Small Wars Journal

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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 12/04/2008 - 5:40pm | 0 comments

Charlie Rose Show: A conversation with Air Force General Kevin Chilton, Commander, United States Strategic Command.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 12/04/2008 - 1:43pm | 0 comments
USJFCOM Press Release and Link to JOE 2008

US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) released today their Joint Operating Environment 2008 (JOE 2008), a report that discusses the trends and contexts of the future operating environment and their implication for the future joint force. JOE 2008 is designed to spark discussions with the widest set of national security and multinational partners about the nature of the future security environment and its potential military requirements.

In the broadest sense, the Joint Operating Environment examines three questions:

1. What future trends and disruptions are likely to affect the joint force over the next quarter century?

2. How are these trends and disruptions likely to define the future contexts for joint operations?

3. What are the implications of these trends and contexts for the joint force?

By exploring these trends, contexts, and implications, the Joint Operating Environment provides a basis for thinking about the world a quarter of a century from now. Its purpose is not to predict, but to suggest ways leaders might think about the future.

JOE 2008 examines changes and trends in the geopolitical and military landscape, such as: demographics, globalization, economics, pandemics, cyber, space, energy, resource scarcity, climate change and national disasters. These trends then form the context for exploring the following types of scenarios:

1. Competition and Cooperation Among Conventional Powers

2. Potential Challenges and Threats

3. Weak and Failing States

4. The Threats of Unconventional Power

5. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

6. Technology

7. The Battle of Narratives

8. Urbanization.

JOE 2008 makes the case that, "The next quarter century will challenge US joint forces with threats and opportunities ranging from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons."

JOE 2008 contributes to USJFCOM's central mission to develop a vision for how our military forces will conduct future operations and test this vision in the most realistic and challenging ways possible.

Joint Operating Environment 2008 (JOE 2008 full document)

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 12/03/2008 - 7:16pm | 1 comment
Carlo Muí±ozn at Inside Defense reports that the new DoD Directive for Irregular Warfare was signed and released on 1 December. The Directive establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DoD conduct of IW and development of capabilities to address irregular challenges to national security and requires any conflicting issuances be identified to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the OSD Director, Administration and Management. Here's an excerpt from Inside Defense:

A new Pentagon directive on irregular warfare drops the idea of making US Special Operations Command the joint proponent for IW and assigns a leading role for developing IW doctrine and capabilities to US Joint Forces Command. ...links IW to the "core US military mission" of stability operations, noting that improving the Defense Department's IW proficiency enhances DOD's conduct of stability operations...

JFCOM, rather than SOCOM, will assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense in "identifying tracking requirements for critical skills and experiences relevant to IW"... JFCOM will also handle another task previously envisioned for SOCOM: leading the identification of "joint IW-relevant capabilities" and recommending priorities for developing those capabilities.

The directive also says JFCOM chief Gen. James Mattis will lead the collaborative development of joint standards for general purpose forces' "IW-relevant training and readiness," along with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen and the service chiefs...

Further, in what could be an attempt to advance a more holistic approach to IW, the final directive omits language that would have required organizations to assign IW tasks to a specific official, as opposed to the institution at large. The final version of the directive notably lists stability operations on the roster of IW missions...

For those who subscribe to Inside Defense there is much more - or sign up for an account at the Inside Defense News Stand - the first three downloads are free.

For those who would like to read DoD Directive 3000.07 (Irregular Warfare) in full, Small Wars Journal has posted it here.

For additional background on IW see the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept. The stated purpose of the IW JOC is to describe how future joint force commanders will accomplish strategic objectives through the conduct of protracted IW on a global or regional scale. It identifies capabilities and capacities required to successfully prosecute IW. Many of the ideas advocated in this JOC are drawn from best practices of current conflicts and history.

Update

US to Raise 'Irregular War' Capabilities - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post

The Pentagon this week approved a major policy directive that elevates the military's mission of "irregular warfare" - the increasingly prevalent campaigns to battle insurgents and terrorists, often with foreign partners and sometimes clandestinely - to an equal footing with traditional combat.

The directive, signed by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England on Monday, requires the Pentagon to step up its capabilities across the board to fight unconventionally, such as by working with foreign security forces, surrogates and indigenous resistance movements to shore up fragile states, extend the reach of US forces into denied areas or battle hostile regimes.

The policy, a result of more than a year of debate in the defense establishment, is part of a broader overhaul of the US military's role as the threat of large-scale combat against other nations' armies has waned and new dangers have arisen from shadowy non-state actors, such as terrorists that target civilian populations.

More at The Washington Post.

Update # 2

Pentagon Steers Toward Irregular Warfare - Westhawk, Westhawk

... When (and if) implemented, this directive will be a sweeping change in the functioning of the entire Defense Department. Naturally, the extent to which the directive's intent is carried out will depend on who leads the Department in the future, on Congressional input and appropriations, and on what actually happens in the world over the next decade (the enemies' votes). As written, the directive establishes the basis for a dramatic change in the US military. An appropriate global context will ensure the completion of this transformation.

Mike Vickers's directive assigns irregular warfare responsibilities and tasks to every corner of the US Defense establishment. All of the under-secretariats inside the Pentagon, the Services, the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff are assigned their homework.

The directive represents a crushing defeat for those who wished to keep irregular warfare doctrine and execution segregated inside a discrete box within the Department. Under this directive, everyone in the Department has a significant part to play. Thus Gian Gentile's nightmare has come true...

More at Westhawk.

by Dave Dilegge | Tue, 12/02/2008 - 10:29pm | 4 comments
I'm sitting here pondering the latest e-mail circulating through various military and subject matter expert networks concerning Dr. Jason Brownlee's Middle East Report hit-piece on the Army's newest field manual -- FM 3-07, Stability Operations. In Imagining the Next Occupation, Brownlee evokes all the politically biased bugaboos in his implied bottom line - the better we become at nation building the more likely we are to try to do more of it, thereby establishing military occupation as a Pentagon priority.

I'll give my "knuckle-dragger" two-cents worth and then turn this discussion over to good friend and colleague Dr. Janine Davidson via her recent Small Wars Journal post - The New Army Stability Operations Manual: Fact, Fiction, and Perspective on FM 3-07 (reposted here in full and recommended reading for Dr. Brownlee should he be inquisitive enough to wander by SWJ).

My bottom line for those disposed to hurling stones at doctrinal publications such as FM 3-07 and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (USA and USMC doctrine) is they really do not understand why the Army and Marine Corps (MCWP 33.3.5) felt compelled to write both publications -- because in the absence of such doctrine -- they were reduced to "winging it" -- conducting stability and counterinsurgency missions as directed by our civilian authorities without the whole of government package associated with such operations. Read -- all those non-military lines of operation such as governance, essential services and rule of law. When a vacuum exists someone needs to fill it and this often falls to the default only guys in town -- excepting the bad guys of course.

Doctrine is not national security strategy, defense strategy or a campaign plan and it is especially not the U.S. military's version of Mao's Little Red Book. Often unread by many until needed, military doctrine provides a common framework and lexicon to foster initiative and creative problem solving. In the case of the two FMs mentioned here, it provides a how to think - not what to think - about an unfamiliar operating environment. The military really does like to be "prepared for the unexpected" and the lack of such doctrine has caught us flat-footed one too many times. More importantly, the collaboration between the Army and non-DoD civilian departments and agencies on FM 3-07 paved the way for a common framework to someday truly contribute to a whole of government approach (read unity of effort here) to problems that beg for non-military solutions. Dr. Brownlee -- it ain't sinister -- it's just good common sense.

Now on to the smart stuff -- here is Dr. Davidson's 20 October SWJ post on the facts, fiction, and perspectives concerning FM 3-07.

The recent release of the Army's latest Field Manual, FM 3-07 Stability Operations, has generated as much controversy as it has praise. On one side of the debate are those who see it as a great step forward in helping the military make sense of the complex, violent, and population-focused environments in which it increasingly finds itself. To the extent that our future conflicts are likely to look more like our current ones as Secretary Gates has asserted, it is high time we stopped muddling through and got serious about learning how to do this stuff. On the other end of the spectrum, however, are those who see the new doctrine as another dangerous step on the slippery slope toward U.S. imperialism. The better we become at nation building the critics claim, the more likely we are to try to do more of it. Moreover, teaching soldiers how to do stability operations not only erodes their war-fighting skills (i.e. their "real" mission), but it lets the civilian agencies who are supposed to do it off the hook in building their own capabilities and capacities. There are merits to both arguments, but on balance FM 3-07 should be seen as a great accomplishment.

Why FM 3-07?

It is perfectly understandable to hope that the military will conduct fewer stability operations in the future, but hoping does not make it so. The military still needs to prepare itself for the missions it will most likely be called on to perform. Given the thousands of troops over the last 200 years who have repeatedly been called to conduct these messy stability operations with little to no doctrine, education, or training, it seems high time someone put some rigorous effort into understanding how to conduct them better.

The concern over the U.S. as an imperialist power may be valid, but let's not get carried away. Doctrine is not grand strategy. For those who worry that this new doctrine will make it more likely that we will try to invade and occupy more countries, consider that it might just have the opposite effect. If there is one thing this manual makes very clear, it is that stability operations are not rocket science -- they are actually more complex and uncertain. Having a better understanding of the complexity and cost of these missions can only enhance the policy and strategy-making processes.

Fact vs. Fiction

The real value of FM 3-07 is that it gets a dialogue going and sets a few things straight:

First, FM 3-07 rightly notes that, contrary to popular belief, the Army has been conducting these types of missions for 200 years. The opening chapter is an excellent overview of this rich history. Military troops have been tasked with stabilizing, building, and re-building societies since the first units were sent West to keep peace between the settlers and the Indians and to build -- literally -- the nation. Recall that West Point was established as an engineering school for a reason. President Thomas Jefferson insisted that if we were to have a standing military (which he originally opposed) it should be as useful in times of peace as it is in times of war. One might make a similar case today and ask if the American taxpayer should expect more for $500 billion than an institution organized, trained, and equipped to fight conventional battles and nothing else.

Second, the manual recognizes that the nature of conflict is more complex than the pure science of defeating enemy militaries. If we truly wish leave a lasting peace in the places in which we intervene or fight, we do not have a choice between preparing for pure scientific battles and preparing for stability operations. At a minimum, if we do not stabilize a place after we bring down an enemy, then we set a trajectory for more chaos not peace. In so many other cases where the military is called to intervene in on-going conflicts or insurgencies, where the need to provide human security is the decisive line of operation, we need a military with a "full spectrum" mindset to understand the myriad interconnected tasks required to get the job done. FM 3-07 is a first step in this education.

Third, the manual suggests that despite aspirations to the contrary, the desired capability and capacity in civilian agencies not only does not currently exist, but it is not likely to be built in the near future. More importantly, even if and when USAID, State and all the other agencies were to enhance their expeditionary capacity 10 fold, these civilians would still not be capable -- nor should they be -- of doing their thing while bullets are still flying. That is the definition of a combatant, not a civilian. This means that the military will, at a minimum, be required to set a trajectory for accomplishing the long term strategic objectives with or without civilian experts on the ground. Once the environment is safe enough for civilians to engage, the military needs to know how to support their work. This means having a fundamental understanding of the nature of the conflict environment, the intersecting lines of operation (e.g. governance, security, economic development, etc), and the appropriate coordination of efforts among myriad military and civilian actors. This is what FM 3-07 is designed to accomplish.

Finally, it is important to understand that although this is a military manual, paid for and sponsored by the U.S. Army, it is in every other way, shape, and form, a true interagency, whole-of-government product. The process of writing this manual was almost as important as the product itself -- and this process was unique. Through a series of conferences, roundtables, and workshops with thought leaders and representatives from various agencies throughout the government, in the NGO community, and among allies, FM 3-07's author, LTC Steve Leonard, was able to glean the latest thought, theory, lessons, and controversies from the widest possible group of experts. Detailed debates over language, connotations, social science theory, and recent lessons learned from the field took place over a 10-month period, with some of these non-military participants contributing actual text to the finished product. In the end, FM 3-07 was written for and by the civilian-military community of practice, which spans well beyond just the U.S. Army. LTG Caldwell, the manual's chief sponsor at Fort Leavenworth, recognized the importance of generating this vibrant interagency dialogue and has thus set the bar for future whole of government efforts in doctrine and strategy. Indeed, the next QDR might follow a similar model.

In sum, FM 3-07 is a great accomplishment. It is about time we thought seriously about these missions -- not only how to do them, but why we do them. That the publication has generated great debate means that it is functioning just as it should.

Update:

Andrew Exum has more at Abu Muqawama - On Critiques of COIN/StabOps:

This MERIP piece is just another example, I'm afraid, of what happens when a political scientist tries to arrive at broad conclusions about the military without the necessary familiarity and study required to do so.

Spencer Ackerman at Washington Indpendent chimes in too - The Counterinsurgency Debate in Two Quick Hyperlinks.

Update # 2:

Mark O'Neill at Lowy Institute's The Interpreter - It's Not a Strategy, it's Just a Very Useful Book:

The pertinent fact to take away from all of the noise is that FM 3.07 is not grand strategy. It is not even a strategy. It is essentially a 'cook book' that provides US Army personnel in simple, easy to understand format, concise information about what they should do when in a stability operation. And this is useful, since they actually have a few of these on their plates at the moment, and it is probably better (for all of us) if they can pull them off successfully.

The idea that the US is likely to embark upon countless crusades because the US Army now has some instructions in how to undertake stability operations is ridiculous. Consider this - the US Army has had doctrine for the tactical use of nuclear weapons for over half a century. I don't recall seeing any blogging about the fact that because they have nuclear weapons doctrine that they will invariably use such weapons. It is simply an illogical argument.
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 12/02/2008 - 5:49pm | 1 comment
Newsweek

The 8 December edition of Newsweek Magazine features leading foreign-policy experts offering their recommendations on dealing with some of the world's most difficult and pressing challenges. Here's the lineup:

Wanted: A New Grand Strategy - Fareed Zakaria

The next US president faces a unique opportunity to put in place an architecture of peace for the 21st century. Grand strategy sounds like an abstract concept - something academics discuss - and one that bears little relationship to urgent, jarring events on the ground. But in the absence of strategy, any administration will be driven by the news, reacting rather than leading. For a superpower that has global interests and is forced to respond to virtually every problem, it's all too easy for the urgent to drive out the important.

Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory? - Andrew J. Bacevich

In Afghanistan today, the United States and its allies are using the wrong means to pursue the wrong mission. Sending more troops to the region, as incoming president Barack Obama and others have suggested we should, will only turn Operation Enduring Freedom into Operation Enduring Obligation. Afghanistan will be a sinkhole, consuming resources neither the US military nor the US government can afford to waste.

Iran: Talk Tough With Tehran - Dennis Ross

It's not too late to stop Iran from getting the bomb. Tehran clearly wants nukes for both defensive and offensive purposes. But it's not clear the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, would sacrifice anything to get nuclear weapons.

Russia: Ease Moscow's Suspicions - Michael Mandelbaum

Russia has reason to feel betrayed by the process of NATO expansion, begun in 1997. Seven years earlier, the Russians believe, American and German officials working on German reunification pledged not to take advantage of Moscow's weakness by extending NATO into Russia's traditional backyard.

China: Don't Isolate, Integrate - Richard N. Haass

The single most important challenge for the new administration—one with the potential to shape the 21st century - is China. As goes China, so go 1.3 billion men, women and children - one out of every five people on the planet.

Middle East: Know the Limits of US Power - John J. Mearsheimer

The United States is in deep trouble in the Middle East. Despite Barack Obama's promises to withdraw from Iraq, the debacle there shows no sign of ending soon. Hamas rules in Gaza; Iran is quickly moving to acquire a nuclear deterrent. We need a radically different strategy for the region.

Charlie Rose

Charlie Rose Show - A conversation about National Security with Steve Coll, Nic Burns and Fareed Zakaria.
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 12/02/2008 - 3:39pm | 0 comments

After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.

Linda Robinson conducted extensive interviews with Petraeus and his subordinate commanders and spent weeks with key U.S. and Iraqi divisions. The result is the only book that ties together military operations in Iraq and the internecine political drama that is at the heart of the civil war.

Replete with dramatic battles, behind-doors confrontations, and astute analysis, the book tells the full story of the Iraq War's endgame, and lays out the options that will be facing the next president when he or she takes office in January 2009.

The US Army / USMC Counterinsurgency Center is pleased to host Linda Robinson at the COIN Center Breakfast Brownbag from 0830 to 0900 (CST) 0930 to 1000 (EST) on Wednesday, December 3, 2008. She will discuss the Iraq Surge and Counterinsurgency. Off-Site personnel may participate virtually at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinbrownbag.

Ms. Robinson, the author of Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces and Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq, is a author in residence at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies' Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies and a contributing editor for U.S. News and World Report.

Ms. Robinson is also the author of a Small Wars Journal Trip Report published on 17 September 2007 entitled Where Do We Go From Here?

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 12/02/2008 - 5:12am | 1 comment
Today's New York Times features a military analysis piece by Michael Gordon on the stiff challenge our strategy for Afghanistan poses for President-elect Obama.

One of the most difficult challenges President-elect Barack Obama's national security team faces is Mr. Obama's vow to send thousands of American troops to help defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Military experts agree that more troops are required to carry out an effective counterinsurgency campaign, but they also caution that the reinforcements are unlikely to lead to the sort of rapid turnaround that the so-called troop surge in Iraq produced after its start in 2007.

After seven years of war, Afghanistan presents a unique set of problems: a rural-based insurgency, an enemy sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan, the chronic weakness of the Afghan government, a thriving narcotics trade, poorly developed infrastructure, and forbidding terrain...

Quoted are many COIN practitioners familiar to SWJ readers: Dr. David Kilcullen - Afghanistan may be the 'good war,' but it is also the harder war, Ali A. Jalali - Afghanistan is not Iraq... It is the theme park of problems, General David McKiernan - ... trying to develop a "bottom up" approach in which tribal elders, religious figures and other community leaders would form local councils that would be given the authority and resources to help with security, Colonel John Agoglia and Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott - ... more American and international troops are needed to protect the Afghan population and hold ground that can eventually be handed off to expanded and better trained Afghan forces... They must deploy prepared for a long fight... They must think long term and realize that victory is unlikely on their watch. They must build a solid foundation on which their successors build on gains made.

Much more at The New York Times.

by Dave Dilegge | Mon, 12/01/2008 - 10:22pm | 2 comments
Just back from a quick tour of blogs I frequent - and some I will soon frequent - to see what they are saying - or have said recently - concerning the President-elect's national security and foreign policy nominations. Not all have commented -- here's what's what from those that have:

David Ignatius at PostPartisan - This is Obama's team; he's clearly in charge. You could see that he wasn't diminished by the proximity of strong personalities; quite the opposite.

Max Boot at Contentions - As someone who was skeptical of Obama's moderate posturing during the campaign, I have to admit that I am gobsmacked by these appointments , most of which could just as easily have come from a President McCain.

Steve Coll at Think Tank - The real challenge (and practical fix) for the next Secretary of State is simply to convince Congress to pay for more diplomats. Filling the shortfall of 2,400 or so positions would reduce waiting times for job applicants, but more importantly, it would give our diplomatic corps the time to get out from behind our desks to communicate with locals, the resources to plan for and respond to emergencies and major events, and the career flexibility to get the training we need to be ready for future challenges.

Blake Hounshell at Passport - What will they do in office? It's too early to tell, but all of these folks, David Sanger observes, "have embraced a sweeping shift of priorities and resources in the national security arena."

Joshua Keating at Passport - Jones's thin paper trail may worry partisans, but with Clinton, Joe Biden, Robert Gates, and Susan Rice on his team, Obama probably has enough big egos with well-defined worldviews to advise him on foreign policy. He may be looking for a towering presence who can call BS on wrongheaded recommendations when necessary, a task the 6'4" Jones seems more than qualified to carry out.

Galrahn at Information Dissemination - The US Navy is a mess right now, and Obama's decision to retain Secretary Gates can't be seen as a good thing for US Navy leadership. Think about the gamble facing the Navy with the Obama administration, the argument to change plans just for the DDG-1000 with the current argument expects the Obama administration to come in, override the recommendation of Secretary Gates, hurt the shipbuilding industry (piss off or on the Unions, however you want to call it), spend more money on the alternative Navy plan, build a fleet for a strategic environment best represented by a nuclear war with China, and finally, take action counter to the majority Democratic Congressman and Senators who are supporting the DDG-1000 plan.

David Wood at Military Watch - The threat of nuclear weapons runs through almost every national security decision Obama and his team will make, from terrorism through negotiations with Moscow.

Noah Shachtman at Danger Room - As predicted, Robert Gates will be staying on as Defense Secretary in the new Obama administration. Count me as psyched. I've been of fan of Gates', for quite some time. I wrote this, for example, in June.

Mary Katharine Ham at The Blog - He fell back on his usual dissembling on Iraq, when asked about withdrawal: "Now, remember what I said consistently during the campaign, and you were there for most of it. I said we'd have all combat troops out of Iraq in 16 months, and that there would likely remain a residual force there." He's clearly squeaking the door open on staying in Iraq, both with rhetoric and appointments (Jim Jones as National Security Adviser instead of Susan Rice.)

Tom Barnett at Thomas P.M. Barnett - Gates is staying, very exciting to hear!

Dan Froomkin at White House Watch - Rather than simply hire a new brand of loyalists -- or replace one gut player with another -- Obama is making it clear that he wants his thinking challenged and wants to hear opposing views before he reaches his decisions.

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway - We're about to see a great shift in resources from the military to other actors, David Sanger argues. In a New Atlanticist piece called "Obama's Foreign Policy Shift," I join Matt Yglesias in proclaiming this "a really good idea."

Jennifer Rubin at Contentions - Certainly much depends on execution of policy, as specific decisions arise for the new administration. But conservatives have little reason to complain about the national security front.

Joe Klein at Swampland - Watching the Obama rollout of his national security team from overseas--I'm in Europe, on my way to Afghanistan--I was struck by the inanity of most of the questions from my colleagues. Granted, these are political reporters, not national security or foreign policy specialists, but what sort of journalist expects the President-elect to tell the "inside story" of how he selected Hillary Clinton?

Jennifer Rubin at Contentions - In responding to a query on his (Obama's) team's strong viewpoints and personalities, he again emphasized his commitment to military strength. His emphasis was on strengthening our capabilities "in all dimensions." (This would seem to mesh with my take that he's not going to be abandoning "hard" power, but rather attempting to supplement it.)

Judah Grunstein at World Politics Review - I think the political optics of what signal this sends regarding Democrats ability to manage national security rightly take a back seat here to the fact that Gates has been very impressive in effecting the institutional changes necessary to support the operational needs of two ongoing wars. But the Pentagon's final internal armistice lines (COIN vs. conventional and hard vs. soft power in Iran, for instance) have not been ultimately settled, which means maintaining continuity at the top makes sense for the time being.

Spencer Ackerman at Attackerman - Instead, Obama presented a clear picture of what he intends to do. Withdraw from Iraq along his 16-month timetable, "but I will listen to the recommendations of [military] commanders." Renew efforts against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Confront the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Reduce the dependency on foreign oil. And, as my last post indicated, recalibrate the balance between civilian and military efforts in U.S. national security to use what Vice President-elect Biden called the "totality" of options.

Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement - Wake up and smell the foreign policy! Big day for the incoming Clinton-Bush administration as POTUS-elect Obama Rodham Bush 3 announces the national security team he campaigned against.

Herschel Smith at The Captain's Jounal - So there seems to be a fundamental difference between Gates and the balance of the team. Gates apparently doesn't believe in fairy tales and myths, while the demands on the left are for Obama not only to defund the military and engage enemies with dialogue, but to succeed, and that, remarkably so. This administration and the American public are being set up for huge disappointment, but all is not lost.

Mark at The Torch - The shift would create a greatly expanded corps of diplomats and aid workers that, in the vision of the incoming Obama administration, would be engaged in projects around the world aimed at preventing conflicts and rebuilding failed states. However, it is unclear whether the financing would be shifted from the Pentagon.

Steve Field at The D-Ring - With the announcement that Sec. Gates will be staying on at the Pentagon for at least a year during what is described as a "rolling transition," my attention has turned to the new communications apparatus at the Pentagon.

Editors at New Atlanticist - The incoming administration will face an enormous array of national security challenges. With General Jim Jones' vision, integrity, and wisdom having such a central role in guiding them, they have a solid foundation.

Westhawk at Westhawk - What about the Obama team's regional strategy for the Afghan problem? One is likely to get better results from a negotiation when one is bargaining from a position of strength. That doesn't describe the U.S. position right now, something the Pakistani and Iranian governments know very well.

Antonious Block at Strategy and National Security - I think the idea of keeping Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense until Obama's own secretary can assemble his team and hit the ground running is brilliant. I also think Clinton will be an excellent Secretary of State (even though I was vehemently opposed to her as a presidential candidate).

Erin Simpson at Abu Muqawama - Victory in our time. Victory for this blog, that is.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 12/01/2008 - 7:05pm | 0 comments

CNN via YouTube: President-elect Obama introduces his national security Team.

Embedded video from CNN Video

CNN: CNN's Ed Henry reports on President-elect Barack Obama's national security team members.

Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

"I am deeply honored that the President-Elect has asked me to continue as Secretary of Defense."

"Mindful that we are engaged in two wars and face other serious challenges at home and around the world, and with a profound sense of personal responsibility to and for our men and women in uniform and their families, I must do my duty - as they do theirs. How could I do otherwise?"

"Serving in this position for nearly two years - and especially the opportunity to lead our brave and dedicated Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Defense Civilians - has been the most gratifying experience of my life. I am honored to continue to serve them and our country, and I will be honored to serve President-Elect Obama."

Pentagon Channel: Robert Gates has agreed to stay on as Secretary of Defense in the Barack Obama administration.

Remarks of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

"Mr. President-elect, thank you for this honor. If confirmed, I will give this assignment, your administration, and our country my all. I also want to thank my fellow New Yorkers, who have for eight years given me the joy of a job I love, with the opportunity to work on issues I care about deeply, in a State that I cherish. And you've also helped prepare me well for this new role. After all, New Yorkers aren't afraid to speak their minds, and do so in every language."

"Leaving the Senate is very difficult for me. But during the last few weeks, I thought often of our troops, serving bravely under difficult circumstances in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. I thought of those other Americans, in our foreign and civil services, working hard to promote and protect our interests around the world. And I thought of the daunting tasks ahead for our country: an economy that is reeling, a climate that is warming, and as we saw with the horrible events in Mumbai -- threats that are relentless. The fate of our nation and the future of our children will be forged in the crucible of these global challenges. America cannot solve these crises without the world, and the world cannot solve them without America."

"By electing Barrack Obama our next President, the American people have demanded not just a new direction at home, but a new effort to renew America's standing in the world as a force for positive change. We know our security, our values, and our interests cannot be protected and advanced by force alone. Nor indeed by Americans alone. We must pursue vigorous diplomacy using all the tools we can muster, to build a future with more partners and fewer adversaries, more opportunities and fewer dangers, for all who seek freedom, peace, and prosperity."

"America is a place founded on the idea that everyone should have the right to live up to his or her God-given potential. And it is that same ideal that must guide America's purpose in the world today. And while we are determined to defend our freedoms and liberties at all costs, we also reach out to the world again, seeking common cause and higher ground. And so I believe the best way to continue serving my country, is to join President-elect Obama, Vice President-elect Biden, the leaders here, and the dedicated public servants of the State Department on behalf of our nation at this defining moment.

"President Kennedy once said that, 'engaging the world to meet the threats we face was the greatest adventure of our century.' Well Mr. President-elect, I am proud to join you, on what will be a difficult and exciting adventure in this new century. And may God bless you, and all who serve with you, and our great country."

CNN via YouTube: Senator Hillary Clinton's remarks upon nomination for Secretary of State.

Obama Names Key Members of Foreign Policy, National Security Team

By Jim Malone, Voice of America

President-elect Barack Obama announced the key members of his foreign policy and national security team Monday, including his choice of former political rival Hillary Clinton to be his secretary of state. In addition, Mr. Obama has decided to keep on the current defense secretary, Robert Gates. VOA National correspondent Jim Malone reports from Washington.

Mr. Obama announced his foreign policy and national security team at a news conference in Chicago.

The president-elect said it was time for a new beginning in what he called an uncertain world, and he described his team as ready to lead what he called a new dawn of American leadership around the world.

"We will strengthen our capacity to defeat our enemies and support our friends," Obama said. "We will renew old alliances and forge new and enduring partnerships. We will show the world once more that America is relentless in defense of our people, steady in advancing our interests, and committed to the ideals that shine as a beacon to the world--democracy and justice, opportunity and unyielding hope--because American values are America's great export to the world."

Mr. Obama's choice of Hillary Clinton to be his secretary of state has easily been the most surprising development so far in the presidential transition period.

Mr. Obama described his former political rival as someone who commands respect in world capitols and who can carry out his commitment to renew American diplomacy and restore alliances.

Mrs. Clinton said it would be difficult to leave the Senate, but added she was excited by the challenge of representing the U.S. abroad.

"We know our security, our values and our interests cannot be protected and advanced by force alone, nor indeed, by Americans alone," Clinton said. "We must pursue vigorous diplomacy using all the tools we can muster to build a future with more partners and fewer adversaries, more opportunities and fewer dangers for all who seek freedom, peace and prosperity."

In order to clear the way for Hillary Clinton's nomination as secretary of state, her husband, former President Bill Clinton, agreed to disclose the names of donors to his charitable foundation. Mr. Clinton will also clear his schedule and speeches with the State Department to avoid any potential conflicts of interest.

Mr. Obama's choice for defense secretary is Robert Gates, the man who currently holds the job under President Bush.

The president-elect said Gates has the respect of members of Congress from both political parties for his pragmatism and competence.

Gates also appeared at the news conference and said he was pleased to continue in his current job.

"I am deeply honored that the president-elect has asked me to continue as secretary of defense," Gates said. "Mindful that we are engaged in two wars and face other serious challenges at home and around the world, and with a profound sense of personal responsibility to and for our men and women in uniform and their families, I must do my duty as they do theirs. How could I do otherwise?"

Mr. Obama announced other appointments as well, including Eric Holder as his choice for attorney general and Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano as the next secretary of Homeland Security.

In addition, Mr. Obama has tapped retired Marine Corps General James Jones to be his national security advisor, and Susan Rice as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

At his news conference, Mr. Obama was also asked about the recent terror attacks in Mumbai, India.

Mr. Obama reiterated that the United States has only one president at a time. But he spoke out forcefully against the terror attacks and said his administration would support India's efforts to catch those responsible.

"Both myself and the team that stands beside me are absolutely committed to eliminating the threat of terrorism and that is true wherever it is found," the president-elect said. "We cannot have, we cannot tolerate, a world in which innocents are being killed by extremists based on twisted ideologies, and we are going to have to bring the full force of our power, not only military but also diplomatic, economic and political to deal with those threats."

Mr. Obama will be sworn in as the country's 44th president on January 20, and his cabinet members will have to be confirmed by the Senate before they can take up their new posts.

Continue on for more...

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 12/01/2008 - 6:00pm | 0 comments
A Reminder on the COIN Leadership Seminar next Monday at Quantico:

8 December - Counterinsurgency Leadership Seminar (Seminar). Quantico, VA. On 8 December 2008 the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW) will host a Counterinsurgency Leadership Seminar at Little Hall (Base Theater), Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia, featuring Colonel Stephen Davis (USMC), Colonel David Maxwell (USA) and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling. This seminar is cosponsored by CIW, US Joint Forces Command Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) and Small Wars Journal (SWJ). Seminar Panel Members: Colonel Stephen Davis, USMC. Col Davis is currently the Deputy Commanding Officer of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. Previously, Col Davis commanded Regimental Combat Team 2 in Iraq. Colonel David Maxwell, USA. COL Maxwell is currently the G-3 (Operations Officer) of the US Army Special Operations Command. Previously he commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, USA. LTC Yingling is the Commander of 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery and is currently deployed to Iraq performing detainee operations. He has served two previous tours in Iraq, and has also deployed to Bosnia and Operation Desert Storm. Colonel Daniel Kelly, USMC, will moderate. Col Kelly is the Director of the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare. He has held a wide variety of command and staff billets and participated in numerous operations to include Operations Restore Hope / Continue Hope (Somalia), Operations Allied Force / Joint Guardian, (Kosovo) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF I and II).

And an update from Matt Armstrong at MountainRunner:

13 January - The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948: A Discourse to Shape America's Discourse (Symposium). Washington, D.C. -- at the Reserve Officer's Association at the intersection of First Street and Constitution Avenue, NE. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 was passed as the U.S. was beginning a "war of ideology... a war unto death," as America's Ambassador to Russia described it at the time. But, beginning in the 1970's, instead of promoting international engagement through information, cultural and educational exchanges, the law was distorted into a barrier of engagement. From its propaganda and counter-propaganda intentions, it transformed into an anti-propaganda law for reasons that had little to nothing to do with concerns over domestic influence and far removed from the original intent of the law. Keynotes will be given by Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy James K. Glassman and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy Michael Doran. There will be four 90 minute panels -- past, present, future, and Congress -- that will emphasize Q&A, discourse, and debate and not presentations or monologues. Registration is free, open to the public, and required to attend. The event will be on the record with a transcript available after the event. A public report based on the proceedings will be produced. Registration and other information can be found at http://mountainrunner.us/symposium.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 11/30/2008 - 9:25pm | 2 comments
General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), responds in a letter - point by point - concerning Saturday's New York Times article One Man's Military-Industrial-Media Complex by David Barstow.
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/28/2008 - 2:04pm | 0 comments
Good, solid analysis and summary - as good as it can get from early accounts - by Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal - Analysis: Mumbai Attack Differs from Past Terror Strikes.

... The Mumbai attack is unique from past terror strikes carried out by Islamic terrorists. Instead of one or more bombings at distinct sites, the Mumbai attackers struck throughout the city using military tactics. Instead of one or more bombings carried out over a short period of time, Mumbai is entering its third day of crisis.

An attack of this nature cannot be thrown together overnight. It requires planned, scouting, financing, training, and a support network to aid the fighters. Initial reports indicate the attacks originated from Pakistan, the hub of jihadi activity in South Asia. Few local terror groups have the capacity to pull off an attack such as this...

Much more at The Long War Journal.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/28/2008 - 7:48am | 0 comments

From Mike Allen at Politico: Defense Secretary Robert Gates has agreed to stay on... according to officials in both parties. Obama plans to announce a national-security team early next week that includes Gates at the Pentagon, Senator Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State and retired Marine General James Jones as National Security Adviser.

Christmas Comes Early for SWJ - Airforce Amazons

Our original take on this issue - Shortest, but Most Important SWJ Post to Date.

Update:

Obama's Picks - Max Boot at Commentary's Contentions

As someone who was skeptical of Obama's moderate posturing during the campaign, I have to admit that I am gobsmacked by these appointments , most of which could just as easily have come from a President McCain...

... Combined with the moderation of the economic team that Obama has just named, I would say his administration already far exceeds expectations, and he hasn't even taken office yet.

The real test, of course, will be seeing how this all-star lineup deals with real-world crises...

Gates to Stay? - Blake Hounshell at Foreign Policy's Passport

Assuming the Gates reappointment, at least, is for real, I think it's a great move. The military is extremely wary of Obama, and keeping Gates will assuage many that their new commander-in-chief is hardly some kind of closet radical -- to say nothing of the fact that Gates has done a great job managing Iraq and sending useful signals about US intentions to Iran. Having him oversee the delicate process of winding down the US presence in Iraq and cranking up the war effort in Afghanistan will be key. This is a lack of change I can believe in.

More:

Victory in our Time - Abu Muqawama

Keeping Gates Signals Change - Fly on the Wall

Meet the New Boss... - Wired's Danger Room

Gates Said To Be Near A Deal to Keep Post - Washington Post

Obama Plans to Retain Gates at Defense Department - New York Times

Gates Agrees to Stay on at Defense Post if Asked - Washington Times

Secretary of Defense Gates to stay on in Obama Cabinet - Los Angeles Times

Gates to Reportedly Stay on as Pentagon Chief - Voice of America

Bush's Defence Secretary to Stay on at Pentagon - The Times

Gates to Stay on in Obama Administration - Daily Telegraph

Official: Obama asks Gates to stay at Pentagon - Associated Press

Gates Staying on as Defense Chief - Boston Globe

Gates 'to Stay as Pentagon Chief' - BBC News

Gates Said to Stay on at Pentagon in Obama Presidency - Bloomberg

Gates to Stay as US Defense Secretary - Reuters

Update # 2:

A Keeper at the Pentagon - Washington Post editorial

In selecting nominees for his Cabinet and a new White House staff, President-elect Barack Obama has so far placed an admirable emphasis on proven competence over personal loyalty or political purity. He's been pragmatic in choosing pragmatists but also bold in his willingness to enlist formidable personalities such as Rahm Emanuel for chief of staff and (reportedly) Hillary Clinton for secretary of state. Now, according to The Post and other media, Mr. Obama is close to settling on another unconventional but supremely practical pick: Robert M. Gates as defense secretary. We hereby join what undoubtedly will be the large chorus that hails this choice...

More at The Washington Post.

Obama's War Cabinet - Wall Street Journal editorial

If reports are correct, on Monday the President-elect will ask Robert Gates to stay on as Secretary of Defense and name retired Marine General James Jones as National Security Adviser. These are the Administration posts most critical to the successful conduct of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to possible entanglements with Iran, North Korea and who knows who else. With these personnel picks, Mr. Obama reveals a bias for competence, experience and continuity. Hence the caterwauls from his left flank...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Continuity in Wartime Behind Obama's Decision on Gates - Gordon Lubold, Christian Science Monitor

An incoming administration rarely retains cabinet members of the outgoing administration, but President-elect Obama's apparent decision to keep Defense Secretary Robert Gates may reflect the extraordinary issues confronting the new president. Mr. Obama is expected to announce early next week that he will keep Mr. Gates on for as long as a year, in part to maintain continuity during the first wartime transition in 40 years. Any drawbacks in keeping Gates are more than countered by the pluses, say experts...

More at The Christian Science Monitor.

Vulnerable Moment for National Security - Miami Herald editorial

Some months ago, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for a quick and smooth transition period to lessen the nation's exposure to a potential attack at a vulnerable moment. Alluding to the danger, he said, ''It's important for us to get as many principals in positions as rapidly as possible in a time of war.'' Apparently, President-elect Barack Obama believes it's a warning worth heeding...

More at The Miami Herald.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/27/2008 - 9:19pm | 0 comments
Hat tip to Nancy Youssef - McClatchy's Pentagon Correspondent - McClatchy's Baghdad Bureau last week produced an unofficial English translation of the Iraq Staus of Forces Agreement based on the Arabic text. McClatchy on Tuesday also obtained an official English version.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/27/2008 - 10:37am | 1 comment
From Company Commanders to Company Commanders at Company Command -- When is Small Too Small? - at Army Magazine:

Companies, platoons and even squads are often deployed alone to remote combat outposts as we wage the counterinsurgency fight. This tactic increases our interaction with local nationals and thus helps us to separate the enemy from the populace. But have we gone too far? Are we stretching ourselves so thin in our efforts to secure remote locations that we are accepting too much risk? Are we presenting the enemy with achievable targets? Listen in as experienced company level leaders talk about their views on the topic.

Much more at Army Magazine.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/26/2008 - 8:27pm | 0 comments

Happy Thanksgiving

"Whereas it is the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey his will, to be grateful for his benefits, and humbly to implore his protection and favor, and whereas both Houses of Congress have by their joint Committee requested me "to recommend to the People of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many signal favors of Almighty God especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and happiness."

"Now therefore I do recommend and assign Thursday the 26th day of November next to be devoted by the People of these States to the service of that great and glorious Being, who is the beneficent Author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be. That we may then all unite in rendering unto him our sincere and humble thanks, for his kind care and protection of the People of this Country previous to their becoming a Nation, for the signal and manifold mercies, and the favorable interpositions of his providence, which we experienced in the course and conclusion of the late war, for the great degree of tranquility, union, and plenty, which we have since enjoyed, for the peaceable and rational manner, in which we have been enabled to establish constitutions of government for our safety and happiness, and particularly the national One now lately instituted, for the civil and religious liberty with which we are blessed; and the means we have of acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge; and in general for all the great and various favors which he hath been pleased to confer upon us."

"And also that we may then unite in most humbly offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations and beseech him to pardon our national and other transgressions, to enable us all, whether in public or private stations, to perform our several and relative duties properly and punctually, to render our national government a blessing to all the people, by constantly being a Government of wise, just, and constitutional laws, discreetly and faithfully executed and obeyed, to protect and guide all Sovereigns and Nations (especially such as have shown kindness unto us) and to bless them with good government, peace, and concord. To promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue, and the encrease of science among them and Us, and generally to grant unto all Mankind such a degree of temporal prosperity as he alone knows to be best."

"Given under my hand at the City of New York the third day of October in the year of our Lord 1789."

--President George Washington, 3 October 1789

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Offers Gratitude to Troops, Families in Thanksgiving Message - American Forces Press Service

In this season of hope, I want to say how uplifting it has been to get to know so many soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines during the last 24 months.

Many of you are far from home, and I'm sure there's no place you would rather be than with your loved ones. But know that they, and all Americans, are free and secure because of what the men and women of the U.S. military are doing all over the world -- from Fort Lewis to Fort Drum, from Korea to Kosovo, from Bagram to Baghdad.

The holidays are a time to reflect on the kind of nation we are: a nation whose character and decency are embodied in our armed forces. Those who risk life and limb every time they set foot "outside the wire." The medical personnel, engineers, and civil affairs teams who improve the lives of thousands. And all are volunteers.

To the families of our forces: thank you for sharing your loved ones to defend us all. To our troops: we admire your selflessness and pray for your success and safe return home. And to all: happy holidays.

Robert M. Gates

Secretary of Defense

'A Day of Thanksgiving' - The national holiday actually began at a dark hour during our war for independence. Here's the story. By Ira Stoll at The Wall Street Journal.

Commanding General's Thanksgiving Day Message - MNF-I

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/25/2008 - 7:21pm | 1 comment
This past Saturday the New York Times ran a series of opinion pieces concerning the road ahead in Iraq and Afghanistan. One piece in particular - One Surge Does Not Fit All -- by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld -- is not much in way of a critique of an anticipated "Afghanistan Surge". Rather, it is his take on the run-up to a new Iraq population-centric counterinsurgency strategy -- of which a surge in ground combat forces was a tactic -- implemented in 2007. Here is an excerpt from the former SecDef's op-ed:

... The decision to conduct a surge came out of an interagency review in the fall of 2006. By mid-December, as I was leaving the Pentagon, there was a rough consensus in the Defense Department that deploying additional combat brigades to Iraq was the right step. Some military leaders raised reasonable questions about the potential effectiveness of a surge, in part because of a correct concern that military power alone could not solve Iraq's problems. I agreed, and emphasized that a military surge would need to be accompanied by effective diplomatic and economic "surges" from other departments and agencies of the American government, and by considerably greater progress from Iraq's elected leaders.

During my last weeks in office, I recommended to President Bush that he consider Gen. David Petraeus as commander of coalition forces in Iraq, as General Casey's tour was coming to an end. General Petraeus and his deputy, Gen. Ray Odierno, had the experience and skill to recognize and exploit the seismic shifts that were taking place in Iraq's political landscape. And United States troops had the courage to win the alliance of Iraq's people against a common enemy - and the benevolence to win their friendship...

Two blogs we at SWJ keep tabs on took great exception to what they consider an attempt by Rumsfeld to revise the history of the turn-around in Iraq.

Peter Wehner at Commentary's Contentions cuts to the quick about the op-ed in his Rumsfeld Revisionism post:

... The real fault with the piece, in my judgment, is that what Rumsfeld writes is selective and misleading. By that I mean that the causal reader would come away from his op-ed believing that Rumsfeld handed over to General David Petraeus, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Robert Gates a nation, Iraq, in which all the pieces had been put in place and that we were on the verge of a successful tipping point.

In fact, thanks in large measure to the policies pursued by Rumsfeld, Iraq was, in the latter half of 2006, in a death spiral. Violence, chaos, and a low-grade civil war were engulfing it. The insurgency and Shia militias were gaining strength. Sectarian divisions were deepening. Millions of Iraqis had fled the country. The economy was in shambles. In the words of the Iraq Study Group Report, "[t]he situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating." Reports are that General Casey himself privately acknowledged that Baghdad was "sliding toward chaos." Many people believed Iraq was so wrecked it was beyond recovery...

... what made the 2007 surge different than everything before it was not the increase in the number of troops but, much more importantly, a new mission that was based on classical counterinsurgency doctrine, meaning that it was focused on living with, securing, and winning the confidence of the Iraqi people.

The bottom line for Wehner (and we agree) is that there are a handful of individuals - including Jack Keane, Raymond Odierno, David Petraeus, Ryan Crocker, Fred Kagan, Stephen Hadley, and the President - who deserve credit for the turnabout. Rumsfeld is not one of them. Read the whole post here.

SWJ friend Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal also chimes in with critical commentary in his post Rumsfeld Peddles Revisionist History:

... Rumsfeld and his reports repeatedly talked of standing down as the people and Iraqi Army stood up, and the strategy wasn't one of counterinsurgency. It was one of a quick turnover and rapid drawdown. Saving the day had to rest on the shoulders of the enlisted men and those in the states who would support the campaign.

... Rumsfeld, who apparently never sat down in his office, would have done much better to park himself in a chair and study why his philosophy of rapidly turning over to an Iraqi Army was destined for failure; or perhaps he could have listened to General Eric Shinseki's recommendation that we needed more troops than called for under the current plan; or perhaps he could have prevented Paul Wolfowitz from making a clown of himself by publicly denouncing Shinseki's remarks to the Congress; or perhaps he could have paid attention to General Anthony Zinni's war-gaming of Iraq in which his team found that they needed 400,000 troops...

Read more at The Captain's Journal. For even more - The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 by Bob Woodward goes into great detail concerning the issues leading up to the new counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.

by Bill Caldwell | Tue, 11/25/2008 - 10:15am | 1 comment
Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, Response to Small Wars Journal Blog Post, "Afghanistan, What Lessons to Apply from Iraq"

The discussion unfolding here and on the COIN Center's blog is an important one, since the situation in Iraq continues to improve while in Afghanistan it deteriorates. As ideas of an Afghan "surge," similar to the course of action adopted in Iraq, circulate among decision makers, the nuances of the Afghanistan situation remain particularly relevant. GEN Petraeus recently noted in a New York Times interview, "The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture." In light of these remarks, what are the peculiarities and strategic nuances inherent in the Afghanistan situation?

The Army Field Manual, FM 3-07, "Stability Operations," states, "Understanding is fundamental to planning. Without understanding, commanders cannot establish the situation's context." Adopting a "Comprehensive Approach" that includes understanding regional dynamics is central to crafting any kind of successful Afghan strategy. Pakistan, seeking strategic depth, has systematically sought influence within Afghanistan for decades. If the Kashmir conflict was resolved and tensions reduced between India and Pakistan, the latter would no longer need to pursue the strategic depth Afghanistan could provide. Reconciling regional conflicts should be a part of any Afghan strategy.

Afghanistan does not have a tradition of a strong central government. The kind of government NATO helps Afghanistan build is of paramount importance. Perhaps a federal system with much more power vested in regional and even local entities would allow tribal structures the autonomy they have historically enjoyed. As COL Roper noted, the bottom up method of building security was one of the keys to success in Iraq. That being said, building governmental capacity is also important. Afghanistan throughout its governing structures needs the kind of mentoring PRTs can provide. The Vietnam-era CORDS program is an example of the kind of interagency cooperation and unity of effort required to build governmental capacity down to sub-district levels.

GEN Petraeus has also noted that reconciliation must become a key line of effort. The Army's new Stability Operations doctrine emphasizes the roles that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration play in security sector reform. Again, the diverse capabilities inherent in PRTs could assist training and reforming Afghan security forces, while legal assistance might strengthen the Afghan judiciary. Long term stability will emerge only when Afghan police forces protect Afghan citizens and enforce the rule of law through a functioning Afghan court system.

Finally, developing Afghanistan's infrastructure must remain a priority. More money is spent each month in Iraq than has been spent on Afghanistan infrastructure since 2001. The judicious use of CERP funds is a start. However, as some commentators noted in the COIN Center blog, training Afghanis in various trades is a necessary part of building Afghan capacity and enhancing employment opportunities. Human resource development is one of the main elements of capacity building, as emphasized in the Stability Operations doctrine.

Frontier 6 is Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the command that oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs located throughout the United States. The Combined Arms Center is also responsible for: development of the Army's doctrinal manuals, training of the Army's commissioned and noncommissioned officers, oversight of major collective training exercises, integration of battle command systems and concepts, and supervision of the Army's Center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/24/2008 - 5:54pm | 0 comments
Just in from the US Army / US Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center concerning a "virtual COIN brown bag" tomorrow:

Friends of the COIN Center,

The US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center is pleased to host Dr. Geoff Demarest at the COIN Center Brownbag from 1200 to 1300 CST (1300 - 1400 EST) on Tuesday, November 25, 2008. Dr. Demarest will present on US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Latin America. Those interested in attending may either come to the COIN Center at 630 McClellan Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or view the meeting on-line. Those wishing to attend virtually should head to https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinbrownbag and participate via Adobe Connect as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

Dr. Demarest's presentation proposes a list of eight common themes, or clichés, of US COIN doctrine and offers part of the reason for their presence. He suggests that the eight are overstated, that they can misdirect, should perhaps be down-toned, and other concepts raised in relative weight. His presentation will offer as evidence current experiences from northern South America.

Geoff Demarest is the author of Property & Peace: Insurgency, Strategy and the Stature of Frauds; Geoproperty: Foreign Affairs, National Security and Property Rights; and the monograph Mapping Colombia: The Correlation Between Land Data and Strategy. He earned his PhD. from the Denver U. Graduate School of International Studies in 1989, submitting a dissertation on professionalism in the Colombian army. He earned a law degree from the Denver School of Law in 1981, and practiced law in Loveland, Colorado. He is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute, the Spanish Language Institute, the JFK Special Warfare Center, the School of the Americas and the US Army War College. While still on active duty in the Army, he served in Central America for five years, and over the past 25 years has traveled to Colombia dozens of times, as well as to other countries in the region. He is currently a Senior Analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office here at Ft. Leavenworth.

Linked here is a read ahead for the event. Please head to http://coin.army.mil and use the "contact us" link with any questions.

v/r,

Major Niel A. Smith

Operations Officer

USA/USMC Counterinsurgency Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

http://coin.army.mil

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/24/2008 - 6:26am | 0 comments

10 Questions for Colonel Peter Mansoor, USA (Ret.)

Reposted here in full with permission of the Consortium for Complex Operations with a hat tip to Dan Troy.

COL (Ret.) Pete Mansoor is currently the Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair in Military History at The Ohio State University. COL Mansoor retired this past summer after more than 26 years in the United States Army. Most recently, he served as Executive Officer to General David Petraeus, then Commander MNF-I. Prior to holding that position, COL Mansoor served on a Council of Colonels that advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a new strategy for Iraq and was the founding director of the US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS, where his team assisted in the final revision process of Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24.

COL Mansoor recently released Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq, a memoir of his time leading the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in Baghdad from 2003-2004. COL Mansoor recently agreed to be interviewed by the CCO on his new book and the counterinsurgency lessons he learned during his first tour in Iraq.

Continue on for the Q&A...

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/24/2008 - 1:16am | 1 comment
Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War - Colonel Ian Hope, Strategic Studies Institute

This Carlisle Paper discusses the traditional importance of unity of command in American doctrine and practice from World War I until now, and how this principle has been forsaken in the evolution of military command for Afghanistan. It examines the unprecedented departure from the principle of unity of command in Afghanistan in 2006, when Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan passed control of the ground fight to the International Security Assistance Force, and operations became split between several unified or "supreme" commanders in charge of US Central Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and US Special Operations Command. It argues for a renewal of understanding of the importance of unity of command, and recommends that the United States revert to the application of this principle by amending the Unified Command Plan to invest one "supreme commander" with responsibility for the current Operation Enduring Freedom Joint Operations Area.

Much more at the Strategic Studies Institute.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/24/2008 - 1:14am | 0 comments
Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development - Nathan P. Freier, Strategic Studies Institute

The author provides the defense policy team a clear warning against excessive adherence to past defense and national security convention. Including the insights of a number of noted scholars on the subjects of "wild cards" and "strategic surprise," he argues that future disruptive, unconventional shocks are inevitable. Through strategic impact and potential for disruption and violence, such shocks, in spite of their nonmilitary character, will demand the focused attention of defense leadership, as well as the decisive employment of defense capabilities in response. As a consequence, the author makes a solid case for continued commitment by the Department of Defense to prudent strategic hedging against their potential occurrence.

Much more at The Strategic Studies Institute.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 11/23/2008 - 6:18am | 0 comments
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Leadership Seminar. On 8 December 2008 the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW) will host a Counterinsurgency Leadership Seminar at Little Hall (Base Theater), Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia, featuring Colonel Stephen Davis (USMC), Colonel David Maxwell (USA) and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling. This seminar is cosponsored by CIW, US Joint Forces Command Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) and Small Wars Journal (SWJ).

Seminar Panel Members. Colonel Stephen Davis, USMC. Col Davis is currently the Deputy Commander of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. Previously, Col Davis commanded Regimental Combat Team 2 in Iraq. Colonel David Maxwell, USA. COL Maxwell is currently the G-3 (Operations Officer) of the US Army Special Operations Command. Previously he commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, USA. LTC Yingling is the Commander of 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery and is currently deployed to Iraq performing detainee operations. He has served two previous tours in Iraq and has also deployed to Bosnia and Operation Desert Storm.

Moderator. Colonel Daniel Kelly, USMC. Col Kelly is the Director of the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare. He has held a wide variety of command and staff billets and participated in numerous operations to include Operations Restore Hope / Continue Hope (Somalia), Operations Allied Force / Joint Guardian, (Kosovo) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF I and II).

COIN Leadership Seminar - Information Paper and Map

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 11/23/2008 - 4:20am | 0 comments
New York Times: It is not a stretch to say that Barack Obama faces stiffer, more vexing challenges on more fronts than any president in recent memory. In the coming weeks, the Opinion section will publish a series of Op-Ed articles by experts on the most formidable issues facing the new president. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are the subject of today's articles.

The Little Battles We Must Win - Linda Robinson

Out of Conflict, a Partnership - Frederick Kagan

A Wartime Presidency, On Two Fronts - Anthony Cordesman

One Surge Does Not Fit All - Donald Rumsfeld

How to Leave Iraq, Intact - Peter Mansoor

Thanks, But You Can Go Now - Ahmad Chalabi

The 'Good War' Isn't Worth Fighting - Rory Stewart

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 11/22/2008 - 9:01am | 3 comments
Last month the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) solicited feedback concerning a statement made by General David Petraeus (Commander, US Central Command) as quoted by the New York Times:

People often ask, "What did you learn from Iraq that might be transferable to Afghanistan?" he said. "The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture," he said.

Counterinsurgents have to understand that in as nuanced a manner as possible, and then with that kind of understanding try to craft a comprehensive approach to the problems.

The COIN Center's OPSO, Major Niel Smith, put out the challenge - We would like to ask for feedback - what lessons from Iraq are applicable to our operations in Afghanistan? - and in the October COIN Center SITREP, the Director - Colonel Daniel Roper - summarized the key points from the responses as follows:

(1) Basic COIN principles of protecting the population, connecting the government with the people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population apply in either conflict but must be adapted for local conditions.

(2) Shift emphasis from top-down (strong central government) to bottom-up (locally provided security) to leverage tribal structure in Afghanistan.

(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2--4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy.

(4) Increase efforts in advisory and PRT initiatives to enhance Afghan capabilities.

(5) Put an Afghan face on all CERP. Use Jirgas to solicit needs from the local populace to bolster local government entities.

And in a note - the COIN Center continues to solicit additional feedback on the CERP issue and invites comments on a blog entry titled "Money as a tool in COIN, mission enhancer or detractor?"