Journal

“Small Wars Journal’s” fourth review of six. “The Village” is a classic, probably the only book that has been on the Commandant of the Marine Corps Professional Reading List for over forty years, it is still taught as part of the curriculum at The Basic School for Marine officers in Quantico, VA. It is a book about a little piece of the Vietnam War that offers lessons for every counterinsurgency since. It’s a book for everyone in the military or in the business of counterinsurgency, over fifty years after the establishment of the CAP program we’re still struggling to replicate its successes.

This book is unique in that unlike many others published since the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and Afghanistan it is focused on the neglected systemic treatment of the insurgency itself, while others in this genre focus on counterinsurgency. Jones breaks down over seven chapters how an insurgency begins and then goes through the various strategies, tactics, organizational structures, how insurgents use propaganda and gain outside support historically used in an insurgency. He uses past and current insurgencies to validate his points throughout the book.

The announcement that John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs and Ambassador to the United Nations in the George W. Bush Administration, will succeed H.R. McMaster as National Security Adviser effective April 9th raises important and interesting questions about the direction of American national security policy and the role of the National Security Council staff.

An Army commander must be able to communicate with geographically dispersed forces to command effectively. A home station mission command center (HSMCC) increases a commander's ability to communicate with military partners anytime, anywhere.

This paper focuses on emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures in the threat finance world concerning cryptocurrencies. It will examine critical vulnerabilities in the crypto market, explore how non-fiat currencies have altered conventional money laundering techniques, and consider potential adversarial use of distributed computational infrastructure. This study will conclude with policy recommendations to US Government officials at the national, strategic, and operational levels that are designed to enable greater scouting of emerging technologies, which may be exploited.

The reason I am writing this article is because I received a lot of feedback on my article published in Small Wars Journal on leadership. The comments below are a sample of what I received from readers. These comments speak to the problem we are having in the military with humility, top-cover for mistakes, understanding how to manage failure, and organizational change.

Faced with an aggressive Russia, expansionary China, and rising military expenditures swelling the national debt, American policymakers are left with a choice: will the country continue to maintain a standing capability to tackle multiple major threats across the world at any fiscal or diplomatic cost?

Rather than continue short duration efforts that lead to little long term gain, long-term embedded advisors in partner nation military institutions should be used. A Western military presence in partner nation professional military educational facilities can provide an enduring effect that may result in professional armies inculcated in Western concepts of professionalism and fealty to civilian control and oversight.

This essay examines the structure and role of non-governmental organizations, identifies the principles of liberal institutionalism, discusses International Committee of the Red Cross events in Afghanistan and concludes with identifying viable solutions through international response with a liberal institutionalist theoretical framework.

To develop an effective foundation for the creation of cybersecurity strategy, cyber policymakers must learn from a historical example when a new domain of warfare, rapidly evolving technology, and an environment dominated by the offense presented challenges to conventional defense.

This paper examines the foundations of the "Chechen model" of Russian intervention, briefly recap the much-documented American "Afghan model” and analyze how the Chechen model proved superior in a shared conflict space with competing objectives in Syria.

Bing West gives us, in this timeless work, an incomparable portrait of the lower end of the spectrum, a small war indeed. The Marines, chronicled by Marine Captain Bing West in a RAND report, all volunteers, were given one simple order—control the five square miles of the village of Binh Nghia, day and night, and do it with rifles, not artillery or airpower. The costs were high.

Although Italy might be currently safer than other European societies, not only could Rome turn into a prime target in the short/medium term; evidence also suggests that, in the long term, the risk of experiencing more serious dynamics of radicalisation is not minimal.

Some might argue that these successes of the ultra-rich have trickled down to the middle and working classes; the data simply does not support such notions. Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz finds that from 2005 to 2015 the income of the ultra-rich increased by eighteen percent, while the middle class saw slight declines in income and men with high school degrees experienced precipitous falls in income.

This is the second in a series of “Small Wars Journal” reviews of Bing West’s military classic “The Village”.

Article two of two in the latest Mad Scientist at Small Wars Journal series.

Perhaps the most apt description of the factions in the Syrian war can be taken from pop culture: “They're all just spokes on a wheel. This ones on top, then that ones on top and on and on it spins crushing those on the ground.”

Article one of two in the latest Mad Scientist at Small Wars Journal series.

In this paper, nine threat categories are discussed through the prism of a unified analytical framework. This discussion forms the central element of the paper’s analysis focusing on expanding the boundaries of the threat landscape.

From the United States’ perspective as the stronger force in recent conflicts, and typically fighting on foreign soil, Time is a critical vulnerability. For US forces fighting abroad, the shorter the duration of the conflict, the more likely the result will be decisive victory.

Manzoor Pashteen is a genuine voice for peace and his demands are constitutional; suppressing him and his movement would result in more chaos in the region. Peace in Afghanistan is ultimately related to peace in FATA, the sooner Pakistani and US authorities realize this, the better.

Military-trained gang members (MTGMs) have been identified in every wartime period for the United States—from the Revolutionary War to the current conflicts. MTGMs in the military threaten the cohesiveness of military units and undermine the authority of military leadership.

A defining feature of the marauder is that it operates outside of the rules and conventions that govern. This feature makes the marauder ubiquitous, giving it a capacity to easily outwit and overwhelm its conventional opposition.

Vast amounts of research exist on why the individual or small group might join a violent organization and travel to a conflict zone, but little exists on how the receiving organizations recruit, vet, and facilitate the foreign fighter process.

Fifty years ago, an armed confrontation between Israel, Jordan, and Palestinian guerillas created a new phase of Middle East diplomacy and conflicts. What does the battle’s legacy tell us about Jordan and its place the troubled region today?

While the US Army has an exceptional force to win the nation’s wars, it lacks the ability to stabilize areas after conflict abates.

Army leadership needs to admit to itself it has a trust and honesty problem. These problems can be directly attributed to inadequate leadership engagement, poor talent management, requirement overload, and a lack of moral courage.

We propose that the United States recognize North Korea as a nuclear power, make it blatantly clear that this an unacceptable end state, and provide nuclear weapons in South Korea and Japan that are jointly maintained, but still owned by the United States.

This essay defines war in the international and historical sense, then analyzes human nature’s role in conflict, followed by human nature’s projection on the nation state and finally concludes with the most frequent manifestations of conflict and conclusion.

The successful application of prospect theory to insurgent behavior demonstrates that the selection of a strategy by an insurgent is not exogenously given, as much counterinsurgency presumes as a starting point, but is open to being shaped by the counterinsurgent state.

Suffering from triple digit inflation, rampaging price increases, severe medicine and food shortages, a 50% drop in national petroleum revenues as well as an authoritarian, corrupt government focused on regime survival guiding the ship, Venezuela requires significant course corrections.

This article explores the progression of Western, and specifically United States, military thinking and warfighting philosophies. It centers on the utility of information, information warfare, and information in war; the operational framework and battlefield geometry by which military forces are employed; and posits that a new conceptual construct is required to better frame contemporary and more importantly future warfare.

This research guide has been created for Small Wars Journal readers to aid in their understanding of the plutocratic insurgency construct and explain how it is related to the earlier criminal insurgency construct which has been the focus of numerous El Centro works over the last decade.

For girls, and women in particular, education can be a source of empowerment and they can serve as a catalyst for societies emerging after decades of civil unrest.

In this paper the authors review the Cyber Threat Framework and propose an extension to the Cyber Threat Framework which integrates cyber threats with cyber defenses.

The first Small Wars Journal review of seven on this classic of the war in Vietnam.

If JPG leaders follow the general rules for fact and assumption development, they are likely to create valuable and relevant facts and assumptions faster and with less wasted effort.

Temporareality is a strange military internal sub-culture that I have personally observed for over 16 years in 4 post 9-11 deployments.

The intent of the work is to develop a theory and philosophy behind the narco-killings taking place in contemporary Mexico.

Article two of two in the latest Mad Scientist at Small Wars Journal series.

Confidence building measures rely on four key components: Reputation, Status, Transparency & Trust. In theory, when RTS2 combine to establish sustainable CBMs, regional conflicts can be prevented.

The deployment of automated weapons systems poses significant ethical challenges, especially jus in bello.

One key purpose of this study is to analyze and assess how Daesh’s actions as a non-state actor either supported or hindered their goals of establishing a religious caliphate.

A nexus of policy guidance meant to protect the defense industry, reduce weapons proliferation and improve financial accountability has hamstrung ANDSF materiel procurement.

Article one of two in the latest Mad Scientist at Small Wars Journal series.

The increased proliferation of information collection technologies is becoming a threat to the Army’s Mission Command Philosophy.

A key to potentially improving influence efforts may be found in economics, in a concept called Consumption Theory.

Erdogan has instigated an irregular and Iranian-like militia structure that helps him control streets, inflict oppression and carry out covert operations against dissident political groups.

The latest article in the Mad Scientist at Small Wars Journal series.

Since the end of the Barre era, no Somali leader or group of leaders has managed to de-clan the Somali National Army, which is why it remains dysfunctional today.