Blog Posts

Much more at The New York Times.

Christopher J. Castelli of Inside Defense (subscription required) has more on General Jim Mattis' Effects Based Operations memo and the "vigorous debate" that followed. Excerpts from the article:

Much, much more at ITP -- praise, criticism and "between the lines" - this article alone is worth the price of a subscription. Also, the discussion continues at Small Wars Council.

More at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

More at SSI.

US, Pakistani Military Leaders Meet Aboard USS Lincoln - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

US and Pakistani military leaders continued their ongoing dialogue about the war on terrorism during an Aug. 26 meeting aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Indian Ocean.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Pentagon reporters today his meeting with Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Pakistani army's chief of staff, was constructive and focused on the challenges posed by extremists in the federally administered tribal area and the North West Frontier in Pakistan. The Taliban and al-Qaida are using the areas to plan and train for attacks in Afghanistan.

"There is... a growing complexity and coordination among extremist groups there -- an almost syndicate-like behavior -- that has resulted in new and ever more sophisticated attacks on coalition forces," Mullen said. He pointed to attacks against French forces near Kabul last week and against US forces in the Wanat Valley near Afghanistan's border with Pakistan last month.

"The safe havens in the border regions provide launching pads for these sorts of attacks, and they need to be shut down," the admiral said.

Accompanying Mullen at the conference was Army Gen. David D. McKiernan, commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan; Army Lt. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, acting US Central Command chief; Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the soon-to-be commander of US Central Command who now commands Multinational Force Iraq; and Navy Adm. Eric T. Olson, commander of US Special Operations Command.

Mullen said he came away from the long-planned meeting "very encouraged that the focus is where it needs to be and that the... military-to-military relationship we're building with Pakistan is getting stronger every day."

This was the fifth visit Mullen has made with Kayani since February, and was a chance to keep the lines of communication open between the two militaries...

Anbar Handover Could Free Marines for Afghanistan Missions

By Donna Miles

American Forces Press Service

Iraq's once-deadly Anbar province could within the next few days become the 11th province to be turned over to Iraqi control, paving the way for a reduced US Marine Corps presence there, the Marine Corps commandant said today.

Gen. James T. Conway told Pentagon reporters the marked drop in violence in Anbar sets the stage for a drawdown of Marine forces that could be freed up for duty in Afghanistan, if needed.

"The change in the al-Anbar province is real and perceptible," with attacks at an all-time daily low of two to three, Conway said. He cited assessments by Marine Maj. Gen. John Kelly, commander of Multinational Force West, that a reduced US force in the region could keep violence in check.

"Anbar remains a dangerous place, but the ever-growing ability of the Iraqi security forces continues to move us closer to seeing Iraqi control of the province," he said. Once believed to be "the last [Iraqi province] to turn for the better," he added, it is expected to return to Iraqi control "in just a few days."

Conway noted that signs of construction and rebuilding -- not violence -- were ever-present during his drive through the Anbar cities of Fallujah and Ramadi earlier this summer.

It's become evident, he said, that "the force we needed in the Anbar province in 2005, 2006 to fight the insurgent at its height is not the force that we need there now to do nation-building and to try to bring the government and the Sunnis closer together."

Marines deployed to Anbar "are doing a very good job of this nation-building business," he said, but are more suited to other missions.

"It's our view that if there is a stiffer fight going someplace else in a much more expeditionary environment where the Marine Air-Ground Task Force really seems to have a true and enduring value, then that's where we need to be," he said.

Conway cited increased violence in Afghanistan, where "the Taliban are growing bolder in their tactics and clearly doing their best to exploit security gaps where they exist."

"Everyone seems to agree that additional forces are the ideal course of action for preventing a Taliban comeback, but just where they're going to come from is still up for discussion," he said.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates ordered additional Marine forces to Afghanistan earlier this year over concerns about a possible spring offensive. The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, operating in the south, and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, training Afghan security forces, are slated to return in late November after a one-month extension of their deployment.

Conway called it "a good idea" to backfill the Marines after they redeploy from Afghanistan, but he said the Corps can't do it without cutting its current commitments in other parts of the world, including Iraq.

"Should our leadership determine that more US forces are needed in the fight in Afghanistan, it's no secret that the Marine Corps would be proud to be part of that undertaking," he said. "However, in order to do more in Afghanistan, our Marines have got to see relief elsewhere."

More: Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Voice of America, Associated Press, Reuters, Stars and Stripes, Agence France-Presse.

The Iraq Decisions That the Next President, Whether It's Obama or McCain, Will Face: In a new book, war correspondent Linda Robinson also assesses the performance of Gen. David Petraeus - Linda Robinson, US News and World Report

More at US News and World Report.

AFGHANISTAN

The Taliban 'Advance': No Time To Wobble - Paul Smyth, Head, Operational Studies, Military Sciences Department, RUSI

More at RUSI.

Farewell to an American Hero - Joe Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers

For the better part of 60 years, two old Army pilots who loved each other argued over many a meal and drink as to which of them was the second best pilot in the world.

The two shared the cockpits of old Beaver prop planes and Huey helicopters; they shared rooms in military hooches all over the world; they shared a love of practical and impractical jokes and they shared an undying love of flying and soldiers and the Army.

They also shared membership in a very small and revered fraternity of fewer than 105 men who are entitled to wear around their necks the light blue ribbon and gold pointed star that is the Medal of Honor, America's highest decoration for heroism above and beyond the call of duty.

Their story was told in a book my buddy Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and I wrote 15 years ago titled "We Were Soldiers Once... and Young" and in the Mel Gibson movie, "We Were Soldiers," released in the spring of 2002. Too Tall and Old Snake were ably portrayed in the movie.

Their argument over which of them is the Best Pilot in the Whole World sadly came to an end this week when our friend and comrade-in-arms Maj. Ed (Too Tall to Fly) Freeman slipped the surly bonds of earth and headed off to Fiddler's Green, where the souls of departed cavalrymen gather by dispensation of God Himself.

More at McClatchy Newspapers.

After Action Report, IA DRANG Valley - LTC Hal Moore

LZ X-Ray - More about LZ X-ray and LZ-Albany

LZ X-Ray - Battle Overview

We Were Soldiers - Joe Galloway's Photos

Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq, New York: Random House, 2008, 410 pgs, $28.00.

This author needs no introduction. Francis "Bing" West is the author of The Village, the definitive depiction of the Marine Combined Action Program in Southeast Asia. He is also is a Marine combat veteran of the Vietnam war, a former RAND analyst, and at one time occupied the hallowed halls of the Pentagon as a political appointee during the Reagan Administration. Over the years, he has been a staunch advocate of the infantryman, that long overlooked asset in our national arsenal.

Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, West has been one of the most prolific and most respected reporters of the war. No author has matched, both in volume and in grim color, the past five years of fighting better than this author. His The March Up coauthored with MajGen Ray Smith, USMC) captured the drive of I Marine Expeditionary Force from Kuwait up to Baghdad from the grunt's perspective. Mixing his broad grasp of national policy to the basic tactics that keeps a young Marine alert and alive, West's battlefield narrative outshone all competitors for its tactical detail and marked sympathy for today's young Marines and all that they endured to topple Hussein's regime. The heat, fine sand, and fear of that campaign are captured with greater granularity and credibility because the authors lived through it at the front line, embedded with the 1st Marine Division, General Jim Mattis' beloved "Blue Diamond."

No True Glory came next. This book centered over the Marines again and their two fights in the caldron of the Iraqi insurgency in Fallujah. West's masterful overview of the epic battle for Fallujah of November 2004 laid bare the tissue thin connections between American policy makers in Washington and the fearsome combat conditions of Al Anbar. I strongly recommend that our Presidential candidates and their prospective team read each page of that book as preparation for their duties in the White House.

West's latest effort may also become required reading for future policy makers, most of which, given the demographic make up of the United States, will not have worn their country's uniform or ever visited a combat zone.

In The Strongest Tribe West takes a step back and looks at the war in a comprehensive manner. The prose is clipped and the action concise and to the point. He briefly reviews the early "successful" military phase of 2003, and cursorily covers the planning failures and slow adaptation that allowed the insurgency to build in 2004. These four chapters serve as a useful foundation for the following section of three chapters which describe the inadequate means, contradictory goals and lack of understanding that perpetuated American actions in Iraq in 2005.

The book is centered on what the author calls the Second War, the fight against Al Qaeda in 2006. This section provides the most detailed account of the efforts by the coalition to stiffen resistance against Al Qaeda's campaign of coercion and assassination. It also connects the dots in the Bermuda triangle between perspectives in Washington, Baghdad and Al Anbar. Here West provides some very original reporting on how the White House eventually came to the conclusion that simply "staying the course" was a losing strategy. Eventually, the President, his NSC staff, and a new team at the Pentagon came to agreement on a new strategy and a new team to implement it. In this chapter, the author proves that he can report on the machinations of the NSC bureaucracy and the even more turgid thinking of the Joint Staff with the same relentless quest for ground truth that he did in Baghdad, Ramadi and Fallujah.

West does not pull punches, and the incident in Haditha in 2006 comes in for close examination. Leadership and tactics deplorable. But West saves his strongest condemnation for politicians, including Congressman Murpha, for rushing to judgment.

The best parts of the book involve the implementation of that new strategy by Generals David Petraeus and LtGen Raymond Ordinero in 2007. Petraeus's COIN manual, which was developed in cooperation with a team of Marines led by General James Mattis when he was the CG at Quantico comes in for some unsubstantiated criticism as an academic exercise in sociology. While FM 3-24 has imperfections, it was written with great urgency by solid professionals who provided a historically-grounded approach for Iraq in 2006. While the manual may be a bit long winded in sections, it has served its purpose well and The Strongest Tribe provides ample testimony for its utility.

There is much in this book to commend it to Marine readers. Now is the time to begin to draw lessons from Iraq. Some of the conclusions in The Strongest Tribe will not surprise you, others infuriated me. It lays bare the failings of our military leadership early in the war, as well as the faults of our political leadership who too often ignored inconvenient facts and too readily embraced news when it fit preconceptions. West is fair with his litany of mistakes, and gives credit where due to Army and Marine leaders like General Petraeus, BGen John Allen, USMC; LtCol Dale Alford, USMC; and Army Colonels H.R. McMaster and McFarland for their intellect and professional acumen. The best parts of this book depict how the U.S. military persisted in its mission and how it adapted itself to the point where success over Al Qaeda can now be claimed.

The strongest test of our profession will be how ruthlessly and objectively we can assess ourselves and move forward to best posture ourselves for the ever evolving character of conflict in the 21st century. The Strongest Tribe is a great product to start our self-assessment with.

Baghdad at Sunrise - Peter Mansoor

The Strongest Tribe - Bing West

Tell Me How This Ends - Linda Robinson

We Are Soldiers Still - Hal Moore and Joe Galloway

Pete, Bing, Linda, Joe -- Again, we are humbled and grateful for your support -- congratulations on your contribution to understanding the critical issues that will define and shape our nation's future.

Job well done!

More at CAC.

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MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

Subject: Assessment of Effects Based Operations

1. Attached are my thoughts and Commander's guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

2. Therefore, we must return to time honored principles and terminology that our forces have tested in the crucible of battle and are well grounded in the theory and nature of war. At the same time, we must retain and adopt those aspects of effect based thinking that are useful. We must stress the importance of mission type orders that contain clear Commander's Intent, unambiguous tasks and purpose, and most importantly, links ways and means with achievable ends. To augment these tenets, we must leverage non-military capabilities and strive to better understand the different operating variables that make up today's more complex operating environments.

3. My assessment is shaped by my own personal experiences and the experience of others in a variety of operational situations. I'm convinced we must keep the following in mind: First, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies. Second, the enemy is smart, and adaptive. Third, all operating environments are dynamic with an infinite number of variables; therefore, it is not scientifically possible to accurately predict the outcome of an action. To suggest otherwise runs contrary to historical experience and the nature of war. Fourth, we are in error when we think that what works (or does not work) in one theater is universally applicable to all theaters. Finally, to quote Sherman, "Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster." History is replete with such examples and further denies us any confidence that the acute predictability promised by EBO's long assessment cycle can strengthen our doctrine.

4. The joint force must act in uncertainty and thrive in chaos, sensing opportunity therein and not retreating into a need for more information. JFCOM's purpose is to ensure that joint doctrine smoothes and simplifies joint operations while reducing friendly friction. My goal is to return clarity to our planning processes and operational concepts. Ultimately, my aim is to ensure leaders convey their intent in clearly understood terms and empower their subordinates to act decisively.

5. While NATO and many Partner Nations have adopted the EBO nomenclature, NATO's policy focuses on the whole of government/Comprehensive Approach. In short, NATO's Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) does not fully mirror U.S. EBO. NATO's use of EBAO is left unaddressed in this USJFCOM Commander's Guidance.

6. A pre-decisional working draft of this document was prematurely circulated and should be discarded. I regret any confusion resulting from the unintended early release of this draft document.

J. N. MATTIS

General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commander's Guidance Regarding Effects Based Operations - US Joint Forces Command

Update: The Council Weighs In (Bill Moore):

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As we consider requirements for advisors in the future I think it is important to look at the doctrinal missions of the US military both past and present and see if there is anything that is relevant to the future of advisory operations.

While most are agreement that the advisor mission is critically important in Iraq and Afghanistan I think it is important to consider the current missions there as well as those both currently outside of OIF and OEF and what we forecast might happen in the future.

I think the most important assumption we have to consider is whether we are likely to be faced with future situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan where we completely depose totalitarian governments, destroy or disband all indigenous security forces as well as the government bureaucracies and are forced to rebuild a nation virtually from scratch. If you see this in our future then I recommend that you pay attention to Dr Nagl's writings and how he believes the Army should organize for the future.

If you do not believe that is a likely scenario then there are two others that must be considered. First is how we will organize for continued operations in Iraq after US combat forces begin to draw down as well as how to organize to deal with the challenges in Afghanistan. Second is how the US will engage throughout the world after OEF and OIF transition to supporting operations that require a minimal presence of US combat and general purpose forces. For the second and third scenarios I believe there is historical doctrine that would be a useful starting point to develop organizations to support our friends, partners and allies in their quest to bring stability and security to their countries and in particular ungoverned and under governed spaces within their sovereign territories. In addition these sovereign nations may need and request assistance in dealing with trans-national threats as well.

Many will say that Special Forces is the force of choice to conduct advisory operations and provide support to counter-insurgencies because of its Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission. Many will also argue that because FID is a SOF/SF mission that the General Purpose Forces need a new mission to define what it is they are now doing. These have taken various names recently such as Security Force Assistance (SFA), Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA), and Stability Operations, just to name a few. And of course many will say (and I strongly concur) that there is not enough SF/SOF to conduct all the advisory and training requirements in OIF and OEF. But I think it is important to debunk a couple of myths about Special Forces...

Much more at the Washington Post.

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Much more at the NYT.

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Special Forces are the best US troops at conducting the Foreign Internal Defense mission, but there aren't enough of them to train the IA, IP, ANA, and ANP, so most of the FID mission has fallen on conventional Army soldiers who are not organized, trained, or equipped to conduct the FID mission. Faced with a problem requiring organizational adaptation, the Army has adopted a series of ad hoc measures to select, organize, train, employ, and demobilize its advisors, despite numerous statements from senior Army leaders that testify to the essential nature of the advisory task in enabling our exit strategy in two wars.

I have previously advocated the creation of an Advisory Corps, in which combat troops would be assigned to standing advisory units ("A Team 1st Battalion 1st Advisory Brigade 1st Advisory Division") for a three-year tour of duty just as they now rotate through other line units. I believe that it is even more important to create standing advisory units now that we are increasing the size of the ANA and focusing more on the advisory effort to the IA while drawing down US units in Iraq. Standing units have history, lineage, and traditions; who wants to serve in Unit Rotating Force 1134 (as Transition Teams of Advisors are currently designated), especially if URF 1134 is disbanded four days after redeploying from combat?

If the Army can't or won't build standing units, at the very least it should designate someone below the level of the Chief of Staff of the Army who is responsible for all aspects of the advisory mission. Once named, the head of Advisor Command should establish a permanent advisory schoolhouse, get doctrine written, get the organization of the advisory teams right, be responsible for their training and employment, and ensure that advisors are given proper credit for their service. There are a number of Lieutenant Generals in the Army; I would submit that none has a more important mission than heading up such an Advisor Command with the possible exceptions of the MNC-I and MNSTC-I commanders.

Pete Dawkins wrote his doctoral dissertation at Princeton on the advisory effort in Vietnam; he called it "The Other War." I am confident that some bright and bitter Captain will do the same for the advisory effort in Iraq and/or Afghanistan.

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Here are several excerpts from the full review.

In it to Win - Washington Post, 17 August 2008.

SWJ Interview with Bing West - (Part 1)

SWJ Interview with Bing West - (Part 2)

Purchase The Strongest Tribe - Amazon.com

First, there's no illusion about who's running Russia. Vladimir Putin is clearly the effective head of state, flying from the Beijing Olympics to southern Russia to oversee military operations and to dominate Russian TV. The return of strongman rule to Russia, and particularly one who regards the demise of the Soviet Union as a historic catastrophe, is now a fact of international life to which we will all have to adjust to.

Second, Putin and his government are attempting to establish the legitimacy of a Russian sphere of influence that looks very much like a reestablishment of the old Soviet empire. This is the core of an enormously sophisticated information campaign that is having some success -- at least around Washington -- in appealing to the realpolitik crowd who look for excuses for inaction in the case of a Russian invasion of their democratic neighbor. The invasion of Georgia was accompanied by an information campaign based on the idea that Russia has a right to intervene anywhere that the "dignity" of Russian minorities is threatened. Since there are Russian minorities in every former Soviet state of the old empire, this is an attempt to establish a "sphere of influence" precedent that must chill newly independent states still struggling with democracy.

From a military perspective, the first impression is that the Russians laid an effective "strategic ambush" for Georgia President Mikhail Saakashvilli, inciting anti-government attacks in South Ossetia by local militias and then responding to the Georgian offensive with a well-planned and rehearsed offensive of their own. Even when viewed through the imperfect lens of news media scrambling to catch up to events, military experts understand that the joint and combined-arms attacks Russia staged in the opening hours of the war were anything but spontaneous. For historians, a retrospective on Nazi Germany's offensive to "protect" the Sudaten Czechs shows a striking similarity of purpose and method...

Bing West, author of The Village, The March Up and No True Glory was kind of enough to be interviewed by Small Wars Journal on the occasion of the release of his latest book The Strongest Tribe.

Francis J. 'Bing' West, originally from the Dorchester section of Boston, served as an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. A warrior-scholar, West authored an extremely influential study while a Visiting Research Associate at the Rand Corporation (1966 - 1968) entitled: "The Strike Teams: Tactical Performance and Strategic Potential". He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration. He is a graduate of Georgetown University (BA) and Princeton University (MA), where he was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow. He is currently president of the GAMA Corporation, which designs wargames and combat decision-making simulations. West is a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, appears on The News Hour on PBS and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. West has been to Iraq on 15 trips since 2003, embedding with over 60 battalions.

Small Wars Journal interview with Bing West (Part 1 of 2)

Small Wars Journal interview with Bing West (Part 2 of 2):

5. You have a long history of advocacy for combat advisers. Why the skepticism about our current and potential future adviser program?

We do not have consistent goals, rigorous selection and training or a set of measures and expectancies. From the start, the role of advisers in Iraq was ill-defined. In Vietnam, advisers were valued because they were the link to fire support. In Iraq, fights requiring fire support were rare. Some adviser teams improved Iraqi staff planning functions, while others set the combat leadership example by daily circulation on the battlefield. I saw some adviser teams where the rule was to be out on two patrols a day; I saw other teams where the rule was to coach the Iraqis on staff procedures and not leave the wire with less than four humvees.

The aggressiveness of adviser teams varied broadly because there was no shared standard about their proper role. In late 2006, the Iraq Study Group recommended replacing US brigades with a corps of advisers embedded in Iraqi units and supported by US firepower. Since that was the road not taken, the Iraq War provides few clues whether advisers with indigenous troops can substitute for US conventional units, assuming the advisers have a role in deciding promotions.

It is unclear whether the US command envisions advisers remaining with Iraqi units. It seems that as US combat units pull back, so will the advisers. The absence of advisers runs the risk that deterioration may creep in from the bottom up - fewer arrests, fewer patrols, taxing drivers at checkpoints, etc. But with the war winding down, Iraqi officials do not want the daily presence of pesky Americans. By removing advisers from the level where the insurgency is fought, the risk of American casualties will decrease, as will the supervision that limits corruption, inspires aggressive operations and provides a warning when conditions are falling apart.

Iraqis marvel at advisers who stride into IED-infested areas without blinking and raise holy hell when they catch anyone stealing or abusing civilians or jundis. The physical and moral fortitude of a protean adviser impresses hundreds of Iraqis and sets a standard they seek to emulate. It would be a grave mistake to pull out the advisers too early...

Continue on for more of Part 2.

Bing West, author of The Village, The March Up and No True Glory was kind of enough to be interviewed by Small Wars Journal on the occasion of the release of his latest book The Strongest Tribe.

Francis J. 'Bing' West, originally from the Dorchester section of Boston, served as an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. A warrior-scholar, West authored an extremely influential study while a Visiting Research Associate at the Rand Corporation (1966 - 1968) entitled: "The Strike Teams: Tactical Performance and Strategic Potential". He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration. He is a graduate of Georgetown University (BA) and Princeton University (MA), where he was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow. He is currently president of the GAMA Corporation, which designs wargames and combat decision-making simulations. West is a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, appears on The News Hour on PBS and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. West has been to Iraq on 15 trips since 2003, embedding with over 60 battalions.

Small Wars Journal interview with Bing West (Part 1 of 2)

1. You assessed that the Iraq war turned around for the better prior to General David Petraeus assuming command of Multi-National Force -- Iraq. Please explain this assessment.

As we look toward changes in Afghanistan, it's important that we understand why the Iraq war turned around, lest we think changing top commanders is the critical variable.

There are two broad views of history. By far the more popular is the "Great Man" view that nations are led from the top. Leaders like Caesar and Lincoln shape history. Most accounts of Iraq subscribe to the Great Man view. The books about Iraq by senior officials like Paul Bremer, George Tenet, Tommy Franks and Ricardo Sanchez have at their core a wonderful sense of self-worth: History is all about them.

The other view of history holds that the will of the people provides the momentum for change. Leaders are important, but only when they channel, or simply have the commonsense to ride the popular movement. "Battle is decided not by the orders of a commander in chief," Tolstoy wrote in War and Peace, "but by the spirit of the army."

Iraq reflected Tolstoy's model. Events were driven by the spirit, or dispirit, of the people and tribes. It took four years of sending the same units back to the same areas, getting to know the local leaders, to give the tribes enough reassurance that they rebelled against al Qaeda. Sheik Sattar, a tremendous leader, would never have stepped forward had it not been for his close relations with the local Americans. (A tank was parked on Sattar's front lawn.)

Anbar was the heart of the insurgency. The Sattar and the Sunni tribes in Anbar turned before General Dave Petraeus and the surge troops arrived. In February of 2006, I listened as General Jim Mattis told the troops in Ramadi that they had won; the tribes -- including the former resistance gangs - were aligning with the American battalions and al Qaeda was on the run. The next day, Mattis flew to Baghdad for Petraeus's change of command.

Iraq wasn't a "Great Man" or a general's war, although General Petraeus certainly was the right and key leader. Transcending that, though, the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are bottom-up movements. They must be defeated at the local level by deploying thousands of Americans who believe in their cause and stick at it, year after year. Washington politicians must avoid the trap of believing that the selection of the right general is a shortcut to success. That attitude enables the rest of us to avoid commitment by leaving it up to the generals, while we turn against the war when we tire of reading about it. By understanding what really occurred in Iraq, we better prepare for Afghanistan, where we are in for a long fight...

Continue on for more of Part 1.

In Iraq, the Surge has helped secure freedom, with all its attendant uncertainties.

By Joel Arends

This article was originally published on 11 August at National Review Online and is posted here with permission of the author and NR.

Baghdad, Iraq - Last week, I had the opportunity to visit the World War II battlefields of Monte Cassino, the Rapido River, and Anzio in southern Italy. Those were just some of the places that America's Greatest Generation fought and where many died in order to break through Hitler's vaunted Gustav Line in the eventual March to Rome. Today I'm in Baghdad going back to the battlefields where I fought with the Army's First Cavalry Division, where some of my comrades died, and where America's next Greatest Generation is currently doing battle. I've returned to Baghdad after three years as an embedded correspondent for NRO to observe the situation for myself.

The battle for Iraq today is not so dissimilar to the Italy campaign waged by the Allies in WWII. Into the late winter of 1943 - two years into the war - the Allies did not have a strategy for victory. Likewise, America did not have a strategy for victory in Iraq until January 2007 when President Bush announced the Surge.

In 1943, Churchill had determined that breaking the back of the German Army in Italy would lead to the eventual downfall of the Axis powers in Europe. His theory went that a March to Rome would siphon off enough German troops to allow the Allies to effectively overwhelm the enemy at Normandy. At the time, Prime Minister Churchill's theory was controversial, and while President Roosevelt signed off it on, military leaders in the Mediterranean were initially skeptical. General Mark Clark, commander of American forces in Italy, at first resisted Churchill's notion that a full-out assault on the most powerful army in the world would lead to anything but disaster. Clark thought the plan was nothing less than death by stupidity.

Similarly, many in Washington were not convinced that a plan as bold as the Surge would work. Of course, the major difference between WWII and now is that today's strategy came from the military, while the skepticism about that strategy came from the politicians. Some in Washington called the Surge an escalation of the war; others called it a quagmire and likened our efforts in Iraq to Vietnam. But General David Petraeus was convinced that if the number of troops available to him was increased and if he were able to effectively deploy them, his counter-insurgency strategy would pay off...

The full C-SPAN video of the panel discussion can be found here.

Also see the Center for American Progress report How to Redeploy: Implementing a Responsible Drawdown of US Forces from Iraq by Lawrence Korb, Sean Duggan and Peter Juul. The link has the full report plus a video produced by CAP on the report. Excerpt summary follows:

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