamin Wittes, author of the recently released Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in an Age of Terror (Penguin Press, 2008), and the New America Foundation's Andrew McCarthy, author of Willful Blindness: A Memoir of the Jihad (Encounter Books, 2008).

There's a crisp transcript of the discussion that's nice and readable, but for the full flavor, listen to the audio, which is much longer and captures much more of the respective authors' responses and elaborations. It kicks off on the recent case of a Chinese Uighur Muslim held at Guantanamo, resolution of which revealed "no evidence that would qualify him as an enemy combatant."

Among other things, TNR's three-way gets into the political context of and for jus ad bellum after 2001, and the politicization of the recent Boumediene Case on habeas corpus rights. The most telling line in the encounter, from Andrew McCarthy: "Rather than having what is probably a not-very-useful argument over what the parameters of the battlefield are, we probably should be much more focused on who it is that we're fighting and under what circumstances they should be brought into the system."

Good on the complexity of battlespace parameters. Bad on suggesting that defining it's probably not useful. Tell it to those who get caught in the "middle", wherever that might be these days. There's a big difference between useless and difficult, the latter hardly a justification for not bothering. That's not what either author's arguing, but they miss an important implication of their own work: the spatial variables that shape and inform the physical disposition of insurgents and terrorists are central to battlespace regulatory regimes.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/09/2008 - 5:24pm | 0 comments

Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt

Remarks at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

Future Land Warfare Conference

12 June 2008

The Land Environment -- Moving Towards 2018

May I start this morning by adding my welcome to that of our Chairman, and in particular thank Professor Michael Clarke, the Director of RUSI and Lieutenant General Ted Stroupe, the Vice President of AUSA, for hosting and putting together this important Conference. May I also thank our many sponsors, too, for their generous support. I believe that our discussions and conclusions over the next two days could prove to be a significant turning point in the way that we address Land Warfare over the next decade or so. There are key questions to be addressed and I welcome this opportunity to exchange ideas and aspirations.

In that spirit I particularly welcome our contributors from overseas, and would like to formally welcome:

(US) Gen Hondo Campbell

(Kenya) Gen Jerry Kianga

(Canada) Lt Gen Andrew Leslie

(Pakistan) Lt Gen Masood Aslam

(France) Maj Gen Jacque Le Chevallier (representing Gen Cuche)

Now to get our proceedings under way in a substantive sense, my aim this morning, over the next 20 minutes is to give you an indication of the direction of travel for the British Army over the next ten years. Now I should caveat this by saying that I am only speaking on my vision for the Land Environment and that elements of wider Defence policy are still being discussed and formulated, but this is where I, and my senior Army colleagues, would like to see the Army moving within that Defence context. This direction has been formulated following what I would describe as a very lively and spirited debate across the Army as to what the force of the future should look like, particularly after our experience on current operations. We have recognised in recent months that we are at, what we could call a Question Four Moment, - that moment that occurs occasionally when the Mission hasn't changed, but the situation and circumstances around it have -- and so a new plan is needed. We believe that our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere have called us to question whether our previous assumptions regarding current practice and future development have been right -- and we have looked at all the issues very carefully.

After what has been this very constructive debate I believe that we now have a wide understanding and consensus certainly at the top end of the Army about what we consider the likely shape of the land environment to be in ten years time and how we need to adapt to meet these new challenges. So our internal debate is over, and our conclusions will now hopefully better inform the overall defence discussion as we move towards the future...

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/09/2008 - 12:07pm | 1 comment

New MH-53M Helicopter Exhibit Opens

By Rob Bardua, National Museum of the US Air Force

Several high ranking officials from Air Force Special Operations Command, industry and the community recently joined personnel from the National Museum of the US Air Force for the official opening of the museum's new MH-53M Pave Low IV helicopter exhibit.

Air Force special operations forces used the Sikorsky MH-53M to covertly enter enemy territory. Capable of operating at day or night or in bad weather, these helicopters conducted long-range, low-level missions to insert, extract, and resupply special operations forces.

The museum's MH-53M Pave Low IV helicopter, serial number 68-10357, carried the command element during the mission to rescue American prisoners of war from the Son Tay prison camp near Hanoi, North Vietnam in 1970.

After Vietnam, it flew in many more combat engagements including Operation DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. After 38 years of service, its final flight was a combat mission in Iraq on March 28, 2008...

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/09/2008 - 10:11am | 0 comments
... There is certainly a wide body of criticism of FM 3-24, to which most of the regulars here are familiar with. Many units who have employed the FM have found strengths and shortfalls in the manual when put into application.

Here's some starter questions, but don't limit yourself:

1) What was helpful/useful in FM 3-24?

2) What is missing in FM 3-24?

3) What needs amplification?

4) What needs de-emphasis?

5) What is flat wrong or needs removal?

6) Does the manual strike the balance between specific, applicable knowledge and theory of operations?

7) How does the manual hold up in application in Iraq/Afghanistan, and does its principles hold up outside of Iraq/Afghanistan?

Join the discussion at Small Wars Council - Revising FM 3-24: What needs to change?

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/09/2008 - 10:07am | 0 comments

Charlie Rose Show - An hour with Pulitzer Prize-winning author David McCullough.

David McCullough has been widely acclaimed as a "master of the art of narrative history," "a matchless writer." He is twice winner of the National Book Award, twice winner of the Pulitzer Prize. In December 2006 he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award.

His books have been praised for their scholarship, their understanding of American life, their "vibrant prose," and insight into individual character. Mr. McCullough's most recent book, 1776, the number one New York Times national bestseller in both hardcover and paperback, has been called, "brilliant...powerful," "a classic." There are three million copies in print, while Mr. McCullough's previous work, John Adams, remains one of the most critically acclaimed and widely read American biographies of all time. It is presently in its sixty-third printing.

John Adams, was filmed as a seven-part mini-series on HBO. Produced by Tom Hanks, it stars Paul Giamatti and Laura Linney.

In the words of the citation accompanying his honorary degree from Yale, "As an historian, he paints with words, giving us pictures of the American people that live, breathe, and above all, confront the fundamental issues of courage, achievement, and moral character."

Mr. McCullough's other books include The Johnstown Flood, The Great Bridge, The Path between the Seas, Mornings on Horseback, Brave Companions, and Truman. His work has been published in ten languages and, in all, nearly 9,000,000 copies are in print. As may be said of few writers, none of his books has ever been out of print.

David McCullough is as well twice winner of the prestigious Francis Parkman Prize, and for his work overall he has been honored by the National Book Foundation Distinguished Contribution to American Letters Award and the National Humanities Medal. He has been elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, as well as the American Academy of Arts and Letters and has received more than forty honorary degrees.

He has been an editor, essayist, teacher, lecturer, and familiar presence on public television -- as host of Smithsonian World, The American Experience, and narrator of numerous documentaries including The Civil War. His is also the narrator's voice in the movie Seabiscuit. He is also one of the few private citizens to speak before a joint session of Congress.

His current project is a book about Americans in Paris, from the 1830's to 1930's.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 07/08/2008 - 6:14pm | 0 comments
Iraq's Water Woes

By Captain Timothy Hsia

News today in Iraq is centered on contracts currently being negotiated between the Government of Iraq and major oil companies. This has occupied much of the attention of America and the rest of the world as the price of oil continues to skyrocket. However, Iraqis for the vast majority are not only interested in the future of their oil but also concentrated on another pressing natural resource problem, the scarcity of water.

Sandwiched between Baghdad and Mosul is the Diyala River Valley (DRV), and within the DRV is a region known as the Breadbasket of Iraq. Farmers have worked the land here since Biblical times. Baqubah, the capital of Diyala, is Arabic for Jacob's house. The region historically has been so abundant agriculturally that the produce from this area has been able to not only sustain the local region but also vast parts of Iraq. Today however, the way of life of these farmers has become imperiled for one simple reason: there is simply not enough water for their crops. Drought like conditions now exist in many regions of the Diyala River Valley and potable water is scarce. When Iraqi kids encounter soldiers on patrols they not only ask for soccer balls but also water bottles...