By Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF
What are the insurgents thinking as General David H. Petraeus prepares to testify about the state of the war in Iraq? If they are historically-minded, they are thinking about the 1968 Tet Offensive...
Blog Posts
SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
by Dave Dilegge | Mon, 09/10/2007 - 4:57am | 0 comments
Note: This entry is a longer version of an article written for Military.com and Defense Tech with the intent to provide basic background, things to look for and potential roadblocks concerning our counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq.-----
Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) has been subject to more than their fair-share of Monday-morning quarterbacking by retired generals and colonels; active duty officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted; Representatives, Senators, reporters, pundits, bloggers and think-tankers without throwing yet another so-called "expert" opinion into the hopper.
Moreover, the release of the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq and General Accounting Office report combined with the partisan bickering in Congress only add to the fog of war as these documents, as well as other reports, have been interpreted by both sides of the aisle as either an encouraging sign of progress or confirmation of a bad war heading south.
The need for restraint in second-guessing and adding to the noise level is especially true leading into General David Petraeus' and Ambassador Ryan Crocker's much awaited progress report to Congress.
What I offer here are "the basics" - background on the "new" counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and a quick-look guide on what to look for in reports and commentary concerning the dynamic and complex operating environment in Iraq -- all against assumptions that "we don't know what we don't know" and everything we hold as ground-truth is nothing more than a snapshot in time of a long campaign that is subject to rapid and dramatic change for good or for bad on a recurring basis...
by Dave Dilegge | Sun, 09/09/2007 - 3:56am | 0 comments
Multi-National Force - Iraq Video
Nothing follows.
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 09/07/2007 - 6:24pm | 0 comments
HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE -- IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400
7 September 2007Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq
We are now over two-and-a-half months into the surge of offensive operations made possible by the surge of forces, and I want to share with you my view of how I think we're doing. This letter is a bit longer than previous ones, since I feel you deserve a detailed description of what I believe we have -- and have not -- accomplished, as Ambassador Crocker and I finalize the assessment we will provide shortly to Congress.
Up front, my sense is that we have achieved tactical momentum and wrested the initiative from our enemies in a number of areas of Iraq. The result has been progress in the security arena, although it has, as you know, been uneven. Additionally, as you all appreciate very well, innumerable tasks remain and much hard work lies ahead. We are, in short, a long way from the goal line, but we do have the ball and we are driving down the field...
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/06/2007 - 9:52pm | 3 comments
By Rob Thornton
I promise this is not a NPR or PBS funding drive.
However, we can tell by the number of new Small Wars Council (SWC) members and the number of visits to the site that clearly there are more people who come to read and consider what is being written, then those —to participate. This is perfectly OK.
However, I would like those both inside and outside the Council to consider some rationale for greater participation...
by Robert Bunker | Wed, 09/05/2007 - 5:27am | 4 comments
By Robert J. Bunker and Hakim Hazim
The recent U.S. consideration to designate the 125,000 person strong Revolutionary Guard of Iran as a "specially designated global terrorist" (per Executive Order 13224) has quite a few international security implications. (1) On the most basic level, it highlights growing U.S. and Iranian tensions over Iran's nuclear weapons program and Iranian involvement—via its Quds Force belonging to the Revolutionary Guard—in both fermenting and supporting terrorist and insurgent activities in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
What may be far more significant, however, is the U.S. designating the military branch of a sovereign state as a terrorist organization. In the past, such designations have applied only to non-state entities. (2) While the intent of such a designation would be to target the Revolutionary Guard's multi-billion dollar business network with ties to over 100 companies, (3) broader implications concerning state sovereignty, political legitimacy, and, ultimately, non-state-on-state conflict readily emerge. Before these issues are discussed, a short overview of Iran's Revolutionary Guard or IRG should be provided with a focus on the Quds Force...
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/02/2007 - 11:17pm | 0 comments
See this post at Small Wars Council. We are trying to work with our web host to eliminate some of the availability problems we are having. We picked a top rated host, but so far it isn't apparent.
This call in particular is focused on those who have consistent (i.e. all the time, 100%) time outs when trying to reach our site from particular machines, but no real other problems. This might effect a number of you on .mil networks, and may be a rare event when the .mil world isn't to blame. In particular, I know some Afghanistan-deployed folks were having woes, but I don't an individual POC to follow up with there. To remedy, I need some info from you. See that post for specifics. And that forum is a good spot to place comments, concerns, etc.
by William McCallister | Thu, 08/30/2007 - 6:54pm | 1 comment
Authors note: This article was first published in March 2005. The information is as relevant today as it was two years ago. The student of counterinsurgency should read this article within a broader context that includes political mobilization such as is the case with the Sahawa al Anbar Awakening in Iraq.
Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion
The answers to what motivates and sustains the insurgency in Iraq are not readily found in traditional insurgency literature. Much better answers can be found by reexamining something deemed anachronistic in the information age: the dynamics of traditionally networked tribes and clans. This paper provides such a reexamination, and shows that tribal dynamics are particularly evident among insurgents in Fallujah and other parts of the so--called Sunni triangle...
by Dave Kilcullen | Wed, 08/29/2007 - 3:52am | 29 comments
Some aspects of the war in Iraq are hard to fit into "classical" models of insurgency. One of these is the growing tribal uprising against al Qa'ida, which could transform the war in ways not factored into neat "benchmarks" developed many months ago and thousands of miles away. I spent time out on the ground during May and June working with coalition units, tribal leaders and fighters engaged in the uprising, so I felt a few field observations might be of interest to the Small Wars community. I apologize in advance for the epic length of this post, but it's a complex issue, so I hope people will forgive my long-windedness. Like much else, it's too early to know how this new development will play out. But surprisingly (surprising to me, anyway), indications so far are relatively positive...
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 08/28/2007 - 6:52pm | 1 comment
MNF-I counterinsurgency adviser and SWJ blogger Dave Kilcullen was featured in a 29 August op-ed piece in The Australian - Our Leaders Must Match Iraqis by Janet Alberechtsen.
Alberechtsen opens with a preview of what President Bush should expect during the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Sydney and cuts to the quick in challenging those who "wish U.S. failure" in Iraq to answer two critical questions:
... Bush arrives in Sydney next week. Mostly, Bush's visit will attract open hostility from feral Bush-haters and quiet ridicule from many others. And the reason is Iraq.Many have a vested interest in an American failure in Iraq. Not just the emotional anti-Bushies but also the more level-headed people who believe failure in Iraq is needed to puncture American hubris.Those —a failure in Iraq to vindicate their derision of Bush ought to answer two questions: Do they have an alternative solution? And what does a precipitate troop withdrawal mean for Iraqis?Read on...
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 08/26/2007 - 4:43pm | 1 comment
An active duty Army field-grade officer on his 3rd tour in Iraq, Small Wars Council member Patriot, discusses officer retention for company and field grade ranks:
I wanted to share some of my observations on an issue that has become a major topic for Army leaders -- officer retention. In the Army we hear a lot about retaining company grade officers and there have been a number of actions taken over the past few years to mitigate the high demand for company grade officers with their requirements...
by Dave Dilegge | Sat, 08/25/2007 - 7:12pm | 0 comments
History Proves Vietnam Victors Wrong -- Senator James Webb (D-VA), Wall Street Journal (28 April 2000)... While it is correct to say that the American people wearied of an ineffective national strategy as the war dragged on, they never ceased in their support for South Vietnam's war effort. As late as September 1972, a Harris survey indicated overwhelming support for continued bombing of North Vietnam (55% to 32%) and for mining North Vietnamese harbors (64% to 22%). By a margin of 74% to 11%, those polled agreed that "it is important that South Vietnam not fall into the control of the communists."The 1973 Paris Peace Accords, which earned both the American and North Vietnamese negotiators the Nobel Peace Prize, are largely ignored by present-day commentators. If we were to treat these accords as a binding international agreement between two still-existing governments, Hanoi would be held accountable for having taken South Vietnam by "other than peaceful means," and for failing to uphold its promise of internationally supervised free elections.The humiliating end result of the communists' final offensive in early 1975 is usually placed on the shoulders of a supposedly incompetent South Vietnamese military. Little mention is made of the impact our "Watergate Congress" had on both its inception and success. This Congress was elected in November 1974, only months after Nixon's resignation, and it was dominated by a fresh group of antiwar Democrats. One of the first actions of the new Congress was to vote down a supplemental appropriation for the beleaguered South Vietnamese that would have provided $800 million in military aid, including much-needed ammunition, spare parts and medical supplies.This vote was a horrendous blow, in both emotional and practical terms, to the country that had trusted American judgment for more than a decade of intense conflict. It was also a clear indication that Washington was abandoning the South Vietnamese even as the North Vietnamese continued to enjoy the support of the Soviet Union, China and other Eastern bloc nations. The vote's impact was hardly lost on North Vietnamese military planners, who began the final offensive only five weeks later, as the South Vietnamese were attempting to adjust their military defenses.Finally, the aftermath of Saigon's fall is rarely dealt with at all. A gruesome holocaust took place in Cambodia, the likes of which had not been seen since World War II. Two million Vietnamese fled their country -- usually by boat -- with untold thousands losing their lives in the process. This was the first such Diaspora in Vietnam's long and frequently tragic history. Inside Vietnam a million of the South's best young leaders were sent to re-education camps; more than 50,000 perished while imprisoned, and others remained captives for as long as 18 years. An apartheid system was put into place that punished those who had been loyal to the U.S., as well as their families, in matters of education, employment and housing. The Soviet Union made Vietnam a client state until its own demise, pumping billions of dollars into the country and keeping extensive naval and air bases at Cam Ranh Bay...
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by SWJ Editors | Fri, 08/24/2007 - 9:31pm | 1 comment
Originally published in the Media Matters blog Altercations, the author has been kind enough to grant SWJ permission to repost his view on the recent New York Times op-ed The War as We Saw It.
Can They Say That?
Lieutenant Colonel Bob Bateman
I am a 7th Cavalryman. That is to say, within the Army, my personal regimental affiliation is with the 7th Cavalry Regiment. All soldiers are aligned with one regiment, though in this day and age that is largely an ornamental designation. In my case it came about because I commanded within the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Because of this, and because of my interest in history, I am effectively the de facto active-duty regimental historian. That is how I know the honorary colonel of my regiment, retired Lt. Gen. Hal Moore. You might know of Moore from the movie We Were Soldiers, itself based on the book We Were Soldiers Once ... And Young. Or you might have read the interview Charlie Pierce did with Mel Gibson (who played Moore in that movie) about his role depicting then-Lt. Col. Moore for Esquire. I assure you, Mel Gibson, even in full Hollywood action hero mode, is a pale shade of the actual man.
It was from Gen. Moore that I picked up my own code of ethics with regard to what I can and cannot (or should not) say in public. Specifically, when writing for the public, or talking to a reporter, I follow his guidance. Moore had a very simple rule for all of his soldiers with regards to the press, and he laid it out for them as they deployed to Vietnam in the summer of '65. It went something like this: "Talk to any reporter you want. Say what you want, but speak the truth. Do not exaggerate, and stay in your lane. Talk about what you know personally, what you have seen, what you have done, and then stand by your words. " These words of wisdom have guided me for the better part of a decade and a half now, and I credit them with keeping me out of trouble...
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 08/24/2007 - 1:26pm | 7 comments
The Daily Show With Jon Stewart
Mon - Thurs 11p / 10c
Lt. Col. John Nagl
www.thedailyshow.com
Daily Show Full Episodes
Political Humor
Tea Party
LTC John Nagl - The Daily Show with Jon Stewart - 23 August 2007On Counterinsurgency -- US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5by SWJ Editors | Thu, 08/23/2007 - 6:29pm | 0 comments
Prospects for Iraq's Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive
Update to NIE, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead
August 2007
Continue on for the NIE's Key Judgements and News / Blogs Links...
by Dave Dilegge | Wed, 08/22/2007 - 9:44pm | 1 comment
... so you can read this:
Challenging the Generals by Fred Kaplan
On Aug. 1, Gen. Richard Cody, the United States Army's vice chief of staff, flew to the sprawling base at Fort Knox, Ky., to talk with the officers enrolled in the Captains Career Course. These are the Army's elite junior officers. Of the 127 captains taking the five-week course, 119 had served one or two tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, mainly as lieutenants. Nearly all would soon be going back as company commanders. A captain named Matt Wignall, who recently spent 16 months in Iraq with a Stryker brigade combat team, asked Cody, the Army's second-highest-ranking general, what he thought of a recent article by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling titled "A Failure in Generalship." The article, a scathing indictment that circulated far and wide, including in Iraq, accused the Army's generals of lacking "professional character," "creative intelligence" and "moral courage."...by SWJ Editors | Wed, 08/22/2007 - 7:54pm | 2 comments
Lots of odds and ends (and links) to include RCT 6 in Iraq, President Bush and Ambassador Crocker on Prime Minister Maliki, free online FSI language courses, SOF seminar at NDU and much more...
Key take-away from today's DoD Bloggers Roundtable with RCT 6 CO Col Richard Simcock...
Grim had special praise for RCT 6's Blog... And Col Simcock had praise for Blackfive's RCT 6 e-mail campaign. Job well done all around.
Let me just say one thing about the e-mails. The response on that was tremendous. It was -- it literally -- it overwhelmed our systems over here. Within about -- I think it was two weeks, we had like 30,000 e-mails that came to us in support, and I would just like to say, we actually had to stop them because they were overwhelming our system, and we had to put them on a -- you know, refer them to our webpage. If you can, I would appreciate you doing anything to thank the people for all their support that they gave us. The Marines over here really do appreciate that; that's something sometimes that gets lost. They -- as I said, they watch the news over here, and a lot of times they seem to think that, you know, the people in the United States are not supporting what we're doing over here. Nothing, you know, based on the amount of replies we got back, could be further from the truth. It was obviously an overwhelming response, and I just thank you, because it came from your guys' follow-up on me asking that... I just want to thank you for the support that you all are giving us.More...
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 08/21/2007 - 4:52pm | 0 comments
Director's Statement on the Release of the 9/11 IG Report Executive Summary
Earlier this month, Congress passed a bill implementing some of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The legislation, lengthy and complex, includes a provision dealing with the report that CIA's Office of Inspector General prepared on the performance of our agency prior to September 11th. The act gave me 30 days to make available to the public a version of the report's executive summary, declassified to the maximum extent possible. Today, well within deadline, I am releasing that material...
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 08/18/2007 - 4:40am | 3 comments
Today's edition of The Australian offers up a profile on counterinsurgency expert, and Small Wars Journal contributor, Dr. David Kilcullen -- Strategist Behind War Gains by Rebecca Weisser.
... when the invasion of Iraq was being planned, Kilcullen was one of a handful of senior military advisers in the coalition of the —to voice a dissenting view. "I was one of a bunch of people ... who said 'Iraq is going to be a lot harder than you people seem to think, based on 20 years of experience doing it and studying it. It's going to take a lot more than you seem to be —to commit."
It was a view that then US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld rejected out of hand, saying Kilcullen didn't know what he was talking about.
But now, after more than four years of entrenched conflict with no end in sight, Kilcullen's doctrine of counterinsurgency prevails in Washington and on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, where it provided the foundation for the surge strategy the Bush administration says is beginning to succeed...
by Dave Dilegge | Thu, 08/16/2007 - 6:58pm | 2 comments
As a lead-in -- to this much longer than usual SWJ Blog entry -- I thought I'd post some recent news as well as recent and not-so-recent background / reference material on the establishment of our newest Combatant Command -- U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and issues that will impact on AFRICOM's mission.
Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right. Getting it right includes ensuring that AFRICOM receives the necessary resources (people and funding) and is enabled to pursue operations utilizing all instruments of national power -- read interagency...
Please post to comments below (or on this thread at Small Wars Council) any additional relevant material (articles, studies, presentations...) for addition to the SWJ Reference Library -- Thanks!
Introduction
On 6 February President Bush directed the creation of U.S. Africa Command. The decision was the culmination of a 10-year thought process within the Department of Defense (DOD) acknowledging the emerging strategic importance of Africa, and recognizing that peace and stability on the continent impacts not only Africans, but the interests of the U.S. and international community as well. Yet, the department's regional command structure did not account for Africa in a comprehensive way, with three different U.S. military headquarters maintaining relationships with African countries. The creation of U.S. Africa Command will enable DOD to better focus its resources to support and enhance existing U.S. initiatives that help African nations, the African Union, and the regional economic communities succeed. It also provides African nations and regional organizations an integrated DOD coordination point to help address security and related needs.
On 10 July Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced that President Bush had nominated Gen. William E. Ward for re-appointment to the rank of general with assignment as commander, U.S. Africa Command
The command will initially report to U.S. European Command, with initial operational capability scheduled to begin in October 2007. The command is scheduled to be fully operational by October 2008. The AFRICOM Transition Team is currently based in Stuttgart, Germany.
Much more...
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 08/15/2007 - 6:32pm | 1 comment
Recently released report from the New York Police Department's Intelligence Division - Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt.
Preface
If the post-September 11th world has taught us anything, it is that the tools for conducting serious terrorist attacks are becoming easier to acquire. Therefore intention becomes an increasingly important factor in the formation of terrorist cells. This study is an attempt to look at how that intention forms, hardens and leads to an attack or attempted attack using real world case studies.
While the threat from overseas remains, many of the terrorist attacks or thwarted plots against cities in Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States have been conceptualized and planned by local residents/citizens who sought to attack their country of residence. The majority of these individuals began as "unremarkable" -they had "unremarkable" jobs, had lived "unremarkable" lives and had little, if any criminal history. The recently thwarted plot by homegrown jihadists, in May 2007, against Fort Dix in New Jersey, only underscores the seriousness of this emerging threat.
Understanding this trend and the radicalization process in the West that drives "unremarkable" people to become terrorists is vital for developing effective counter-strategies. This realization has special importance for the NYPD and the City of New York. As one of the country's iconic symbols and the target of numerous terrorist plots since the 1990's, New York City continues to be the one of the top targets of terrorists worldwide. Consequently, the NYPD places a priority on understanding what drives and defines the radicalization process.
The aim of this report is to assist policymakers and law enforcement officials, both in Washington and throughout the country, by providing a thorough understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically. It also seeks to contribute to the debate among intelligence and law enforcement agencies on how best to counter this emerging threat by better understanding what constitutes the radicalization process...
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 08/15/2007 - 8:03am | 1 comment
Khalid, Khalil, and Khattab al-Turki, senior terrorists operating in Iraq with close ties to top al-Qaeda leadership, were killed after taking hostile action against Coalition forces on 23 June 2007