Blog Posts

US Air Force Major General Charlie Dunlap says forget the lessons of Iraq in the latest edition of The Armed Forces Journal.

Among defense intelligentsia, there are few mantras more chic than that which claims the US military "forgot the lessons of Vietnam." Had it not done so, received wisdom insists, America's armed forces would not have struggled in Iraq for so long. Powerful adherents to this theory have spawned a follow-on analog, that we must not "forget the lessons of Iraq."

Unfortunately, some of the key lessons these enthusiasts believe should be learned are the wrong ones, and these mistaken ideas are causing America's military to be altered in ways that may prove troubling as the US faces an increasingly complex and dangerous range of security threats.

Indeed, the devotees of the forgot-the-lessons-of-Vietnam philosophy have become so ascendant that they might be said to form the New Establishment of defense strategists. The New Establishment is especially strong in the Army. As a result, much of the service is being reconceptualized into a constabulary force in which nation-building and stability operations all but trump force-on-force war fighting...

What say you?

Reaffirming the Right of Israel to Exist in the Face of Hamas Attacks in Gaza or the only thing Hamas likes better than dead Israelis is dead Palestinians. By Mortimer Zuckerman at U.S. News and World Report

What the world cannot remember the Israelis cannot forget. The Israelis know the Jewish nation has been one defeat away from extinction for 70 years. They know that every partition plan in the region, from the dawn of Zionism to the present day, has failed because of the Arab failure to accept the State of Israel. They know that the Palestinian leadership is virtually hopeless, wherein the people who are moderate are not effective and the people who are effective are not moderate.

Today the impossible Yasser Arafat has been replaced by the impotent Mahmoud Abbas. It was Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, who presided over the division of the Palestinians into Fatah and Hamas. Hamas doesn't want peace, and Fatah can't deliver it. Fatah is so weak that it cannot enforce the rule of law against terrorism or make compromises for fear of the radical Islamists. Indeed, without the support of the Israeli Defense Forces, even now it is under threat of being displaced by Hamas. Mahmoud Al-Zahar, a major Hamas leader, underlined Fatah's weakness when he said, "Fatah can't stop us from seizing control of those [West Bank] territories. It is only a matter of time."

Much more at U.S. News and World Report.

The Best Defense-Related Books of 2008 by Paul McLeary, Aviation Week

When developing a list of the best defense-related books published in 2008, I sent e-mail messages to people I respect to ask what books are getting their attention and a piece of their ever-dwindling time. Given the sheer volume of books published, and the flood of war and military-related titles that have hit the market during the past few years, I was surprised to find that a few recommendations came up time and again...

Dave Dilegge, who runs the Small Wars Journal web site, splits the difference between Metz and Nagl. Like Metz, he names Baghdad at Sunrise (DTI October 2008, p. 68) and like Nagl, he shortlists In a Time of War. From there, he strikes out on his own, citing Bing West's The Strongest Tribe (reviewed on the Ares blog in October), as "a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the Iraq war was turned around and the choice now facing America."

Dilegge also includes Tell Me How This Ends by Linda Robinson, which he describes as "an inside account of [Gen. David Petraeus's] attempt to turn around a failing war." Rounding out his list is We Are Soldiers Still, Joe Galloway's follow-up to his classic bestseller, We Were Soldiers Once... and Young, in which Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and Galloway return to Vietnam and reflect on how the war changed them, their men, their enemies and both countries...

Both Metz and Dilegge include Baghdad at Sunrise on their lists of the year's best, and with good reason. The author, Peter Mansoor, was a brigade commander in Baghdad in 2003-04...

See more recommendations from John Nagl and Steve Metz at Aviation Week.

Phil Carter, who sadly no longer maintains Intel Dump, called this back in October of 2004 in his Slate op-ed To Fight Another Day - subtitled the real reason Guantanamo detainees have returned to the battlefield.

New battlefield reports indicate that at least eight and as many as 25 of the 202 prisoners paroled by the Pentagon from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have rejoined the fight as members of the pro-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan, or as part of al-Qaida. One of the now-free prisoners fighting in Afghanistan proudly proclaimed that he won his parole simply by lying through his teeth throughout the time he was at Gitmo. And the Pentagon blames fibbing prisoners and inadequate screening systems - driven by this summer's Supreme Court terrorism decisions -for allowing these men to escape from captivity.

It's more than a little disingenuous to blame the Supreme Court for these problems, though, especially since most of these detainees were released before the June decisions were handed down. The real problem is that the Defense Department and U.S. intelligence community developed inadequate and unreliable systems for screening detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Just as one might expect, detainees exploited the flaws in this system to secure their freedom by any means available - including telling a few lies to deceive their captors into believing that they were innocent. Ironically, it didn't have to be this way - international law would have allowed the United States to warehouse the Gitmo detainees until "the cessation of active hostilities" and to interrogate them, too. But by rejecting the Geneva Conventions' restrictions on Gitmo detainee operations, the United States also rejected its benefits - creating the situation we have today in which paroled detainees have returned to fight against us...

More at Slate.

The Defense Stimulus by Tom Donnelly at The Weekly Standard.

The politics of the current economic crisis are fluid -- the Bush administration's original diktats for bailing out the troubled financial sector and the auto industry have generated growing resistance -- but it's likely that Barack Obama will be able to produce a stimulus package quickly after his inauguration. Even House Republican leader Rep. John Boehner "believe[s] Washington has to act." Indeed, the stimulus debate that remains was succinctly framed by his counterpart in the upper house, Sen. Mitch McConnell: "The question is: How big and in what form?"

A key part of the answer on the spending side of the equation is increased defense spending, by at least $20 billion per year, particularly on procurement and personnel. These kinds of expenditures not only make economic good sense, but would help close the large and long-standing gap between U.S. strategy and military resources. If bridges need fixing, so too do the tools with which our military fights. A critical element in any recovery will be strengthening the foundations of the globalized economy, built upon U.S. worldwide security guarantees...

More at The Weekly Standard.

Remarks by Secretary Rice at signing ceremony for U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide

US State Department Press Release / Transcript

Secretary Condoleezza Rice

Treaty Room

Washington, DC

January 13, 2009

Other Participants:

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore

Department of State Counselor Eliot Cohen

MR. COHEN: Let me welcome you all to the official signing of the United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide. My name is Eliot Cohen. I'm the Counselor at the Department.

This is going to be a very brief ceremony, but I want to thank, first and foremost, everybody who's made the effort that has yielded up the COIN guide. It took a lot of work by the many different departments of government that are represented in it, and it's a very fine piece of work.

There's a larger thanks, I think, to the many, many thousands of Americans whose practice out in the field has informed the writing of this guide, because it wasn't just an intellectual effort back here in Washington. In many ways, it's the distillation of a lot of experience.

I'm particularly grateful to the ladies and gentleman standing to my right. I want to particularly single out my boss, Secretary Rice, and Secretary Gates, who I think have, by both word and deed, signaled the importance of State, Defense, and of course, AID working together. And I don't think that there's ever been a period in our history where the two departments of government have worked so closely, and I think that's a -- that's going to be an important legacy.

If I could, my last observation is really addressed to Dr. Rice and Dr. Gates. It's a little bit unprecedented, I think, to have a pair of Ph.D.s running the State Department and the Defense Department -- but not just Ph.D.s., people who have been great educational leaders. And I think that the long-term significance of this guide, which had better outlive the Bush Administration, is going to be as a document that will be used in war colleges, at our own Foreign Service Institute. I can guarantee there'll be at least one civilian university that will use it. (Laughter.) And it will do what good doctrine ought to do, which is to stimulate thought. It's not a template. I don't think it's going to be a rigid set of prescriptions. But what it will do, I think, will be to stimulate thought and to be the basis of ever-developing practice in this field.

So thank you very much. Madame Secretary.

SECRETARY RICE: Well, thank you very much, Eliot, Dr. Cohen, who has been a terrific Counselor and has spearheaded this very important effort. The last several years have taught us some important lessons; first of all, that the old notion of war and then peace is really not appropriate to the challenges that we face in the international system now. Whether one is talking about Iraq or Afghanistan or even places like Liberia or Haiti, you are usually talking about a continuum between war and peace where one is trying at the same time to bring security, development, and governance to the people of a war-torn or a civil war-torn or conflict-torn region.

And this counterinsurgency doctrine and this manual really is a compilation of the experiences that we have had in learning how to fight together, how to work together, and ultimately how to deliver for people defense, democracy, and development. And I could not have had a better partner than Secretary Gates, Bob Gates, my good friend of many years now, in bringing the two departments together to bring our individual and unique experiences and individual and unique talents to this fight.

I'm very proud of the effort that we've had here, and together with Henrietta Fore, I think that you're seeing that democracy, defense, and development, the three Ds, will be at the foundation for American policy going forward. And I'm very proud of this effort, and I suspect that that means that there are two American universities that may be teaching from this manual. (Laughter.)

And now to my good friend, Bob Gates. And not only are we both Ph.D.s and former high-ranking university administrators, but we both studied the Soviet Union, which, in case you don't know, no longer exists. And it means that we found useful work after that. (Laughter.)

Bob.

SECRETARY GATES: Thank you, Condi. I'm honored to sign the Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide today and demonstrate my support for whole-of-government counterinsurgency process. Military efforts alone are rarely effective in counterinsurgency operations. This guide reflects strong efforts by many organizations and individuals to build the soft power capabilities and the coordinating processes within the United States Government that are so central to our counterinsurgency efforts.

So I want to thank Secretary Rice, Administrator Fore, and Counselor Cohen for providing strong leadership in building soft power capabilities within our foreign policy establishment and advancing the image of the United States among our partner nations.

Thank you.

ADMINISTRATOR FORE: And let me add for my two secretaries that it is very important for us in the world of development to have a guide such as this. It's a very complex and challenging area -- the work of counterinsurgency. We in development will particularly focus on helping host country governments how they can deal with good governance while having an atmosphere of counterinsurgency. It is very challenging, but country ownership and legitimacy of a government, as well as continuing good governance and democratic reforms, are a very important and integral part. And we will add our highest accolade in that we will use this guide in the field.

Thank you.

-----

More by Nathan Hodge at Wired's Danger Room - A Counterinsurgency Guide for the Next Administration?

Excellent piece by Colonel H. R. McMaster in the current World Affairs - The Human Element: When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the political debates concerning the nature and scope of US involvement in those countries, have resurrected the "lessons" of Vietnam once again. Far from having kicked the "Vietnam syndrome," as President George H. W. Bush put it in the exuberant aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, it now seems possible that the memory of the Vietnam War will be forever conflated in the public imagination with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, producing something like a Vietnam syndrome on steroids...

Much more at World Affairs.

Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, says the US military needs to become more balanced in its role as a partner in foreign policy.

Mullen Urges Emphasis on 'Soft Power' in Foreign Policy - John J. Kruzel, American Forces Press Service

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated a "whole-of-government approach" to foreign policy in a speech here last night, urging more funding for nonmilitary departments' roles overseas.

"I believe we should be more —to break this cycle, and say when armed forces may not always be the best choice to take the lead," Navy Adm. Mike Mullen told a Nixon Center audience.

Mullen said civilian agencies representing American "soft power" -- the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce and Agriculture -- deserve more money and support than they currently receive, and should play an enlarged role internationally.

The chairman's remarks align with those made by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who has warned against a "creeping militarization" of US foreign policy. In a speech in June, the secretary said diplomacy and development should lead American efforts abroad.

"Broadly speaking, when it comes to America's engagement with the rest of the world, it is important that the military is -- and is clearly seen to be -- in a supporting role to civilian agencies," Gates said.

Mullen echoed Gates, saying that the US military should be "just as bold in providing options when they don't involve our participation or our leadership." He added that this notion should apply even when alternative options are unpopular, or when they demand resources be transferred from the military.

The Defense Department's fiscal 2009 budget was about $650 billion, compared to the State Department's reported budget of about $11.5 billion.

"As an equal partner in government, I want to be able to transfer resources to my other partners when they need them," Mullen said. "And we need to reallocate roles and resources in a way that places our military as an equal among many in government, as an enabler, a true partner."

More at American Forces Press Service.

Colonel Gian Gentile has a new piece up at Foreign Policy entitled Think Again: Counterinsurgency continuing his theme on why the U.S. Army's focus on nation-building at the expense of warfighting is misguided and dangerous.

The bottom line for Gian:

"The U.S. military is still too focused on conventional warfare." - Absolutely not.

"Small wars are the wars of the future." - Perhaps.

"The surge worked in Iraq." - Not quite.

"General Petraeus is a military genius." - Time will tell.

"The military should embrace nation-building." - If those are the orders.

More at Foreign Policy.

Derek S. Reveron writes in FP - Think Again: Pirates - more than 20 countries are joining a special U.S.-led naval force to combat pirates off the coast of Somalia. But it won't be warships that defeat these modern-day sea dogs.

Derek's bottom line is:

"Piracy Is Making a Comeback" - No, it never went away.

"Pirates Are Terrorists" - Not yet.

"Pirates Are Terrorists" - Wrong.

"If Captured, Pirates Could Easily Be Tried for Their Crimes" - Guess again.

"The World Needs a War on Piracy" - Absolutely not.

More at Foreign Policy.

Next-War-itis, This-War-itis, and the American Military by Michael P. Noonan at Foreign Policy Research Institute

In a recent CBS News story, Marine Corps Commandant General James Conway stated—for at least the second time publicly—that it was time for the Marine Corps to leave Iraq and focus on Afghanistan. In the Commandant's view, the Marine Corps is a "fighting machine," Iraq has turned into "nation building," and "[t]hat's not what we do.... Where there's a fight, that's where the Marine Corps is needed." The subtext of this seems clear enough. General Conway feels that his Marines should focus on "real war," where their martial skills of air and artillery strikes and violent maneuver to close with and destroy the enemy are employed to effect. The extended current counterinsurgency and nation-building campaign in Iraq is seen as a misapplication of the Corps' core competencies and soften the force, or at least emphasize the wrong skills sets and lessons that will cause the United States to pay a steep tax in blood and treasure on some future battlefield.

These comments caused a stir in some circles. Some argue that his comments misread the source of success in Al Anbar, where patient "nation-building" by the Army and the Marine Corps was crucial. It also arguably misreads what will be most useful in Afghanistan, where U.S. strategy emphasizes more than just conventional brawn. But this is not just solely an issue of debate amongst the Marine Corps. All of the services currently are having debates about their dominant service culture and core competencies. A distilled short hand for this debate is between the antagonistically labeled schools of "this-war-itis" and "next-war-itis." This short piece will provide a glimpse of these contemporary debates and offer opinions on how they might play out going into the Obama administration. This is an important debate because strategic success—and no small amount of treasure—is at stake...

Much more at Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Here's the latest from the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute:

After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy by Dr. Colin S. Gray

A sustainable national security strategy is feasible only when directed by a sustainable national security policy. In the absence of policy guidance, strategy will be meaningless. The only policy that meets both the mandates of American culture and the challenges of the outside world is one that seeks to lead the necessary mission of guarding and advancing world order. The author considers and rejects a policy that would encourage the emergence of a multipolar structure to global politics. He argues that multipolarity not only would fail to maintain order, it would also promote conflict among the inevitably rival great powers. In addition, he suggests Americans culturally are not comfortable with balance-of-power politics and certainly would not choose to promote the return of such a system. Various "pieces of the puzzle" most relevant to national security strategy are located; leading assumptions held by American policymakers and strategists are identified; alternative national security policies are considered; and necessary components of a sustainable national security strategy are specified. The author concludes that America has much less choice over its policy and strategy than the public debate suggests. He warns that the country's dominant leadership role for global security certainly will be challenged before the century is old...

Regional Spillover Effects of the Iraq War by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

The Iraq war has been one of the dominant factors influencing U.S. strategic thinking in the Middle East and globally since 2003. Yet the problems of this highly dynamic and fluid war have sometimes forced U.S. policymakers to address near-term issues that cannot be safely postponed at the expense of long-term strategic thought. Such a technique, while understandable, cannot continue indefinitely as an approach to policy. Long-term planning remains vital for advancing regionwide U.S. and Iraqi interests following a U.S. drawdown from Iraq. Such planning must include dealing with current and potential "spillover" from the Iraq war.

Regional spillover problems associated with the Iraq war need to be considered and addressed even in the event of strong future success in building the new Iraq. In less optimistic scenarios, these issues will become even more important. Spillover issues addressed herein include: (1) the flow of refugees and displaced persons from Iraq, (2) cross-border terrorism, (3) the potential intensification of separatism and sectarian discord among Iraq's neighbors, and (4) transnational crime. All of these problems will be exceptionally important in the Middle East in the coming years and perhaps decades, and trends involving these issues will need to be closely monitored. The author presents ideas, concerns, and strategies that can help to fill this gap in the literature and enrich the debate on the actual and potential spillover effects of the Iraq war that will face U.S. policymakers, possibly for decades. Of these problems, he clearly is especially concerned with the spread of sectarian divisions which, if not properly managed, can have devastating regional consequences. This monograph forms an important baseline useful for considering future trends in each of the areas that the author has identified...

Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security by Dr. Gabriel Marcella

The United States has a large and complex interagency process to deal with national security on a global basis. It is imperative that civilian and military professionals understand that process. The chapters in this volume deal with various dimensions and institutions, from the National Security Council, the Department of State, and other agencies. It also contains case studies of interagency coordination and integration...

HAMAS and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics by Dr. Sherifa D. Zuhur

Efforts to separate HAMAS from its popular support and network of social and charitable organizations have not been effective in destroying the organization, nor in eradicating the will to resist among a fairly large segment of the Palestinian population. It is important to consider this Islamist movement in the context of a region-wide phenomenon of similar movements with local goals, which can be persuaded to relinquish violence or which could become more violent. Certainly an orientation to HAMAS and its base must be factored into new and more practical and effective approaches to peacemaking in the region. At the same time, HAMAS offers a fascinating glimpse of the dynamics of strategic reactions and the modification of Israeli impulses towards aggressive deterrence, as well as the evolution in the Islamist movements' planning and operations. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict bears similarities to a long-standing civil conflict, even as it has sparked inter-Palestinian hostilities in its most recent phase...

War without Borders: The Colombia-Ecuador Crisis of 2008 by Dr. Gabriel Marcella

Unprotected borders are a serious threat to the security of a number of states around the globe. Indeed, the combination of weak states, ungoverned space, terrorism, and international criminal networks make a mockery of the Westphalian system of international order. Latin American countries are experiencing all of these maladies in varying degrees. The Andean region is under assault by a different kind of war that defies borders. In this context, Dr. Gabriel Marcella analyzes the lessons to be learned from the Colombian attack against the clandestine camp of the the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which was located at an isolated area within Ecuador on March 1, 2008. This single incident and its aftermath had profound reverberations throughout the Hemisphere. The events leading to the attack illuminate the vulnerabilities of states, societies, and the international community to the actions of substate groups conducting criminal activities. Accordingly, the hemispheric community of nations needs to develop better ways to anticipate and resolve conflicts. The United States plays a critical role in the emerging security environment of the Andean region. Yet a superpower is often unaware of the immense influence it has with respect to small countries like Ecuador, which is trying to extricate itself from becoming a failed state. The author recommends that the United States manage its complex agenda with sensitivity and balance its support for Colombia with equally creative support for Ecuador...

Via Reuters - President-elect Obama named four former Clinton administration officials to top defense positions, including former Pentagon comptroller William Lynn as deputy defense secretary. The other nominations are Michele Flournoy to become under secretary of defense for policy, Robert Hale as comptroller and Jeh Johnson to general counsel.

Update # 1: Obama Selects 4 More Senior Defense Officials by Ann Scott Tyson at The Washington Post and Unexpected Pick for Deputy Defense Secretary Suggests Gates Had a Say by Spencer Ackerman at The Washington Independent.

Update # 2: Inside Defense (subscription required) reports that outgoing Pentagon policy chief Eric Edelman said that defense official Joseph Benkert is slated to stay on until the new administration finds a successor and that another defense official, Michael Vickers, may stay even longer. Benkert is the assistant secretary of defense for global security affairs. Vickers is the assistant secretary of defense for special operations, low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities.

Update # 3: The Cable via Abu Muqawama reports on rumors that the Center for a New American Security's Derek Chollet is likely to be named Deputy Director of the State Department Office of Policy Planning and CNA's James N. Miller is going to be named Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

Via the Los Angeles Times - Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak dies at 95.

"Retired Marine Lt. Gen. Victor H. "Brute" Krulak, celebrated for his leadership in World War II, Korea and Vietnam and for his authoritative book on the Marines, "First To Fight," died Monday at Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla. He was 95 and had been in declining health for several years."

"In a career that spanned three decades Krulak displayed bravery during combat and brilliance as a tactician and organizer of troops..."

More at the International Herald Tribune and San Diego Union Tribune.

Lt. Gen. Krulak's official USMC biography:

Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, a "paramarine" during World War II, was born in Denver, CO, January 7, 1913. He was commissioned a Marine second lieutenant upon graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy, May 31, 1934. His early Marine Corps service included: sea duty aboard USS ARIZONA, an assignment at the U.S. Naval Academy; duty with the 6th Marines in San Diego and the 4th Marines in China (1937-39); completion of the Junior School, Quantico, VA (1940); and an assignment with the 1st Marine Brigade, FMF, later the 1st Marine Division.

At the outbreak of World War II, he was a captain serving as aide to the Commanding General, Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, General Holland M. Smith. He volunteered for parachute training and on completing training was ordered to the Pacific area as commander of the 2d Parachute Battalion, 1st Marine Amphibious Corps. He went into action at Vella Lavella with the 2d New Zealand Brigade.

As a lieutenant colonel in the fall of 1943, he earned the Navy Cross and the Purple Heart Medal on Choiseul Island, where his battalion staged a week-long diversionary raid to cover the Bougainville invasion. Later, he joined the newly formed 6th Marine Division and took part in the Okinawa campaign and the surrender of Japanese forces in the China area, earning the Legion of Merit with Combat "V" and the Bronze Star Medal.

After the war, he returned to the United States and served as Assistant Director of the Senior School at Quantico, and, later, as Regimental Commander of the 5th Marines at Camp Pendleton. He was serving as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, when the Korean Conflict erupted, and subsequently served in Korea as Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division, earning a second Legion of Merit with Combat "V" and Air Medal.

From 1951 to 1955, he served at HQMC as Secretary of the General Staff, then rejoined Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, as Chief of Staff. In July 1956, he was promoted to brigadier general and designated Assistant Commander, 3d Marine Division on Okinawa. From 1957 to 1959, he served as Director, Marine Corps Educational Center, Quantico. He was promoted to major general in November 1959, and the following month assumed command of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego.

General Krulak was presented a third Legion of Merit by General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for exceptionally meritorious service from 1962 to 1964 as Special Assistant for Counter Insurgency Activities, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On March 1, 1964, he was designated Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and promoted to lieutenant general.

For the next four years he was responsible for all Fleet Marine Force units in the Pacific, including some 54 trips to the Vietnam theater. He retired on 1 June 1968, receiving a Distinguished Service Medal for his performance during that period.

Rest in peace General Krulak and our condolences to the family and friends of this great Marine.

Please see A New Kind of War written by Lt. Gen. Krulak.

Serving in the Joint Staff as the focal point in counterinsurgency operations and training, I went to Vietnam eight times between 1962 and 1964. In those early years, I learned something of the complex nature of the conflict there. The problem of seeking out and destroying guerrillas was easy enough to comprehend, but winning the loyalty of the people, why it was so important and how to do it, took longer to understand. Several meetings with Sir Robert Thompson, who contributed so much to the British victory over the guerrillas in Malaya, established a set of basic counterinsurgency principles in my mind. Thompson said, "The peoples' trust is primary. It will come hard because they are fearful and suspicious. Protection is the most important thing you can bring them. After that comes health. And, after that, many things--land, prosperity, education, and privacy to name a few."

Update: Brute Force by Mackubin Thomas Owens, National Review

The country lost a storied Marine when retired Lt. Gen. Victor "Brute" Krulak died in his sleep on December 29 at the age of 95. Krulak was a thinker as well as a fighter, and in both capacities, he left his imprint on the Corps...

In 1962, former PT boat skipper President Kennedy directed the services to emphasize counterinsurgency training, and Krulak played a central role in implementing the president's directive. During this period, Krulak met several times with Sir Robert Thompson, the architect of the British victory over the guerrillas in Malaya. From Thompson he absorbed a set of basic counterinsurgency principles that the Marines subsequently sought to apply in Vietnam. As Krulak observed, "The more [aware I became] of the situation facing the Vietnamese government and the Vietnamese Army, the more convinced I became . . . that our success in the counterinsurgency conflict would depend on a complete and intimate understanding by all ranks from top to bottom of the principles Thompson had articulated."...

Much more at National Review.

Top Officer Urges Limit on Mission of Military - Thom Shanker, New York Times

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said Monday that senior officers must work to prevent the militarization of American foreign policy, and he urged generals and admirals to tell civilian leaders when they believed the armed forces should not take the lead in carrying out policies overseas.

Adm. Mike Mullen, who as chairman is the nation's highest-ranking military officer, also called for more money and personnel to be devoted to the civilian agencies responsible for diplomacy and overseas economic development...

More at The New York Times.

Joint Chiefs Chairman Makes Case for Non-military Solutions - Julian Barnes, Los Angeles Times

The country's top uniformed officer said Monday that the Defense Department should be ready to tell civilian leaders when military force is not the best response -- and be prepared to transfer resources to other agencies during times of crisis.

Adm. Michael G. Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, previously has made the case for nonmilitary solutions to world problems, but his comments Monday were his most forceful to date on the subject. They also came as he prepares to report to a new president who has pledged to strengthen America's "soft," or nonmilitary, power abroad.

Reacting to trouble spots is a natural reflex for the military, and the Pentagon's willingness to respond ensures that it gets more resources. But its ever-present readiness means the military is frequently asked by top civilian leaders to do more.

More at The Los Angeles Times.

An American Strategy for Asia by Dan Blumenthal and Aaron Friedberg, American Enterprise Institute

Purpose

The new administration confronts an unusually long and daunting list of pressing foreign policy problems: ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the continuing threat of global terrorism, a brewing crisis in Pakistan, unresolved nuclear standoffs with Iran and North Korea, Russia's new aggressiveness toward its neighbors, and the lingering aftereffects of a global financial meltdown. All will demand urgent attention and timely action. The president-elect will be lucky if he has a moment to savor his victory, let alone to pause and reflect on the longer-term trends that are reshaping the world.

Yet such reflection is badly needed. As important as they undoubtedly are, all of the issues listed above are being played out against the backdrop of something even bigger: a massive, rapid shift in the distribution of global wealth and power toward Asia. This process has been gathering momentum for more than thirty years; if current projections are borne out, in the next thirty Asia's rise will fundamentally alter the structure of the international system and the character of great power politics.

It is difficult to exaggerate the magnitude of what is taking place. The changes now underway are comparable in scale, and potentially in historical significance, to the "rise of the West"--the emergence of Europe as the world's leader in wealth and military power--or the rise of the United States to global preponderance that began in the nineteenth century.

Such a profound shift will eventually require the reexamination, and ultimately the reorientation, of many aspects of America's foreign, economic, and defense policies. These changes may be forced by events. Or they could be shaped by a clear and coherent national strategy, a plan of action that looks beyond today's turmoil, sets broad goals, and identifies the tools and policies that will be necessary to achieve them.

The purpose of this report is to put forward an American strategy for Asia. While it is motivated by an awareness of long-term trends, the emphasis of this report will be on the concrete and practical. We intend not only to identify goals, but also to specify the steps that a new president should take over the next four to eight years to bring them closer to realization.

Our report differs from others on related subjects in two important ways. First, it is focused rather than comprehensive. Instead of touching lightly on every conceivable subject relevant to Asia, we have chosen to concentrate on those that we believe to be of greatest strategic importance. Second, our report is more candid than is typically the case about the challenges that are likely to emanate from Asia and, in particular, about those that may result from the rise of China. Our intention is not to be provocative, but rather to be clear. Ritualized "happy talk" about where China is headed will do little, if anything, to alter Beijing's course. But unwarranted optimism on the part of our leaders may make it harder to maintain public support for the policies necessary to keep the peace and secure American interests, and it could set the stage for future disappointment and overreaction if exaggerated expectations of Sino-American friendship are not met. We have been reminded in recent years how important it is not to overstate the magnitude and imminence of threats to our nation's security, but it is at least as important to be clear and honest in acknowledging their existence.

An American Strategy for Asia

Christopher Castelli of Inside the Navy (subscription required at Inside Defense) is reporting that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates received feedback on several key strategic initiatives from combatant commanders last week as top US military leaders converged on the Pentagon for a high-level summit.

Internal documents indicate the January 7 morning session was scheduled to cover current defense actions and planning, with remarks by Gates and Mullen. That was to be followed by an afternoon agenda built around the theme of "A Balanced Defense Strategy," the title of Gates' recent Foreign Affairs article.

Gates was slated to kick off the afternoon meeting by discussing the fiscal year 2010 budget, as well as potential supplemental funding for FY-09 and FY-10. Gates has told Congress he needs roughly $70 billion more in FY-09 to finance the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Next up was a discussion of the upcoming 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review led by the Pentagon's policy shop. That was supposed to be followed by a session on current force planning and future requirements, including the status of the defense planning scenarios and future scenario requirements.

In another Inside the Navy article Zachary Peterson reports that The Marine Corps' Strategic Vision Group is busy briefing US military combatant commands around the world, think tanks and congressional committees on the service's vision for the future, which includes returning to Navy ships and a focus on hybrid warfare, the colonel who heads the strategy group tells Inside the Navy.

Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway has called for Marines to return to their expeditionary roots, which means shipborne operations in close-to-shore areas around the globe. The briefs, presented by Col. Steven Zotti and his team, outline how the Marines see the future and their role in protecting U.S. national security interests abroad in the decades to come.

SWJ friend and Marine brother-in-arms Frank Hoffman is quoted as follows:

"These distinctions may no longer be as relevant as they were in the past," according to an information paper on the topic authored by retired Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman, a research fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, a division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, VA.

Much more - for those who subscribe to Inside Defense - to include their interpretation of the roles and missions of the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG), which has small teams deployed to Africa and South America and, according to Inside Defense, how the MCTAG would fold into a larger effort to form Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Forces aimed at training and civil-military operations on a task-oriented basis.

Update: For more see Warfighting, Peacemaking, and Hybrid Warfare at Sea at Information Dissemination.

HBO Trailer: Taking Chance

Chance Phelps was wearing his Saint Christopher medal when he was killed on Good Friday. Eight days later, I handed the medallion to his mother. I didn't know Chance before he died. Today, I miss him.

About HBO's Taking Chance

Now, he was home to stay and I suddenly felt at once sad, relieved, and useless. It had been my honor to take Chance Phelps to his final post. Now he is on the high ground overlooking his town.

A Soldier's Story: "Taking Chance" - Caitlin A. Johnson, CBS News, 15 April 2007

After they are brought to Dover Air Force Base, all fallen soldiers, Marines, airmen, and sailors are escorted home to their families and loved ones by a uniformed member of the U.S. armed forces. In mid-April 2004, 38-year-old U.S. Marine Lt. Col. Michael R. Strobl, a manpower analyst assigned to the Combat Development Command in Quantico, Va., accompanied the body of a young Marine killed in Iraq to his final resting place in Wyoming. Strobl wrote the following description of his journey to Wyoming in a small, spiral notebook on his way back to Virginia.

"Taking Chance" - A personal narrative by Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Strobl, CBS News

Chance Phelps was wearing his Saint Christopher medal when he was killed on Good Friday. Eight days later, I handed the medallion to his mother. I didn't know Chance before he died. Today, I miss him.

Over a year ago, I volunteered to escort the remains of Marines killed in Iraq should the need arise. Thankfully, I hadn't been called on to be an escort since Operation Iraqi Freedom began. The first few weeks of April, however, had been tough ones for the Marines. On the Monday after Easter, I was reviewing Department of Defense press releases when I saw that a Private First Class Chance Phelps was killed in action outside of Baghdad. The press release listed his hometown as Clifton, Colorado — which is near where I'm from. I notified our battalion adjutant and told him that, should the duty to escort PFC Phelps fall to our battalion, I would take him.

Lance Corporal Chance Phelps - Wikipedia

Taking Chance - LtCol Michael Strobl, PBS

Taking Chance Home - Blackfive

The Marine Corps is a special fraternity. There are moments when we are reminded of this. Interestingly, those moments don't always happen at awards ceremonies or in dress blues at Birthday Balls. I have found, rather, that they occur at unexpected times and places: next to a loaded moving van at Camp Lejeune's base housing, in a dirty CP tent in northern Saudi Arabia, and in a smoky VFW post in western Wyoming.

Semper Fi.

Petraeus Discusses Way Ahead For Afghanistan

Michael J. Carden

American Forces Press Service

Peace and stability in Afghanistan are incomplete without improving relations among the country and its neighbors, the top U.S. military commander in the region said here yesterday.

Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, U.S. Central Command commander, told an audience at the Washington Convention Center that the road to success in Afghanistan involves commitment and comprehensive coordination from Pakistan, India and possibly Russia and Iran to combat the spread of terror and extremism in central Asia.

"It's not possible to solve the challenges internal to Afghanistan without addressing the challenges, especially in terms of security, with Afghanistan's neighbors," Petraeus said in an address to the U.S. Institute of Peace. "A regional approach is required."

Petraeus spoke as part of a conference highlighting some of the foreign policy challenges facing President-elect Barack Obama's administration, citing complexities of the war in Afghanistan and his perspective on the way forward to bring peace to the region...

SWJ friend Herschel Smith on Major General John Kelly and USMC COIN efforts in Iraq at The Captain's Journal.

... We have observed before that it is the responsibility of the people and government of Iraq to progress on reconciliation, and that the Marines can help only marginally in this endeavor and certainly don't belong in the middle of internecine struggles at this point in the counterinsurgency and reconstruction effort.

... Rather than being in the middle of internecine struggles, the Marines have led by example. This is counterinsurgency at its very best, and represents the closing of an era in Anbar. It's the final phase of the campaign, and while troops will remain in Iraq for some time to help ensure border sovereignty, proper training of Iraqi Security Forces and robust actions against remaining hard core al Qaeda in Iraq fighters, General Kelly has every reason to be proud of his Marines and his own effort.

Nothing follows.

... at Foreign Policy's Passport - This Week at War by Robert Haddick.

Today is the first installment of "This Week at War," a new weekly feature at Foreign Policy, reviewing what's hot in small wars, and at Small Wars Journal...

Yep.

2009 Conference of Army Historians

The U.S. Army Center of Military History is soliciting papers for the 27 - 30 July 2009 biennial Conference of Army Historians, to be held in the Washington, D.C., area. This biennial conference has traditionally featured presentations on joint and combined military history as well as papers presented by civilian historians from government and academia. As such, we are very pleased to invite members of the international and academic communities to both attend and present papers on the 2009 theme of "Exiting War: Phase IV Operations."

"Phase IV Operations," a term used by the U.S. military and the U.S. Department of State, is used to describe all post-conflict operations and efforts, including reconstruction. As such, papers may deal with any aspect of the U.S. Army's role in post-conflict operations, including but not limited to: peace-keeping, nation-building, reconstruction, counter-insurgency, occupation, and withdrawal. Special attention will be given to topics that focus on the current Global War on Terror.

Presenters should be prepared to speak for twenty minutes. Should the Center of Military History decide to publish the conference papers, those speaking will have an opportunity to submit a formal paper for consideration.

Further information on the conference location will be forthcoming on the Center of Military History Website.

Prospective participants should send a detailed topic proposal and formal CV no later than 16 January 2009 to Conference of Army Historians, U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-FPF, 103 Third Avenue, Fort McNair, DC 20319-5058 or via email at [email protected].

Like them or hate them, we still need private security contractors says Colonel Mark Cancian (USMCR Ret.) at FP's Passport.

In criticizing the use of contractors in Iraq, some observers cite Blackwater as the tip of the contractor iceberg. It's a fair analogy, but it deserves to be taken a step further. As with an iceberg, you may be able to shave some off the tip, but hacking away at the body is pointless...

Via e-mail from Michael Yon (and on his web page):

Word just came to me that Paula Lloyd died. The word came from a close mutual friend who currently is in Afghanistan. Godspeed to Paula. Those who knew Paula said many great things. I was told she was engaged to be married. Now Paula is with God.

Paula Lloyd, a Human Terrain Team member in Afghanistan, was attacked last November in the southern village of Maywand by a man who doused Lloyd in a flammable liquid and set her on fire.

We join Michael in offering our condolences to Paula's family, friends and co-workers.

Update: More from Noah at Danger Room.

We've been tracking two Posts by Tom Ricks at his new blogosphere home (The Best Defense) at Foreign Policy. The first post, Fiasco at the Army War College, concerns one of our Small Wars Council members -- Dr. Steven Metz. In that post, Ricks asks - Did faculty members at the Army War College curtail their criticism of the Iraq war for fear of institutional retaliation? The second post, an offshoot of the first, Fiasco at the Army War College: The Sequel concerns Mark Perry, an author of several books on defense issues, who wrote to say that a series of experiences two years ago at the college so concerned him that he sent a letter outlining his worries to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen.

If you feel compelled to comment here or at the Council on either post keep it professional and in context of the issues presented by Ricks -- personal attacks won't cut it. Thanks much.

Ex at Abu Muqawama is also tracking...

Small Wars Journal (the site) has been owned and operated by Small Wars Foundation (the non-profit corporation) since June 1, 2008. We have just received notice from the IRS that Small Wars Foundation is officially recognized as an exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

This is great news for us as we can now pursue subsequent phases of our nefarious plans.

For those of you who have been kind enough to donate to Small Wars Journal, the determination and tax exempt status are retroactive to all donations made 1 June 2008 and later. We will be sending out individual emails shortly to make sure you get the good word before the tax man claims too large a chunk. Please check with your people as to the tax deductibility of your contribution. And fire them if they tell you it isn't.