Small Wars Journal

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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

Can Counterinsurgency Win?
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/14/2008 - 6:40am | 1 comment
Can Counterinsurgency Win? - Daniel Pipes, Washington Times opinion

When it comes to a state fighting a nonstate enemy, there is a widespread impression the state is doomed to fail.

In 1968, Robert F. Kennedy concluded that victory in Vietnam was "probably beyond our grasp," and called for a peaceful settlement. In 1983, the analyst Shahram Chubin wrote that the Soviets in Afghanistan were embroiled in an "unwinnable war." In 1992, US officials shied away from involvement in Bosnia, fearing entanglement in a centuries-old conflict. In 2002, retired US Gen. Wesley Clark portrayed the American effort in Afghanistan as unwinnable. In 2004, President George W. Bush said of the war on terror, "I don't think you can win it." In 2007, the Winograd Commission deemed Israel's war against Hezbollah unwinnable.

More than any other recent war, the allied forces' effort in Iraq was seen as a certain defeat, especially in the 2004-06 period. Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, former British minister Tony Benn, and former US special envoy James Dobbins all called it unwinnable. The Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group Report echoed this view. Military analyst David Hackworth, among others, explicitly compared Iraq to Vietnam: "As with Vietnam, the Iraqi tar pit was oh-so-easy to sink into, but appears to be just as tough to exit."

The list of "unwinnable wars" goes on and includes, for example, the counterinsurgencies in Sri Lanka and Nepal. "Underlying all these analyses," notes Yaakov Amidror, a retired Israeli major general, is the assumption "that counterinsurgency campaigns necessarily turn into protracted conflicts that will inevitably lose political support."

Gen. Amidror, however, disagrees with this assessment. In a recent study published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, "Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience," he convincingly argues that states can beat nonstate actors.

More at The Washington Times.

He Came, He Cut Deals, He (May) Conquer
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/14/2008 - 5:46am | 0 comments
Linda Robinson, author of Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search For a Way Out of Iraq, in today's Washington Post.

He Came, He Cut Deals, He (May) Conquer

Iraq still divides Democrats and Republicans like no other issue, as the campaign rhetoric of both parties makes abundantly clear. Liberals and conservatives can now more or less agree that Iraq is a much, much safer country than it was 18 months ago. But each side is peddling its own story about Iraq's extraordinary turnaround -- and both are wrong.

Many conservatives believe that the 2007 "surge" in US troop levels directly produced the decline in Iraqi violence. Meanwhile, liberals argue that Iraq's warring Shiites and Sunnis spontaneously decided -- for their own internal reasons, unrelated to the surge -- to stop fighting. As is so often true of Washington debates, these arguments bear little relation to the reality of how Iraq actually pulled out of its death spiral, which is far more interesting than either partisan yarn. There was no single silver bullet, but rather a multifaceted strategy crafted and carried out by those in Baghdad -- not, despite recent claims, in Washington.

I came to this conclusion after reporting in Iraq for a total of 10 months since 2003 and after extensive interviews with Iraqi and US leaders, as well as with troops in the most violent neighborhoods of greater Baghdad, the epicenter of the conflict. My biggest question was my simplest: How did Gen. David H. Petraeus do it?

My answer? Bottom line, for the first time since the war began, a US leader decided to address the political motivations of the Iraqi combatants. Petraeus convened a study group that shrewdly analyzed the raging sectarian conflict, then came up with what he called "the Anaconda strategy" to address the underlying dynamic.

More at The Washington Post.

Off Topic, But...
by Dave Dilegge | Sat, 09/13/2008 - 9:58pm | 0 comments
A big supporter and great friend of SWJ has some news - his wife has written a novel - Tethered by Amy MacKinnon - that is receiving great reviews. Check it out at Jules Crittenden's Forward Movement.

Congrats to Amy and Jules!

Things Looking Up in Iraq
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 09/13/2008 - 9:42am | 0 comments
This Time, Things Are Looking Up by Dr. John Nagl, 14 September edition of The Washington Post

When I retired from the Army in June, my comrades in arms laughed at my summer vacation plans: another August in Iraq.

But I had unfinished business...

Everyone I talked to, Iraqis and Americans alike, stressed that the security gains are fragile and reversible; there were two car bombs and a suicide vest attack in Mosul three days after our visit. But the improvements in Baghdad and Basra are striking, with increasingly competent Iraqi security forces on every street corner -- although they will continue to need our advice and assistance for some years to come.

I am no cheerleader for the war in Iraq. We've made horrible mistakes that cost the lives of too many of my friends, American and Iraqi. It took us too long to learn from our errors and adopt an effective counterinsurgency strategy, and even now the war is far from won...

So they are -- as long as we continue to back them with air support, intelligence and US combat units, whose numbers are steadily diminishing. Iraq will need American advisers for years to come. For starters, it takes five years to produce a competent fighter pilot or tank company commander. Moreover, Iraq faces significant external security threats, as well as the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Shiite militias and Sunni insurgent groups. But US forces will increasingly be able to turn combat over to the Iraqis, allowing the United States to scale back its involvement significantly...

Much more at The Washington Post.

The Endgame in Iraq
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 09/13/2008 - 7:05am | 0 comments
The Endgame in Iraq - Jack Keane, Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, Weekly Standard

On September 16, General Raymond Odierno will succeed General David Petraeus as commander of US and coalition forces in Iraq. The surge strategy Petraeus and Odierno developed and executed in 2007 achieved its objectives: reducing violence in Iraq enough to allow political processes to restart, economic development to move forward, and reconciliation to begin. Violence has remained at historic lows even after the withdrawal of all surge forces and the handover of many areas to Iraqi control. Accordingly, President Bush has approved the withdrawal of 8,000 additional troops by February 2009.

With Barack Obama's recent declaration that the surge in Iraq has succeeded, it should now be possible to move beyond that debate and squarely address the current situation in Iraq and the future. Reductions in violence permitting political change were the goal of the surge, but they are not the sole measure of success in Iraq.

The United States seeks a free, stable, independent Iraq, with a legitimately elected representative government that can govern and defend its territory, is at peace with its neighbors, and is an ally of the United States in the war on terror. The Iraqi leadership has made important strides toward developing a new and inclusive political system that addresses the concerns of all Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups. But it has also taken steps in the wrong direction. An understandable desire to seize on the reduction in violence to justify overly hasty force reductions and premature transfer of authority to Iraqis puts the hard-won gains of 2007 and 2008 at risk. Thus, the president's announcement of new troop withdrawals has come before we even know when Iraq's provincial elections will occur.

More at The Weekly Standard.

Soundtrack of Dora: A Neighborhood Reborn
by John A. Nagl | Fri, 09/12/2008 - 7:40pm | 0 comments
LTC Jim Crider commanded 1-4 Cavalry in Dora from February 2007 through March 2008; his soldiers conducted classic population control counterinsurgency and completely turned the security situation around in one of Baghdad's most important neighborhoods. Time Magazine summed up the results of his efforts:

The unit has come to know the neighborhood in a way that would have been unthinkable just after the war, or even into 2004 and 2005. In fact, the US military has never secured Iraq or controlled it so completely as it has today, and never before has their wealth of intelligence and ability to analyze it been better.

--Daniel Pepper

Rebuilding a Baghdad Neighborhood

Time Magazine

January 13, 2008

When Colonel James R. Crider's 1-4 cavalry squadron got to Baghdad last May, their first 30 days were pockmarked with roadside bombs, shootings and grenade attacks. But the war stories out of Crider's outfit nowadays don't have much to do with war anymore. For the past three months there hasn't been a significant incident.

--Daniel Pepper

When the War Stories Have Nothing to Do With War

Time Magazine

January 15, 2008

Jim is now a Senior Military Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and has put together a world-class briefing on how to conduct population security counterinsurgency operations, which he has presented to rave reviews at the COIN Academy in Taji and in Washington. Highlights of his slide package are posted here. Those interested in inviting Jim to lecture so that they can learn counterinsurgency from someone who's been there and done it are invited to contact Jim through the CNAS at 202.457.9400.

Iraq's Political Transition After The Surge
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 09/12/2008 - 7:04pm | 0 comments
Marc Lynch, Brian Katulis, and Peter Juul have co-authored a new report entitled "Iraq's Political Transition After The Surge," exploring some of the political issues which continue to block national reconciliation in Iraq.

Here's a blog post explaining the report, and the full report in pdf form.

Thanks to Matt at the Center for American Progress for the tip on the report. Matt writes "Small Wars Journal is essential reading for a lot of us here!" Glad to hear that. We thought everyone there was pretty smart. :)

CSIS on the Russia-Georgia Conflict
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 09/12/2008 - 7:00pm | 0 comments

The Center for Strategic and International Studies has posted a number of short pieces written by CSIS scholars on the Russia-Georgia conflict and its broader implications. Additionally, CSIS recorded several podcast interviews to compliment the index. It's a very good resource for anyone looking for a level of insight beyond the mainstream media and the papers are a bit more disciplined than much of the other material currently floating around the 'Net.

Militias, Tribes and Insurgents
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/11/2008 - 7:01pm | 0 comments
Militias, Tribes and Insurgents: The Challenge of Political Reintegration in Iraq - David Ucko, Conflict, Security and Development Journal

Fine analysis by longtime SWJ friend Dr. David Ucko, a Program Coordinator and Research Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King's College London. He administers and contributes to the Conflict, Security and Development Research Group and is the co-editor of a volume examining political reintegration in various contexts, to be published by Routledge in 2009.

Here's the abstract:

Following its overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the United States was confronted with one of the most complex state-building enterprises of recent history. A central component of state building, emphasised in the literature yet given scant attention at the time of the invasion, is the process of political reintegration: the transformation of armed groups into political actors —to participate peacefully in the political future of the country. In Iraq, political reintegration was a particularly important challenge, relating both to the armed forces of the disposed regime and to the Kurdish and Shia militias eager to play a role in the new political system. This article examines the different approaches employed by the United States toward the political reintegration of irregular armed groups, from the policy vacuum of 2003 to the informal reintegration seen during the course of the so-called "surge" in 2007 and 2008. The case study has significant implications for the importance of getting political reintegration right - and the long-term costs of getting it badly wrong.

More at Routledge.

Lives Lost, Lives Changed
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/11/2008 - 6:24pm | 0 comments

9/11: One Story of Many

by Tina Beller

Sept. 11, 2001, was a horrific day for Americans. The sights of innocent men and women losing their lives are forever seared in the mind's eyes of our Nation, including the memory of a young Brooklynite named Monique Page.

Born to two hard-working, Italian-American parents, Page was raised in the hallways of the family business -- a women's clothing manufacturer. Years of training and grooming to assume a key leadership role in the family business was certainly the Page family's goal for their daughter's future. Growing up, life was relatively easy for Page.

"I was 33-years old and single when 9-11 happened," said Page, now a U.S. Army sergeant and a noncommissioned officer assigned to the U.S. Army Recruiting Station -- City Hall. "I was a retail sales manager for an upscale women's sportswear store in Manhattan, and I was easily recruited for the next better deal. I had gone as far as I could within the family business without taking over, and I just wasn't ready for that. For a short time, I had even attended college studying business management ... again ... preparing me to take over my parent's family business. I look back now and realize I didn't really know what my future held."

When the news reached her at work of two planes crashing into the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan's financial district, she watched in horror as television stations broadcasted unbelievable images of planes crashing into the famous New York skyscrapers and then later collapsing in furious mushroom-like clouds of smoke and debris. The toll -- over 3,000 innocent dead -- nationality immaterial.

Page's normally energetic and glowing personality became unusually morose in the weeks that followed. Weeks became months as broadcast and print news agencies carried storylines of memorial ceremonies, investigations and the spouses, mothers, fathers and children alike, who continued to search desperately for their loved ones that never came home that unforgettable September day...

The Petraeus Doctrine
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/10/2008 - 7:07am | 0 comments
The Petraeus Doctrine by Andrew J. Bacevich, The Atlantic, October 2008 issue.

Iraq-style counterinsurgency is fast becoming the US Army's organizing principle. Is our military preparing to fight the next war, or the last one?

For a military accustomed to quick, easy victories, the trials and tribulations of the Iraq War have come as a rude awakening. To its credit, the officer corps has responded not with excuses but with introspection. One result, especially evident within the US Army, has been the beginning of a Great Debate of sorts.

Anyone who cares about the Army's health should take considerable encouragement from this intellectual ferment. Yet anyone who cares about future US national-security strategy should view the debate with considerable concern: it threatens to encroach upon matters that civilian policy makers, not soldiers, should decide.

What makes this debate noteworthy is not only its substance, but its character—the who and the how.

The military remains a hierarchical organization in which orders come from the top down. Yet as the officer corps grapples with its experience in Iraq, fresh ideas are coming from the bottom up. In today's Army, the most-creative thinkers are not generals but mid-career officers—lieutenant colonels and colonels.

Like any bureaucracy, today's military prefers to project a united front when dealing with the outside world, keeping internal dissent under wraps. Nonetheless, the Great Debate is unfolding in plain view in publications outside the Pentagon's purview, among them print magazines such as Armed Forces Journal, the Web-based Small Wars Journal, and the counterinsurgency blog Abu Muqawama.

The chief participants in this debate - all Iraq War veterans - fixate on two large questions. First, why, after its promising start, did Operation Iraqi Freedom go so badly wrong? Second, how should the hard-earned lessons of Iraq inform future policy? Hovering in the background of this Iraq-centered debate is another war that none of the debaters experienced personally - namely, Vietnam.

The protagonists fall into two camps: Crusaders and Conservatives...

Much more at The Atlantic.

Discuss at Small Wars Council.

A Conversation with Steve Coll
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/10/2008 - 7:06am | 0 comments

Charlie Rose Show - A Conversation with Steve Coll of The New Yorker. Topics include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and General David Petraeus.

Bio

Steve Coll is President & CEO of New America Foundation, and a staff writer at The New Yorker magazine. Previously he spent 20 years as a foreign correspondent and senior editor at The Washington Post, serving as the paper's managing editor from 1998 to 2004. He is author six books, including The Deal of the Century: The Break Up of AT&T (1986); The Taking of Getty Oil (1987); Eagle on the Street, based on the Pulitzer Prize-winning account of the SEC's battle with Wall Street (with David A. Vise, 1991); On the Grand Trunk Road: A Journey into South Asia (1994), Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (2004); and The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century (2008).

Mr. Coll's professional awards include two Pulitzer Prizes. He won the first of these, for explanatory journalism, in 1990, for his series, with David A. Vise, about the SEC. His second was awarded in 2005, for his book, Ghost Wars, which also won the Council on Foreign Relations' Arthur Ross award; the Overseas Press Club award and the Lionel Gelber Prize for the best book published on international affairs during 2004. Other awards include the 1992 Livingston Award for outstanding foreign reporting; the 2000 Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Award for his coverage of the civil war in Sierra Leone; and a second Overseas Press Club Award for international magazine writing.

Selected Books

The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century

Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001

Latest at The New Yorker

The General's Dilemma

Early in 2007, when David Petraeus became Commanding General of United States and international forces in Iraq, he had in mind a strategy to manage the political pressures he would face because of the unpopularity of the war, then four years old, and of its author, George W. Bush. He pledged to be responsive to "both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue"—to his Commander-in-Chief in the White House, of course, but also to antiwar Democrats on Capitol Hill. Petraeus earned a doctoral degree at Princeton University in 1987; the title of his dissertation was "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam." In thinking about how to cope with political divisions in the United States over Iraq, he was influenced, he told me recently, by Samuel Huntington's 1957 book "The Soldier and the State," which argues that civilian control over the military can best be achieved when uniformed officers regard themselves as impartial professionals. Petraeus is registered to vote as a Republican in New Hampshire—he once described himself to a friend as a northeastern Republican, in the tradition of Nelson Rockefeller—but he said that around 2002, after he became a two-star general, he stopped voting. As he departed for Baghdad, to oversee a "surge" deployment of additional American troops to Iraq, he sought, as he recalled it, "to try to avoid being pulled in one direction or another, to be in a sense used by one side or the other." He added, "That's very hard to do, because you become at some point sort of the face of the surge. So be it. You just have to deal with that."

Much more at The New Yorker.

Think Tank - Steve Coll's blog at The New Yorker

The War Within (Updated)
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/10/2008 - 5:44am | 2 comments
The War Within - Washington Post series adapted from The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 by Bob Woodward.

Part 1 - Doubt, Distrust, Delay.

During the summer of 2006, from her office adjacent to the White House, deputy national security adviser Meghan O'Sullivan sent President Bush a daily top secret report cataloging the escalating bloodshed and chaos in Iraq. "Violence has acquired a momentum of its own and is now self-sustaining," she wrote July 20, quoting from an intelligence assessment.

Her dire evaluation contradicted the upbeat assurances that President Bush was hearing from Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the US commander in Iraq. Casey and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld were pushing to draw down American forces and speed the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqis. Despite months of skyrocketing violence, Casey insisted that within a year, Iraq would be mostly stable, with the bulk of American combat troops headed home.

Publicly, the president claimed the United States was winning the war, and he expressed unwavering faith in Casey, saying, "It's his judgment that I rely upon." Privately, he was losing confidence in the drawdown strategy. He questioned O'Sullivan that summer with increasing urgency: "What are you hearing from people in Baghdad? What are people's daily lives like?"

Part 2 - Outmaneuvered And Outranked, Military Chiefs Became Outsiders

At the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late November 2006, Gen. Peter Pace was facing every chairman's nightmare: a potential revolt of the other chiefs. Two months earlier, the JCS had convened a special team of colonels to recommend options for reversing the deteriorating situation in Iraq. Now, it appeared that the chiefs' and colonels' advice was being marginalized, if not ignored, by the White House.

During a JCS meeting with the colonels Nov. 20, Chairman Pace dropped a bomb: The White House was considering a "surge" of additional troops to quell the violence in Iraq. "Would it be a good idea?" Pace asked the group. "If so, what would you do with five more brigades?" That amounted to 20,000 to 30,000 more troops, depending on the number of support personnel.

Part 3 - 'You're Not Accountable, Jack'

Retired Army Gen. Jack Keane came to the White House on Thursday, Sept. 13, 2007, to deliver a strong and sober message. The military chain of command, he told Vice President Cheney, wasn't on the same page as the current US commander in Iraq, Gen. David H. Petraeus. The tension threatened to undermine Petraeus's chances of continued success, Keane said.

Keane, a former vice chief of the Army, was 63, 6-foot-3 and 240 pounds, with a boxer's face framed by tightly cropped hair. As far as Cheney was concerned, Keane was outstanding -- an experienced soldier who had maintained great Pentagon contacts, had no ax to grind and had been a mentor to Petraeus. Keane was all meat and potatoes; he didn't inflate expectations or waste Cheney's time.

By the late summer of 2007, Keane had established an unusual back-channel relationship with the president and vice president, a kind of shadow general advising them on the Iraq war. This September visit was the fifth back-channel briefing that Keane had given the vice president that year.

Part 4 - A Portrait of a Man Defined by His Wars

Five days before Christmas 2001, a little more than three months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks that redefined his presidency, George W. Bush sat in the Oval Office for the first of what would become a series of six interviews about how he had chosen to exercise his most consequential power -- that of commander in chief.

At 55, he was a young president, filled with certainty. The war in Afghanistan appeared to be going well. The US military had overthrown the Taliban regime and was hammering al-Qaeda sanctuaries. He kept photos of al-Qaeda leaders in his desk and showed how he had crossed through the pictures with a large "X" as each suspected terrorist was killed or captured. He explained: "One time early on, I said: 'I'm a baseball fan. I want a scorecard.' "

He confidently laid out grand goals. "We're going to root out terror wherever it may exist," he said. He talked of achieving "world peace" and of creating unity at home. "The job of the president," he said, "is to unite the nation."

More at The Washington Post.

Intel Dump Returns
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 09/08/2008 - 5:55pm | 0 comments
Phil Carter has been on leave from one of our favorite blogs - Intel Dump - and we've missed his posts on foreign policy and national security issues. Phil will be returning - ETA November 08 - but in the meantime Intel Dump has assembled a first-class lineup to fill the void. Here it is:

Robert Bateman, Army Infantry Officer and author of Digital War: A View from the Front Lines and No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident

Shawn Brimley, a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security

Roger Carstens, retired Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security

Janine Davidson, former Air Force pilot and Assistant Professor at George Mason University's School of Public Policy

Clint Douglas, former Army Special Forces Sergeant and contributor to Operation Homecoming

Colin Kahl, Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University

John Nagl, retired US Army Officer and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security

Erin Simpson, who writes on Counterinsurgency strategy and terrorism

Enjoy...

Right at the Edge
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/07/2008 - 8:17pm | 0 comments
Right at the Edge - Dexter Filkins, New York Times

Late in the afternoon of June 10, during a firefight with Taliban militants along the Afghan-Pakistani border, American soldiers called in airstrikes to beat back the attack. The firefight was taking place right on the border itself, known in military jargon as the "zero line." Afghanistan was on one side, and the remote Pakistani region known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA, was on the other. The stretch of border was guarded by three Pakistani military posts.

The American bombers did the job, and then some. By the time the fighting ended, the Taliban militants had slipped away, the American unit was safe and 11 Pakistani border guards lay dead. The airstrikes on the Pakistani positions sparked a diplomatic row between the two allies: Pakistan called the incident "unprovoked and cowardly"; American officials regretted what they called a tragic mistake. But even after a joint inquiry by the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan, it remained unclear why American soldiers had reached the point of calling in airstrikes on soldiers from Pakistan, a critical ally in the war in Afghanistan and the campaign against terrorism.

The mystery, at least part of it, was solved in July by four residents of Suran Dara, a Pakistani village a few hundred yards from the site of the fight. According to two of these villagers, whom I interviewed together with a local reporter, the Americans started calling in airstrikes on the Pakistanis after the latter started shooting at the Americans.

"When the Americans started bombing the Taliban, the Frontier Corps started shooting at the Americans," we were told by one of Suran Dara's villagers, who, like the others, spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of being persecuted or killed by the Pakistani government or the Taliban. "They were trying to help the Taliban. And then the American planes bombed the Pakistani post."

Much more at The New York Times.

Afghanistan Update
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 09/05/2008 - 5:53pm | 0 comments

Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-101 and Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division, spoke via satellite with reporters at the Pentagon on 5 September 2008.

More Troops Needed in Afghanistan, General Says

By Gerry J. Gilmore

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Sept. 5, 2008 -- Though U.S., coalition and Afghan troops are making steady progress against increasingly active insurgent forces in Afghanistan, it's time to turn up the heat, a senior U.S. military officer said today.

"I believe that more forces are required. And I think that over the next several months we can put them, certainly, to good use," Army Maj. Gen. Jeffrey J. Schloesser, commander of Combined Joint Task Force 101 and 101st Airborne Division, told Pentagon reporters during a satellite-carried news conference.

Insurgent attacks in Afghanistan have increased 20 to 30 percent from 2007 to now, said Schloesser, who arrived in Afghanistan in April and also heads counterinsurgency operations for NATO's Regional Command East.

Discussions about increasing the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan are ongoing among senior leaders in Washington, Schloesser acknowledged...

Dangerous Thresholds
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 09/05/2008 - 7:59am | 0 comments
Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century - Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter and Roger Cliff, Rand Corporation

Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition. When such competition entails military confrontation or war, the pressure to escalate can become intense due to the potential cost of losing conflicts of deadly force. Cold War--era thinking about escalation focused on the dynamics of bipolar, superpower confrontation and strategies to control it. Today's security environment, however, demands that the United States be prepared for a host of escalatory threats involving not only long-standing nuclear powers, but also new, lesser nuclear powers and irregular adversaries, such as insurgent groups and terrorists. This examination of escalation dynamics and approaches to escalation management draws on historical examples from World War I through Somalia in the early 1990s. It reveals that, to manage the risks of escalatory chain reactions in future conflicts, military and political leaders will need to understand and dampen the mechanisms of deliberate, accidental, and inadvertent escalation. Informing the analysis are the results of two modified Delphi exercises, which focused on a potential conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan and a potential conflict between states and nonstate actors in the event of a collapse of Pakistan's government.

More at Rand.

The Defense Inheritance
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/04/2008 - 9:58pm | 0 comments
The Defense Inheritance: Challenges and Choices for the Next Pentagon Team by Michí¨le A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, The Washington Quarterly

The next U.S. commander in chief will face the most daunting defense inheritance in generations when he takes the oath of office in January. Not since the Johnson-Nixon handoff 40 years ago has the country faced such a challenging wartime transition. Ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will force the new president to make early and consequential decisions regarding the U.S. approach toward both conflicts as well as the search for al Qaeda's top leadership in the lawless frontier lands along the Afghan-Pakistani border. President John McCain or Barack Obama will inherit a military that, although still the best in the world, is experiencing profound strains after nearly seven years of constant warfare. A young person entering the combat branches of the Army or Marine Corps in the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks has almost certainly deployed numerous times to Afghanistan and/or Iraq. An entire generation of young military personnel has endured years of difficult and heroic service and sacrifice. Their morale is high, but they and their families are tired.

The next secretary of defense will inherit a department that also is under enormous pressure. The constant imperative to support forward-deployed forces engaged in current operations has strained the ability of the military services and their civilian leaders to adequately plan for a complex and uncertain future. The high financial costs of two wars, rapidly increasing personnel obligations, and huge cost overruns in most major procurement programs have caused Pentagon spending to skyrocket. With the U.S. economy sliding toward recession and the national deficit and foreign debt rising to unprecedented levels, the next president and secretary of defense will need to avoid strategic overstretch and make difficult decisions about where to place emphasis and how to prudently balance risk.

The next Pentagon team will thus be faced with the dual challenge of presenting the new commander in chief with the best possible advice on key current wartime decisions while providing the support and leadership necessary to prepare U.S. armed forces for a future far different from the one for which they were optimized. This challenging endeavor will require forming a comprehensive and strategic view in order to chart a way forward.

More at The Washington Quarterly.

Managing Foreign Policy and National Security Challenges
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/04/2008 - 9:57pm | 0 comments
Managing Foreign Policy and National Security Challenges in Presidential Transitions by Kurt M. Campbell and James B. Steinberg, The Washington Quarterly

The process of transferring power from a sitting U.S. president to a president-elect is one of the most distinctive and perilous features of the American constitutional system - a time of great hope and optimism, but also one of great risk. From the earliest days of the Cold War, how the old and new leaders have navigated this strait has literally been a matter of survival for the United States and for the stability and prosperity of the entire world.

The end of the Cold War has changed the nature of the dangers, but in many ways the two-and-a-half-month transition that will take place at the end of this year poses even greater challenges than in the past. These 72 days are fraught with suspense, tension, promise, and risk as a new team of foreign policy players confronts the arduous challenges of managing the interregnum.

The experience of transitions over the past 60 years is full of poignant examples of self-inflicted wounds and near misses, as well as of skillful takings of the reins. Although each transition is unique, the next president and his team need to understand the lessons of the past if he is to take advantage of the great opportunities for new U.S. leadership and avoid the landmines that lie ahead.

More at The Washington Quarterly.

August 2008 CCO Newsletter
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/04/2008 - 8:29pm | 0 comments
Received via e-mail and posted to SWJ - The August 2008 Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) Newsletter.

The latest on the CCO. This edition of the newsletter includes information on a number of initiatives, including a workshop co-sponsored with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) on education and training, a task force to recommend options for a lessons learned process, an interview with Dr. Steven Metz on his latest scholarship on high value targeting in counterinsurgency, upcoming events in the complex operations community and more.

Please feel free to forward this newsletter to colleagues who may not have heard of the CCO and who might be interested in their activities.

Iran: Assessing US Strategic Options
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/04/2008 - 1:06am | 0 comments
Iran: Assessing US Strategic Options - James N. Miller, Christine Parthemore, Kurt M. Campbell, Center for a New American Security

Dealing with Iran and its nuclear program will be an urgent priority for the next president. In order to evaluate US policy options, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) convened a bipartisan group of experts on foreign policy and national security, retired military personnel, former diplomats and other government officials, and specialists on Iran and the region. Ambassador Dennis Ross presented a paper on diplomatic strategies for dealing with Iran, and Dr. Suzanne Maloney wrote on potential Iranian responses. Dr. Ashton Carter evaluated various US military options, and Dr. Vali Nasr described likely Iranian reactions and other potential impacts. Ambassador Richard Haass considered the challenges of living with a nuclear Iran. Each of these papers represents an important contribution to a much-needed national discussion on US policy toward Iran. Based on these papers and expert group discussion, as well as additional research and analysis, three CNAS authors (Dr. James Miller, Christine Parthemore, and Dr. Kurt Campbell) proposed that the next administration pursue "game-changing diplomacy" with Iran. While both Iran and the international community would be better off if Iran plays ball, game-changing diplomacy is designed to improve prospects for the United States and the international community irrespective of how Iran responds.

More at CNAS.

Counterinsurgency and Military Culture
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/04/2008 - 12:54am | 0 comments
Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars versus Non-State Irregulars by Robert M. Cassidy in the 2008 edition of the Baltic Security and Defence Review, the annual publication of the Baltic Defence College.

"Any good soldier can handle guerrillas."

Krepinevich, 1986:37

"Our enemies understand that irregular warfare

is the bane of regular military traditions."

Cassidy, 2007:44

The first quote is attributed to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff during 1961 when the U.S. Army was on the verge of escalating its commitment to help fight insurgents in the jungles of Vietnam. The officer to whom the first quote is attributed was steeped in the conventions of regular Army forces' organization, training, and education. The second quote is an inference about the difficulties that obtain when big power militaries attempt to fight against irregular adversaries without adapting their methods to meet the exigencies of irregular warfare. U.S military operations in Somalia from 1992 to 1994 under the aegis of the UN saw the operation evolve from peace enforcement into what was essentially irregular warfare in and around Mogadishu. By June 1993, U.S. Soldiers and Marines were fighting a counter-guerrilla war against Mohammed Farah Aideed's irregulars. The October 3rd -- 4th, 1993, battle in Mogadishu was the culminating battle which saw U.S. regular and elite infantry battalions, along with special operators, fighting out of the city against swarming irregulars. In fact, the battle in Mogadishu that night represented the most intense light infantry battle experienced by the U.S. Army since Vietnam at that time. Rangers, special operators, and the infantrymen of the 10th Mountain Division acquitted themselves with courage and élan in the most difficult of circumstances. However, the ultimate outcome of Somalia, where the U.S. pulled its military forces out, would seem to refute the veracity of the first quote above and attest to the merit of the second one. In Somalia, American forces possessed a technological advantage and an ostensible numerical advantage in regular military formations. Yet in this first experiment with irregular warfare after the end of the Cold War, the big conventional war military cultural orientation of the American military was manifest, as it had for many years almost exclusively focused on regular or, conventional war. The regular military forces of the U.S. faced Somali indigenous forces which employed the irregular methods of the insurgent...

More at Baltic Security and Defence Review.

Military Review: September -- October 2008 Issue
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/04/2008 - 12:53am | 1 comment
The September -- October 2008 issue of Military Review is now online. Lineup below.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance - General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army

General Petraeus outlines the essential tasks necessary for successful counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

The Baby and the Bathwater: Changing Times or Changing Principles? - Colonel John Mark Mattox, U.S. Army

Principles of war have not changed, even if tactics, techniques, and procedures have.

Discipline, Punishment, and Counterinsurgency- Scott Andrew Ewing

Vague regulations encourages NCOs to disguise arbitrary punishments as extra training may

be contributing to abuse of civilians during operations.

Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Command - Dr. John A. Nagl, LTC, U.S. Army, Retired

Institutionalizing and professionalizing the manning and training of combat advisors is an American strategic necessity.

Integrating the Advisory Effort in the Army: A Full Spectrum Solution - Major Michael D. Jason, U.S. Army

The author proposes creating a new U.S. Army "Advisor Command" at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, under control of Forces Command in collaboration with Training and Doctrine Command.

From Tactical Planning to Operational Design - Major Ketti Davison, U.S. Army

"Effects-based operations" may be banished from the joint lexicon, but a coherent operational design remains necessary for effectively understanding the emergent qualities of complex environments.

An Innovative Approach to Blast Injury Recovery - Colonel Karl D. Reed, U.S. Army

Caring for mild traumatic brain injury is challenging for the military and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Sports medicine's "best practices" can revolutionize treatment of such injuries for Soldiers.

In Uncle Sam's Backyard: China's Military Influence in Latin America - Loro Horta

Beijing's rising economic and political influence in Latin America may pave the way for major Chinese arms sales and expansion of China's military influence.

Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria: A French Point of View - Lieutenant Colonel Philippe Francois, French Marine Infantry

The history of the French-Algerian War contains illuminating lessons that can help shape COIN operations today.

Operation BOA: A Counterfactual History of the Battle for Shah-I-Kot - Colonel Robert D. Hyde, USAF; and Colonel Mark D. Kelly, USAF; Colonel William F. Andrews, USA

The authors present a counterfactual version of what might have happened in Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan.

Leadership Success Strategies of U.S. Army Women General Officers - Lieutenant Colonel Yvonne Doll, U.S. Army, Retired

Women general officers reflect on what it took to succeed.

Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation in Rwanda - Major Jeffrey H. Powell, U.S. Army

Failure to grant amnesty has mired the reconciliation process in Rwanda after the genocide there in 1994.

Winning Battles but Losing Wars: Three Ways Successes in Combat Promote Failures in Peace - Christopher E. Housenick, Ph.D.

The American way of war may be an obstacle to the best outcomes in a workable peace.

A National Security Strategy for the Next Administration - Amitai Etzioni

Professor Etzioni analyzes a recent proposal for post-Bush foreign policy and America's future strategic posture.

Finding the Flow: Shadow Economies, Ethnic Networks, and Counterinsurgency - Captain Robert M. Chamberlain, U.S. Army

Does reuniting Iraq's religious communities represent the best hope for the fledgling democracy, or is it a hopeless quest to turn back the clock?
Tell Me How This Ends
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/03/2008 - 5:44pm | 1 comment

Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search For a Way Out of Iraq

After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.

Wednesday, 10 September

Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at SAIS

Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search For a Way Out of Iraq

4:30 p.m. - Kenney Auditorium, Nitze Building

Linda Robinson, author-in-residence at the Merrill Center, will discuss Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search For a Way Out of Iraq, her new book about General David Petraeus, the surge and the future of Iraq policy. John Nagl, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a retired Army officer who served in Iraq; Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and senior author of the Iraq Index; and Thomas Keaney (moderator), acting director of the Merrill Center; will provide commentary. A reception and booking signing will follow the discussion. For more information and to RSVP, contact [email protected] or 202.663.5772.

Coalition in Afghanistan Completes Investigation Into Aug. 22 Engagement (Updated)
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/03/2008 - 7:02am | 0 comments
Coalition in Afghanistan Completes Investigation Into Aug. 22 Engagement - American Forces Press Service

BAGRAM AIRFIELD, Afghanistan, Sept. 2, 2008 -- Intense enemy fire justified actions taken by Afghan and U.S. forces during an Aug. 22 engagement in which several civilians and more than 30 Taliban fighters were killed in western Afghanistan, a coalition investigation has concluded.

The investigation found that Afghan and U.S. forces began taking fire from Taliban militants as the combined force approached its objective in Azizabad, Herat province, during a planned offensive operation in the pre-dawn hours.

The intensity of the enemy fire justified use of well-aimed small-arms fire and close-air support to defend the combined force, investigators concluded, adding that the type and application of fires were used in accordance with existing rules of engagement.

The investigation found that 30 to 35 Taliban militants were killed, and it revealed evidence suggesting a known Taliban commander, Mullah Sadiq, was among them, officials said. Five to seven civilians were killed, the investigation determined. Two civilians were injured and were treated by coalition forces, and five Taliban were detained.

Officials said investigators determined the range in the casualty numbers by observation of the enemy movements during the engagement as well as on-site observations immediately following the engagement.

In addition, investigators discovered firm evidence that the militants planned to attack a nearby coalition base, officials said. Other evidence collected included weapons, explosives, intelligence materials, and an access badge to a nearby base, as well as photographs from inside and outside of the base.

The engagement disrupted any planned attack, officials said.

The investigating officer took statements from more than 30 Afghan and U.S. participants. The investigating officer also reviewed reports made by ground and air personnel during the engagement; video taken during the engagement; topographic photo comparisons of the area before and after the event, including analysis of burial sites; reports from local medical clinics and hospitals; intelligence reports; and physical data and photographs collected on the site, coalition officials said.

Local government officials and Afghan coalition forces were denied entry into the village the day following the event. No other evidence that may have been collected by other organizations was provided to the U.S. investigating officer and therefore could not be considered in the findings, Combined Joint Task Force 101 officials reported.

The results of the investigation were provided to Army Gen. David McKiernan, commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, for his use as part of a joint inquiry into the incident.

Coalition officials said the investigating officer conducted the investigation using methods prescribed by U.S. Army Regulation 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers.

(From a Combined Joint Task Force 101 news release.)

US Rejects Claims of Afghan Deaths - Candace Rondeaux and Javed Hamdard, Washington Post

US military officials on Tuesday flatly rejected claims by the United Nations and the Afghan government that a US airstrike in western Afghanistan two weeks ago killed at least 90 Afghan civilians, saying that a complete investigation into the incident found that only five civilians were killed.

A review of video footage and photos, and an analysis of burial sites after the strike in Azizabad village in Herat province in the early morning of Aug. 22, found that 30 to 35 Taliban insurgents and five civilian relatives of a Taliban commander died in the attack, according to a summary of the findings released Tuesday. Two other civilians were injured, it said.

Interviews with 30 American and Afghan participants in the military operation further reinforced the conclusion that the incident's toll was considerably lower than those suggested by eyewitnesses, the summary said.

More at the Washington Post, New York Times and Washington Times.

Related Sites:

Combined Joint Task Force 101

NATO International Security Assistance Force

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