Rear Admiral Patrick Driscoll, MNF-I Spokesman, and Brigadier Carew Wilks, Director of Energy Operations for the Multi-National Force-Iraq Energy Fusion Cell, brief reporters in Baghdad on 6 July 2008.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen held a town hall meeting 7 July with troops in Iraq.
Blog Posts
SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 07/06/2008 - 12:37pm | 1 comment
Part I of selected excerpts from Small Wars II, an unpublished U.S. Marine Corps document written in 2003. Noel Williams is the primary author.The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking.
--Clausewitz
On October 23, 1983 the world turned upside down for the U.S. Marine Corps. The deaths of 241 sailors, soldiers, and Marines in a concrete slab building in Beirut, Lebanon at the hands of a suicide bomber marked the beginning of the end of an era - an era where the enemy was a Soviet motorized rifle regiment and where Marines stood guard duty without magazines inserted because the United States was not "at war." In retrospect, the Beirut bombing was a seminal event, heavily influencing subsequent Marine Corps organization and culture and ushering in the kind of profound change that seldom takes place in large organizations without the stimulus of a significant emotional event.
Orders were quick to follow: All Marines will walk post armed; Marines will not starch their utilities; Marines will not spit shine their combat boots; Marines will read professionally. These changes did not occur overnight, but looking back from today's vantage point, it is hard not to marvel at the profound changes that have transformed the Corps.
If there can be a silver lining to a tragedy as great as Beirut, it is that the Marine Corps began a great awakening to a new way of warfare fully two decades before her sister Services. There was recognition that Marines must prepare differently, both physically and mentally, for the new challenges posed by terrorism, transnational threats, and the more dynamic security requirements of the post-Cold War world. In attempting to discern the nature of this changing security environment and to develop appropriate courses of action, some were quick to say, harkening back to the Corps' small wars legacy, "been there, done that."
But is it just a question of back to the future? Or, is conflict in the new millennium fundamentally different? The short answer is yes to both. Meaning, while many small wars fundamentals remain unchanged, there are significant threats and challenges that are without precedent. It is the intent of this work to examine these emerging threats and convert the challenges they present into opportunities for improving our capabilities to provide for the national defense...
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 07/06/2008 - 8:15am | 4 comments
The Syria Card
By David J. Haimsky
The ongoing, peace talks between Israel and Syria have been relatively underreported in the news media, and are surprisingly seldom discussed in policy circles in Washington, despite the fact that their potential success will drastically change the political landscape in the Middle East in Washington's favor. That is why the Bush Administration's lack of involvement in this process is all the more puzzling.
President Bush is widely perceived as a "lame duck" president. His recent European tour failed to bring out crowds of protesters that have greeted him every time he stepped foot on the continent in the past, not because people have warmed up to his policies, but simply because they regard his tenure in office as effectively over. His popularity ratings at home and abroad remain at an all-time low and people on both sides of the political spectrum are waiting anxiously for January's changing of the guard. Bush, however, is determined to go down in history as the president who had taken on terror networks and rogue states in defense of democracy worldwide. The prospect of an Israeli-Syrian peace provides an historic opportunity for him to at least partially meet that objective, while reversing some of the policy setbacks of his administration...
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 07/05/2008 - 5:40pm | 0 comments
Since 1922, Military Review has provided a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs. Subsequently, publications have proliferated throughout the Army education system that specialize either in tactical issues associated with particular Branches or on strategic issues at the Senior Service School level. Bridging these two levels of intellectual inquiry, Military Review focuses on research and analysis of the concepts, doctrine and principles of warfighting between the tactical and operational levels of war.
Military Review is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. Military Review also supports the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Military Review is printed bimonthly in English, Spanish and Portuguese and is distributed to readers in more than 100 countries. It is also printed in Arabic on a quarterly basis. Widely quoted and reprinted throughout the world, it is a readily available reference at most military and civilian university libraries and research agencies.
Here is the July - August 2008 lineup:
Interagency Reform: The Congressional Perspective by Congressman Geoff Davis, speech given at PNSR/ROA Luncheon, 8 May 2008
Congressman Davis explains why we need to reform the interagency process in regard to national security and what must be considered in future legislation on this pressing issue.Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Steven M. Leonard, U.S. Army
This FM will institutionalize a whole-of-government approach to combating insurgency and sustaining success in an era of persistent conflict.Darfur and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa by Lieutenant Commander Patrick Paterson, U.S. Navy
The crisis in Darfur, which the United States has labeled "genocide" and the United Nations has called "the world's gravest human rights abuse," has revealed glaring weaknesses in the African Union's ability to conduct peacekeeping operations.Salvadoran Reconciliation by Major M. Chris Herrera, U.S. Army, and Major Michael G. Nelson, U.S. Air Force
A brutal 12-year civil war in El Salvador ended in 1992. The conflict killed more than 75,000 mostly innocent civilians and left 8,000 missing. Reconciliation has been difficult to achieve.A Troubled Past: The Army and Security on the Mexican Border, 1915-1917 by Thomas A. Bruscino Jr.
The tempestuous historical border relationships between the United States and Mexico have always been complex.Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare by Andrew J. Birtle, Ph.D.
Much confusion remains over the roles that persuasion and coercion play in rebellions and other internal conflicts. What is the relationship between force and politics?After Iraq: The Politics of Blame and Civilian-Military Relations by George R. Mastroianni, Ph.D., and Wilbur J. Scott, Ph.D.
Competing post-Iraq narratives may lead to a broadening of sociological divisions between military professionals and the civil society they defend.Legitimacy and Military Operations by Lieutenant Colonel James W. Hammond, Canadian Forces
In America's rush to war it forgot that legitimacy, whether real or perceived, is everything. The author argues that to achieve success, the U.S. must conduct all military operations with legitimacy in mind.Twelve Urgent Steps for the Advisor Mission in Afghanistan by Captain Daniel Helmer, U.S. Army
Without major and rapid changes to structure and execution, the advisory effort in Afghanistan will fail to arrest the growing insurgencies.Burnout: Staff Exhaustion by Major Stephen H. Bales, U.S. Army
Commanders can proactively take initiative to mitigate conditions that cause their staffs to lose their peak effectiveness. Imaginative management can help prevent staff burnout.Reaching Out: Partnering with Iraqi Media by Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. DeCarvalho, U.S. Army; Major Spring Kivett, U.S. Army; and Captain Matthew Lindsey, U.S. Army
Using Iraqi news reporters can the increase chances that good news stories will resonate favorably in Iraq. An expert lays out the particulars of an important dimension of the information war.Why the U.S. Should Gender Its Counterterrorism Strategy by Lieutenant Colonel Miemie Winn Byrd, U.S. Army Reserve, and Major Gretchen Decker, U.S. Army Reserve
Gender prejudices and traditional assumptions belie an increasing threat from radicalized women. It is time to consider gender issues in designing counterterrorism strategies.Knowledge Management by the Generating Force by Lieutenant Colonel (P) E.J. Degen, U.S. Army
The accelerated operational tempo of the War on Terrorism has forced us to take an honest, in-depth look at how we collect, analyze, debate, codify, write, and disseminate doctrine.The Sole Superpower in Decline: The Rise of a Multipolar World by Shri Dilip Hiro
A widely published author asserts that we are witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which new powers are challenging different aspects of American hegemony.Book Reviews by multiple authors
Contemporary readings for the professional.by Huba Wass de Czege | Fri, 07/04/2008 - 6:36pm | 4 comments
I thought I'd share with SWJ readership an article recently published in Army magazine (May 2008). In particular - I draw your attention to discussion of our infatuation with the term "Irregular Warfare" - US Forces Do Not Conduct "Irregular War".
What is it about the US Military that tends to produce sound, pragmatic, and common sense ideas about the concrete present, and tends toward illogic, faddish paradigms and hyperbole when dealing with the abstract future? Joint Operating Concepts for dealing with post cold war security problems have proven difficult to "get right." This is because they begin from the wrong logical starting point and thus define the problem incorrectly. It is also because of inattention to historical fact, definitional subtlety and the theoretical logic within which military forces must operate. This inattention overlooks key logical inconsistencies in such documents crafted more to "sell" to constituencies within the Washington "Beltway" the capabilities and programs championed by one military interest group or another rather than to inform current decisions in the field. For this reason those who nag about these things tend to be ignored by the practical people dealing with near term problems. When the future becomes the present, the consequences of illogic, faddish paradigms, and hyperbole in abstract concepts can pose insurmountable problems for pragmatic common sense. For one, "Beltway" constituencies have been educated to think according to the attractive new paradigms military professionals have used to buttress their budget arguments. The new "Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept" signed by the Commander, United States Special Operations Command, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense on 11 September 2007 deals with the abstract future and exhibits the usual tendencies. We have been here before, and are still suffering the consequences.
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 07/04/2008 - 1:23am | 2 comments
Middle East Strategy at Harvard (MESH) asks the question: Is the American era in the Middle East over? The argument was first made by Richard Haass in a Foreign Affairs article published in 2006.The American era in the Middle East... has ended.... It is one of history's ironies that the first war in Iraq, a war of necessity, marked the beginning of the American era in the Middle East and the second Iraq war, a war of choice, has precipitated its end.... The United States will continue to enjoy more influence in the region than any other outside power, but its influence will be reduced from what it once was.
J. Scott Carpenter, Lawrence Freedman, Mark T. Kimmitt, Martin Kramer, Walter Laqueur, Robert J. Lieber, Michael Mandelbaum, Aaron David Miller, Joshua Muravchik, Robert Satloff and Harvey Sicherman all take a shot at the answer.
MESH is a project of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. The Olin Institute is part of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
MESH is a community of scholars and practitioners who are interested in the formulation of US strategic options for the Middle East. Since 9/11 and the Iraq war, the Middle East has occupied a place of primacy in debates over US global aims and strategies. MESH brings together the most original strategic thinkers in academe, research centers, and government, in a web-based forum for exchanging and disseminating ideas.
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 07/04/2008 - 1:00am | 1 comment
Symbols of America - US Department of Defense
Bush, Mullen Send Independence Day Greetings - John Kruzel, AFPS
Independence Days - George Will, Washington Post
Vindicators of the Declaration - Rich Lowry, National Review
Civics Fireworks - Myrna Blyth, National Review
The Necessary Religion - Mark Goldblatt, National Review
Imperial Considerations - Thomas Madden, National Review
One New World, Two Big Ideas - David Hackett Fischer, New York Times
A Gift From France, to France - Edward Berenson, New York Times
No Room for Negativity - Ed Feulner, Washington Times
The Fourth of July - Washington Post
The Meaning of a Day - New York Times
1,100 Troops in Iraq to Reenlist in Independence Day Ceremony - AFPS
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/02/2008 - 5:40pm | 0 comments
I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!
--Signature line of Small Wars Council member William F. Owen
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/02/2008 - 4:13pm | 1 comment
The Marine Corps of 2025 will fight and win our Nation's battles with multicapable MAGTFs, either from the sea or in sustained operations ashore. Our unique role as the Nation's force in readiness, along with our values, enduring ethos and core competencies, will ensure we remain highly responsive to the needs of combatant commanders in an uncertain environment and against irregular threats. Our future Corps will be increasingly reliant on naval deployment, preventative in approach, leaner in equipment, versatile in capabilities, and innovative in mindset. In an evolving and complex world, we will excel as the Nation's expeditionary "force of choice."
Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 - Full USMC DocumentI want all Marines to understand it clearly; read it, think about it, discuss it...The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Conway, talks about how the Corps will head into the future.
Bolded emphasis by SWJ.
The purpose of the vision and strategy document is to inform all Marines where we intend to take our Corps to give combatant commanders a concept of how we might best be employed, and to provide our civilian leadership a reference point as to how we see Marine Corps contributions to national defense in the coming years and decades. This document is grounded in the Marine Corps' identity, ethos, values, and competencies. It serves as the principal strategic planning document for our Corps and reflects our legislated roles, functions, and composition. Derived from strategic guidance at the national and departmental level, it illustrates our utility and value within the joint warfighting community.
The vision section describes a Marine Corps adapting to fulfill our role in the Nation's defense in an inherently unpredictable future. It is founded on our enduring characteristics and capabilities, but also reflects shifts in posture and practice designed to enhance today's Corps for tomorrow's challenges. The strategy section lays out a strategy statement as well as a set of institutional objectives to realize the vision and meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Our Service capstone concept and supporting operating concepts will flow from the vision and strategy, as will the more detailed plans of the deputy commandants and subordinate commanders. The development of these plans will be directed by the Implementation Planning Guidance which will be published in a subsequent document.
Enduring Principles
Every Marine a Rifleman. Every Marine - regardless of military occupational specialty - is first and foremost a disciplined warrior.
Expeditionary Naval Force. Marines are "soldiers of the sea," an integral part of the naval Services - lean, versatile, flexible, and ready. We are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct naval campaigns and operate on and from naval platforms, or to fight in protracted campaigns ashore.
Combined Arms Organization. In 1952, Congress directed the Marine Corps' composition as an air-ground combined arms force. This integrated force, known as the MAGTF, has unique and incomparable warfighting capabilities. Our MAGTF contains organic air, ground, and logistics elements under a single command element, making it an effective and integrated combined arms force.
Ready and Forward Deployed. Congress' intent that the Marine Corps serve as the "force in readiness" was founded on a recognized national need for a force capable of rapid response to emerging crises. This requirement mandates high standards of readiness across the force. We are routinely forward deployed around the globe and stand prepared to respond quickly in times of crisis.
Agile and Adaptable. The Marine Corps' agility is based on its expeditionary mindset and flexible structure, able to operate either from the sea or in sustained operations ashore. We can adapt quickly with unparalleled speed across an extraordinary range of military operations. Our organizational design and training facilitate a seamless transition between these operations, providing the necessary capability to operate effectively.
Marines Take Care of Their Own. We are stewards of the most important resource entrusted to us - our Nation's sons and daughters. We make Marines, imbue them with our Core Values, and offer them the opportunity to serve a cause greater than themselves. Marines live up to the motto, Semper Fidelis. We are faithful to those who fall and we care for our wounded Marines and their families.
Objectives
1. Focus on the Individual Marine. The individual Marine will remain our most important warfighting asset...
2. Improve Training and Education for Fog, Friction, and Uncertainty. Our realistic training and education system will prepare Marines for complex conditions and to counter the unexpected...
3. Expand Persistent Forward Presence and Engagement. The Marine Corps will develop a plan to provide a tailored, persistently engaged, contingency-capable MAGTF in five prioritized regions...
4. Better Posture for Hybrid Threats in Complex Environments. Without sacrificing its conventional capabilities, the Corps will prepare to conduct operations against hybrid threats in complex environments; such as urbanized littorals, mountainous terrain, and dense jungles...
5. Reinforce Naval Relationships. We share with the Navy a remarkable heritage and a common perspective on the fundamental necessity of maintaining the ability to operate freely in the littorals...
6. Ensure Amphibious Force Levels Meet Strategic Requirements. We are resolved to maintain the requisite capacity of modern amphibious lift to support the Nation's ability to execute forcible entry operations from the sea and other combatant commander missions...
7. Create Joint Seabasing Capabilities. We will improve our ability to cross wide expanses of ocean and remain persistently offshore at the place and time of our choosing...
8. Lead Joint/Multinational Operations and Enable Interagency Activities. A clear changing characteristic in the modern battlespace is the shift from a primarily military focus to one that achieves a greater degree of operational integration of all instruments of national power...
9. Maintain a Ready and Sustainable Reserve. We will employ a total force approach to meet the Marine Corps' force generation requirements...
10. Build and Deploy Multicapable MAGTFs. Our MAGTFs will be decisive across the range of military operations with their capacity tailored to combatant commander's requirements...
Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 - Full USMC Documentby SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/02/2008 - 3:28am | 0 comments
We received an e-mail several days ago concerning the new American University of Iraq and getting an entry posted here has been at the top of our list... Our partner in the Afghanistan COIN Academy book-drive have done so and with the kind permission of Erin Simpson (aka Charlie) at Abu Muqawama we bring you the following -- with a hearty SWJ endorsement of helping stock the University's library.
Most readers of this blog are familiar with the American Universities of Beirut and Cairo (this blog's namesake is an alum of AUB). Some, like Charlie, may be unaware that there is an ongoing effort to build a similar institution in Sulaimaniya, Iraq.
It would be an ambitious project even in a Middle Eastern country not embroiled in war: build an American-style university where classes are taught in English, teachers come from around the world and graduates compete for lucrative jobs in fields like business and computer science. Yet some of the leading lights of Iraq's political and intellectual classes are doing exactly that, even as the bloodshed widens.Their planned American University of Iraq is modeled after the famous private universities in Cairo and Beirut. The project's managers have a board of trustees; a business plan recently completed by McKinsey & Company, an international consulting firm; three candidates for university president; and $25 million, much of it in pledges from the American government and Kurdish sources. To fulfill their dream, they need much more: $200 million to $250 million over 15 years, said Azzam Alwash, the board's executive secretary.Our world famous blog is unlikely to make a dent in that $200 million price tag. But loyal readers may remember our efforts earlier this year to support the COIN Academy in Kabul. Now, via interminable contrarian Christopher Hitchens, we present a similar opportunity for the American University in Iraq:
However, I do believe that many people wish they could do something positive and make a contribution, however small, to the effort to build democracy in Iraq. And I have a suggestion. In the northern Iraqi city of Sulaymaniya, the American University of Iraq has just opened its doors. And it is appealing for people to donate books. [...]I recently received a progress report from Sulaymaniya from Thomas Cushman, who is a professor in the sociology department at Wellesley College and the founding editor of the Journal of Human Rights. He tells me that the American University attaches very special importance to the establishment of a library in English. An initiative has been set up to furnish the campus with the most up-to-date books that can be provided.
We here at Abu M [and SWJ] aren't doing the coordinating this time... and there is no official reading list. But as Hitchens notes there's a need for social science and technical, engineering related books, among many others. We've all got books from college (and beyond) laying around our shelves: calc, organic chemistry, political theory, etc. If you have a minute, see that they find their way to Sulaimaniya.
Nathan Musselman
The American University of Iraq—Sulaimani
Building No. 7, Street 10
Quarter 410
Ablakh Area
Sulaimani, Iraq
(+964) (0)770-461-5099
by John P. Sullivan | Wed, 07/02/2008 - 2:18am | 10 comments
Expeditionary Law Enforcement
By John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus
Cross-posted at Defense and the National Interest where it was originally published on 29 June 2008.
Washington is overflowing with foreign policy proposals for the next administration. Think-tankers of all political stripes are looking for a big idea to revolutionize American foreign policy. Missing from the equation, however, are new solutions for America's problems with counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilization operations. The goal of these military missions is the reconstruction of law and order and the pacification of enemies such as criminals and guerrillas. The vast majority of American military missions since World War II have been counterinsurgencies, and military experts agree that we will face many more in the coming decades.
Unfortunately, Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the immense difficulties our conventional military faces in adapting to careful, intelligence-driven stabilization missions. A bipartisan chorus of critics argue that military force alone is insufficient for winning counterinsurgencies, which they often dub "police work." So how do we get COIN right? One solution wears blue, drives cars with flashing lights, and wrote you up yesterday for doing 56 in the 55 zone. Yes — police officers.
Why? Future battlegrounds increasingly blur the boundaries between war, crime, and terrorism. Lawlessness usually follows disorder and accelerates the process of state failure by eroding the state's monopoly of violence and preventing the growth of legitimate enterprise. In Afghanistan the Taliban uses the country's illegal opium trade to finance its operations and undermine government authority. Mobbed-up Iraqi insurgents muscle in on criminal enterprises. And the Colombian FARC, who lack mass public support, are sustained by their command of the coca fields. This highly volatile and complex kind of warfare cannot be waged by traditional military forces alone.
The fault lies not in the professionalism and courage of our fighting men and women, who have proven their mettle in fierce combat. But military forces are ill-suited for restoring basic law and order in societies ravaged by the reach of terrorists and organized crime. Investigation, community relations, and other complex tasks of preserving social order have never been part of the basic military mission and remain at best an acquired taste.
With a wealth of experience in combating gangs and organized crime, community policing, and dealing with complex conflicts in an increasingly multi-ethnic society, America's metropolitan police officers are well suited to overseas stabilization missions.
Yes, the average uniformed police officer doesn't have all of the range of skills necessary to operate effectively in failed states riven by insurgency. But building from community police skills, SWAT capabilities, gang suppression, and detective practices, they can be adapted and integrated into paramilitary, "formed" police units. These hybrid forces like France's Gendarmerie, Italy's Carabinieri, and Spain's Guardia Civil are a third option between the military and the police. These militarized internal security units are trained for both policing and fighting, and excel at international stability missions. These units handle specialized tasks like riot control, investigations, and disrupting criminal conspiracies, freeing up military forces for more general missions.
The European Union has pooled these military police into a 5,000-strong expeditionary police (EXPOL) force known as the European Gendarmerie Force (Eurogendfor), and Australian and Canadian national police departments regularly deploy police for stability operations worldwide.
Unfortunately, the US has no equivalent. With no national police force, few local police forces can contribute officers for peacekeeping abroad without straining their own resources. With no standing EXPOL force, international policing needs are filled on an ad hoc basis by military units and small civilian police forces that are ill-suited to the task. The United Nations has experimented with civilian police (CIVPOL) in peacekeeping forces, but uniformed military peacekeepers still predominate in peace operations.
The time has come for the development of standing constabulary forces that can draw talented and intelligent individuals for overseas policing. A US-specific EXPOL force could deploy in concert with standing NATO and UN expeditionary police units, although there's no reason why US EXPOL units couldn't be combined into mixed police units.
There are many remaining questions about such a force. Under whose authority would it fall--State Department, Defense Department, or Homeland Security? Would it be a US-centric standing force, or a composite force drawn from many alliance powers? A standing force would offer a clear continuity of command and control, but would be expensive in both money and political will to maintain. A composite force would be cheap and rapidly deployable, but would have uncertain lines of command and control and lack continuity and professionalized training. Constructing such a stability police force would pose many problems and difficulties. But going without it is infinitely more expensive.
In the military, the COIN process is often simplified as DIME (Diplomacy, Intelligence, Military, Economic). But without effective policing to guarantee basic law and order, diplomacy has no credibility, the military cannot effectively operate, and economic reconstruction is impossible. We need to add a "P" — Policing — to the mix.
John P. Sullivan is a senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism. A career police officer, he is a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is also co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a global counter-terrorism network (Routledge, 2006).
Adam Elkus is a writer specializing in foreign policy, national security, and law enforcement issues. His work has appeared in Foreign Policy in Focus, Military.com, DefenseWatch, Defense and the National Interest, SWAT Digest, and the Huffington Post. Adam blogs at Rethinking Security.
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 07/01/2008 - 6:28pm | 3 comments
A Unified General Framework of Insurgency Using a Living Systems Approach by Ensign Shanece Kendall, Naval Post Graduate School, June 2008.This thesis develops a unified general framework of insurgency. The framework is "unifying" in that it includes all the physical and social science formulations of insurgencies and both contemporary and historical insurgencies. It is "general" in that it describes all insurgencies rather than a specific one. This thesis first redefines the definition of insurgency in the context of the twenty-first century and addresses the military, political, social, and economic elements. Next, it adopts the view that an insurgency is a living system. This idea is based on the characteristic that every insurgency consists of a group of people embedded in a larger society. Using this concept, this thesis argues that James Grier Miller's Living Systems Theory, from his book Living Systems, is the most fitting theory to study insurgency. To demonstrate the framework's effectiveness, it is applied to the Iraq Sunni Insurgency.The framework is used to describe the structure of the insurgency system using three levels - insurgency, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Unit, and IED Cell—and the twenty critical subsystems that process information and matter-energy in the insurgency's IED Cell. This framework should help clarify, focus, and support the current debates about policy, operations, and tactics for insurgencies.
A Unified General Framework of Insurgency Using a Living Systems Approach
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 07/01/2008 - 1:41pm | 0 comments
Australian Army Journal Special Edition: CounterinsurgencyThis edition of the Australian Army Journal marks a departure from established practice in that it is a thematic edition dedicated exclusively to the issue of counterinsurgency warfare. Since the end of the Cold War military professionals, scholars and policy-makers alike have pondered the changing character of war. Consensus has proved elusive......
The pressing importance of understanding counterinsurgency led the Chief of Army to direct the urgent rewriting of Australian Army doctrine for counterinsurgency. In February this year he convened a two-day seminar to frame an authors' brief to inform the doctrine writing team. This task is now being undertaken against a tight schedule. That is the reason that this edition of the Australian Army Journal is a thematic special edition. It also explains why we have expedited its production, in an effort to stimulate thinking across the Army about this important issue.
Accordingly, a number of qualifications need to be expressed. This issue is built around a significant number of articles expressly reprinted from foreign military journals. This does not reflect a want of confidence in the calibre of our own officers and soldiers. Nor will it become the standard practice of the Australian Army Journal, which is committed to maintaining its authentic Australian voice. We hope that Australian readers will read these articles with a critical attitude and ponder their validity in the light of their own experiences of current operations, before writing their own opinions for this Journal.It would, however, be parochial in the extreme not to acknowledge the vast experience that our allies have accumulated over the past few years. For that reason we have sought the views of some of the leading experts in this field from other nations. We are honoured to publish the views of General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszley, whose contributions in this area are without peer. Likewise, the expertise of Ian Beckett and Stephen Metz—highly esteemed scholars both—are valuable additions to this Journal.Furthermore, there is a distinct land bias in this edition. As Major General Molan emphasises, successful counterinsurgency demands seamless orchestration of joint effects. And the Chief of Army stresses that the multi-agency, comprehensive approach is vital to counterinsurgency, which requires more intimate coordination of political effects than other forms of warfare. The absence of RAN, RAAF, AFP or NGO perspectives from this edition does not imply a lack of recognition of their fundamental importance to effective counterinsurgency operations. However, this edition has been compiled within the serious time constraints applicable to the doctrine writers. In the interests of publishing this contribution in time to be of any relevance to the Army, we necessarily focused on our primary audience...Table of Contents:
Historical Context
Australia's Counterinsurgencies: A Brief History by Jeff Grey
New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency by Steven Metz
Back to the Future: The Enduring Characteristics of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency by Lieutenant Colonel Mark O'Neill
Current Operations
Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq by Lieutenant General David H Petraeus
Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point by Major Niel Smith and Colonel Sean Macfarland
Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan by Colonel Patrick Donahue and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel
Joint/Combined Arms
Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for US Forces Based on Israel's Operation Change of Direction by Captain Daniel Helmer
Canadian Armour in Afghanistan by Major Trevor Cadieu, CD
Air Power's Illusion? Israel's 2006 Campaign in the Lebanon by Group Captain Neville Parton
Intellectual Challenges
On War: Lessons to be Learned by Colonel H R McMaster
Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors by Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely
Doctrine
Defeating Insurgencies: Adaptive Campaigning and an Australian Way of War by Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott
Thoughts of a Practitioner: A Contribution to Australia's Counterinsurgency Doctrine Drafters by Major General Jim Molan
Task Force Ranger Vs. Urban Somali Guerrillas in Mogadishu: An Analysis of Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Tactics and Techniques Used During Operation Gothic Serpent by Marshall V Ecklund
The Future
The Future of Insurgency by Ian Beckett
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 07/01/2008 - 2:23am | 0 comments
Colonel Lewis Craparotta, Commander of Regimental Combat Team 1, speaks from from Camp Fallujah, providing an update on ongoing security operations in western Iraq on 30 June 2008.Colonel Robert Vasta, Gulf Region Central District Commander, and Abdul Salam Abdullah, Government of Iraq Anbar Provincial Council Chairman, speaking with reporters in Iraq on 30 June 2008.
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 06/30/2008 - 1:46pm | 2 comments
Occupation Plan for Iraq Faulted in Army History - Michael Gordon, New York Times
... The story of the American occupation of Iraq has been the subject of numerous books, studies and memoirs. But now the Army has waded into the highly charged debate with its own nearly 700-page account: "On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign."The unclassified study, the second volume in a continuing history of the Iraq conflict, is as noteworthy for who prepared it as for what it says. In essence, the study is an attempt by the Army to tell the story of one of the most contentious periods in its history to military experts - and to itself. It adds to a growing body of literature about the problems the United States encountered in Iraq, not all of which has been embraced by Army leaders.Lt. Col. Paul Yingling of the Army ignited a debate when he wrote a magazine article that criticized American generals for failing to prepare a coherent plan to stabilize postwar Iraq. In 2005, the RAND Corporation submitted a report to the Army, called "Rebuilding Iraq," that identified problems with virtually every government agency that played a role in planning the postwar phase. After a long delay, the report is scheduled to be made public on Monday.But the "On Point" report carries the imprimatur of the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. The study is based on 200 interviews conducted by military historians and includes long quotations from active or recently retired officers...Army's History of After Hussein Faults Pentagon - Josh White, Washington Post
A new Army history of the service's performance in Iraq immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein faults military and civilian leaders for their planning for the war's aftermath, and it suggests that the Pentagon's current way of using troops is breaking the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.The study, "On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign," is an unclassified and unhindered look at US Army operations in Iraq from May 2003 to January 2005. That critical era of the war has drawn widespread criticism because of a failure to anticipate the rise of an Iraqi insurgency and because policymakers provided too few US troops and no strategy to maintain order after Iraq's decades-old regime was overthrown. Donald P. Wright and Col. Timothy R. Reese, who authored the report along with the Army's Contemporary Operations Study Team, conclude that US commanders and civilian leaders were too focused on only the military victory and lacked a realistic vision of what Iraq would look like following that triumph...Download On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign
Order On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign
Discuss at Small Wars Council
Update 2
News
US Army's Own Report Faults Poor Planning, Lack of Vision - Voice of America
Public Military History Criticizes Pentagon - FOX News
US History Blames Commander and Lack of Plan - The Australian
Blogs
Reflections on "On Point II" - CAC Blog
Generalship and Iraq - HG's World
Preliminary Thoughts - The Captain's Journal
Update 3
After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq by Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell, Rand Report 30 June 2008.
This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.Update 4
On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign - US Army Information Brief
On Point Bloggers Roundtable - Department of Defense
Army's Official Iraq War Report Cites Poor Planning - National Public Radio
Prewar Planning and Occupation of Iraq - The Captain's Journal
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 06/28/2008 - 9:19pm | 0 comments
General David H Petraeus: The General's Knowledge - Charles Sennott, The Sunday TimesGeneral David H Petraeus, the commander of US forces in Iraq, looked exhausted. A competitive miler who loves to challenge young field commanders to five-mile running races and push-up contests (which he usually wins), he appears fit as ever. But there are dark circles under his eyes. Leading this war has begun to exact a visible toll. "You are on the edge of having just enough sleep to sort of make it through every day," he says, conceding that he has reconfigured his schedule to a less gruelling pace than when he first led the "surge" of 30,000-plus American troops into Iraq just over a year ago. "There is a point of no reservoir." It's a cool, grey day outside his office inside the former Republican Palace of Saddam Hussein, in the heavily fortified green zone in Baghdad. On a delicate tea table sits a folder bulging with field reports and "weekly attack trends", as well as a series of charts tracking the body count in Iraq. The office is in a corner of the palace he shares with Ryan Crocker, the US ambassador to Iraq. Crocker arrived in Baghdad with Petraeus in February 2007. Both came intending to undo a series of mistakes by the generals and diplomats who preceded them and brought the war to the edge of defeat. Petraeus brought a new playbook: a 240-page counterinsurgency manual he wrote during 2005-6 and whose precepts he was determined to test...
General David H Petraeus: The General's Knowledge
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 06/28/2008 - 5:42pm | 0 comments
Today's Financial Times contains a detailed and thought provoking article by Andrew Woods on efforts by Major General Douglas Stone and Task Force 134 in conducting "counterinsurgency inside the wire". Here are several excerpts, be sure to read the entire article...... An imperial city like this -- guarded by an occupying army whose legitimacy has been in the balance since the prison abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib in 2004 -- is an unlikely place to test the claim that a more humane military is a more effective one. But, then, Stone is an unlikely commander. A Marine reservist who made a fortune in Silicon Valley before taking a doctorate in public administration, he is now fanatical about winning what he calls "the battlefield of the mind".Since arriving in Iraq, he has instituted significant changes to coalition detention centres, including new review boards which explain to detainees why they are being held and what they can do about it; a pledge-and-guarantor programme whereby soon-to-be-released detainees swear in front of a judge that they will not return to the fight; increased family visits to the prisons; education programmes, including maths, Arabic and English classes; vocational training programmes; and religious discussion classes, where privately hired sheikhs discuss the Koran with detainees...... Stone himself brags that he has "a high tolerance, a very high tolerance" for killing. "Don't get me wrong," he says. "You have to have violence. The moderate mosques had extremist imams. Those extremist imams are now with Allah."Stone's great innovation, however, is that the US and its allies must limit indiscriminate killings -- and detainee mistreatment -- as a matter of public diplomacy rather than principle. This theory is a military doctrine that offers rare common ground for human rights advocates and hard-nosed generals, and it is one Stone has been working on for a while...... Euphoric as it sounds, this is the way Task Force 134 was originally envisioned. Several policy planners say, off the record, that detention was always thought of as the cornerstone of a new civil society in Iraq. Because they suspected that the rule of law was corrupted under Saddam, American planners decided they would have to rebuild the country's legal system from the ground up. Detention was seen as a good incubator for "rule of law programmes" -- a training ground for Iraqi judges and lawyers, and thereby a means of manufacturing civil society.None of that materialised. By the time the Abu Ghraib scandal broke in April 2004, detention was a shambles and cycles of rioting and repression were the norm. While Abu Ghraib provoked better oversight -- at least of soldiers' cameras -- detention's basic contours remained static, but the number of detainees was rising fast...
Much more, read and learn.
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 06/28/2008 - 2:52pm | 0 comments
Charlie Rose Show - A discussion about North Korea's Declaration of Nuclear Materials with David Sanger, White House correspondent for The New York Times.
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 06/28/2008 - 8:24am | 0 comments
With a hat tip to Daniel Troy of the Consortium for Complex Operations - United Press International recently ran a three part series titled Emerging Threats: USAF Counterinsurgency authored by Shaun Watterman. From the introduction in Part 1:The veteran military officials picked by Defense Secretary Robert Gates to take over the Air Force face a tough job redefining the service's role in what many see as the key kind of combat the U.S. military will face in the immediate future: counterinsurgency.
The problem, say many who have studied the topic, is that the things the U.S. Air Force has made its priority capabilities -- establishing air supremacy over the enemy and perfecting the timely and pinpoint delivery of high explosives -- tend to be less useful in irregular or asymmetric conflicts like those in which the U.S. military is currently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In particular, critics have singled out an over-reliance on air strikes in Afghanistan as a significant barrier to the success of a "hearts and minds" strategy on the ground, given the inevitability of "collateral damage" -- the accidental killing of civilians.
"From an Air Force perspective, we were told to plan for a different kind of war," Lt. Col. Michael Pietrucha told United Press International, commenting on the general direction of post-Cold War strategic thinking, which emphasized the potential for conventional conflicts with strategic competitors or regional powers like China or Iran.
Pietrucha, a specialist in irregular combat who until recently worked at the Air Force Warfare Center, stressed he did not speak for the service.
He added it was appropriate the Air Force had different priorities, because of its strategic roles in assuring "force projection" -- the ability of the U.S. military to strike anywhere in the world -- and in operating the nation's nuclear strike capabilities.
"We have a set of global responsibilities that require us to keep a slightly different focus," he said, adding that while counterinsurgency might be the most common kind of conflict the military would face in the immediate future, "The most common conflicts are not necessarily the most dangerous."
Other observers agree that, if the Air Force has been slow to meet the counterinsurgency challenge, they have other priorities, too.
"They have always put their emphasis on air supremacy," said a senior congressional staffer, "on the basis that unless you have that, your troops on the ground are at risk."
"The question," he added, "is whether they have overemphasized it."
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Analysis: USAF's Counterinsurgency Plan
Discuss at Small Wars Council
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 06/28/2008 - 7:59am | 0 comments
The latest issue of Joint Force Quarterly has been posted. JFQ is published for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, integrated operations, coalition warfare, contingency planning, military operations conducted across the spectrum of conflict, and joint force development. Here are the featured articles:
ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater by Raymond T. Odierno, Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastracchio
Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices by Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L. Cantrell
Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: The Critical Role of Special Operations Forces by Thomas R. Searle
The Imbalance in Iraqi Security Force Transition by Scott S. Jensen
The Influence of Just War Perspectives: Implications for U.S. Central Command by Tyler Rauert
Forty Years of COIN: The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories by Nathan W. Toronto
Israel's Survival Instincts and the Dangers of Nuclear Weapons in Iranian Hands by Richard L. Russell
Integration of Coalition Forces into the USCENTCOM Mission by John F. Couture
Battling Misperceptions: Challenges to U.S. Security Cooperation in Central Asia by Roger D. Kangas
Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies: Building Relationships, Enhancing Security by John D. Lawrence
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 06/27/2008 - 8:31pm | 1 comment
Notes Towards a Theory of Information Operations (IO) - Marc Tyrrell, In HarmoniumYesterday (June 26, 2008), Andrew Exum posted a blog entry over at Small Wars Journal on Information Operations. As part of the post, he laid out a challenge to SWC members.So far, as of early morning the following day (June 27, 2008), a rather active thread on the question has emerged. Part of the thread was a comment I posted that tried to pull apart the roots of Information Operations (IO) so that an actual, analytically useful, definition could be produced. After working on the post for half an hour, I realized that it would require a lot more thought and detail, hence this post...
Good reads all, Ex's and Marc's posts and the Council discussion.
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 06/27/2008 - 7:47pm | 0 comments
Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan - June 2008 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
(Section 1230, Public Law 110-181).
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the first in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2010 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is current as of April 10, 2008.United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces - June 2008 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181).
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes the United States plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). In accordance with subsection (a), it includes a description of the long-term plan for sustaining the ANSF, with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. The report includes a comprehensive strategy and budget, with defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. This report is the first of the annual reports required through 2010 on the long-term plan for Afghanistan. Consistent with this Act, this report has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its international partners, or Afghanistan.by SWJ Editors | Fri, 06/27/2008 - 6:30pm | 0 comments
The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations edited by Jay W. Boggs and Colonel (USA, Ret) Joseph R. Cerami, US Army War College - Strategic Studies Institute.For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.
The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 06/27/2008 - 6:29pm | 0 comments
Wars of Ideas and the War of Ideas by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, II, US Army War College - Strategic Studies Institute.The author discusses several types of wars of ideas in an effort to achieve a better understanding of what wars of ideas are. That knowledge, in turn, can help inform strategy. It is important to note, for instance, that because ideas are interpreted subjectively, it is not likely that opposing parties will "win" each other over by means of an ideational campaign alone. Hence, physical events, whether intended or incidental, typically play determining roles in the ways wars of ideas unfold, and how (or whether) they are end. Thus, while the act of communicating strategically remains a vital part of any war of ideas, we need to manage our expectations as far as what it can accomplish.
Wars of Ideas and the War of Ideas
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 06/27/2008 - 5:35pm | 0 comments
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Public Event). Washington, DC. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is sponsoring a discussion on counterinsurgency on 22 July 2008, at the National Press Club (the Holeman Lounge), Washington, DC. Dr. John Nagl (Center for a New American Security), Dr. Daniel Marston (Australian National University), and Dr. Carter Malkasian (CNA) recently collaborated on Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Osprey, 2008), an edited book that examines 13 of the most important counterinsurgency campaigns of the past 100 years, including the current Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Dr. David Kilcullen (U.S. State Department), the renowned counterinsurgency expert, will moderate the discussion and provide critical commentary. Lunch will be provided. Books will be available to purchase at a discounted rate. For more information, visit the first link above. RSVP at [email protected] or 703.824.2436.