Blog Posts

... and this:

... and coal in your stockings CSIRO.

The U.S. Defense Department has taken several steps in recent weeks to ensure that hard won lessons in counterinsurgency are not lost when the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are over. The military has been ordered to establish organizations to preserve counterinsurgency capabilities, the Army has published a new training manual focusing on such skills and one military command has published a report indicating that the United States is most likely to face insurgencies and other small scale threats during the next 25 years.

For years, a debate has been raging along the many kilometers of hallways in the Pentagon - should the U.S. military focus on fighting insurgencies or should it return to its traditional strength in conventional, large-scale warfare.

In May, Defense Secretary Robert Gates weighed in.

"I've noticed too much of a tendency toward what might be called 'next-war-itis,' the propensity of much of the defense establishment to be in favor of what might be needed in a future conflict," he said.

By labeling those who favor a focus on large-scale warfare as having 'next-war-itis' Secretary Gates came down firmly on the side of those advocating a deeper commitment to counterinsurgency. Indeed, the secretary asked rhetorically who the United States might reasonably expect to fight in a major traditional war, indicating he sees no such adversary on the horizon...

From the Director

Welcome to the inaugural issue of Operational Culture, the newsletter of the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL)—an easy-to-read synopsis of the latest trends in Marine Corps cultural learning and language familiarization. This is also a forum for discussion and debate about these important issues.

As you may know, Training and Education Command (TECOM) stood up CAOCL in the spring of 2005. We were created to help Marines plan and operate successfully in a joint expeditionary environment.

Equipping Marines with the essential regional, cultural, and language skills that enable them to effectively operate in any region of the world has been re-validated by the just-released "Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025."

The Commandant's new vision statement calls upon all Marines to acquire all the necessary cultural and communications skills to enable them to effectively navigate the "cultural terrain." This means giving Marines the skills they need to operate in any current and potential operating conditions in order to effectively target persistent and emerging irregular, traditional, catastrophic, and disruptive threats.

Complementary to the Commandant's vision and strategy is the Long War operational employment concept that makes the awareness of regional and cultural issues into the foundation of future Marine Corps operations. In particular, cultural awareness and language skills are now key tasks associated with building partnership capacity.

To that end, CAOCL's three primary lines of operations -- education, pre-deployment training, and regional studies -- are connected by a language familiarization program that blends instructor- facilitated classes with self-paced, computer-based training.

To date, CAOCL has supported OIF and OEF. This focused effort will not waver. We are broadening our culture and language capacity to include the development of other regional and country specific packages that support security force activities and unit deployments to Africa, South America, and other global locations.

Your access to Rosetta Stone, CL-150, and other language training programs are part of our effort to develop and sustain individual language skills within the Corps. These courses can be taken via MarineNet or at any of our newly-opened Language Learning Resource Centers.

Additionally, we are expanding our education programs to include a more dynamic

Enlisted and Officer PME. We are also creating a Culture and Strategic Studies program: a confederation of organizations that will provide research, seminars, and symposia. And, lastly, in the spring of 2009, we will release the Career Marine Regional Studies (CMRS) program.

Good things are happening here at CAOCL. However, we believe that our goal of constantly striving to improve service to the Marine Corps is enhanced by active communications with the people we train and educate. So let's hear from you and start a dialogue!

Col George M. Dallas, USMC (Ret.)

Much more in the first issue of Operational Culture.

The rest of the story via The Daily Telegraph

Well done men.

We received this "Who's Who" current history recap out of the blue from Hamid

Hussain.  He was born and raised in Peshawar, is an allergist by

profession, but has been unable to cure his affliction with military history. 

That condition has been observed before on these premises.  Hamid is now

freelancing and doing analysis on security issues in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and

the Middle East.

As for this piece, many of the players and muscle movements will be familiar

to regulars around here.  For folks that haven't been following the story

for long, it's a handy recap and there are plenty of links to many of the

milestone articles.  Here it is basically as received, with some minimal

tweaks to the links.  Thanks, Hamid, and good luck with your new venture.

Courageous Colonels

by Hamid Hussain

'It takes one madman to throw a stone down the well.  It

takes ten wise persons to get it out'.

- A Persian proverb

In the last three years there has been a subtle shift in U.S. military

thinking where colonel level officers have come to the forefront of a debate

about ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.   Most of this debate is going

on the sidelines away from the media limelight but influence of some colonels is

being felt well beyond their rank.  This article will summarize the background

of some of these mid-level officers and the important role they played in the

shift in Iraq policy as far as military operations are concerned.  It will also

look at current ongoing contribution of these officers and point to some of the

potential pitfalls of solutions offered by these officers for a diverse and very

complex strategic environment. 

By Haviland Smith at American Diplomacy

Much more at American Diplomacy.

President George W. Bush sent his best wishes for the holiday season and those of first lady Laura Bush to servicemembers around the world in a message broadcast on the Pentagon Channel.

Here is the text of the President's holiday message:

"Laura and I send greetings to all the men and women of the U.S. military this holiday season.

"This time of year, our thoughts turn to rejoicing and reflection, gratitude and cheer, love and peace.

"Throughout our history, love of country and the hope of peace on earth have inspired America's armed forces, from the frozen fields of France to the jungles of Southeast Asia. Around the globe, today's men and women in uniform are carrying on that noble tradition. You are helping bring freedom, security and peace to millions in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, and you are helping to protect the American people here at home.

"Many of you are spending this holiday season far from home, but you are close in our thoughts and prayers.

"I am sometimes asked what I will miss most about being president. Above all, I am going to miss being your commander in chief. Every one of you volunteered to serve the United States, and in this dangerous time, I thank you for making the world freer, our country safer and all Americans proud.

"Happy holidays and may God bless you."

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

In this season of hope, I want to say how uplifting it has been to get to know so many soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines during the last 24 months.

Many of you are far from home, and I'm sure there's no place you would rather be than with your loved ones. But know that they, and all Americans, are free and secure because of what the men and women of the U.S. military are doing all over the world -- from Fort Lewis to Fort Drum, from Korea to Kosovo, from Bagram to Baghdad.

The holidays are a time to reflect on the kind of nation we are: a nation whose character and decency are embodied in our armed forces. Those who risk life and limb every time they set foot "outside the wire." The medical personnel, engineers, and civil affairs teams who improve the lives of thousands. And all are volunteers.

To the families of our forces: thank you for sharing your loved ones to defend us all. To our troops: we admire your selflessness and pray for your success and safe return home. And to all: happy holidays.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff evoked the Revolutionary War's Battle of Trenton in the annual holiday message he issued to U.S. servicemembers and their families today.

Here is the text of Navy Adm. Mike Mullen's message:

"Throughout our history, when faced with war at this special time of the year, American Servicemen and women have risen with crisis and fought with valor -- while providing their fellow citizens precious moments to enjoy the season's joyous spirit with loved ones at home.

"This tradition harkens to our first holiday season as an independent Nation, 232 years ago. The bleak winter of 1776 found this Republic and its leader, General Washington, with a difficult and uncertain future. At twilight on the twenty-fifth of December, faced with one of the darkest moments of the American Revolution, Washington's Army crossed the icy Delaware River to defeat enemy forces at the Battle of Trenton. Their bravery on that cold winter's night altered the course of the war, and, ultimately, our road to victory.

"Among Washington's troops that December was Thomas Paine, who appealed to the honor and patriotic duty of his fellow soldiers with these famous words: 'These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman.'

"This holiday season, more than 280,000 modern-day patriots are deployed around the globe, ensuring their families and friends -- and ours -- can celebrate in peace and comfort. Let us take pause to honor their sacrifice.

"We also offer our thoughts and prayers to the wounded, their families, and the families of the fallen. Theirs is an emptiness we cannot know -- made only deeper during the holidays. Although their sacred void can never be filled, let us look deep into our hearts and honor them all -- for they richly deserve the love and thanks of a grateful Nation.

"On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our families, I thank you for all that you do for our country. We wish you and your loved ones a festive holiday season, and tidings of peace in the coming New Year."

The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 by Thomas Ricks

The Gamble will be released on 10 February 2009.

Thomas E. Ricks uses hundreds of hours of exclusive interviews with top officers in Iraq and extraordinary on-the-ground reportage to document the inside story of the Iraq War since late 2005 as only he can, examining the events that took place as the military was forced to reckon with itself, the surge was launched, and a very different war began.

Since early 2007 a new military order has directed American strategy. Some top U.S. officials now in Iraq actually opposed the 2003 invasion, and almost all are severely critical of how the war was fought from then through 2006. At the core of the story is General David Petraeus, a military intellectual who has gathered around him an unprecedented number of officers with both combat experience and Ph.D.s. Underscoring his new and unorthodox approach, three of his key advisers are quirky foreigners—an Australian infantryman-turned- anthropologist, an antimilitary British woman who is an expert in the Middle East, and a Mennonite-educated Palestinian pacifist.

The Gamble offers news breaking information, revealing behind-the-scenes disagreements between top commanders. We learn that almost every single officer in the chain of command fought the surge. Many of Petraeus's closest advisers went to Iraq extremely pessimistic, doubting that the surge would have any effect, and his own boss was so skeptical that he dispatched an admiral to Baghdad in the summer of 2007 to come up with a strategy to replace Petraeus's. That same boss later flew to Iraq to try to talk Petraeus out of his planned congressional testimony. The Gamble examines the congressional hearings through the eyes of Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and their views of the questions posed by the 2008 presidential candidates.

For Petraeus, prevailing in Iraq means extending the war. Thomas E. Ricks concludes that the war is likely to last another five to ten years—and that that outcome is a best case scenario. His stunning conclusion, stated in the last line of the book, is that "the events for which the Iraq war will be remembered by us and by the world have not yet happened."

Thomas E. Ricks is The Washington Post's senior Pentagon correspondent, where he has covered the U.S. military since 2000. Until the end of 1999 he held the same beat at The Wall Street Journal, where he was a reporter for seventeen years. A member of two Pulitzer Prize- winning teams for national reporting, he has reported on U.S. military activities in Somalia, Haiti, Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Kuwait, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He is the author of Fiasco, Making the Corps, and A Soldier's Duty.

1) Have you been to Somalia before? If yes proceed to 2. If no proceed to 3

2) Were you kidnapped on that occasion? If yes proceed to 4. If no proceed to 5

3) Have you been to Iraq or Afghanistan? If yes proceed to 7. If no proceed to 6

4) Then you should know better. Don't go

5) Then your luck is probably about to run out. Don't go

6) Then what are you thinking of? Don't go

7) Then you are probably under the impression that you can hide in the green zone and wait for an embed to go somewhere interesting. In Somalia there's no green zone, and the only embeds are with Ethiopian or African Union soldiers who are being blown to smithereens on a daily basis. There's no-one you can trust. And no-one who can guarantee your safety. Don't go

Check out Wings Over Iraq and From the Frontline - great stuff and both added to our blogroll.

The anti-COIN beat goes on with Gian Gentile's latest - this time at War and Game.

Writing "current history" is not an easy task for historians because it involves delving into topics that are often loaded with domestic political implications. It also involves writing about people who are still active in the topic of the current history. Yet, it is very important for professional historians to bring their expertise to the field of current history, if for no other reason than to provide an important corrective to other accounts of the recent past by pundits, so-called experts, journalists, and bloggers of various shapes and sizes.

The war in Iraq is a perfect case in point. Already, a very misleading narrative has been created by memoirists, journalists, and others. That narrative goes like this: because of the U.S. Army's lack of counterinsurgency doctrine and preparation prior to the start of the war it fumbled at counterinsurgency after the fall of Baghdad in spring 2003 until the end of 2006. But then, as a result of newly written counterinsurgency doctrine and inspired leadership, plus an additional five U.S. combat brigades that all entered into the mix in early 2007, Iraq and the American army were rescued. This flawed narrative puts the U.S. Army and U.S. foreign policy on a trajectory toward more Iraqs and Afghanistans.

The interlocutors of this flawed narrative are legion. But a few examples of the texts, articles, and blog entries that have built the matrix-cum-metanarrative include Tom Ricks's Fiasco, published in 2006 (and one can only assume Ricks will add more force to the matrix in his forthcoming The Gamble); Steve Coll's recent lengthy and gushing article in the New Yorker on General David H. Petraeus ("The General's Dilemma," September 8, 2008); and Pete Mansoor's, John Nagl's, and Fred Kagan's numerous writings arguing that prior to the surge the U.S. Army just didn't "get it."

More at War and Game.

Links:

On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign - US Army

Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq - Tom Ricks

The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 - Tom Ricks

The General's Dilemma - Steve Coll, The New Yorker

Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq - Pete Mansoor

Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power - Fred Kagan and Tom Donnelly

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam - John Nagl

More at The Sunday Times.

SWJ Editor's Note: From the small corner of the world of counterinsurgency I occupy my observation is that our (the US) adjustment to face COIN realities, produce a new doctrine for the same and execute that doctrine were well informed by the British Army, Royal Marines and Air Force participants in a program I was associated with (and am) from 2003 to the present. That program -- Joint Urban Warrior -- cosponsored by the USMC and USJFCOM -- specifically looked at insurgent threats and counterinsurgency strategies as well as tactics, techniques and procedures - in five annual wargames and dozens of seminars, workshops and planning events. The UK delegation; along with the Australians, Canadians and others; contributed first-class lessons learned, theory and practice - we owe them quite a bit for that. - Dave Dilegge

Discuss at Small Wars Council

More at The Sunday Times.

Much more at The Army Times.

In over a year of effort, and two separate meetings of OSD's most senior officers; we failed to come up with a good solid definition for Irregular Warfare (IW). It's like porn, we know IW when we see it. I do take exception to the unfounded statement made about historical research. The IW JOC (Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept) may not show it, but there is a lot of good history referenced by both the IW team and counterinsurgency guys, with lots of cross fertilization and common members. We may not have gotten it right, but it wasn't due to a lack of intellectualism. I'll be a bit blunter, people who live in glass houses, need to be careful where they throw their rocks. That said, I agree with the conclusion that we could use a better definition.

To continue, let me decompose the proffered new definition and raise some points:

Combat operations conducted by the overt element of an insurgency in enemy-held territory,

Not clear why IW is limited to combat ops, nor limited to only the overt element rather than the insurgency at large. No explanation is offered. Nor is it clear or useful to make "insurgency" synonymous with IW rather than the subset it should be. I agree that the IW JOC is overtly insurgency oriented and limiting. But equally limiting is constraining our grasp to only the physical dimension of IW -- this is very limiting and historically erroneous. I am also unclear why only the overt element is addressed rather than whole of insurgency. It is completely ambiguous to discuss "enemy held" territory. Is this needed? Meaningful? Extraneous words are killing this definition.

...by predominantly indigenous and irregular forces organized on a military or paramilitary basis,

It is not evident why only "a predominantly indigenous" nature is useful. The global jihad is a movable feast. Irregular forces in IW? No kidding, but organized on a military or paramilitary basis means not terrorist or networked or transnational? How is this relevant today? Taking a backward look at my limited glance -- I have to ask - are we saying that they have to look like us, organize like us, and fight irregularly but conduct combat operations and be overt? This part of the definition is most important and gets us past just COIN, as it could be relevant to Fedeyeen and future jihadist opponents who will target us in future interventions.

...characterized by the extensive use of unorthodox tactics to reduce the combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale of an enemy, usually an established civil and military authority.

Unorthodox is vague but acceptable - but culturally dependent. "Reduce" is okay, but the goals are limited by two physical - conditions and morale - not overthrow of state - or one of Bard O'Neill's or Steve Metz's categories. The ending is a bit odd, "an enemy" helps me figure out the meaning of the "enemy held territory" in opening phrase, but its utility in both places is not clear and it seems to only muddy things.

All in all - the beginnings of a good debate. Yes, we need a definition better than what we have. Yes, concur with the point about populations (very COIN centric). But out of a dozen or so definitions that exist in the foreign literature, and the six or so developed by OSD, Army, Booze Allen etc, this is not an improvement. Sorry about that -- so it's back to the white board. I will put up a bottle of scotch to the best definition.

More at The Washington Times.

Also:

13 January 2009 - The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948: A Discourse to Shape America's Discourse (Symposium). Washington, D.C. -- at the Reserve Officer's Association at the intersection of First Street and Constitution Avenue, NE. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 was passed as the U.S. was beginning a "war of ideology... a war unto death," as America's Ambassador to Russia described it at the time. But, beginning in the 1970's, instead of promoting international engagement through information, cultural and educational exchanges, the law was distorted into a barrier of engagement. From its propaganda and counter-propaganda intentions, it transformed into an anti-propaganda law for reasons that had little to nothing to do with concerns over domestic influence and far removed from the original intent of the law. Keynotes will be given by Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy James K. Glassman and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy Michael Doran. There will be four 90 minute panels -- past, present, future, and Congress -- that will emphasize Q&A, discourse, and debate and not presentations or monologues. Registration is free, open to the public, and required to attend. The event will be on the record with a transcript available after the event. A public report based on the proceedings will be produced. Registration and other information can be found at http://mountainrunner.us/symposium.

More at The New York Times.

From the Veterans for America web page:

More at VFA.

More at The Middle East Times.

Let's get something straight.  There's a strong streak of unapologetic

curmudgeon in both Dave and me.  But it's not nearly as strong as the

raging case of validation of preconceived notions that runs in so many

commentators these days.  Latest case in point, some of the reactions to

Dave's recent micro-rant,

It Takes a

Hero. 

For example,

Armchair Generalist says "Small Wars Journal Blog departs from the sane and

analytical evaluation of military issues and sounds off with a primal scream of

disgust on what they perceive as unjust things....Fortunately we have articulate

people on the left, like

Matt Yglesias, who can counter this short-sighted, myopic view."  Both

go on to suggest SWJ has basically drunk the Kool-Aid, buys "completely into the

CheneyBush argument for the Iraqi invasion and justification for continued US

force presence", and "reflects some dangerous trends in American culture." 

Yeah, right.

Take another look at

Dave's post. 

Intermittent display of personal frustration / disappointment?  Sure. 

Revisionist history or glorifying, fact-distorting, self-justifying neo-con

rant?  Hell no.  That's only there if you want to see it that way. 

Primal scream of disgust?  Not hardly.  Unless you count the one that

rightfully follows from how so many people can spool so endlessly on such random

things.

So we'll continue to toil away here, focusing on the serious work at hand. 

For the most part, we have no Small Wars Journal house opinion, other than that

the opinions of all serious participants should be heard and considered. 

We're trying to facilitate that, and will continue to be equal opportunity based

on substance, credibility, and weight of reason, not ideology.  We'd like

to be better at it, and we'd dearly like greater participation from non-military practitioners of Small Wars.  It will come.

From time to time, we'll flip out a personal opinion.  You don't do this

for as much time as we do without forming a few that you just want to put out

there, pretty clearly standing alone as such and only for what they're worth

(typically not much).  But that happens on SWJ Blog a lot less than most

blogs, and it never interferes with our desire to publish substantive analysis

and personal insights on all sides of unpopular issues, whenever we can find

them presented thoughtfully.  Those are worth a lot more.  We are,

after all, pretty much boring small wars wonks.  And as such, one thing we

really don't like is opinion disguised as analysis, particularly when it's

cantilevered out from extrapolated perceptions.  We'll leave that to the

legions of armchair pundits.

Active component officers train for, prepare, and staff reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) operations and conflict prevention and mitigation efforts all over the world. They focus on critical initial interagency functions such as assessment, planning, and management in order to stand-up or increase the capabilities of USG systems/structures for response and implementation of R&S activities for a specific crisis operation in countries in or emerging from conflict. CRC-A will work with military or peacekeeping forces and with international organizations and NGOs on the ground.

CRC-A officers are full-time employees who must be available for overseas deployment within 48 hours of notification. Officers may spend up to 60% of their year in conflict areas on deployments averaging 3 months. CRC-A members will attend up to eight weeks of formal training and exercises per year. Deployments may be to the most isolated and restricted overseas locations, including combat zones, and may involve embedding with U.S. or international military or peacekeeping units. Deployed personnel will receive benefits (per diem, hardship, danger pay) as applicable. Please visit www.civilianresponsecorps.gov for more information.

Please Note: Some positions are open to current employees only; other are advertised for all sources. More Active Component positions will be posted shortly, please check our website for updates. In addition, Washington-based positions supporting these overseas operations are also available.

Copies of the announcements are available here. Bookmark and check back as more vacancies become available.

Much more at U.S. News and World Report.

FM 7-0 Download

FM 7-0 Information Paper

FM 7-0 Media Package

Jules has an overview and plenty of photographs marking the anniversary of this "bloodiest of battles".

I was sent an email by Dr. Carter Malkasian stating that you wished to speak to me. I then quickly was informed that an article was published with a quote from this summer's CNA/Press Club book launch.

I wished you had waited to speak to me, since I would have put the quote in context. There are many positive developments within the British Army at the moment.

British officers and soldiers were embarrassed since they felt they could not complete their COIN mission in Iraq, due to issues outside their remit.

There is recognition that the Americans have reformed beyond all expectations. The British Army has recognised the need to reform as well.

The British Army and HMG had many issues in MND SE due to a variety of decisions, one being the US approach to the campaign from 2003-06, which was not appropriate. However, the British Army recognised that the war had changed dramatically in 2007 and many commanders, officers, NCOs and soldiers wished there had been a shift of strategy from Whitehall for MND SE.

The shift finally occurred with the Charge of the Knights and the British were able to support the Iraqi 14 DIV in its efforts to clear and now hold the city of BASRA, through proper embedding into MITTs. The British Army in their time honoured tradition of learning and adapting, was able to restore honour to their mission in MND SE. Many lessons are being learned from the campaign in Iraq that have had a positive impact on British operations in Helmand and RC South.

The British campaign in RC South and Helmand has been difficult but not due to the efforts of the officers, NCOs and soldiers of the British Army. Their preparation for Helmand has been stronger with each HERRICK due to lessons from the past as well as Iraq. There are issues for the Army that are outside their control but rest with Whitehall that need to be addressed.

All armies need to learn and adapt. The Americans have done so and now the British are doing it as well.

I feel that I should write a letter to the editor or an op-ed to put these 'quotes' in their proper context. Do you have any ideas how best to do this?

Best

Daniel Marston

-----

SWJ Editors Note: This letter is in response to an article in today's Times entitled US Accuses Britain Over Military Failings in Afghanistan by Tom Baldwin and Michael Evans.

Nothing follows.