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UPDATE: Via Voice of America and Associated Press - US military officials in Iraq say the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq has not been captured. They denied reports from an Iraqi Interior Ministry spokesman Major General Abdul Karim Khalaf, who told Iraqi state television on Thursday that Abu Ayyub al-Masri had been detained in a raid in the city of Mosul.

"Neither coalition forces nor Iraqi security forces detained or killed Abu Ayyub al-Masri. This guy had a similar name," said Maj. Peggy Kageleiry, a US military spokeswoman in northern Iraq. She said no additional details were being immediately provided.

Iraqi Defense Ministry spokesman Mohammed al-Askari said the confusion arose because the commander of Iraqi forces in northern Ninevah province was convinced that he had arrested al-Masri — also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.

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The London Times, Associated Press and Reuters are reporting that al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri has been captured by Iraqi troops in Mosul. The capture was also reported on Iraqi television though there has been no official denial or confirmation from Multi-National Forces-Iraq or the Pentagon. Al-Masri took over al-Qaida in Iraq after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed 7 June 2006 in a US airstrike northeast of Baghdad. From the reports:

"The leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, has been arrested, the Arabic television station al-Arabiya reported on Friday, quoting the Iraqi Defense Ministry."

"Arabiya said Muhajir had been detained in a joint Iraqi-U.S. operation in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. The US military said it had no information on the reports at this stage..."

"US officials said al-Masri joined an extremist group led by al-Qaida's No.2 official. He later joined al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan in 1999 and trained as a car bombing expert before traveling to Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003."

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway probably has it right as to the significance of al-Masri's capture:

News Links

Man Held is Not Leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq - Freeman and Sabah, Washington Post

US Military Denies Iraq Report of al-Qaida Arrest - Associated Press

Leader of al-Qaida in Iraq Has Not Been Captured - Voice of America

Iraq al-Qaeda Chief Not Captured - BBC News

Al-Qaeda in Iraq Leader Arrested In Mosul - Freeman and Sabah, Washington Post

Al-Qaeda in Iraq Leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri Captured - James Hider, London Times

Iraqis Report Capture of al Qaeda in Iraq Leader - CNN News

Iraqi Army Says Iraqi al-Qaida Leader Arrested - Associated Press

Al Qaeda's Leader in Iraq Arrested - Reuters

Al-Qaeda Iraq Leader 'Arrested' - BBC News

Blog Links

US Military Denies al Masri in Custody - Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal

Abu Ayyub al-Masri Arrested - James Joyner, Outside the Beltway

Al-Masri the Egyptian Falls - Richard Fernandez, The Belmont Club

Favorable Indicators - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

Abu Ayyub al Masri Reported Captured - Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal

AQI # 1 Busted - Dr. iRack, Abu Muqawama

UK Troops and US Marines Join Forces to Tackle the Taliban in Garmsir

By MoD Defence News via British Defence Staff - United States (BDS-US)

UK troops working as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in southern Afghanistan have been taking part in a joint operation with US Marines aimed at disrupting Taliban activity in the volatile Garmsir area of Helmand province...

Major General Kevin Bergner, Spokesman for Multi-National Force-Iraq, and Tahseen al-Sheikhly, Civilian Spokesman for Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, speak with reporters in Baghdad, 7 May 2008.

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13 May 2008 - After the Iraqi Offensive: An Address by Colonel H. R. McMaster (Public Event). Washington, D.C. Sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute. The government of Iraq has made great strides both militarily and politically over the past year and a half. After dramatically reducing al Qaeda in Iraq's operational capability, the Iraqi Security Forces have successfully undertaken operations to reclaim segments of Basra and Sadr City from Shiite extremist elements. Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al Maliki has won increasing support from the major Sunni, Kurdish, and Shiite blocs due to his leadership in this offensive. Moreover, in a sign of bottom-up reconciliation, nearly 90 percent of Sunnis polled declared their intention to participate in the October provincial elections. How will Iraqi political dynamics evolve as operations against Shiite extremists continue? How will the security situation in Iraq evolve as the July drawdown in U.S. forces approaches? How have recent events in Iraq influenced our understanding of nation-building strategy? Having recently returned from working with Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus in Iraq, Colonel H. R. McMaster will address these and other questions at AEI on May 13. Following his address, Michí¨le Flournoy of the Center for a New American Security and AEI's Thomas Donnelly will join Colonel McMaster for a discussion of these issues.

15 May 2008 - Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power (Public Event). Washington, D.C. Sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute. In Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power (AEI Press, May 2008), AEI scholars Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan pose a series of urgent questions for policymakers: What is the strategic role of American ground forces? What missions will these forces undertake in the future? What is the nature of land warfare in the twenty-first century? What qualities are necessary to succeed on the battlefields of the Long War? What is the ideal size and configuration of the force--and how much will it cost? On Thursday, May 15, Donnelly, Kagan, and Kathleen Hicks of the Center for Strategic and International Studies will discuss these and other questions about the size, shape, and costs of the land forces the United States will require in the years ahead.

17-19 June 2008-

3rd Annual North American Security Colloquium: Wars Without Borders (Public Event). Kingston, Ontario. Sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Queen's Centre for International Relations, Defence Management Studies at Queen's University, and the Canadian Forces Land Doctrine and Training System. The conflicts today in Iraq and in Afghanistan are examples of what some leading scholars and many commanders have termed "continuous wars among the people." This type of conflict is developing or occurring in other regions of the world, in Africa and in Latin America for example. In many of these situations traditional and legal borders no longer define or contain the conflict, nor do obvious sovereign entities control belligerents. International commitments to control these conflicts necessarily demand complex, multi-dimensional diplomatic, military, police, and humanitarian responses. What has been learned about such conflicts from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may to some degree be transferable to conflicts in other regions. Assuming that the international community may well face future operations characterized by regional, borderless "wars among the people", the centres at Queen's University and their partners propose convening a distinguished group of approximately 200 experts from academic, military, governmental, and international institutions to examine how best to prepare commanders, military units and governments to plan for and conduct complex, multi-dimensional stability campaigns in this new environment.

16-18 September 2008 - The U.S. Army and the Interagency Process: A Historical Perspective (Public Event - Conference / Call for Papers). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Sponsored by the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. The symposium will include a variety of guest speakers, panel sessions, and general discussions. This symposium will explore the partnership between the U.S. Army and government agencies in attaining national goals and objectives in peace and war within a historical context. Separate international topics may be presented. The symposium will also examine current issues, dilemmas, problems, trends, and practices associated with U.S. Army operations requiring close interagency cooperation.

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your Small Wars related event listed on Small Wars Journal.

From Army Focus on Counterinsurgency Debated Within:

Much of this debate has played out here on SWJ and the Council. Expect more in the coming months...

Discuss at Small Wars Council

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The priority issues include ISR / Unmanned Aerial Systems, Intratheater Airlift / Joint Cargo Aircraft, Cyberspace Operations / Information Operations, Irregular Warfare, Excessively Overlapping Service Capabilities, DOD Governance Roles and Responsibilities, and Supporting Interagency Roles and Missions.

On Irregular Warfare Inside Defense had this to say:

special operations forces and general purpose forces in order to explore opportunities to forge greater integration and interoperability between the two, according to the draft document.

and Afghanistan, this issue group will examine how "to develop air and maritime capabilities for counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense," according to the document.

For those who subscribe to Inside Defense there is much more on roles and missions issues and the upcoming review. Good read...

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American Forces Press Service

The U.S. Army has published three new handbooks to help soldiers prepare for the first 100 days of combat, officials said on a teleconference with online journalists and "bloggers" yesterday. (Transcript).

Army Col. Steven Mains, director of the Center for Army Lesson Learned, and Milton Hileman, a senior military analyst, explained that there was a small but clear rise in the number of casualties early in a combat deployment, concentrated in the first 100 days.

"It's not a new phenomenon that ... we just figured out and nobody had ever seen before, but it's something we could clearly show was the case in Iraq," Mains said.

"And so it drove us to say, well, what do they know at day 250 that they really need to know during those first 100 days?"

After an extensive interview process with approximately 1700 soldiers, Mains and Hileman said that there were three key elements to surviving the first three months; avoiding complacency, good decisions made by junior leaders, and the efficient staff processes at the battalion and brigade level for commanders...

Charlie Rose Show - A Conversation with Meghan O'Sullivan, former deputy national security adviser on Iraq and Afghanistan.

Charlie Rose Show - A Conversation with Fareed Zakaria. Zakaria is a journalist, columnist, author, editor, commentator, and television host specializing in international relations and foreign affairs.

Rethinking Counterinsurgency - John Mackinlay, Alison Al-Baddawy, Rand.

Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 - US State Department.

Iraq after the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape and Iraq after the Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy - International Crisis Group.

Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 - Rand 2006 reprint of 1963 David Galula article.

Much more at Insurgency Research Group to include recent Small Wars Journal magazine offerings. Hat tip to ya Will.

Lastly, one not on the IRG list - American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador by Benjamin Schwarz of Rand.

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Much more at Government Executive.

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Call of Duty

Should Cadet's NFL Status Keep Him Out of Iraq? - Tom Weir and Reid Cherner, USA Today.

An Officer and a Linebacker for the NFL by Judy Battista, New York Times.

Discuss at Small Wars Council

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By Jill Russell

I have known Bob Bateman several years through our mutual participation in H-War, another internet forum, and from that experience I have great respect for him. However, I must disagree with his dismissive critique of David Barstow's New York Times article. To the contrary, I would argue that the muted tones of the piece belied problems far deeper than would be inferred from his recent blog post. That retired officers are acting as the puppets of DoD in their role as network and cable news military analysts is troubling when examined within the historical context of the Vietnam War's effect upon the credibility of military officers and the subsequent decades-long effort to restore their reputation for integrity. Thus, if the NYT article deserves criticism (1) , I would submit it's for missing the real significance, in big historic terms, of the military "analyst" story.

It may seem almost heretical to suggest, but the single greatest casualty of the Vietnam War for the American military was not the damage done to cohesion and morale, or training and readiness. These are actually fairly common occurrences in the aftermath of any American war, successful or not. (2) Rather, the real tragedy of that war was the American public's loss of faith in the credibility of the military leadership. And although there is constant scholarly (and other) jousting as to the outcome and ramifications of the Tet Offensive, what cannot be disputed is that it was at this point in the war that the American people began to doubt the veracity of what they heard from their nation's officers. The constant repetition that the "light at the end of the tunnel" was in sight, that the war's successful conclusion was just around the corner, could not be squared with the events of '68...

The Associated Press reported that he actually went on to say:

"As long as Americans are not being injured or harmed or wounded or killed, it's fine with me, and I hope it would be fine with you, if we maintain a presence in a very volatile part of the world where al-Qaida is training, recruiting, equipping and motivating people every single day."

The ad makes no distinction between sustained combat and other operations that require a much smaller US force footprint -- a training and advisory role comes to mind here. Here is the ad - you be the judge:

I agree with the RNC on this one.

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The second item was recently published by the Center for a New American Security - Sustainable Security: Developing a Security Strategy for the Long Haul by Jim Thomas.

Both are well worth reading.

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More at the Los Angeles Times.

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By Robert L. Bateman

~ T.E. Lawrence

Of late there are quite a few people who have taken to quoting T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia. The quote presented above is seen almost every day now, on military briefings and in State Department papers, in quotes in news articles and in public statements from people involved in all aspects of our effort. In the eyes of many Lawrence, it seems, holds the answer to our dilemmas both in our efforts to suppress an insurgency and helping develop a democracy.

Unfortunately, as seems to happen too often, almost everyone who uses this particular quote does so without understanding the context in which it was written. Many people, for example, assume that it comes from his 1922 classic, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Unfortunately, not so many of those who use the quote have actually read The Seven Pillars of Wisdom in all of its sometimes mind-numbing "Oh aren't these rocks and the shadows of the desert beautiful" glory. Even fewer realize that the quote is actually from a collection tidbits of advice Lawrence penned during the war in a British publication known as The Arab Bulletin. This particular quote was number fifteen (of twenty-seven) pieces of wisdom published under his byline on 20 August 1917. The salient points regarding the relevance of the citations are actually twofold. This is an issue is because, especially when quoting Lawrence, the context is important...

Diebold Accidentally Leaks Results Of 2008 Election Early

US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. April 2008.

From the Introduction:

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations chose to investigate Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) because they are considered to be critical to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The subcommittee used PRTs as a case study of an issue that the subcommittee has been interested in -- examining in more depth how multiple agencies work together, or for that matter, do not work together in the field and in Washington, as the third quote above suggests. As we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the national effort involves more than just military actions, and instead requires integrated efforts and the resources of government departments and agencies beyond the Department of Defense (the Department, DOD). PRTs illustrate the need for effective, integrated action to achieve government-wide "unity of effort" in complex contingency operations. We wanted to know how the departments and agencies in Washington give comprehensive and consistent guidance to the military services and combatant commanders (COCOMs), as well as how both Washington and organizations at agency, service, and COCOM levels support interagency operations in the field. After all, mission success will only be ensured if senior leaders adequately guide and support the people who the nation has asked to do difficult jobs under dangerous and challenging conditions.

To support the committee's oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee sought to

accomplish the following:

This report includes only a brief summary of how the subcommittee went about this oversight project (more detail can be found at Appendix B). We have focused instead on our major findings, and lay out the details of these, with related recommendations, at the tactical level (field operations), the operational level (combatant commands, services, and agencies with their policy and guidance responsibilities and their 'organize, train, and equip' missions), and at the strategic level in Washington.

The PRT tactical-level concept and the fact that there are approximately 50 such U.S. units on the ground reflect a willingness among government agencies to move outside of "stovepipes." However, the subcommittee found many significant issues during the course of our study. Although efforts have been made over the last seven years attempting to improve interagency coordination and cooperation, the government has not gone far enough or fast enough to support the people in the field or accomplish the nation's mission. The efforts that have been made must be assessed to determine whether interagency integration is improving or whether a different approach is needed. Many people are working very hard, but processes and structures in Washington still resemble what was used in the Cold War rather than what is needed to best address our nation's current and future opportunities and challenges. While agency stovepipes still exist, the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan offer lessons we can use at every level to increase our "strategic agility". What our nation needs now is a sense of urgency in capturing and applying these lessons. Our recommendations are meant to foster just that.

Read the entire report.

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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen press briefing on 25 April 2008. Topics inlcluded Iranian actions in Iraq and US options.

Earl Scruggs and Friends - Foggy Mountain Breakdown

Lester Flatt and Earl Scruggs - Foggy Mountain Breakdown

Part 1 of a Series on Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency

Dr. David Kilcullen

As a tactics instructor in the mid-1990s, teaching British platoon commanders at the School of Infantry, I spent many weeks on extended field exercises in the wilds of south Wales and on windswept Salisbury Plain. Both landscapes are studded with Roman military antiquities, relics of ancient counterinsurgency campaigns -- mile-castles, military roads, legion encampments -- as well as the Iron Age hill-forts of the Romans' insurgent adversaries. Teaching ambushing, I often found that ambush sites I chose from a map, even on the remotest hillsides, would turn out (once I dragged my weary, rucksack-carrying ass to the actual spot) to have Roman or Celtic ruins on them, and often a Roman military road nearby: call me lacking in self-assurance, but I often found this a comforting vote of confidence in my tactical judgment from the collective wisdom of the ancestors.

Like the Romans, counterinsurgents through history have engaged in road-building as a tool for projecting military force, extending governance and the rule of law, enhancing political communication and bringing economic development, health and education to the population. Clearly, roads that are patrolled by friendly forces or secured by local allies also have the tactical benefit of channeling and restricting insurgent movement and compartmenting terrain across which guerrillas could otherwise move freely. But the political impact of road-building is even more striking than its tactical effect.

This is my first Small Wars Journal post for several months; since leaving Iraq last year I have been working mainly on Afghanistan, in the field and in various coalition capitals. This brief essay (brief by my risibly low standards, anyhow!) describes recent road-building efforts in Afghanistan. A follow-on piece will explore the broader notion of political maneuver in counterinsurgency, using road-building as one of several examples...

Lest we forget. ANZAC Day is commemorated by Australia and New Zealand on 25 April every year to remember members of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) who landed at Gallipoli in Turkey during World War I. ANZAC Day is also a public holiday in the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa and Tonga.

The ANZAC Day Tradition - Australian War Memorial

ANZAC Day - New Zealand History

ANZAC Day Full Coverage - The Australian

ANZAC Day Full Coverage - New Zealand Herald

ANZAC Day Full Coverage - Sydney Morning Herald

ANZAC Day Full Coverage - Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Wednesday Fred Kaplan provided Gates Celebrates Dissent.

Much more at Slate.

You can find articles by LTC Yingling at his SWJ Bio Page.

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