Blog Posts

This piece of pseudo-history below bounces around the internet every year about this time. Like most things of its ilk, it probably has a few errors, and its author is writing to reinforce a point with succinct and selective facts. But darn if it doesn't strike a nerve.

As we in the U.S. chill our lite beer (ughh!) and refill the propane tanks to burn plenty of meat for the 4th, let's not forget the stories and sacrifices of the many proud Iraqis and Afghanis who are out there trying to do the right thing, whether it be for their country or just for their family. Their history, when it is finally written, looks like it will be on par with this list, at least in terms of blood. Unfortunately, the outcome is still very much in question. ....

William Kristol at The Weekly Standard - Richard Lugar, Meet David Kilcullen

Max Boot at Commentary's Contentions -- Kilcullen's War

More...

In briefest of terms, these are to (1) Develop a New Lexicon, (2) Get the Grand Strategy Right, (3) Remedy the Imbalance in Government Capability, (4) Identify New Strategic Services, and (5) Develop Capacity For Strategic Information Warfare. While others will comment in learned fashion on all five of these topics in due course, this commentary will concern only the first -- the proposed New Lexicon...

The story of how the Army found itself less than ready to fight an insurgency goes back to the Army's unwillingness to internalize and build upon the lessons of Vietnam. Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Schoomaker has written that in Vietnam, "The U.S. Army, predisposed to fight a conventional enemy that fought using conventional tactics, overpowered innovative ideas from within the Army and from outside it. As a result, the U.S. Army was not as effective at learning as it should have been, and its failures in Vietnam had grave implications for both the Army and the nation." Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Jack Keane concurs, recently noting that in Iraq, "We put an Army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. It doesn't have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency . . . After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that had to do with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. In hindsight, that was a bad decision."...

This post is not about whether current ops are "working" — for us, here on the ground, time will tell, though some observers elsewhere seem to have already made up their minds (on the basis of what evidence, I'm not really sure). But for professional counterinsurgency operators such as our SWJ community, the thing to understand at this point is the intention and concept behind current ops in Iraq: if you grasp this, you can tell for yourself how the operations are going, without relying on armchair pundits. So in the interests of self-education (and cutting out the commentariat middlemen—sorry, guys) here is a field perspective on current operations...

Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia

By Anthony Bubalo and Dr Greg Fealy

Lowy Institute Paper #5:

Since 9/11 a number of claims have been made about the global nature of the threat posed by militant Islam, many of these have been debated extensively at the Small Wars Journal. This significant monograph from a part of the world directly engaged in these issues provides a fresh, research driven and policy focused perspective on this topical issue. From the paper's executive summary...

Men of Harlech stop your dreaming

Can't you see their spear points gleaming

See their warrior pennants streaming

To this battlefield

Men of Harlech stand ye steady

It cannot be ever said ye

For the battle were not ready

Welshmen never yield

From the hills rebounding

Let this song be sounding

Summon all at Cambria's call

The mighty force surrounding

Men of Harlech on to glory

This will ever be your story

Keep these burning words before ye

Welshmen will not yield

Hat Tip to Council Member 120mm

SWJ Book Review by Terry Daly

Bing West's superb book on the loss and retaking of Fallujah in al-Anbar Province, western Iraq, in 2004 excels on several levels. For the general reader it tells a heroic story in the tradition of American combat writing of Richard Tregaskis on Guadalcanal, Robert Sherrod on Tarawa, and Samuel Lyman Atwood ("SLAM") Marshal on World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Second, its dependence on first hand knowledge from participants at every level among U.S. military and civilian participants, while the action was taking place, guarantees it will be one of the basic historical reference works for future writers on the Iraq war...

Learning and Adapting

Both of the following linked articles by Major Don Vandergriff (USA, Ret.) address US Army training, education and culture and its relative importance in producing the adaptive leaders we require. Vandergriff retired August 30, 2005 following 24 years of active duty as a Marine enlisted and Army officer. He has served in numerous troop, staff and education assignments in the United States and overseas. Vandergriff is a recognized authority on the U.S. Army personnel system, Army culture, leadership development, soldier training and the emergence in the early 21st century of asymmetric warfare...

Ten Key Points:....

The Laptop Is Mightier Than the Sword

By Owen West and Bing West

More at the New York Times...

This article originally appeared in Democracy, and is reposted here with their kind permission at the author's request.

Iraqization is a dead-end strategy. But there is still some hope of saving the country, and it lies in an unlikely place: local Sunni militias and police.

For more than two years, the heart of U.S. military strategy in Iraq has been "Iraqization," the creation of an effective Iraqi security force that can take the place of U.S. Marines and soldiers. Thereby, the United States can eventually withdraw without leaving behind a terrorist safe haven and fractured Iraq. A wide range of military officers, policymakers, and scholars argue that through re-invigorated American efforts at training, equipping, and advising the Iraqi Army, any shortcomings in the Iraqi security forces can be overcome. Even Democrats who oppose the surge strategy support Iraqization, contending that Iraqi security forces are perfectly capable of suppressing violence now but that only when the United States "stands down" will they truly "stand up."

Between February 2004 and February 2005, and later from February to August

2006, I served as an advisor to the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in Al Anbar province. During that time I interviewed members of the Iraqi Army and police, held discussions with American advisers, and directly observed Iraqi Army and police operations. Al Anbar is overwhelmingly Sunni and infamously a center of insurgent activity. Therefore, it is critical to the success of the Iraqization strategy. Failure there means a U.S. withdrawal would leave hard-core insurgent groups, specifically Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), free to operate and possibly organize terrorist operations outside the province. Even if it is successful everywhere else in Iraq, Iraqization will have failed if it cannot work in Al Anbar...

The folks at Defense and the National Interest

(DNI) have been kind enough to offer a block of seats to members of the

Small Wars Journal /

Small Wars Council community

of interest.  Space is very limited -- so it's first come first serve -- and

the price is right -- free.  For additional information to include the agenda

follow the continued reading link below...

For those that wish to attend please contact Mr. Bob Howard at

[email protected].

In the linked paper I argue that, just as

the new realities of warfare demanded the creation of the Special Forces in the

1960's, winning the Long War will require that the Army develop a standing Advisor

Corps.  It has been informed by the experience of many advisors with service

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and may prove of some interest to the Small Wars Journal

/ Small Wars Council community of interest.

"Institutionalizing

Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps"

was published by the

Center for a New American Security.

The most important military component

of the Long War will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable

and empower our allies to fight with us. After describing the many complicated,

interrelated, and simultaneous tasks that must be conducted to defeat an insurgency,

the new

Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency

Field Manual notes

"Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security

force. Indeed, it has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency;

the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local

forces to win for them...

The Small Wars Council has begun a discussion of John Robb’s new book Brave New War at the Brave New War Roundtable thread.  The discussion is in the Members Only forum and can be accessed after a short, painless and free registration process.

Join in today and participate over the coming weeks in an in-depth discussion on Robb’s latest on the “next stage of terrorism and the end of globalization”.

A quick look at several recent news articles that mention or quote members of the Small Wars Journal and Council community of interest and a boatload of thanks to fellow bloggers, reporters and columnists who have helped us along in our quest to facilitate and support the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance

knowledge and capabilities in the field.

Diana West's

holier-than-thou attack on

Dr. David Kilcullen

of

Gen. David Petraeus' senior staff in Baghdad must be a delight to al Qaeda and

Hizballah propagandists and anti-American brainwashers worldwide.

In a June 1, 2007 Washington Times essay entitled

"Pay attention to jihad,"

she slams the Australian-born anti-Terrorism strategist for an assertion several

months ago that so-called "jihad" (holy war in the name of Allah, etc.) has assumed

the stature of heroic "adventure" in the minds, hearts and souls of many young Muslims.

She distorts Kilcullen's words into the preposterous

speculation that  he approves of this development and asks whether

if he had grown up in Hitler's Germany he "might have become a Nazi" -- when, in

fact, the man and his fellow counterinsurgency (COIN) experts are attempting to

discover an effective antidote for a highly seductive "Jihadi martyrdom" factor

which is providing al Qaeda-style Terrorism with an endless supply of enthusiastic

young suicide mass murderers.

Recruit more Iraqi Soldiers and increase their divisions from 11 to 20 is what one counterinsurgency expert said he would do if he was in the shoes of the Multinational Forces - Iraq commander.

Dr. David Kilcullen, an authority on counterinsurgency, was appointed to advise the MNF-Iraq commander, Gen. David Petraeus. Dr. Kilcullen visited Soldiers with the 10th Mountain Division's 2nd Brigade out of Fort Drum, N.Y., to take stock of the "Commando" brigade's progress June 2 and 3.

Dr. Kilcullen served 21 years in the Australian army and has led Timorese troops, was a special advisor for irregular warfare during the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, and remains a reserve lieutenant colonel in the Australian army.

Col. Michael Kershaw, 2nd BCT commander, escorted Dr. Kilcullen around Patrol Base Dragon, the Yusufiyah Joint Security Station and the Mahmudiyah Iraqi Army Compound...

Originally aired on 1 June on The News Hour w/ Jim Lehrer.  

Iraq's western Anbar Province is undergoing shifts in military and political power as Sunni Arab militants continue to battle with al-Qaida insurgents. A journalist and a former military official discuss the region's struggles.

Ray Suarez - "For an on-the-ground assessment of the situation in Iraq's largest province, we're joined by two men who visited there last month. David Wood is the national security correspondent for the Baltimore Sun, and former Marine Captain Bing West, he's now a correspondent for the Atlantic magazine and has written two books about the war."

Full transcript and audio available here at The News Hour's site. 

Commander, United States Marine Corps

Forces, Central Command Reading List

Commander's Intent: The Global War on Terrorism

is a long war, and as such we need to continue our preparation to be engaged in

all aspects of this war. For our current fights the MARCENT Reading List provides

a collection of readings to be read dependent upon your grade and how long you have

before deploying. Whether part of a unit or an individual augment, my intent is

to prepare you for the operational, tactical, cultural and environmental factors

affecting your specific fight. This reading list is not all inclusive and your local

command may require you to accomplish other tasks in preparation for deployment

as well. All of these actions will ensure we send educated, well-trained and properly

prepared Marines into the fight. Turn-to, get it done, you and your Marines will

be better for your efforts.

LtGen James N. Mattis

Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central

Command

Dr. Steven Metz's latest monograph, Rethinking Insurgency, has just been posted to the US Army Strategic Studies Institute's (SSI) web page.