Blog Posts

One of the most controversial issues today is the role of kinetic military force, and especially airpower, in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. While no one advocates the use of force except when truly necessary, the history of COIN efforts reveal that it is essential to success. For example, Professor Daniel Moran points out in his book, Wars of National Liberation, that in Malaya, the COIN operation most admired by many contemporary COIN aficionados, "7,000 guerillas were killed" out of total number "which probably never exceeded 10,000."

Nevertheless, accepted wisdom these days is that reflected in FM 3-24, that is, "killing insurgents...cannot itself defeat an insurgency." This is complemented by a related listing of "paradoxes" which include such aphorisms as "sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is." (Of course, "sometimes" is a qualifier that renders it almost meaningless because virtually anything can happen "sometimes" -- to include sometimes the more force is used, the more effective it is.)

The overall flavor of FM 3-24 is, however, most unambiguously reflected in its attitude toward airpower...

Colonel Anderson discusses recent Iraq related war games and how the situation on the ground may play out if the US withdraws military forces.

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Foreword

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8 August - U.S. Soldiers Partner With Iraqi Troops in Mahmudiyah with U. S. Army Lt. Col. Robert Morschauser.

AFPS (Donna Miles) - U.S. soldiers leading operations in and around Mahmudiyah, Iraq, have "cracked the code when it comes to working with the Iraqi army," their task force commander said today.

Army Lt. Col. Morschauser, battalion commander for the 10th Mountain Division's 2nd Brigade, 2nd Battalion, 15th Artillery, said his unit is doing more than simply training Iraqi soldiers. It's partnering with them at all levels -- and yielding results.

"Our unit is heavily focused on the extremely important task of supporting and advising and providing advanced training to our Iraqi army partners so that they can operate autonomously in the near future," he said from Mahmudiyah during a conference call with online journalists and "bloggers."

That focus isn't limited to military transition teams within the task force, he said. "Our brigade has placed our entire battalion toward this mission, rather than a traditional 11-man MTT."

This arrangement brings a full task force of manpower to the training mission, enabling the soldiers to serve as partners rather than just advisors to the 6th Iraqi Army Division's 4th Brigade, Morschauser said... More -- Roundtable Audio -- Transcript -- Bio

8 August - Coalition Successes Mount Against al Qaeda in Iraq with U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Kevin J. Bergner.

AFPS (John Kruzel) - Coalition and Iraqi security forces captured or killed 18 senior al Qaeda members in July, a Multinational Force Iraq spokesman said today.

Of the 18, six were terrorist unit commanders known as "senior emirs," and seven were either foreign fighters or weapons distributors. Troops detained or killed three cell leaders and two members who manned an al Qaeda media operation, Army Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner told online journalists and "bloggers" during a conference call.

"There has been some tactical momentum achieved in July and into the first week now of August," he said. "And we have continued to see the results of some of those successful operations."

The most noteworthy terrorist nabbed recently is al Qaeda's No. 1 Iraqi operative, Khaled al Mashhadani, whom coalition forces captured July 4, the general said. Mashhadani rose through the al Qaeda ranks by directing media and communications operations, and he helped create an online virtual organization called the Islamic State of Iraq, Bergner said in a previous briefing... More -- Roundtable Audio -- Transcript - Briefing Slide - Bio

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Concerning my SWJ Blog post - The MEF Engagement Model and Al Qaeda -- Brian H. comments:

As my reply is rather long for the comments section at the original site I'll post it here...

In other public statements and in several Small Wars Journal postings, Kilcullen entered very slowly, very prudently into the virtually verboten realm of attacking al Qaeda-style Terrorism in Islamic religious context, rather than in Western secular terms only -- referring to the AQ terrorists as "munafiquun" (hypocrites to authentic, Qur'anic Islam) and pointing out that "they call themselves mujahideen" but are doing barbaric things which are anything but holy.

To which this word warrior says: Spot on! Two small steps for a good man, two giant steps for truth-in-language and truth-in-Islam in the War on al Qaeda-style Terrorism -- a.k.a., Irhabi Murderdom and the AQ Apostasy, as this essay recommends as its most appropriate new names.

But even these two measured Kilcullen attacks on the terrorists' religious legitimacy were in conflict with the State Department's basic rule in such matters. As stated on page 25 of the US National Strategy For Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, the official advisory is, in part, as follows: Use caution when dealing with faith issues. Government officials should be extremely cautious and, if possible, avoid using religious language, because it can mean different things and can be easily misunderstood...

General Peck's article is a balanced, even restrained, articulation of what airpower can and has brought to today's ongoing irregular campaigns, and I highly recommend it. Gen Peck is the Commander of the Air Force Doctrine Center and Vice Commander of Air University. He brings impressive operational and academic credentials to bear on the subject, including his 300 combat hours in the F-15.

Continue on to find out more about Airpower's Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare...

Richard also comments on an earlier Belmont Club post (Half a Loaf) about the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq...

RADM Mark Fox, MNF-Iraq, BG Gen Robert Allardice, Commander, Coalition Air Force Transition Team, and Iraqi Air Force Commander LTG Kamal Barzanjy speak with reporters 5 August 2007.

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Participants included Andrew Lubin of On Point, Grim of Blackfive, Dave Dilegge of Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council, Austin Bay, Richard Fernandez of The Belmont Club, David Axe of Aviation Week Charlie Quidnunc of Wizbang and Jason Sigger of Armchair Generalist

As soon as DoD posts the transcript of this roundtable we will place a link here.

SWJ BLUF (On Edit - this is my take-away from the roundtable - opinion on the matter)

The PRTs are a critical component of the population-centric "new strategy" for Iraq to include one of its tactical elements -- "the surge". Criticisms of those executing the grassroots (local level) nature of the PRT program are not only unwarranted, they are detrimental to the success of ongoing operations.

A reality check boils down to reconciliation on a national level is not moving forward -- those "in-country" are painfully aware of the "Washington Clock" and are exploiting the only viable option available - working at the local level to provide at least a solid base in terms of rule of law, infrastructure, economic development, governance, and public diplomacy. National-level reconciliation might very well be enabled by these grassroots efforts.

Hindsight 20 / 20 as it is, maybe a bottom-up approach should have been a lynchpin of OIF from the very beginning...

AFPS - Jim Garamone: Speaking to Pentagon reporters via teleconference from Ramadi, the capital of Iraq's Anbar province, Army Col. John Charlton, commander of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, said counterinsurgencies are fought and won "neighborhood by neighborhood, with the focus on protecting the population and improving conditions in the community."...

In today's military, the requirement to conduct tasks far outside traditional specialties is an accepted reality. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught leaders across the services the need for flexibility and creativity both in action and organization. The recently published FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5) Counterinsurgency (COIN) manual provides an excellent framework for leaders to understand the demands of the COIN environment and draw from recent lessons. With regard to organizing for COIN, the manual makes several valuable recommendations such as establishing a company level intelligence section and identifying a political and cultural advisor. My purpose here is to go one step further, providing additional, specific recommendations for company level leaders organizing for counterinsurgency operations. Some of the ideas presented involve actual changes to task organization, while others involve developing skills internally that, by doctrine, only exist in specialized attachments. These steps are by no means prescriptive, but intended as a starting point for discussion among officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at the company level...

Paul Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, and Philip Reeker, US Embassy, Baghdad, join BG Kevin Bergner, Multi-National Force-Iraq spokesman, in an expansion of the normal weekly Iraq update. Bergner starts off with a security update then turns over to Reeker and Brinkley who discuss reconstruction, economic and political efforts underway to assist the government of Iraq.

SWJ PRT Briefing Notes and PRT Background Links follow...

Subject: Withdrawal from Iraq

July 25, 2007

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and Members: It is an honor to appear before this subcommittee. The subject today is "Alternatives for Iraq". The President and the Congress agree about the desirability of a withdrawal of US forces; the issue is under what conditions. It makes a vast difference to our self-esteem as a nation, to our reputation around the world and to the morale of our enemies whether we say we are withdrawing because the Iraqi forces have improved or because we have given up...

One problem - the events as reported in the Telegraph never happened. This from COL Steve Boylan, MNF-I CG Public Affairs Officer, in an e-mail he sent earlier today to McElroy...

More CA videos...

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--Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper (USMC Ret.)

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Coercion -- The Belmont Club...

The review (requires subscription to New York Times Select) is quite long and well worth reading. Here is an excerpt concerning FM 3-24...