Blog Posts

SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

General Petraeus Gets CENTCOM (Updated)

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 04/23/2008 - 7:00pm | 1 comment

The Associated Press is reporting that General David Petraeus, Commanding General Multi-National Force - Iraq, has been named as the next commander of U.S. Central Command.

Army Gen. David Petraeus, the four-star general who led troops in Iraq for the past year, will be nominated by President Bush to be the next commander of U.S. Central Command, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Wednesday.

Gates said he expected Petraeus to make the shift in late summer or early fall. The Pentagon chief also announced that Bush will nominate Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno to replace Petraeus in Baghdad...

At a hastily arranged Pentagon news conference, Gates said the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other problems in the Central Command area of responsibility, demand knowledge of how to fight counterinsurgencies as well as other unconventional conflicts.

"I don't know anybody in the U.S. military better qualified to lead that effort," he said, referring to Petraeus...

Selected Quotes:

Max Boot (Commentary's Contentions): Odierno spent the year from early 2007 to early 2008 working closely with Petraeus to supervise the implementation of the surge. They were by far the most successful team of commanders we have had in Iraq--potentially the Grant/Sherman or Eisenhower/Patton of this long conflict. Yet there was a strong impetus back in DC to break up the winning combination--as seen in Odierno's rotation home earlier this year and in persistent rumors that Petraeus would be sent to NATO. That is something I warned against in a January post, in which I suggested that a better move would be to send Petraeus to Centcom and Odierno to MNFI. But, based on his track record, I knew I could not necessarily count on the President doing the right thing. Now he has. That gives us a chance to build on the initial success of the surge in the challenging months that lie ahead.

Shawn Brimley (Democracy Arsenal): First, it clearly reflects a desire for some continuity in Iraq over the presidential transition -- this is a good thing. With Ambassador Crocker retiring in early 2009, this will ensure that at least the top military commander in Iraq will stay consistent through the transition. Wartime transitions are inherently dangerous, and I'm glad Gates and Co. are thinking this through.

Phil Carter (Intel Dump): After ousting Adm. William "Fox" Fallon for various sins, Gates tapped his top Iraq commander to run the organization responsible for both of America's wars and a bunch of other hotspots. As my friends at Abu Muqawama note, the challenge will be for Petraeus to command CENTCOM in a way that embraces all of these places, and shows no improper preference for Iraq (although Iraq is the main effort for CENTCOM, so some preference will be natural). Another challenge will be for Petraeus to sustain himself and his staff in yet another grueling assignment. Granted, he'll be home-based in Tampa, Fla., but I don't imagine he'll spend much time there.

Charlie (Abu Muqawama): General David Petraeus has been tapped to replace Admiral Fox Fallon at Centcom. But CNN buries the lead: the real story is that LTG Odierno is headed back to Iraq to replace Petraeus.

Abu Muqawama (Abu Muqawama): Abu Muqawama respectfully disagrees with Charlie that the big story here is Odierno moving to Iraq. Abu Muqawama has no problem with this and thinks he's an okay choice at this stage in the conflict. The big story is Petraeus moving to CENTCOM. Why? Because aside from the president, no one man is more closely associated with the war in Iraq than General David Petraeus. America's success or failure in Iraq will largely determine his legacy.

Tom Barnett (Thomas PM Barnett): But overall, good for the military change process and good for the COIN vector. If Petraeus goes from CENTCOM to the CJCS, which many will now anticipate all the more, depending on his perceived success in this post, then he logically ends up as the pivotal player in military's post-9/11 evolution, eclipsing Schoomaker and Rumsfeld by a ways. His career trajectory thus contradicting the "one-off" school of thought on Iraq.

Richard Fernandez (The Belmont Club): More important than his battlefield successes in Iraq may be the implied victory in Pentagon politics that his nomination to CENTCOM chief suggests. It's important to remember that before the Surge, Petraeus' ideas were on the margin. Now they are in the mainstream.

William Kristol (Weekly Standard Blog): The allegedly lame duck Bush administration has--if this report is correct--hit a home run. CENTCOM is the central theater of the war on terror, and the president is putting our best commander in charge of it. What Odierno achieved as day-to-day commander in Iraq was amazing (see Fred and Kim Kagan's article, "The Patton of Counterinsurgency"), and he's clearly the right choice for MNFI. Bush has done the right thing, overriding opposition from within the Pentagon. He deserves congratulations--and thanks.

Spencer Ackerman (Washington Independent): Terrence Daly, a retired Army officer and long-time mentor to many counterinsurgency theorists, considered the appointment auspicious for both the course of both ground wars -- though not necessarily for the rise of counterinsurgency within a military often reluctant to embrace it. "This moves Petraeus into an important post from where he will be able to oversee the prosecution of both of our major counterinsurgencies, Afghanistan and Iraq," Daly said. "It moves him away from the Army, however, where he was regarded as a possible successor to Gen. George Casey as chief of staff of the Army; and, unlike Casey who wants to take the Army back to the emphasis on conventional fire and maneuver warfare, one who would carry out far-reaching reforms to enable it to deal with COIN [counterinsurgency] more effectively."

SWJ Comment: Commentary addressing the need for continuity is spot on -- but this goes beyond the benefits afforded the US presidential transition come January. The "bigger" transition - the successful handoff of security responsibility to a government of Iraq that can govern its people and territory -- is proceeding and requires US military and diplomatic leadership experienced and well-versed in the complex operational environment we call Iraq.

While General Petraeus to CENTCOM and General Odierno to MNF-I provide the military continuity -- the wild card is the diplomatic continuity. With Ambassador Crocker's retirement and a change at the top of our diplomatic leadership -- both in January -- the time is now to address the "all instruments of national power" requirements to see this thing through.

The writing is on the wall -- once the drawdown of Coalition military forces begins in earnest there is no turning back -- no operational pauses -- no new surges.

Petraeus-Odierno Team Nominated to Lead in CentCom, Iraq - AFPS

Petraeus Picked to Lead Mideast Command - Washington Post

New Jobs Set for 2 Generals With Iraq Role - New York Times

Petraeus to Be Nominated to Lead CENTCOM - New York Times

Petraeus Tapped for Central Command - Washington Times

Petraeus Promotion Ensures Continuation - Los Angeles Times

Promoted Petraeus to Leave Iraq - The Australian

Petraeus Set for Central Command - BBC News

Gen. Petraeus Picked to Lead Iraq, Afghan Wars - Reuters

Odierno 'Best' Choice for Iraq Post - USA Today

Battlefield Promotions - Wall Street Journal

Petraeus Wins - The Atlantic

Grand Slam: Petraeus Moves Up - New York Post

Republicans Hail Petraeus Selection - The Hill

Army Musical Chairs - Intel Dump

Why Petraeus? - Westhawk

Petraeus Nominated CENTCOM CINC - The Belmont Club

Impressions on Military Shifts - Democracy Arsenal

Petraeus Gets Promotion; Odierno Gets Iraq - Danger Room

Better for America... - Thomas PM Barnett

General Petraeus To CENTCOM - Threats Watch

Petraeus to CENTCOM - Abu Muqawama

CENTCOM is Not IRAQCOM - Abu Muqawama

Changes for Petraeus and Odierno - The Captain's Journal

Petraeus to CENTCOM - Weekly Standard Blog

Petraeus' Ascension - Washington Independent

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Successful Counterinsurgency in Tal Afar

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 04/23/2008 - 6:18pm | 0 comments

We recently came across an article by SWJ's Cavguy, Major Niel Smith -- Retaking Sa'ad: Successful Counterinsurgency in Tal Afar originally appeared in the July-August 2007 issue of Armor magazine.

Following Operation Iraqi Freedom, the northwestern border and farming city of Tal Afar was a relatively peaceful and stable haven in Iraq. During 2004 and 2005, the city emerged as both a hub of insurgent infiltration from Syria to Mosul and as a refuge for insurgents fleeing the campaigns in Anbar province. The city was cleared during a major operation in November 2004 by 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, and again in September 2005 by the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) accompanied by the 3d Iraqi Army (IA) Division. The 3d ACR followed up on its success by establishing company- and platoon-sized U.S./IA outposts throughout the city to restore order and allow the reformation of civil government and security forces to rebuild. The conflict also included a bitter campaign by Sunni supremacists to exterminate the Shia presence in town, which had the effect of polarizing the populace along sectarian lines.

Our unit, Team Battle, 2-37 Armor, assumed responsibility for west and southwest Tal Afar on 14 February 2006. It consisted of a motorized tank platoon, a dual-purpose tank/motorized platoon, a mechanized infantry platoon, and a combat engineer platoon. The team's specific tasks included ensuring mobility on the alternate supply route (ASR) in its sector, developing IA and Iraqi Police (IP) capabilities, and defeating the insurgents' ability to operate in its area of operations (AO). Approximately half of the sector was occupied by friendly tribes, mostly Shia, who formed a partnership with coalition forces to protect their interests and restore a fair government to Tal Afar.

Cavguy is the Small Wars Council screen name of Major Niel Smith, of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He currently is assigned to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center as an operations officer. He has served almost 29 months in Iraq during two tours with 1/1 AD and 2-37 Armor, serving as a company commander, battalion staff officer, and brigade staff officer in Baghdad, Najaf, Tal Afar, and Ramadi. The opinions stated in this post and this are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the Combined Arms Center or the Department of Defense.

Much more.

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Americans at War

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 04/23/2008 - 6:15pm | 0 comments

A SWJ hat tip to Anita for drawing our attention to the US Naval Institute's Americans at War web page. From USNI:

Americans at War is a signature program of the U.S. Naval Institute that has engaged national audiences through poignant and personal portrayals of the war experiences of America's men and women in uniform. Individual veterans are presented in a series of 90-second short stories — powerful tales that inspire pride and patriotism. The Naval Institute, the benchmark publisher of naval and maritime books and magazines for more than 130 years, is documenting the American war experience for a diverse audience and honoring the strength, character, leadership, perseverance, and sacrifice of America's heroes.

The U.S. Naval Institute, a non-profit organization, honors the heritage of military service and the personal sacrifices of individual heroes through the Institute's unparalleled photo collection and library, professional books, Proceedings magazine and Naval History magazine, oral histories and videos.

Through the eyes of those who were there, Americans at War looks back at the moments when ordinary people were called to extraordinary heroism.

High-definition interviews offer intimate, one-on-one experiences. It's a priceless understanding of the effects of war through harrowing personal accounts. Featured on PBS, this award-winning series offers 50 compelling vignettes.

This series is educating a new generation of young men and women, and honors our nation's heroes who have sacrificed so much.

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Sign of the Apocalypse

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 04/22/2008 - 7:00pm | 0 comments

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling is deploying to Iraq again this afternoon. We wish him, his family and his soldiers God speed, fair winds and following seas.

In light of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' address yesterday at the US Military Academy we thought it timely to point out another important speech on issues of leadership and "generalship".

That speech would be Secretary of the Army Pete Geren's address at the George C. Marshall Awards, Washington and Lee University, on 17 April 2008. The full transcript can be found at this link.

Here is an excerpt:

... You the Marshall class of 2008, are part of the legacy of one of our truly great Americans. You are being recognized both for your outstanding performance in ROTC and for your potential as future Army officers.

Each of you was selected as the top cadets of your ROTC Units -- you have demonstrated outstanding leadership and academic achievement.

Together, you represent our Army's next generation of leaders. You are among our very best and our expectations of you are high. Today, our Army is the best led, best trained and best equipped Army the world has ever seen. Your job is to make sure we can still say that 20 years from now.

You are leaders who will lead our Soldiers during this time of war and in this era of persistent conflict and persistent engagement.

You will lead in complex and complicated times - under the Chinese curse of all those who are fated to live in "interesting times" - and much will be asked of you. You will be entrusted with our Nation's most precious resource - our sons and daughters - and our nation's most important mission - our nation's defense.

Napoleon told us, "There are no bad soldiers, only bad generals."...

Each of you has been given Forrest C. Pogue's four-volume biography of George C. Marshall. You would do well to study it. The many and varied challenges George C. Marshall confronted over his nearly 60 years of service to our Nation - you will find them all compressed into your military career, whether it be 5 years or 40 - perhaps even into a single tour in Iraq or Afghanistan. Clear-hold-build, Counter-insurgency, stability operations, combat, nation-building - winning a war, winning the peace - and laying the foundation for a sustainable peace - our Soldiers are doing all of that and more -- everyday.

That is a lot to ask of you - but that is what we are asking of Army leaders today...

Our Army understands that the way we fight has changed - and is changing, and you will become the leaders who will carry this dynamic vision into this century.

And, if we are going to retain the combat edge honed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and adapt as the future requires, we must be an institution that encourages Soldiers to ask hard questions, questions that make us uncomfortable - reward not only the Soldier who risks his life, but also the Soldier who is —to risk a promotion - encourage those who afflict the comfortable.

Recently, LTC Paul Yingling wrote a piece that appeared in the Armed Forces Journal - and sparked heated debate throughout the Army - ruffled some feathers - ruffled a lot of feathers. That is a good thing. We need more, not fewer, Paul Yinglings.

And on this point, George C. Marshall also can serve as our model. Many thought MAJ Marshall's career was at an end in 1917 when he publicly disagreed with and angrily lectured GEN "Black Jack" Pershing at 1st Division headquarters in France during World War I. He even grabbed the general's arm when he tried to disengage.

His anger and assertiveness did not draw a rebuke from Pershing - rather it earned his respect...

You can find articles by LTC Yingling at his SWJ Bio Page.

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Nagl and Exum Twofer

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 04/22/2008 - 6:34pm | 0 comments

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl joined the Washington Post and their online visitors this afternoon for a The War Over the War Q&A.

Readers joined U.S. Army Lt. Col. John Nagl, author of " Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam," on Tuesday, April 22 at 1 p.m. ET to discuss the latest developments and the debate in Washington among government, military and intelligence officials about what course to follow in Iraq...

Here's the first question and answer.

Detroit: Lt. Col. Nagl, as an American trying to make sense of Iraq I find it troubling that the administration and the media to a great extent try to simplify the relationships and polarization that exists in Iraq. Good vs. evil hardly can be the subtext to this story. It is my understanding that all political groups of any size have their own militias, not just Sadr. Is this true? If so, what of the joyous recent pronouncements from Rice that the Iraq government is banning militias? Why are they moving on him now, and what is the implication given the upcoming elections?

Lt. Col. John Nagl: Detroit, Iraq is indeed a complicated place; I think General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker did a good job last week of laying out just how fragile the progress we've seen over the past year still is, and how many parties have an interest in the future direction of Iraq. There are in fact several political groups with affiliated militia movements, although Sadr's is among the most worrisome, and has the potential to significantly affect the course of the elections this fall. In this light, I think the decision by the Government of Iraq (GoI) to move against not just Sadr's militia, but all of them, is a step in the right direction. How well it is executed remains to be seen.

Also check out SWJ friend Andrew Exum's Strategic Miscommunication over at The Guardian. Key quote from the subtitle - The Pentagon's spinning of military analysts isn't an illegal propaganda campaign against the American people - it's just savvy PR.

In a third-party counterinsurgency campaign pitting a strong, industrial democracy against a poorly-armed guerrilla group, the weak underbelly of the democracy carrying out the campaign is the popular support it must have to continue its war efforts. An authoritarian government can start and stop wars when it decides - democracies ostensibly require the will of the people to initiate and then carry out any type of sustained military action. As such, maintaining the enthusiasm of the populace for the war effort is both desired and necessary in a counterinsurgency campaign. That said, the potential for excess on the part of the government is readily apparent, and checks on abuse of power must be firmly established...

If you just glanced at the front page of Sunday's New York Times, you could be forgiven for thinking reporter David Barstow and his editors had uncovered a real scandal at the Pentagon: had the department of defence been waging a propaganda campaign against the American people in the early years of the Iraq war?

In the end, though, all the 8,500-word article revealed was that the department of defence had (very cleverly) manipulated popular opinion by targeting opinion makers - in this case, the retired generals who often turn up on television news as "military experts" - with the same kind of positive "spin" everyday Americans are subjected to every waking hour during a presidential campaign...

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Secretary Gates at West Point

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 04/22/2008 - 3:37pm | 0 comments

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates speaks at the US Military Academy, West Point, NY on 21 April 2008.

Full Transcript - US Department of Defense. Highlights include comments on leadership and credibility, Iran; Iraq, Afghanistan and the Long War; applying Fox Conner's three axioms to the security challenges of the 21st century -- 1. Never fight unless you have to, 2. Never fight alone and 3. Never fight for long.

An AFPS News Excerpt:

Success on today's and tomorrow's battlefields requires military leaders guided by conscience who refuse to be "yes men," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said in a speech last night to future Army officers at the U.S. Military Academy.

Gates told the cadets at West Point, N.Y., that he considers principled dissent a sign of a healthy organization, but he also encouraged loyalty among the dissenters.

The Army will need leaders of "uncommon agility, resourcefulness and imagination, leaders —and able to think and act creatively and decisively in a different kind of world and a different kind of conflict than we have prepared for over the last six decades," Gates said.

But one factor remains constant, Gates continued. "We will still need men and women in uniform to call things as they see them and tell their subordinates and superiors alike what they need to hear, not what they want to hear." ...

Related news and blog items:

Gates Assails Pentagon on Resources - White and Branigin, Washington Post

Gates Advises on Disagreeing With Leaders - Thom Shanker, New York Times

Air Force Under Fire From Gates - Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times

Air Force Must do More for War, Gates Says - Associated Press

Gates Forms ISR Task Force - Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service

Gates Urges Unconventional Thinking - Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service

Why the Air Force Bugs Gates - Mark Thompson, Time

The Problem with Culture (Ours) - Abu Muqawama, Abu Muqawama

The Ghost of Boyd Invoked - John Robb, Global Guerrillas

Gates: Air Force Must Do More - Sharon Weinberger, Danger Room

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Iraq: MNF-I and RCT 1 Updates

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 04/22/2008 - 7:34am | 0 comments

Rear Admiral Patrick Driscoll, spokesman for Multi-National Force-Iraq, and Tahseen Sheikhly, Spokesman for Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, speaking with reporters in Baghdad.

Colonel Louis Craparotta, Commander of Regimental Combat Team 1, speaks with reporters at the Pentagon via satellite from Camp Fallujah.

Military Review: May - June 2008 Issue

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 04/21/2008 - 7:20pm | 0 comments

The May -- June 2008 issue of Military Review has been posted to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center web site.

Since 1922, Military Review has provided a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs. Subsequently, publications have proliferated throughout the Army education system that specialize either in tactical issues associated with particular Branches or on strategic issues at the Senior Service School level. Bridging these two levels of intellectual inquiry, Military Review focuses on research and analysis of the concepts, doctrine and principles of warfighting between the tactical and operational levels of war.

Military Review is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. Military Review also supports the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Continue on to the articles...

Child Soldiers

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 04/21/2008 - 6:30pm | 0 comments

John Sullivan; a senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism, a member of the board of advisors for the Terrorism Research Center, Inc., a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and SWJ Blogger to boot; sent an e-mail alerting us to an Air & Space Power Journal (Spanish Edition) issue on child soldiers.

Here are the links to the English translation versions of the articles...

All The News That's...

by Robert Bateman | Sun, 04/20/2008 - 5:16pm | 17 comments

An editor somewhere at the New York Times should probably be very worried for his job right about now. Not because he or she missed a comma splice, or permitted a run-on sentence, that is actually the job of people called copy editors. No, that editor should be worried because today, on page A1 and above the fold, he or she failed in their job to present a logical and intellectually coherent article. In short, they let a reporter run wild with an a historical collection of claptrap which displays both a stunning ignorance of the military as well as the even more unforgivable sin of being ignorant of how the Pentagon press corps (to include the Pentagon correspondent for the Times) works.

Here is the short version of the thesis: The political appointees in the Pentagon try to counteract adverse news stories and also try to increase what they believe are positive news stories.

Whoa Nellie! Knocked ya right outta your saddle with that one, didn't they?

Of course, as with all such situations, there are some nuggets to be found within the body of the story...

Problems and Prospects of Defense COIN Wargaming

by Eric Walters | Sun, 04/20/2008 - 2:37pm | 4 comments

In the Winter 2007 issue of the hobby wargaming journal Fire & Movement, the editor, Jon Compton, relates his experiences in playing counterinsurgency games at the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) conference in Monterrey, California. His last comments are worth circulating in this group and expanding upon:

All in all, it was an enlightening experience, and it was fascinating to get a glimpse of what professional wargame developers are doing in the military. Although board games are highly respected in this group, they are not taken seriously as modeling tools. To some extent I found that disappointing in that there is, in my opinion, too much dependence upon computer based agent interaction and stochastic processes, and too little upon the actual human interaction, which is where board games excel. The other problem I see is the black box issue related to computer-based simulations. This issue became very apparent as I quizzed the developers of the wargame we participated in and discovered that many of the governing assumptions were not based upon any sort of empirical or theoretical structure, but were simply invented out of whole cloth. This is information you would not know by playing the game, whereas with board games the system is open to examination and critical evaluation.

The Center For Naval Analyses (CNA) - certainly no stranger to MORS or to those well-read in counterinsurgency studies - published a very interesting monograph in September 2006 on the possibilities of wargaming such situations in board wargame formats, most notably using Card Driven Game (CDG) method pioneered by Mark Herman (currently at Booz, Allen and Hamilton) in his commercial hobby wargames. Entitled Wargaming Fourth Generation Warfare, authors Peter P. Perla, Albert A. Nofi, and Michael C. Markowitz would seem to solve some of Compton's complaints - if only commercial game designers could be taken seriously...

Secretary Gates on Academia and the Military

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 04/20/2008 - 10:02am | 2 comments

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates 14 April 2008 speech to the Association of American Universities.

Topics included the state of relations between academia and the military, Human Terrain Team anthropologists in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Minerva consortia to promote research relevant to national security, China, Iraq, religion and ideology, an ROTC initiative to improve foreign languages in the military, and what universities can do to support veterans.

The full transcript can be found here.

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Sunday Chase

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 04/20/2008 - 6:05am | 0 comments

NYT: DOD Strategic Communications

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 04/20/2008 - 2:18am | 1 comment

Today's New York Times features two items concerning the Department of Defense and strategic communications / outreach. David Barstow's Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon's Hidden Hand makes the claim that a "Pentagon information apparatus" has used a group of retired military officers in a campaign to generate favorable news coverage of the administration's wartime performance.

To the public, these men are members of a familiar fraternity, presented tens of thousands of times on television and radio as "military analysts" whose long service has equipped them to give authoritative and unfettered judgments about the most pressing issues of the post-Sept. 11 world.

Hidden behind that appearance of objectivity, though, is a Pentagon information apparatus that has used those analysts in a campaign to generate favorable news coverage of the administration's wartime performance, an examination by The New York Times has found.

The effort, which began with the buildup to the Iraq war and continues to this day, has sought to exploit ideological and military allegiances, and also a powerful financial dynamic: Most of the analysts have ties to military contractors vested in the very war policies they are asked to assess on air...

The article continues.

In turn, members of this group have echoed administration talking points, sometimes even when they suspected the information was false or inflated. Some analysts acknowledge they suppressed doubts because they feared jeopardizing their access.

A few expressed regret for participating in what they regarded as an effort to dupe the American public with propaganda dressed as independent military analysis.

"It was them saying, 'We need to stick our hands up your back and move your mouth for you,' " Robert S. Bevelacqua, a retired Green Beret and former Fox News analyst, said.

Kenneth Allard, a former NBC military analyst who has taught information warfare at the National Defense University, said the campaign amounted to a sophisticated information operation. "This was a coherent, active policy," he said...

Much more here and at NYT's multimedia piece - How the Pentagon Spread Its Message - chapters include The General's Revolt, A Private Meeting and Deployed on the Air. Also included are the primary source documents used by the NYT.

Michael Goldfarb, Weekly Standard, comments.

The piece goes on for some ten pages, with one damning revelation after the next.The Pentagon distributes talking points, provides special access to retired generals, and even arranged a meeting for them with the Secretary of Defense. You'll also be very surprised to learn that many retired generals have business interests in the defense industry.

The paper offers no evidence that any of these men were using their influence to directly further a personal interest (unless one counts "networking"), and it offers no evidence of coercion on the part of the administration. So the charge is a lack of transparency, and it rests on the assumption that Americans are too stupid to surmise the likely ideological and institutional biases of a former general officer in the United States military.

For my money, concerning understanding the complexities and trends in strategic communications / outreach and public diplomacy, I do my research (sanity check) at MountainRunner, an excellent resource by Matt Armstrong.

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SWJ Editors' Links

Stop the Presses! - Contentions

The NYT's Method and the Commentariat - Democracy Project

NYTimes Exclusive: Generals Know People at Pentagon - Weekly Standard Blog

Attacking the Military Analysts - PrairiePundit

Discuss at Small Wars Council

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Pentagon Study? Current Events in Iraq? Not so Fast... (Updated)

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 04/18/2008 - 6:05pm | 21 comments

Today's Miami Herald carries a story on page 3 titled Pentagon Study: War is `Debacle' by Jonathan Landay and John Walcott.

The war in Iraq has become ''a major debacle'' and the outcome ''is in doubt'' despite improvements in security from the buildup in U.S. forces, according to a highly critical study published Thursday by the Pentagon's premier military educational institute.

The report released by the National Defense University raises fresh doubts about President Bush's projections of a U.S. victory in Iraq just a week after Bush announced that he was suspending U.S. troop reductions.

The report carries considerable weight because it was written by Joseph Collins, a former senior Pentagon official, and was based in part on interviews with other former senior defense and intelligence officials who played roles in prewar preparations. It was published by the university's National Institute for Strategic Studies [SWJ Note: Institute for National Security Studies], a Defense Department research center...

The Miami Herald piece on a NDU "occasional paper" (Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath), quoted alternately as a Pentagon or NDU study, raised some flags here at SWJ. So we asked the author, Joseph Collins, to provide some context. His reply:

The Miami Herald story ("Pentagon Study: War is a 'Debacle' ") distorts the nature of and intent of my personal research project. It was not an NDU study, nor was it a Pentagon study. Indeed, the implication of the Herald story was that this study was mostly about current events. Such is not the case. It was mainly about the period 2002-04. The story also hypes a number of paragraphs, many of which are quoted out of context. The study does not "lay much of the blame" on Secretary Rumsfeld for problems in the conduct of the war, nor does it say that he "bypassed the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It does not single out "Condoleeza Rice and Stephen Hadley" for criticism.

Here is a fair summary of my personal research, which formally is NDU INSS Occasional Paper 5, "Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath."

This study examines how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decision-making process functioned, and what can be done to improve that process. The central finding of this study is that U.S. efforts in Iraq were hobbled by a set of faulty assumptions, a flawed planning effort, and a continuing inability to create security conditions in Iraq that could have fostered meaningful advances in stabilization, reconstruction, and governance. With the best of intentions, the United States toppled a vile, dangerous regime but has been unable to replace it with a stable entity. Even allowing for progress under the Surge, the study insists that mistakes in the Iraq operation cry out in the mid- to long-term for improvements in the U.S. decision-making and policy execution systems.

The study recommends the development of a national planning charter, improving the qualifications of national security planners, streamlining policy execution in the field, improving military education, strengthening the Department of State and USAID, and reviewing the tangled legal authorities for complex contingencies. The study ends with a plea to improve alliance relations and to exercise caution in deciding to go to war.

SWJ Editors Note: Unfortunately this is not the first instance - nor will it be the last -- of highly selective use of source quotes and excerpts as well as distortion of context by members of the "mainstream media" in reporting on recent events and trends in Iraq...

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Update 1: The Herald article is a McClatchy News item picked up by the former (H/T Charles Bird).

Update 2: SWJ Editors' Links

The "NDU" Report - Abu Muqawama

Miami Herald's "Major Debacle": a Lack of Journalism - Hot Air

Distorted Antiwar Propaganda from McClatchy - Protein Wisdom

'Classic Case Of Failure' - Think Progress

Liberal Narrative on Iraq Might Not Be Going Official Yet! - Washington Independent

Not So Fast With That "Pentagon Study" - Outside the Beltway

The McClatchy Narrative on Iraq - Red State

McClatchey Misreports Iraq War Report - Flopping Aces

Less Than Meets the Eye in "Pentagon Story" - The Glittering Eye

Small Wars Has the Details - Argghhh!

Misrepresentation at the Miami Herald - Instapundit

Iraq War "A Major Debacle," Outcome "Is In Doubt" - The Huffington Post

MSM Distorts War Report - The Jawa Report

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Parameters: Spring 2008 Issue

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 04/18/2008 - 8:00am | 1 comment

The Spring 2008 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.

Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.

Here is the line-up:

In This Issue - Parameters Editors

Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics by Martin L. Cook

The fact that a joke like that could be told in front of an audience including the President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Chief of Staff, and many other Washington dignitaries spoke volumes for the state of relations between senior military leaders and their civilian superiors. For those recently retired general officers who chose to go public with their criticisms of then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (and by implication the Iraq policy), clearly the situation had reached a point where they felt it was part of their obligation to the profession of arms and the American people to dissent. Such intense criticism from military officers who previously held positions of great responsibility in implementing the Administration's policies is something rarely seen in American history. This article will attempt to assess the ethical considerations that bear on officers contemplating such action in any future civil-military crisis.

The Limits of American Generalship: The JCS's Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises by Wade Markel

Last spring, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling reignited the perennial debate regarding American generalship with his article, "General Failure." He joined a number of critics in blaming America's senior military leadership, especially Army leaders, for the situation in Iraq. In his view, US generals failed the nation by not anticipating the nature of the war, thus failing to prepare the military for the war in which it is now engaged. Worse, he asserted that they failed to conduct counterinsurgency operations with competence, poorly integrating the political, military, economic, social, and information domains, if at all. In short, Yingling believed that America's generals had waged the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time.

The Mythical Shia Crescent by Pat Proctor

Sometime in late 2006, America awoke to the realization that, by deposing Saddam Hussein and toppling his Ba'athist regime, it had inadvertently removed a major obstacle to Iranian dominance in the Middle East. Assessments of the associated events reached hyperbolic levels. Dire warnings of a growing Iranian hegemony began to surface. Sunni leaders such as Jordan's King Abdullah II began to warn the West of an emerging "Shia Crescent," led by Iran and encompassing Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The idea caught fire in American media and became the dominant narrative in discourse on Middle East policy.

But how realistic is this amalgamation? Is a Shia Crescent really emerging that is capable of challenging more than a millennium of Sunni domination in the Islamic world? Will Iran lead it? On the surface, the idea appears plausible. Yet, a more in-depth examination of the prospective members of this geopolitical realignment raises numerous questions. This intellectual shorthand may be blinding the United States to opportunities that could yield tangible progress on several strategic fronts in the Middle East, while providing a new ally in the global war on terrorism.

Meddling in the Markets: Foreign Manipulation by Felix K. Chang and Jonathan Goldman

No bombs need fall from the sky. Yet damage can be inflicted on the United States through market manipulation that would be as costly to recover from as any conventional attack. The threat of financial and commodity market manipulation is not new. What is new is the ability of a foreign government to use manipulation in a way that would cause a swift and systemic economic crisis in the United States. Such actions could be taken without ever clashing with the American military—offering those without the military capability to penetrate America's defenses an asymmetric tactic for direct attack. That a foreign government could do so should be a major concern for all of America's political and military strategists.

China through Arab Eyes: American Influence in the Middle East by Chris Zambelis and Brandon Gentry

The significance of Beijing's hosting of the second annual China-Arab Cooperation Forum—an event bringing together key envoys from 22 Arab nations under the auspices of the Arab League and their Chinese counterparts—went largely unnoticed in the western media. According to Chinese and Arab news reports, however, the conference, held in May and June 2006, was a success on many levels. As Chinese and Arab dignitaries agreed to greatly strengthen and expand economic, energy, and cultural ties to unprecedented levels over the course of the twenty-first century, Chinese President Hu Jintao, speaking warmly of the blossoming Sino-Arab relationship, stated, "China thanks the Arab states for supporting China in relation to Taiwan and human rights issues and will as always support the just cause of the Arab states and people." For his part, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa reaffirmed the League's support of the "One China" principle, declaring, "The world has but one China, and we only visit a China with Beijing as its capital."

The Strategic Importance of Central Asia: An American View by Stephen Blank

Undoubtedly Central Asia's strategic importance in international affairs is growing. The rivalries among Russia, China, United States, Iran, India, and Pakistan not to mention the ever-changing pattern of relations among local states (five former Soviet republics and Afghanistan) make the region's importance obviously clear. Central Asia's strategic importance for Washington, Moscow, and Beijing varies with each nation's perception of its strategic interests. Washington focuses primarily on Central Asia as an important theater in the war on terrorism. Additionally, it is viewed as a theater where America might counter a revived Russia or China, or a place to blunt any extension of Iranian influence. Moscow and Beijing view the region as a vital locale for defending critical domestic interests. This asymmetry of interest is a major factor in the competition among states for influence in the region.

Editor's Shelf

Review Essay

Book Reviews

Off the Press

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HTS and Newsweek

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 04/17/2008 - 4:23am | 0 comments

In resposnse to a recent Newsweek article - A Gun in One Hand, A Pen in the Other by Dan Ephron and Silvia Spring - Dr. Montgomery McFate; the Senior Social Science Adviser to the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System Program; has this to say:

Dear Editors,

Having long been an admirer of Newsweek, I found your failure to fact check the story by Dan Ephron & Silvia Springs entitled "A gun in one hand, a pen in the other" (21 April issue) completely shocking. One naturally expects more from Newsweek than such sloppy journalism.

Below you will find a list of factual corrections and some more general points about the article.

FACTUAL ERRORS:

1) "the idea is to recruit academics whose area expertise and language skills" - Incorrect. In fact, the goal of HTS is to recruit social scientists with the appropriate research skills and methodological approaches. There are very, very few social scientists in the US who have the requisite knowledge of Iraq or Afghanistan, since these countries have been closed to research for many decades. However, if the social scientist on a team is not an Arabic speaker, other members of the team possess the requisite area expertise and language skills.

2) "only three speak Arabic" - Incorrect. Each team in Iraq and Afghanistan has members who speak the local language, although this person is not necessarily the social scientist. As of 14 April, there are 38 HTS personnel in Iraq distributed among 5 teams (slightly higher than normal, since we are in transition and executing some individual Reliefs in Place). 8 of those personnel are Social Scientists. 13 of those personnel speak Arabic,of which 2 are Social Scientists and 11 are Human Terrain Analysts or Research Managers.

3) "Johnson served in Afghanistan on a pilot Human Terrain team last year" - Incorrect. Tom Johnson was never a team member, but merely visited theater for two weeks.

4) Tom Johnson is a "Pashto speaker", and "spent much of his time there interviewing Afghans in their homes" - Incorrect. According to Tom Johnson, he has no idea where this information came from -- "surely not me."

5) "Omar Altalib was one of only two Iraqi-Americans in the program" - Incorrect. Actually the program currently has about 20 Iraqi Americans.

6) Social scientists earn "$300,000" a year - Overstated. This is true only if hazard pay, overtime, and danger pay are included. The base salary is a low six figures.

7) "Steve Fondacaro...........a retired Special Forces colonel.." - Incorrect. COL Fondacaro (ret'd) has never been in Army Special Forces. His experience as Special Operations Force (SOF) officer was exclusively with 75th Ranger Regiment and higher Headquarters.

8) "Fondacaro says overseers had to rush through the start-up phase because Pentagon planners wanted the terrain teams in Iraq quickly" - Incorrect. The requirement to put teams in country was in response to the Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) that came from the units in the war zone. Pentagon planners actually slowed the process down to carefully analyze and validate the need.

9) the contract "was handed to British Aerospace Engineering (BAE) without a bidding process" - Overstated. BAE is the omnibus contractor for TRADOC and for a start-up program, this was a normal process. Once HTS becomes a program of record, the contract will be bid out.

10) "The rest are social scientists or former GIs" - Incorrect. Actually, much of the manpower is made up of US Army reserves.

11) "the anthropologists sent to Iraq..." - Incorrect. Not all of the social scientists on teams are anthropologists.

12) "the relationship between civilian academics and military or ex-military team members was sometimes strained" - Incorrect. The environment in the training program is very different than a year ago, which is the period the quoted sources were familiar with.

13) "40-year-old expert on trash" - Incorrect. Actually, Dr. Griffin is an anthropologist with an interest in food security and economics.

GENERAL ISSUES

1) The main input to the article came from two individuals who were terminated, and whose knowledge is outdated.

2) The article's main premise is that the majority of HTS social scientists are not Middle East specialists with fluency in Arabic. Fair enough, but Human Terrain Teams include personnel with language, regional, and local area knowledge in addition to social scientists. The teams are not just the lone social science advisor that the media has tended to focus upon. As teams, they include a variety of individuals uniquely suited to understanding the social, political, economic and cultural aspects of the population in question -- both military and civilian.

3) In the article, the significance of research methods was downplayed in favor of language and culture area skills. Certain subfields require formal area studies training, but as whole, social scientists are trained to apply their knowledge of analytical frameworks and research methodologies across different locales, based on the premise that the dynamics of human behavior exhibit certain universal features. This does not mean that social scientists cannot be area experts: many are, given their past research. However, what social scientists bring to the table is a way of looking at the social world, studying it, and analyzing it in a way that is distinct from the way the military approaches these issues.

4) That soldiers on their second- or third- tours possess inestimable knowledge about the area in which they are operating is undeniable. Yet, as currently organized, combat brigades do not possess the organic staff capability or assets to organize this knowledge and look at the broad questions that HTTs are concerned with. While civil affairs soldiers are the closest to such an organic asset, along with information operations, these assets are mission-focused and often lack the manpower to engage in the sort of question-formulation and asking that HTTs can. Nor do these assets always include personnel trained in social scientific analysis. Therefore, it is the job of HTTs to take the knowledge these soldiers have gleaned, to examine the information already being gathered on the ground on a daily basis, engage in original research, and consider this information in terms of broader issues from a different perspective in order to add to the brigade commander's situational awareness of the social, economic, political, cultural and psychological factors at work in the environment.

5) All this was explained to both Dan Ephron & Silvia Spring, but none of it is reflected in the article.

GEN Wallace, the commander of TRADOC, has written a letter to the editors of Newsweek regarding this article, which I hope you will consider publishing. You may also consider this email as a 'letter to the editor' and publish any or all of it.

I hope in the future that Newsweek will hold itself to a higher standard of journalism.

Warm regards,

Montgomery McFate, JD PhD

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RCT-5 COIN Update

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 04/15/2008 - 6:07pm | 0 comments

Marine Corps Colonel Patrick Malay, commander of Regimental Combat Team 5 of Multi-National Force - West, briefed Pentagon reporters and the bloggers roundtable this week on success against insurgents in the western portion of Iraq's Anbar province.

U.S., Iraqi Forces Winning in Western Anbar Province by Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service

Increased security brought about by military success against insurgents in the western portion of Iraq's Anbar province is enabling a drawdown of U.S. forces there as well as enhanced regional reconstruction efforts, a senior Marine commander told Pentagon reporters today.

"The insurgents, by and large, have been marginalized in western Anbar," Marine Corps Col. Pat Malay, commander of Regimental Combat Team 5, told Pentagon reporters during a satellite-carried news conference from Camp Ripper, Iraq. Malay's area of operations comprises about 30,000 square miles, an area about the size of South Carolina.

During a previous Iraq tour in Fallujah two years ago, Malay recalled, multitudes of foreign fighters were entering western Iraq from Syria. Today, there are very few foreign fighters in his area of operations, he observed.

"Quite frankly, I think we've killed a lot of them, and I think that the enemy is having a more difficult time recruiting to the numbers that they have in the past," Malay said. In addition, foreign fighters no longer are transiting across the Syrian border into Anbar province, the colonel said.

With insurgents "on the run" in western Anbar province, the resultant reduced violence has enabled a drawdown of U.S. forces in his sector, Malay said. Three of his command's five battalions have rotated home over the past three months, he noted...

Related Sites:

Multinational Force Iraq

Multinational Corps Iraq

Multinational Division West

Briefing Transcript

Defense Department Bloggers Roundtable

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Secretary Rice's Remarks on US COIN Doctrine / Strategy

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 04/14/2008 - 9:33pm | 1 comment

Remarks At Air University, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base

Secretary Condoleezza Rice

Montgomery, Alabama

April 14, 2008

Secretary Rice receives the first honorary degree at Air University, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, Alabama.

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you very much. Thank you, General Lorenz, for that really wonderful introduction. I want to thank very much the members of the Board of Governors who are here. It's my great privilege to accept the first ever honorary degree from Air University. I want to thank you too, General, for your leadership of this great institution, for adapting the education of the U.S. Air Force to the challenges of the 21st century. From the Wright brothers to the creation of the Air Corps Tactical School, the River Region of Alabama has been at the forefront of aeronautical innovation and training for nearly one century. Today, Air University is the intellectual and leadership center of the Air Force. And as an educator myself, I want you to know that I really value the mission of this institution...

Remembering our Heroes

by Bill Caldwell | Mon, 04/14/2008 - 6:29pm | 0 comments

Frontier Six, LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, Sends

Remembering our Heroes

Corporal Jason Dunham, United States Marine Corps

Four years ago Corporal Jason Dunham did the unimaginable when an insurgent tossed a grenade into the middle of his unit. In a split second, he placed the welfare of his comrades above his own. Covering the grenade with his Kevlar helmet and his body, he saved the lives of the Marines around him. Tragically, he died of his wounds eight days later. Jason's actions may come as a shock to us, but not to the people who knew him because they reflect the character of the man he was.

Jason was always concerned for others. He had extended his term of enlistment because he wanted to stay with his squad for their entire tour in combat. His good friend, Lance Corporal Mark Dean said "you're crazy, why would you do that?" Jason's response was "I want to make sure everyone makes it home alive. I want to be sure you go home to your wife alive." Shortly before deploying to Iraq, Lance Corporal Dean was a little short on cash and Jason bought him a phone card so he could call his wife.

From his first day in the Marines, Corporal Dunham stood out for his outstanding leadership abilities. One of his leaders, Staff Sergeant John Ferguson, said he showed "the kind of leadership where you're confident in your abilities and don't have to yell about it." A fervent patriot, his father, Dan Dunham said "Jason believed that all men on this earth should be free."

No, Corporal Jason Dunham's actions were no surprise to the people who knew him because Jason was a man of character and integrity, a selfless servant and leader. He embodied all the qualities we want in the men and women serving in our military. Jason also had something extra; the dedication to go above and beyond the call of duty, to care just a little more.

I am always amazed to hear stories like Jason's; amazed, but also thankful. Thankful that people like Deb and Dan Dunham raised a young man with Jason's character, compassion, and concern for others. Thankful that our nation always seems to produce another generation of heroes who are —to step up and serve when their nation calls.

For his actions that day, Corporal Jason Dunham was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. At that time, it was only the second Medal of Honor awarded for actions during the Global War on Terrorism. The first was to SFC Paul Smith of the US Army and the other two were awarded to Lieutenant Michael Murphy and Petty Officer Michael Monsoor both of the US Navy. They each made the ultimate sacrifice. Now it is our job to ensure their sacrifice and the lives they lived will never be forgotten.

On April 14th 2008, let's honor the incredible sacrifice of Corporal Jason Dunham and those who loved him so dearly.

Interagency Online Training

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 04/14/2008 - 5:33pm | 0 comments

From US Joint Forces Command - USJFCOM Signs Letter of Intent to Support Interagency Online Training by MC2 (AW) Nikki Carter of JFCOM's Public Affairs Office.

The State Department's Foreign Services Institute (FSI) and U.S. Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) signed a letter of intent to commence the development of online courseware in support of integrated reconstruction and stabilization training and education.

The State Department hosted the ceremonial signing Thursday to recognize the significant collaboration achieved between FSI and the JWFC.

The JWFC's Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution (JKDDC) initiative will work closely with FSI to make the courseware a reality...

Iraq and the Human Terrain Teams

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 04/14/2008 - 5:29pm | 0 comments

Newsweek has posted a Human Terrain System profile piece by Dan Efron and Silvia Spring - A Gun in One Hand, A Pen in the Other.

Marcus Griffin had never been to the Middle East before he arrived in Iraq last fall, as part of a project to help the U.S. military decipher the country's intricate social nuances. An anthropologist from Christopher Newport University in Virginia, Griffin knew much more about the Philippines, having accompanied his social-scientist father on a two-year research project there as a teen. In Virginia he'd been studying Freegans, those superenvironmentalists who forage for food in restaurant and supermarket Dumpsters. And so, during a recent outing with the unit he's attached to in Baghdad, Griffin rummaged through the trash of an Iraqi sheep rancher, looking for patterns that would tell him something worthwhile about the neighborhood—and by extension, about Iraqi society. "Well, they're drinking a great deal of Pepsi," he said dryly to a Newsweek correspondent. When a man in a checked kaffiyeh emerged from one of the homes, Griffin peppered him with questions. Where did he get his electricity? (A generator.) Did his children attend school? (No, they're too young.) How did he make a living? (From his sheep.)

Though he wears Army fatigues and carries a gun, Griffin is a civilian, part of a controversial program known as the Human Terrain System. According to a Pentagon blueprint from 2006, the idea is to recruit academics whose area expertise and language skills can help the military wage a smarter counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. These specialists, among other things, are meant to map the population of towns and villages, identify the clans that matter and the fault lines within them, then advise U.S. commanders on the right approach for leveraging local support...

Continue reading A Gun in One Hand, A Pen in the Other.

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General David Petraeus / Ambassador Ryan Crocker Testimony (Updated 14 April)

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 04/14/2008 - 4:34am | 0 comments

Background material, transcripts, videos, briefing slides, news reports, opinion-editorials, and blog reporting on the testimonies of General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker to Congress (Last Update 14 April)...

Yea, Right

by Dave Dilegge | Sun, 04/13/2008 - 12:14pm | 1 comment

Associated Press news item - Iran Dismisses Sabotage in Mosque Blast by Nasser Karimi.

Iranian officials on Sunday ruled out an attack as the cause of an explosion that killed 11 people inside a mosque in the southern city of Shiraz.

The explosion ripped through the mosque packed with hundreds of worshippers late Saturday as a cleric delivered his weekly speech against extremist Wahabi beliefs and the outlawed Baha'i faith, the semiofficial Fars news agency said.

Authorities said besides the 11 killed, 191 people were wounded, some of them critically, the state IRNA news agency reported...

The police chief of the southern Fars Province, Gen. Ali Moayyedi, said he "rejects" the possibility of an intentional bombing and "any sort of insurgency" in the blast.

Moayyedi, in comments carried by state IRNA news agency, said the initial investigation found remnants of ammunition from a military exhibition that was held recently at the mosque....

Sure, that's the ticket.

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