Blog Posts

A Battalion's Worth of Good Ideas by LTC John Nagl in today's New York Times.

... Based on American experiences in Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador and now in Iraq and Afghanistan, an advisory strategy can help the Iraqi Army and security forces beat Al Qaeda and protect their country. (Obviously, these are my personal views, and do not represent those of the Army.) However, doing so will require America's ground forces to provide at least 20,000 combat advisers for the duration of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — men and women specially equipped and trained to help foreign forces bear a greater share of the combat load.

Unfortunately, America's military did not have the advisory capacity it should have had after major combat operations ceased. The first attempt to create a new Iraqi Army was farmed out to private contractors. When that effort failed, and it became clear that the assistance needed to help the fledgling Iraqi Army far exceeded the capability of the Army's Special Forces, regular Army troops were called on to fill the gap. Given their lack of training, these soldiers did remarkably well, but it was always a stopgap measure...

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The War over the War w/ Tom Ricks - Washington Post online discussion on 1 April.

As the experts poke the ashes, I think the emerging consensus is that Moqtada al-Sadr won more than he lost, because he and the government agreed to a cease-fire. That makes him 3 for 3 in taking on state powers (the U.S. in the previous two rounds, and now the Baghdad government). If nothing else, this guy is a survivor.

What puzzles me most is the role Iran played, especially in ending the fighting. There are lots of rumors that it brokered the ceasefire, but I have seen nothing definitive. If it did, that indicates that the Tehran government felt it had something to lose through the fighting. I have been told by U.S. officials that the Iranians were taken aback by intra-Shiite combat in Iraq last year around Karbala. I don't know why they would be surprised: It seems to me that one of the obstacles to major political movement in Iraq is that the Shiites still haven't sorted themselves out.

The other international actor of interest is Britain. They have 4,000 troops at the airport on the outskirts of Basra. You wouldn't know it, would you? (By the way, the British defense minister, Des Browne, said today that he is putting on hold a plan to further cut the British troop strength. Why? Seems kind of meaningless to me.) Nance's subhed: "It's Always Tea Time at Basrah Airport."

At any rate, the phrase that keeps coming back to me is one I heard last year from a diplomat: If you want to know what Baghdad will look like eventually, look at Basra now.

Now let's get to your questions...

Marc Lynch at Abu Aardvark and Malcolm Nance at Small Wars Journal Blog are quoted by Tom.

Posted today at The Jamestown Foundation - Online Terrorist Training Manual - Part One: Creating a Terrorist Cell by Abdul Hameed Bakier.

Jihadis continue to pursue terror training and knowledge exchange with fellow jihadis through Internet forums. Often, the jihadi forum participants post short, though significant, details pertinent to terror conduct drawn from real life experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recently, a forum participant posted six training episodes comprised of the basic knowledge needed by a novice jihadi to become a full-fledged terrorist (ek-ls.org, March 15). The episodes begin with two basics lessons on "How to set up a terrorist cell." Four more episodes followed, over a week, on sniper attacks, assassination techniques, attacking and looting government centers, and conducting massive terror strikes. Terrorism Focus will cover all six episodes of this important training manual, beginning with this issue and continuing over the next two weeks...

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Engaging the Mahdi Militia in Basrah and labeling them as equal to Al-Qaeda in Iraq is a deadly gamble that may leave Iran the winner.

On 19 March, 2008 CNN's Iraq war correspondent, Kyra Phillips gave a live interview from in front of the crossed Swords at the Tomb of the Unknowns parade ground in Baghdad's International Zone (IZ). She cheerfully reported that Iraq had somehow changed after five years and the lack of mortar and rocket fire allowed her to broadcast live. Rockets and mortars were a daily occurrence in the heavily fortified center of government over the previous 1,825 days. On this indirect fire free day, Phillips proclaimed, "there was a time twice a day there would be mortar rounds coming into this area. Now, five years later, Kiran, very rarely are you seeing that type of action, mortars or rockets coming in here. And the fact that I'm here live right now tells you this is a sign of progress."

The media's definition of "very rarely" would be exactly four days. That Sunday the IZ and surrounding neighborhoods would be bombarded with a 12-hour long barrage of rockets and mortars, which killed 13 civilians in the outlying neighborhoods. The barrages continued throughout the week and embassy workers and residents of the IZ were informed they could not go outside of concrete structures without body armor and helmets -- a standing order for the first five years, which somehow needed to be reiterated. Phillip's ridiculously premature assessment that the surge had dispelled mayhem and resentment of the 2003 invasion, was short-circuited by the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), or Mahdi Militia...

A Grand Plan for NATO Will Have to Wait

By Stanley R. Sloan

As the NATO countries prepare for the last alliance summit of George Bush's presidency, scheduled for April 2-4 in Bucharest, there is widespread recognition that the alliance needs reinforcement. On the practical level, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan needs more men and equipment, particularly helicopters, to block resurgence of the Taliban. On the strategic level, the alliance's 1999 concept of its role and operations is in dire need of updating to reflect new realities in the wake of 9/11 and NATO's subsequent mission in Afghanistan. On the political level, new life needs to be pumped into the alliance's veins, to convince skeptical commentators, publics and parliaments that the transatlantic bargain is still a viable and valuable deal.

Hopefully, new commitments to the alliance mission in Afghanistan will emerge from Bucharest. None of the allies will want to celebrate NATO's 60th anniversary in 2009 by acknowledging that it is incapable of handling the Afghanistan mission.

However, the commitment to prepare a fresh strategic concept along with a new "Atlantic Charter," as advocated by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, may have to wait. As good an idea as it is, the reality of the American election schedule will enforce a delay. Do the European allies really want to take the chance of handing off a drafting process begun under President George Bush to a new American administration led by Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton? There could not be a more awkward way for the allies to greet the next US administration...

1776 and All That - Andrew Exum, The Guardian

SWJ friend, former Soldier (he led a platoon of light infantry in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks and subsequently led a platoon of Army Rangers as a part of special operations task forces in Iraq and Afghanistan) and King's College of London PhD candidate Andrew Exum stirs things up over at The Guardian (see the comments section).

... But maybe the British army was never that good at counterinsurgency warfare in the first place. In fact, the very existence of the United States of America points toward an 18th-century counterinsurgency failure of epic proportions. At the moment, Americans are reliving their revolutionary era through HBO's slick new mini-series on founding father John Adams. But this interest in the American Revolution surely opens the door onto an interesting thought experiment: What would have happened had the British army applied contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine against those pesky colonists in the 18th century?

This question is one currently being asked by several smart US army and Marine Corps officers who have taken their experiences fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and applied them to historical analysis of other American wars...

More at Kings of War - Could the British Army have fought successful COIN in 1776? by Dr. David Betz.

More at Abu Muqawama - 1776 and All That by AM.

How to Fix the U.S. Military - Phillip Carter, Slate

Overhaul the budget. If you'd awakened from a 20-year-long slumber and glanced at the current defense budget, you'd think the Cold War were still raging...

Rejigger the military services. One obstacle to rational military planning is that, for the past 40 years, by unspoken agreement, the defense budget has been evenly split among the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force....

Fix the Army. The Army is (barely) meeting its recruitment goals by lowering standards and dishing out large bonuses...

Invest in people. When the draft ended in 1973, the Army chiefs shifted incentives from veterans' benefits (such as the GI Bill) to enlistment bonuses...

Promote the right leaders. Owing to a shortage of officers, almost anyone can get promoted to lieutenant colonel...

Create incentives for a real nation-building or counterinsurgency capability. ... more troops are trained in such operations and more officers with expertise in that area are promoted to general...

Spread the responsibilities around. Civilian experts are probably better than sergeants at the kinds of stability operations described above....

Taxes. ... more citizens have to contribute something to national defense—if not their blood, then more of their treasure.

Fixing America's Military - James Joyner, Outside the Beltway

Phil Carter has teamed with Fred Kaplan to write the first in a ten-part series on fixing what ails America's military.

Many of the suggestions are familiar: drastically change budget priorities away from major procurement programs designed to fight an enemy that doesn't exist; do away with parity between the Service budgets, realigning spending to our real-world mission requirements; stabilize career patterns to make them less burdensome on wives and families; and promote the most innovate, visionary leaders rather than the best bureaucrats...

Fixing U.S. Diplomacy by Fred Kaplan, Slate

Travel to all the Middle East countries and leave behind a full-time envoy to the region...

Iraq: Use the troops as leverage. Most Democrats realize that total withdrawal in the next few years is impractical...

Prevent Iraq's internal violence from spreading into neighboring countries...

In certain neighboring countries... In 2006, Condoleezza Rice was asked why she wasn't talking with Syria...

Separately, open up talks with Iran with an eye toward negotiating a "grand bargain."...

Work toward new Pakistani alliances...

Pursue public diplomacy. What we do sends a more potent signal to the world than the cleverest PR campaign...

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The Smart Way Out of a Foolish War by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Washington Post, 30 March 2008.

... The case for U.S. disengagement from combat is compelling in its own right. But it must be matched by a comprehensive political and diplomatic effort to mitigate the destabilizing regional consequences of a war that the outgoing Bush administration started deliberately, justified demagogically and waged badly. (I write, of course, as a Democrat; while I prefer Sen. Barack Obama, I speak here for myself.)

The contrast between the Democratic argument for ending the war and the Republican argument for continuing is sharp and dramatic. The case for terminating the war is based on its prohibitive and tangible costs, while the case for "staying the course" draws heavily on shadowy fears of the unknown and relies on worst-case scenarios. President Bush's and Sen. John McCain's forecasts of regional catastrophe are quite reminiscent of the predictions of "falling dominoes" that were used to justify continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Neither has provided any real evidence that ending the war would mean disaster, but their fear-mongering makes prolonging it easier...

How Not to End the War by Max Boot, Washington Post, 31 March 2008.

Why am I not reassured by Zbigniew Brzezinski's breezy assurance in Sunday's Outlook section that "forecasts of regional catastrophe" after an American pullout from Iraq are as overblown as similar predictions made prior to our pullout from South Vietnam? Perhaps because the fall of Saigon in 1975 really was a catastrophe. Another domino fell at virtually the same time -- Cambodia.

Estimates vary, but a safe bet is that some two million people died in the killing fields of Cambodia. In South Vietnam, the death toll was lower, but hundreds of thousands were consigned to harsh "reeducation" camps where many perished, and hundreds of thousands more risked their lives to flee as "boat people."

The consequences of the U.S. defeat rippled outward, emboldening communist aggression from Angola to Afghanistan. Iran's willingness to hold our embassy personnel hostage -- something that Brzezinski should recall -- was probably at least in part a reaction to America's post-Vietnam malaise. Certainly the inability of the U.S. armed services to rescue those hostages was emblematic of the "hollow," post-Vietnam military. It took us more than a decade to recover from the worst military defeat in our history...

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The Center for a New American Security has posted its latest policy brief - The Case for Conditional Engagement in Iraq by Colin Kahl and Shawn Brimley.

Five years into the war in Iraq with no end in sight, a new strategy is needed. The current strategy of unconditional support to Iraq's central government has not produced nearly enough political progress. President Bush and those wishing to succeed him should embrace a new political strategy in Iraq that makes our military presence conditional on political accommodation.

Under the leadership of General David Petraeus, U.S. forces in Iraq have designed and implemented the best military strategy possible under the circumstances. But security progress appears to have leveled off, and violence has started to tick back up. Further gains can only come through the political process. General Petraeus recently told reporters that "no one feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national reconciliation." Similar candor will likely be on display when Petraeus testifies before Congress in the coming days. Rather than re-litigate the debate over how we got here, Congress must look forward and help shape the public debate over the basic strategic choices from which this and the next President must choose.

President Bush and his successor have only three basic choices on strategy for Iraq: unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, or unconditional disengagement. Only a policy of conditional engagement can help translate recent security gains into something more sustainable...

More of The Case for Conditional Engagement.

Brigadier General Robert Livingston, Deputy Commanding General of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, provided an operations update on 28 March 2008.

Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations by Richard Kohn at World Affairs Journal.

An excerpt:

When a new president takes office in early 2009, military leaders and politicians will approach one another with considerable suspicion. Dislike of the Democrats in general and Bill Clinton in particular, and disgust for Donald Rumsfeld, has rendered all politicians suspect in the imaginations of generals and admirals. The indictments make for a long list: a beleaguered military at war while the American public shops at the mall; the absence of elites in military ranks; the bungling of the Iraq occupation; the politicization of General David Petraeus by the White House and Congress; an army and Marine Corps exhausted and overstretched, their people dying, their commitments never-ending. Nearly six years of Donald Rumsfeld's intimidation and abuse have encouraged in the officer corps a conviction that military leaders ought to—are obliged to—push back against their civilian masters. Egged on by Democrats in Congress—and well-meaning but profoundly mistaken associates who believe the military must hold political leaders accountable for their mistakes—some flag officers now opine publicly and seemingly without hesitation. Though divided about Iraq strategy, the four-stars unite in their contempt for today's political class and vow not to be saddled with blame for mistakes not of their own making.

Read it all and then tell us 'what say you?' - Comment below or discuss at Small Wars Council.

National Defense University's Institute for National Security Studies has posted its proceedings of the 2008 European Symposium - NATO: Bucharest and Beyond. Here are several take-aways from the report:

1) The NATO-ISAF operation poses the most critical test to date of NATO's ability to generate the military forces required to meet its level of political ambition. In several categories, ranging from maneuver battalions to helicopters to C4ISR assets to Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) intended to build the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Allied nations as a group are not filling the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) set by NATO Military Authorities. This allows opposition forces to operate in the space between what NATO-ISAF has and what it requires.

2) There exists a lack of "political will" among Allies whose publics and parliaments are questioning the goals and strategy of the Alliance commitment and, in some cases, are increasingly worried about casualties suffered by their forces and/or incidents of collateral damage affecting Afghan civilians. In addition, numerous Allies lack the required capabilities and/or funding to deploy and sustain their forces, particularly in the more challenging operational environment of Afghanistan. For some Allies, this is complicated further by their competing commitments to other operations (e.g., in the Balkans, Lebanon, and Africa.).

3) Allied governments have underestimated the tasks of simultaneously stabilizing the security situation, dealing with a complex set of opposition forces (Taliban, narco-terrorists, and tribal "warlords"), and developing a basic Afghan governmental capacity in a society wracked by decades of warfare and corruption. That said, there are important, albeit underreported, signs of progress in Afghanistan, and the strategic stakes remain high, for the region as well as the Alliance.

4) Within NATO, a variety of steps are underway to improve Allied individual and collective capabilities to deploy the forces and assets necessary for expeditionary missions, although resource limitations are a significant underlying problem. Within NATO and individual Allied forces, increased emphasis is needed on training military personnel and sharing "lessons learned" for complex and multinational counterinsurgency (COIN) operations with a heavy civilian military component.

5) "Naming and shaming" or "finger pointing" at Allies whose forces are not engaged, for various reasons, in the most dangerous areas will be counterproductive.

6) Serious effort is needed to improve NATO's strategic communications capabilities with the Afghan population.

7) Notwithstanding public perceptions a few years ago that the United States had "lost interest" in NATO, the American commitment to the Alliance remains strong and enjoys broad bipartisan support.

*Hyperlinks inserted by SWJ.

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More of a whole lot of debate and analysis of current news going on concerning recent events vic Basra, Baghdad and ??? (Part I here.)

Behind the Bloodshed in Basra - Mohammed Fadhil, Iraq the Model

One of the most notable things about the fierce and bloody confrontation taking place the government and Sadr's militia is the spin on the operation by the commanders and the government; that it is a crackdown on outlaws with emphasis that the operation targets no particular movement or political line.

This generic label, includes the so-called rogue Sadrists. Sadr announced only weeks ago that whoever doesn't uphold the ceasefire would no longer be considered a member of the movement.

Now, Sadr is watching those rogue elements being hit hard by the government forces. Instead of disavowing those who blatantly disobeyed his ceasefire orders we see him call for negotiations and condemning the government, thus once more revealing his real face as a defender of his own version of terrorism.

Basra a Test of America's Exit Strategy - Westhawk, Westhawk

President Bush has called the current battle between Iraqi security forces and Sadr militiamen in Basra "a defining moment." In his mind, President Bush probably likens the Basra battle to America's Whiskey Rebellion, when President Washington had to defend the new constitution against a militia uprising. Of course, many other observers interpret the violence in Basra as Shi'ite factions, some in government uniforms, battling for economic spoils in Basra and the surrounding oil patch.

For the U.S. military in Iraq, the battle for Basra is a defining moment for its exit strategy from the country. Namely, will.

Fighting in Basra - Max Boot, Commentary

I have hesitated to comment on the fighting raging in Basra, which has spilled over into other cities including Baghdad, because the shape of events is so difficult to make out from afar-or for that matter even from up close. The best analysis I have seen is this article in the Financial Times which notes that Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki is taking a major gamble by challenging the power of the Shiite militias--more like criminal gangs-which have seized control of Basra, Iraq's second or third largest city and home to its only major port.

While most news coverage has focused on the renewed fighting as signs of impending doom--or at the very least evidence that the surge isn't working so well--the FT correctly detects a silver lining: "If the prime minister succeeds, the pay-off would deliver a big boost to the credibility of a shaky government, proving that the growing national army is capable of taking on powerful militia."

This gamble is long overdue.

From SNAFU to FUBAR in Basra (Updated) - Phil Carter, Intel Dump

Oh yeah, and another thing. Every time you think of the "adviser model" for Iraq, you should think of this operation in Basra. Because this is the end result of the U.S. advisory effort to date -- which has focused on creating well-trained and equipped units at the tactical level, but has basically failed at the national, strategic level. The leaders of the Iraqi security forces at the ministry level are as bad as they ever were. And the national government is about as bad. Training and advising Iraqi units at the brigade level and below is well and good. But if you fail to properly shape the national command structure, you're handing those units over to leaders who will misuse them.

There is Nothing Prreventing Iraq from Going Right... - AM, Abu Muqawama

Karen DeYoung's article in the Washington Post nicely captures two things: One, how tenuous a situation we have right now in Iraq, and how the gains of 2007 can be wiped out frighteningly quickly, and two, what an absolute mess the British Army left southern Iraq. This is what happens when you march into Basra Province thinking it's an Arabic-speaking Country Armagh. This is what happens when you equate a lack of violence with everything going well -- and ignore the militias who are taking control of the streets. This is what happens when you decide to do peace-keeping rather than counter-insurgency.

Sadr - Richard Fernandez, The Belmont Club

The attitude of the other factions towards Sadr was manifested when the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance apparently boycotted sessions attended by Sadr's faction. The question of how far Maliki will go against Sadr was partially answered when the Iraqi PM extended the deadline for the militias to lay down their arms. This has led some to suggest that a deal is now in the works.

But it's also possible that Maliki is trying to peel away the less loyal of Sadr's commanders and turn them to his side. Which exactly will be the case the next few days will reveal.

The Lesson of Najaf - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

Leaving armed criminal gangs running half the country was never going to work, anyway. There were reports a few months ago that in some areas south of Baghdad, Shiites were interested in the Sunni experience and wanted to try it themselves. U.S. forces can support and even lead Iraqi troops, but none of it works in the long run until the people decide they've had enough.

The Battle for Basra: U.S. Forces Take the Lead - AM, Abu Muqawama

If Abu Muqawama was leading one of those U.S. units into Sadr City past a bunch of Iraqi Army soldiers hanging out on the outskirts, he would not be happy. He would be asking himself a) why is he the one establishing the authority of the Iraqi state and not the Iraqi Army and b) why is he duking it out with a militia with broad popular support so that another Iran-backed political party can win a bigger share of the vote in the fall?

Now Iraqi Army units are calling for U.S. and UK military units to lend direct support in Basra as well.

Moral Hazard to Infinity and.... Basra? - Marc Lynch, Abu Aardvark

Did the United States have advance notice of Maliki's decision to attack Basra? In a much-blogged story this morning, The Washington Post reported that "Maliki decided to launch the offensive without consulting his U.S. allies, according to administration officials" and that they were all arguing over "who's got the best conspiracy theory about why Maliki decided to act now" (fortunately, they had this handy guide).

Shia Clashes in Basra - Will Hartley, Insurgency Research Group

Al-Jazeera English has a good report on the current fighting in Basra, which offers a more nuanced analysis of events than is provided by most coverage. The report makes clear that underlying the engagement is a struggle for influence in the oil-rich south between the two main Shia factions in Iraq: the Sadrists led by Muqtada al-Sadr, whose armed wing - the Jaish al Mahdi (Mahdi Army) - is the object of the security operation; and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), whose armed wing - the Badr Organisation - dominates the security forces.

Moqtada al-Sadr's Religious Strategy Complicates Jaysh al-Mahdi Ceasefire - Ramzy Mardini, Jamestown Foundation

As smoke billows from Baghdad's U.S.-controlled "Green Zone" following a series of rocket and mortar attacks thought to have been carried out by members of Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JaM) movement last weekend, important questions have been raised concerning the direction of the movement as its leader becomes increasingly reclusive.

The young Iraqi firebrand and Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, recently tried to put to rest the confusion and rumors circulating around his withdrawal from the Iraqi political scene. In a statement posted on the Sadrist al-Amarah website, al-Sadr declared that his absence was due to a decision to pursue religious studies in Qom and Najaf—a path intended to lead to Ayatollah status within Shiite Islam (Gulf News, March 10). Though al-Sadr extended the self-imposed ceasefire on his forces last February, his absence poses serious questions regarding the status of his JaM militia.

Fighting in Baghdad, South Against Mahdi Army Completes Fourth Day - Bill Roggio, Long War Journal

Fighting in Basrah, Baghdad, and throughout much of the South continues as Iraqi security Forces and Multinational Forces Iraq press the fight against the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backed terror groups. The Iraqi Army has moved additional forces to Basrah as the US and Iraqi military have conducted significant engagements in Shia areas of Baghdad. The Mahdi Army has taken significant casualties. The US military has denied the Mahdi Army has taken control of checkpoints in Baghdad.

Several hundred Iraqis are reported to have been killed during the fighting since the operation began on March 25. A large majority of them are Mahdi Army fighters, according to the press reports. The US and Iraqi military have killed more than 70 Mahdi Army fighters in Shia neighborhood in Baghdad alone over the past three days.

Iraqi Army's Vehicles Stall Out in Basra - Paul McLeary, Ares

While this isn't necessarily a defeat for the IA, it remains to be seen if they can overcome the limitations of their equipment to move through the city to confront the Mahdi Army. For now, at least, it looks like their recon might not have been the best. A "Basra newspaper editor" quoted by the Times told the paper that "it was obvious that the central government had not consulted with local commanders in planning the assault, citing the inability of the armored vehicles to fit through city streets."

When fighting an insurgency that relies on motorcycles and small cars and trucks to move around the narrow streets of a city, bigger isn't always better.

Continued Chaos in Basra - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

In mid-2007 when the British retreated from Basra, they did so while telling the tall tale that since the very presence of the British themselves was causing the violence, it would be better if they just left. In other words, no one would shoot at the British Army if the Army wasn't there. There wasn't a rush of anyone or any faction into Basra. They were already there and had control of the city. The British never had control of Basra, and from the beginning it was left to Shi'a factions, criminal elements, Iranian proxy fighters (Badr, Quds), and the loss of Basra was a constant diminution of civilization up to the point that the British ended up behind barbed wire at the Basra airport, contributing nothing to the Iraq campaign. We have already linked Nibras Kazimi who, in the update to his post, conveys the Iraqi sentiment concerning the British Army. It isn't flattering, and British Colonel Tim Collins knows and has said that the retreat from Basra has badly damaged the reputation of the British Army.

Cutting the Road to Kut, Part I - Jeff Kouba, Peace Like a River

If Iran supports the Mahdi Army, and if Mehran is a source of that support, and if Kut is near Mehran, it stands to reason that Kut will harbor a particularly strong Mahdi Army force.

And so, I'd like to offer up Kut as a metaphor for what is happening inside Iraq. If that road between Kut and Mehran can be "cut," if Iran's support for militants in Iraq who foment violence and discord can be cut, Iraq stands a much better chance of getting on its feet again.

Add additional relevant links to comments below - thanks...

Even more on the future of a training and advisory role as part of our Security Force Assistance efforts. From Westhawk:

Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (ret) is an experienced veteran of COIN-in-the field; his views are worthy of serious attention. Writing at the Small Wars Journal Blog, Col. Killebrew dismissed LTC Nagl's proposal for a permanent Advisory Corps. Col. Killebrew strongly supports the advisor mission, but wants the whole Army, not a specialized few, contributing to it...

The best argument for the Nagl Advisory Corps plan is how it offers the prospect of preventing large-scale U.S. COIN missions from becoming necessary in the future. By making it a regular practice for small U.S. advisor teams to work in all four corners of the globe, assisting allies with peacetime foreign internal defense preparation (so-called "Phase Zero operations"), the U.S. can prevent crises from happening in the first place. LTC Nagl's Advisory Corps and its associated schoolhouse would ensure that these Phase Zero advisory efforts would be performed by well-trained and highly-prepared teams, employing best-practices tactics, techniques, and procedures.

After five years and over $500 billion, the U.S. military has gotten better at the advisory missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A long-term commitment to Latin America, and a large presence of the Spanish language and Latin culture inside the U.S., has boosted the U.S. foreign internal defense missions in Latin America...

More.

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Whole lot of debate and analysis of current news going on concerning recent events vic Basra.

Update - Part II here.

Iraqi security forces battle the Mahdi Army - Bill Roggio, Long War Journal

The current Iraqi offensive has been in the works for some time. The Iraqi Army and police have been massing forces in the South since August 2007, when the Basrah Operational Command was established to coordinate efforts in the region. As of December the Iraqi Army deployed four brigades and an Iraqi Special Operations Forces battalion in Basrah province. The Iraqi National Police deployed two additional battalions to the province.

The clashes with the Mahdi Army come just weeks after Muqtada al Sadr admitted failure in Iraq. "So far I did not succeed either to liberate Iraq or make it an Islamic society — whether because of my own inability or the inability of society, only God knows," Sadr wrote to his followers...

How Far Against Sadr? - The Belmont Club

The offensive is almost entirely an all-Iraqi show. British forces, though still in Basra are uninvolved. The International Herald Tribune says "U.S. forces also appeared to play little role in the clashes in Baghdad." Maliki himself toured Basra a few days ago. A Time article by Bobby Ghost speculates on whether Maliki will finish off Sadr as a political force, unlike Iyad Allawi, who crushed Sadr with US help in 2004 only to let him off the hook after intervention by Ayatollah Ali Sistani.

But more than Sistani's intervention saved Sadr's position on that occasion. The US was preoccupied in combating what it felt was the primary threat: al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Sunni insurgency. Sadr's political clout after the elections also prevented Maliki from acting against him. But things have changed...

More on Basra (Updated) - Abu Muqawama

... One answer is that the Brits adopted a "peacekeeping" mindset in Basra and never really engaged in a broader COIN or CT effort. That meant that all the myriad Shia groups were able to pursue their (relatively) non-violent political agenda and consolidate control over the political levers of city. There's a chance (albeit not a big one) that our COIN efforts in Anbar, Baghdad, and elsewhere have undercut the political bases of these groups and made a Basra-style breakdown less likely. Time will tell.

Basra Fighting Triggers Baghdad Clashes - Noah Shachtman, Danger Room

It's not all that surprising that U.S. and Iraqi forces moved against Shi'ite militias in Basra today: the British essentially abandoned the city months ago; even now, in the middle of these clashes, "there are no British troops on the ground," reports SkyNews. What's disconcerting is that this fighting in southern Iraq appears to have triggered clashes in Baghdad, as well...

Basra: Shi'ite Militias Clash (Updated) - Noah Shachtman, Danger Room

The fight in Basra is being billed as the Iraqi government versus the militias of Shi'ite cleric Moktada al-Sadr. But it's just as much a fight between rival Shi'ite factions...

Brits Bail, Basra Burns (Updated) - David Axe, Danger Room

And where's the British Army during all this? Hunkered at the airport outside Basra, where in December Major General Graham Binns signed documents officially handing over security in the region to Iraqi forces. I was there for the ceremony (videos here and here), and in the aftermath I wrote that the British had effectively surrendered any ability to intervene in Basra. With no forward bases, no intelligence apparatus in the city of Basra, less nimble equipment and no political will to suffer a single additional casualty in Iraq, the roughly 3,000 Brits remaining in the country can do little but wait out the current fighting.

Which means any Western intervention in Basra -- some reports are calling it a planned "surge" for the south -- will have to be mostly manned by U.S. forces. Specifically, U.S. Marines, according to one AFP report...

Wages of Sin, We Keep Paying - Spencer Ackerman, Too Hot for TNR

Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki is giving powerful Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr's forces three days to surrender in Basra, as clashes between Maliki's security forces and Sadr's Mahdi Army -- in which the U.S. intervenes on Maliki's side -- escalate. But with the U.S. happy about the now-abrogated Sadrist ceasefire, why is the U.S. military getting involved?

Chaos While We're There, Chaos After We Leave? - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent

... Withdrawing without any political strategy, as the British did from Basra, leads to a vacuum like the one we're seeing now. Sadr rushes in. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq rushes in. The Fadhila party maneuvers between the two. Forces ostensibly loyal to the government, pinioned between all sides, find ways to accommodate the existing power on the streets. In other words: chaos.

So to avoid chaos -- and I recognize this is banal and generic -- you can't just pull up stakes...

From SNAFU to FUBAR in Basra - Phil Carter, Intel Dump

.... It's difficult to see how this ends well. This is some of the nastiest intra-sectarian fighting we've seen in Iraq. Second, it looks pretty clear that Maliki is using the Iraqi security forces to consolidate his own power and eliminate his rivals. Third, I can only imagine the trepidation being felt by Sunni leaders who are watching this and wondering whether they're next on Maliki's hit list. For now, the heavy fighting remains limited to Basra, although skirmishes have erupted throughout the country. If this clash in Basra lasts longer than a week, that's going to be really bad for the Maliki government. If the heavy fighting spreads, that's going to be even worse.

Another Theory for the Pile - Marc Lynch, Abu Aardvark

... Me, I wish that Maliki and Bush had paid more attention to Joost Hilterman's prescient analysis when thinking through how to go about extending Iraqi state sovereignty into the south - a good thing! - without violent confrontations with Sadr and without giving the strong appearance of employing the Iraqi Army on behalf of one player in an intra-communal political battle. I'm still trying to figure out whether there are really talks going on behind the scenes to end this or whether Maliki really does plan to push on as he says, and whether there's any truth at all to the stories in the Arab press of widescale defections among government troops (I tend to doubt it, given the sources where thus far these stories have been running).... in between sneezing, coughing, and blowing my nose, that is.

The Enigmatic Second Battle of Basra - Reidar Visser, Histories of Political Imagining

... Perhaps most importantly, there is a discrepancy between the description of Basra as a city ruled by militias (in the plural) -- which is doubtless correct -- and the battlefield facts of the ongoing operations which seem to target only one of these militia groups, the Mahdi Army loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr. Surely, if the aim was to make Basra a safer place, it would have been logical to do something to also stem the influence of the other militias loyal to the local competitors of the Sadrists, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), as well as the armed groups allied to the Fadila party (which have dominated the oil protection services for a long time). But so far, only Sadrists have complained about attacks by government forces.

The Battle in Basra - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

... The Captain's Journal still doesn't like Maliki. This operation should have been conducted years ago, and one troubling aspect of Maliki's involvement came to light in an ultimatum he issued to the fighters in Basra. "Iraq's prime minister on Wednesday gave gunmen in the southern oil port of Basra a three-day deadline to surrender their weapons and renounce violence ..."

Kazimi has gotten it right. The enemy is comprised of Iranian-sponsored thugs and killers, corrupt Sadrists, and criminals who are after oil money (not to mention the Islamist gangs who have beheaded hundreds of women over the last year). Basra is currently run by a witch's brew of the worst elements on earth. To be fighting them is a good thing. Far from Iraq slipping into chaos, it was always the case that until the Shi'a fighters were taken out like the Sunni insurgents were, there would be no peace in Iraq...

Google News Search: Basra

Coming soon in April's Proceedings - Listen Up Marines! We Belong at Sea, Ready for Trouble by Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired). Here's a sneak preview:

As the Marine Corps looks beyond Iraq, the question becomes "Where do we go from here?"

That question was asked of the Marine Corps after the two World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. After each conflict there were many who discounted the utility of the Marines, citing cost-effectiveness, duplication, and myriad other reasons as justification for the elimination or absorption of this singular and peculiar organization. But the Corps survived

and justified its existence through its performance in and out of battle. Nonetheless, it will face renewed scrutiny after Iraq and Afghanistan and the result will be the same—but only if the Corps remains useful and does what it says it can do.

Marines have been almost indistinguishable from the Army for the past five years of the Iraq War. That was also the case in the wars [previously] cited. But the Corps was born to serve on the Seven Seas and that's where its future will again reside...

I sincerely hope so, but remain pessimistic. Senator Sam Nunn, when he chaired the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1990 (nearly two decades ago), qustioned whether a lighter Army and a heavier Marine Corps were already undesirably redundant and cost-ineffective. My take in the July 2005 issue of Proceedings noted that Title 10, United States Code, tells our Marine Corps to organize, train, and equip forces for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

That prescription, however, isn't worth the paper it's printed on because Marines repeatedly must supplement our shorthanded Army, which cannot satisfy its assignments unassisted. Leathernecks during World War I and since World War II have routinely taken up part of the slack by performing protracted land power missions that have nothing in common with naval campaigns. Included tasks frequently involve nitty gritty urban combat rather than fluid littoral warfare, as demonstrated inside Seoul (1950), Hue (1968), and Fallujah (2004)...

That sorry situation will persist until the Army expands enough to satisfy commitments...

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Major General Kevin Bergner, Multi-National Force-Iraq spokesman, provides an update on current operations.

Maj. Gen. Bergner's Opening Remarks:

Good afternoon, al Salam Aleikem. This has been a difficult and challenging few days. It has also been a period of significant effort by the Iraqi government and their security forces to deal with the violence that criminal activity has been contributing to. This afternoon I'd like to talk in particular about events in Basra and also events here in Baghdad.

Turning to operations underway in Basra, it's important to note that they have been undertaken by Iraqi Security Forces based on the decision and direction of the Prime Minister, with his national security ministers -- completely an Iraqi initiative. Prime Minister Maliki specifically said that he took these actions because -quote- The lawlessness is going on under religious or political cover along with smuggling of oil, weapons, and drugs. These outlaws found support from inside government institutions either willingly or by coercion...turning Basra into a place where citizens cannot feel secure for their lives and property.

Iraqi operations in Basra also reflect the growing ability of the Iraqi security forces, Iraqi decision making, and Iraqi leadership. A year ago it was a significant challenge to move Iraqi Army units to Baghdad to augment forces here at the beginning of Operation Fard al-Qanoon. But, in the past week, Iraqi leaders directed forces that are the equivalent of some two brigades to move to Basra and undertake operations. These forces have included Emergency Response Units, Special Operations Forces, Helicopters and conventional forces. In addition, the Prime Minister and his council of security ministers are personally involved. A year ago, the Iraqi Security Forces could not have moved this force, they would not have been able to support it, and it would have been difficult for the government to take this strong position against the criminals...

The Army's TMAAG

By Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.)

The Chief of Staff of the Army's recent decision not to field the proposed Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Groups (TMAAG) was the right one. Regardless of which party wins the general election this fall, future U.S. national security strategy will include increased assistance to allies fighting against radical Islamic aggression. Whether called "building partnership capacity" or some other acronym, the essential idea will be to help other states fight their own wars, rather than providing U.S. combat forces as a first resort. The Army's TMAAG was an effort to get out front of this emerging strategy, but it was taking the wrong route.

Providing enhanced military assistance to a particular allied country, as part of overall U.S. policy toward that country, is first and foremost a political act overseen by the U.S. Chief of Mission -- the Ambassador -- working with the host country and the U.S. regional commander. The COM and the regional commander negotiate very specific support for the host country based on its needs. Military support to the COM is either assigned permanently in-country or "visits" as military training teams (MTT)...

Afghan Soldiers Train at US Army Base

Voice of America

By Greg Flakus

Fort Riley

25 March 2008

US troops at Fort Riley, in the Midwestern state of Kansas, are training for deployment in Afghanistan along with 31 soldiers from Afghanistan's National Army. Some 300 US soldiers are in the current exercise and, as VOA's Greg Flakus reports from Fort Riley, they are getting a good preview of the kind of conditions and problems they will face after they deploy to Afghanistan.

In this exercise, the soldiers are raiding the suspected base of an insurgent group in order to apprehend what they call "a bad guy." The training takes place in a mock Afghan village complete with so-called enactors, usually Afghan Americans, who play the role of villagers and combatants. Soldiers must safely enter the village, locate the house of the insurgents and enter without harming any of the civilians who wander the streets nearby.

Carrying out such an operation requires cultural sensitivity and knowledge of local traditions. US soldiers are taught to respect local village leaders and to work closely with Afghan security forces and that is one reason the Afghan soldiers are here taking part in these exercises. US Army advisors do most training of Afghan soldiers in Afghanistan, but these 31 men are here so that they can help US soldiers learn how to work with Afghan counterparts before they leave Fort Riley...

A small sampling of several recent discussions at the Small Wars Council - for our many lurkers - take the plunge - registration is easy and the price is right...

A Grand Strategy of Sustainment

By Shawn Brimley

America has been adrift for too long. The attacks of September 11th did not "change everything," but exacerbated the difficulty of articulating a purpose for American power since the Berlin Wall fell nearly two decades ago. America has suffered from strategic whiplash: the nebulousness of the post-Cold War era was rapidly replaced by a post-9/11 myopia on Islamist extremism and the so-called "war on terrorism." This myopia lay at the root of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and it remains the chief obstacle preventing the emergence of a reasoned and pragmatic debate over the purpose of American power in the 21st century. The absence of a true grand strategy imperils America.

The Bush administration has pursued a foreign policy that is narrow in its view, negative in its purpose, and has produced negligible results. Americans deserve a grand strategy that is panoramic in view, positive in its purpose, and persuasive as a basis for the continued exercise of American power...

U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy by Michael Kamber, International Herald Tribune.

During the war in Iraq, young army and Marine captains have become American viceroys, officers with large sectors to run and near-autonomy to do it. In military parlance, they are the "ground-owners." In practice, they are power brokers.

"They give us a chunk of land and say, 'Fix it,' " said Captain Rich Thompson, 36, who controls an area east of Baghdad.

The Iraqis have learned that these captains, many still in their 20s, can call down devastating American firepower one day and approve multimillion-dollar projects the next. Some have become celebrities in their sectors, men whose names are known even to children.

Many in the military believe that these captains are the linchpins in the American strategy for success in Iraq, but as the war continues into its sixth year the military has been losing them in large numbers — at a time when it says it needs thousands more.

Most of these captains have extensive combat experience and are regarded as the military's future leaders. They're exactly the men the military most wants. But corporate America wants them too. And the hardships of repeated tours are taking their toll, tilting them back toward civilian life and possibly complicating the future course of the war...

Much more.

Also see The Captain Crisis by Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Nothing follows.

Today's Junior Army Officers

By Captain Tim Hsia, U.S. Army

Debating retention of junior officers is a perilous matter but there are just too many vital issues currently concerning the future of the officer corps that it is necessary to inject some realism within the debate. Junior officers are leaving the army at an alarming rate and not simply because of continuous deployments and the state of affairs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lieutenants and Captains, although focused at the tactical level, still ponder what exactly senior officers and politicians have in mind in regards to the plan and endstate for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and how it will affect the Army as an institution. These important questions are debated by junior officers on a daily basis. Nonetheless, these questions at a personal level are subordinate to an even more vital question which junior officers contemplate, and that is whether to leave the military for the corporate sector.

Possible solutions to the current retention of junior officers lie perhaps not in wild conjectures but in looking to the past. James Kitfield's "Prodigal Soldiers" documents the problems, dilemmas, and hopes of junior officers during the Vietnam era. Those junior officers who served in Vietnam fully understood the sacrifices they would have to make before commissioning. This is similar to today's junior officers who volunteered after the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. Officers who continued to serve in the Army after Vietnam did so because of their strong belief in preserving and safeguarding the Army as an institution. These officers continued to stay in the Army and Armed Forces despite the poor state in which the Army suffered thru during, and after the Vietnam era. As Kitfield writes, it was this generation of officers who successfully led the country thru the Cold War and Persian Gulf I. These officers were also fully aware of the proper role between their political masters and the military because they were firsthand witnesses of the dereliction of duty chronicled by Col H.R. McMaster. The result was the Powell doctrine which took into account the relationship between the American people and the military...

The Political Context Behind Successful Revolutionary Movements, Three Case Studies: Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79) by LTC Raymond Millen, US Army, at the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, 20 March 2008.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the new world order did not bring about a closure of revolutionary warfare. In fact, the Soviet-inspired wars of liberation against imperialism have been eclipsed by reactionary, jihadist wars. By all indications in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Somalia, and Iraq, Islamic militants have embraced revolutionary warfare, although not Mao's People's War model. Therefore, a study of revolutionary warfare is apt because the conflict between the West and radical jihadism will continue to take place in dysfunctional, collapsing, or failed states. The author examines the political-military lessons from these conflicts and suggests that the United States should minimize the level and type of assistance to states fighting in an insurgency because these states possess greater advantages than previously supposed.

Nothing follows.

I think the SWJ community will benefit from the attached essay by Dr. David Ucko, who recently completed his doctoral work at King's College London. This well-crafted essay has just been published by Orbis, the policy journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. It's an objective assessment of where the United States stands in our adaptation to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, from an outsider's perspective.

Dr. Ucko's research is focused on how well the U.S. is absorbing the right lessons from today's ongoing conflicts, and how well DOD is institutionalizing the necessary changes across the doctrine, structure, training and education and equipment pillars of combat development. A student of American military culture, he notes our history of adapting to counterinsurgency campaigns, but then quickly discarding the lessons learned at the close of the war to return to our preferred conventional mode.

Ucko challenges whether or not DOD has truly embraced irregular warfare. "With the eventual close of the Iraq campaign," he asks "will counterinsurgency again be pushed off the table, leaving the military just as unprepared for these contingencies as it was when it invaded Iraq in 2003?" Thus, this essay fits into the context of the debate we have seen on these pages and in the Armed Forces Journal (Shawn Brimley and Vikram Singh's "System Reboot") about whether or not the American Way of War will adapt or revert to form...