Journal

Practical Application of Complexity Theory to Military Operations

by Grant Martin

Download The Full Article: Tell Me How to Do This Thing Called Design!

Since first being introduced to "Design" I, like many others, have felt that there was an awful lot of theory and not enough practical application. Naturally, therefore, I feel sympathetic towards those who clamor for less background theory and more operational "how to" instructions. We are an Army of action, and there is little room, patience, or cultural tradition for too much time thinking about things. And, honestly, too much time hesitating, thinking, or theorizing many times will cede the initiative to those who act boldly. '"Okay", you say: "I'll trust your theory (or I'm just not interested in all that mumbo-jumbo), just give me what to do!!" If that quote is something that resonates with you, then this article was written with you in mind.

Download The Full Article: Tell Me How to Do This Thing Called Design!

Grant Martin is a U.S. Army Special Forces Major assigned to the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School (Airborne).

by James Michael Few

Download The Full Article: The Pacification of Zaganiyah (Part One)

The attacks of 9/11 and subsequent Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) thrust the United States military General Purpose Forces (GPF) into a host of small wars. As we relearned the timeless art of counterinsurgency, much debate surrounds perfecting the proper mixture of gentle influence and violent coercion required as an external intervention force. In the beginning, this mixture is irrelevant. Instead, the most difficult problem facing the commander is one of information. How does one discover and define the current situation on the ground? This understanding is the critical foundation of all other planning and actions.

This essay describes how one Army reconnaissance unit answered this question in a small village perched in a rural, hostile valley. It is the first part in a larger work describing company-level counterinsurgency efforts in the Diyala River Valley during the Iraq Surge. The intent is to describe our initial reconnaissance efforts to define the operational environment and develop a plan to intervene. The purpose is two-fold: 1. inform policy makers on the costs, requirements, and time needed for such GPF interventions, and 2. provide young leaders with an example of applying theory to practice.

While this individual case is unique in study, the methodology is universal. Basic military tactics and techniques appropriately applied for the given environment provide the highest probability for a successful outcome. This valley would serve as watershed moment for the junior combat leaders involved, and they would eventually apply these lessons learned in the streets of Baghdad at the tail end of the Iraq Surge, the ravaged airfield and slums of Port-au-Prince, Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, and the seemingly unconquerable valleys of Kunar Province along the Af-Pak border during the Afghanistan Surge.

Download The Full Article: The Pacification of Zaganiyah (Part One)

Major James Michael Few, USA, is an active duty armor officer and the Editor of Small Wars Journal. He served multiple tours to Iraq in various command and staff positions. The views expressed herein are his own.

by Neoptolemus

Download the Full Article: Defense in an Age of Austerity: 2022

My fellow Americans, it is with a grave heart and serious reservations that I come to you today to announce the implementation of the results of the Preserving America's Economic Security Commission. This congressionally-authorized panel was established to provide our nation's elected leaders with recommendations to better balance the abyss between our national treasury and our collective ability to pay for our own government and security. Decades of delay and delusion have brought us well past the crisis point. We have preserved global stability for others for many decades, but at great expense. The long war against extremism has cost us well over $2T in direct costs alone and the interest compounds daily. Meanwhile the country's demographic aging, rising health care costs, and insatiable appetite for entitlements has placed our great Nation's balance sheet deep in the red. A culture of entitlement over sacrifice and shared obligation has eroded our stature as a great power and our moral standing. A decade of continued economic pressure, unemployment above 12%, coupled with a determined resistance on the part of the nation's elected officials to come to any serious resolution of the country's fiscal crisis has brought us to the point of peril.

The international bond market has spoken. We presently owe $23T in publicly held debt and at least another $10T in unfunded social security liabilities. Just the interest on that debt alone costs us more than $1T a year, double our annual defense expenditures. We continue to run trillion dollar deficits as we have for the entire last decade. Our debt to revenue ratio is now well over 120%. People are beginning to avoid U.S. backed bonds and dollar based investments. Now interest rates are climbing several points from 3 to 5 to 7% on our bonds, as global markets have found better places and safer currencies in which to invest. The dollar is no longer the world's reserve currency or first choice. We once criticized small countries like Greece or Ireland for failing to meet their debts, and now we are in far worse shape.

Download the Full Article: Defense in an Age of Austerity: 2022

Neoptolemus, a retired infantry officer, is currently imprisoned as a senior defense official in the Pentagon. Neoptolemus was the son of the warrior Achilles and the princess Deidamia in Greek mythology.

An Interview with General Jack Keane

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Interview: An Interview with General Jack Keane

How would you describe the US Army's mind-set in approaching the war in Vietnam?

I think we took an army whose primary focus was conventional operations against the Warsaw Pact in Europe and took it to war in South Vietnam. In the first three years of the war we were trying to use conventional tactics against an unconventional enemy. That strategy failed miserably. And it was not until General Abrams came in and took over from General Westmoreland who changed the strategy to a counterinsurgency strategy which was designed to protect the population. We saw significant progress against the insurgency and then, by 1971, three years later, it was essentially defeated.

Should we understand that World War II, the Korean War, and preparation for Fulda Gap campaigns - all this operational heritage - had an impact in shaping the mind-set of the US Military vis-í -vis executing war?

Yes.

What should have been the lessons learned from the Vietnam experience?

I think we learned all the right lessons in how to defeat an insurgency because we succeeded. We lost the war for other reasons, but in terms of defeating the insurgency, I think we learned the right lessons in terms of the preeminence of and the importance of protecting the population, winning the population to your side, using minimum amount of force, dealing with a government that is not effective and dealing with a population that has legitimate grievances against that government. Most insurgencies obviously have some legitimate grievances against the government -- otherwise - it wouldn't be an insurgency to begin with. I think we codified the major tenets of the counterinsurgency we learned and it was in our memory up until 1975. When the war ended we purged it from our lexicon and put the doctrine we had developed on the shelf and embraced war against the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. I think it has much to do with how the war ended in Vietnam. The fact that it did not come out favorably to us - I think the military leaders of the time just wanted to get rid of it like a cancer.

Download the Full Interview: An Interview with General Jack Keane

Interview with General Jack Keane conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

Small Wars Journal

Vol. 7, No. 3 is now available.  It presents a few new (as of 31 Mar) articles

and provides select reprints and an index of all articles from March. 

Click here for the

full issue, or directly on these titles for single articles.

Countering Extremism in Yemen: Beyond Interagency Cooperation

Kaz Kotlow

Shaping Coalition Forces' Strategic Narrative in Support of Village Stability

Operations by  Scott Mann

The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer's Frustration by Scott Dempsey

Building Relationships and Influence in Counterinsurgency: One Officer's Perspective

by Eric von Tersh

Libya's Rebel Leaders and Western Assistance by Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol

E. B. Choksy

Book Review: How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict by Timothy

Richardson

The index of all articles published in March begins on

page 22 of the

issue.  Please review that listing or our

monthly or

title archives

for any you may have missed as they fired past during the month.

This entry is closed for comment. Please make any comments directly on the individual

articles via the links above.

To Design or Not to Design (Part Four):

Taking Lines out of Non-Linear; How Design Must Escape 'Tacticization' Bias of Military Culture

by Ben Zweibelson

Download The Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Four)

The fifteen pages of design doctrine in FM5-0 Chapter 3 Design introduces non-linear open system concepts while paradoxically recommending traditional linear methodology for transforming these dynamic open systems into the desired state. While the first eleven pages on design discuss open systems and their inherent tendencies to learn, adapt, and resist mechanistic action, section 3-58, The Operational Approach, resorts back to linear causality by recommending lines of effort as a method to depict transforming the system. Once again, Army design doctrine suffers an identity crisis in which holistic approaches to complex systems struggles with an institutional preference for tacticizing all levels of war.

Download The Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Four)

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer in the US Army. A veteran of OIF 1 and OIF 6, Ben is currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Air Force (Air Command and Staff College program). Ben deploys this June to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a planner.

Editor's Note: This essay is part four of a six part series on design.

by Michael E. Reheuser

Download The Full Article: Shaping a Culture of Privacy in the DoD

I read with interest your December 6th article entitled The Military's Cultural Disregard for Personal Information. The authors have done well to bring to light a continuing challenge not only for the Department of Defense, but for all government agencies. They rightly point out the overreliance on Social Security Numbers as a common identifier and the risks which its pervasiveness present to military personnel both at home and deployed across the globe.

For more than 30 years the Defense Privacy Office -- now Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office (DPCLO) -- has worked across the DoD Components to address a myriad of risks to personal information. Over that time the Department has instituted numerous policies to protect the privacy and secure the records of its personnel and their dependents, sometimes revolutionizing entire business practices in the process. Today the Department faces just such a watershed moment.

Download The Full Article: Shaping a Culture of Privacy in the DoD

Michael Reheuser is the Director of the Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office (DPCLO) and DoD's Deputy Civil Liberties Officer.

Seeing Everything from the Prism of Islamic Extremism in Afghanistan

by Metin Turcan

Download The Full Article: Simply a Nirvana Fallacy

Abstract. There has emerged a vast literature at the strategic level on the COIN efforts of the CF in Afghanistan, which is generally considered as an integral part of the struggle against global extremism. Nonetheless, to see Afghanistan as a "front" in the struggle against global extremism severely distracts our focus and falsely lead us to cover all other related phenomena under the blanket of "Islamic extremism.' The utmost aim of this article is to challenge traditional COIN wisdom available in the literature which takes "Islamic Extremism" as the single factor that explains everything in rural Afghanistan. This article suggests that the tribal and rural characteristics of Afghanistan precede the Islamic identity of Afghanistan, and therefore, the current debacle of international community in rural Afghanistan does not conform to established frames or assumptions in the literature.

Download The Full Article: Simply a Nirvana Fallacy

Metin Turcan holds an MA degree in Security Studies from Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He served in northern Iraq (1999, 2004), Kazakhstan (2003), Kyrgyzstan (2004) and Afghanistan (2005) in both fulfilled liaison and training missions. Currently, he is working as a security advisor in the Interior Ministry of Turkey and a Ph.D candidate studying Afghanistan and the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century.

All opinions expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views of any institution or organization the author has been associated with.

by Kurt Albaugh

Download The Full Article: Six Frigates and the Future of Gunboat Diplomacy

March was a busy month for the Navy. It supported the war against extremism in Afghanistan, led the vanguard of strikes in Libya, boarded suspicious vessels off the Somali coast, and saved life and property in Japan. A month's events couldn't augur more strongly why we need to maintain a global, flexible, versatile Navy. Even with excellent intelligence, we can't know when the Navy will be called to fight, to protect, or to save. By maintaining a widespread presence, the Navy was able to respond to the government's foreign policy objectives with gunboat diplomacy in Libya and aid to the thousands suffering in Japan.

While the Navy was doing the nation's work, congressional testimony described a bleak future. The fiscal reality of today will have a lasting effect on the Department of Defense, and the Navy, of tomorrow. Congressional Budget Office analysis shows that shipbuilding costs are expected to far outpace inflation. Demand for naval forces is high, but as costs to provide those forces grow rapidly, the federal budget is stretched thin, and some are calling to cut the defense budget by as much as one sixth. Even if the Navy can articulate its value to the nation and gain a higher proportion of the defense budget, the larger slice will likely come from a smaller pie. With defense budget cuts looming, the Navy should look to its own history: as our ships once more go to the shores of Tripoli, the philosophy behind the Navy's first ships offers appropriate and instructive lessons on forging American resources into the sword and shield of our republic. The original six frigates of the United States exemplify the qualities the Navy should advocate in its plan to provide the capabilities America expects in a way America can afford.

Download The Full Article: Six Frigates and the Future of Gunboat Diplomacy

Kurt Albaugh currently teaches at the U.S. Naval Academy. A surface warfare officer, he has experience in frigates and destroyers. He is a 2010 recipient of the Surface Navy Association's Arleigh Burke Award for Operational Excellence. The views expressed are his alone.

by Scott Mann

Download The Full Article: Shaping Coalition Forces' Strategic Narrative in Support of Village Stability Operations

This article is designed to provide strategists and tacticians with comprehensive recommendations for weaving a strategic narrative and supporting plans to achieve a tipping point in the Afghan Counterinsurgency Campaign by leveraging the power of information to amplify the bottom up effects of Village Stability Operations ( VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP).

Download The Full Article: Shaping Coalition Forces' Strategic Narrative in Support of Village Stability Operations

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Mann is a Special Forces Officer assigned to United States Special Operations Command.

Beyond Interagency Cooperation

by Kaz Kotlow

Download The Full Article: Countering Extremism in Yemen

Extremism, especially violent extremism, is a clear threat to the national security of the United States. It is widely believed that effectively addressing quality of life issues, encouraging peaceful conflict resolution and enhancing political inclusion are critical to neutralizing extremist messaging, helping prevent the development and spread of violent extremism. Traditionally, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and The United States Department of State (DOS) are the primary agencies for development, with Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in support. But traditional "interagency cooperation" has often not resulted in effective programs. The U.S. Government (USG) should maximize integration of effort, bringing all government elements together from inception to planning and assessment, of a single coherent plan. DOD assets, from doctrine to personnel and funding, can be of great benefit in helping create and execute those integrated efforts.

Download The Full Article: Countering Extremism in Yemen

Colonel Kazimierz "Kaz" Kotlow, USA is currently a visiting Senior Service Col-lege Fellow at The Washington Insti-tute. Most recently, he served as the Defense and Army Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, a post he previously held at the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon. Colonel Kotlow also deployed as a political/military advisor to the Multinational Force (MNF) Commander, III Corps, in Baghdad, Iraq. Prior to his postings as a Foreign Area Officer, Colonel Kotlow served as a Special Forces detachment commander, deploying multiple times to Eritrea and Kuwait to train host nation forces in infantry operations and demining. The views expressed herein are his own.

by Brian C. Collins

Download The Full Article: Lessons for Libya?

Thesis: The disastrous outcome of the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was not the result of tactical incompetence, but rather a consequence of flawed policy.

Discussion: It is critical for policy-makers to not only understand the difficulties of armed intervention, but also the commitment of will required. If policy limitations preclude waging the type of war necessary to achieve strategic objectives, the pursuit of other options becomes imperative. Professional military members expend a great deal of energy to understand the relationship between politics and war. It would be wise for policy-makers to do the same so as to avoid the pitfalls experienced by the British and French in 1956. Tactically, the British and French - in concert with the Israelis - mobilized, deployed, and employed a diverse military force to compel the fall of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egyptian government. Operationally, the campaign required a degree of coordination between not only national entities, but branches within the armed forces as well which had yet to be exhibited in an operation of such limited size and scope in the twentieth century. Strategically, geo-political influences and factors forced the withdrawal of British and French forces before ever achieving the purpose for which the military campaign was intended -- the removal of the Nasser. This paper examines the Anglo-French expedition to identify the root causes which lead to this tremendous failure in order to provide lessons for the national leadership of today.

Conclusion: The failure of the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was clearly the result of flawed policy, not tactical incompetence. The political establishment's failure to anticipate reaction in the context of Cold War balance of power politics, their discount of options other than military action, and insistence upon planning to obtain limited objectives, all contributed directly to the ignominy which would follow.

Download The Full Article: Lessons for Libya?

Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Collins, USMC is the Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor at Headquarters, US Special Operations Command. The views expressed herein are his own.

by Charli Carpenter

Download the Full Article: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect

There has been a fair amount of debate over Obama's decision to join Western powers in using force to protect civilians in Libya. Among various refrains is the claim that "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) doctrine lacks moral strength if applied selectively.

According to this line of thinking, the international community can't legitimately go after Qaddafi if it won't/can't also go after every other dictator. However, it is important to recall that R2P doctrine, as laid out by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and acknowledged as a legal principle in several multilateral documents, actually promotes military force for civilian protection not in every case where it might be merited, but rather only in limited circumstances mapping roughly onto just war theory.

Download the Full Article: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect

Charli Carpenter, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts-Amherst, is the author of two books on the protection of civilians. She blogs about human security and asymmetric warfare at The Duck of Minerva and Lawyers, Guns and Money.

Insurgencia Criminal en las Américas

por John P. Sullivan

Transfiera el Artí­culo Completo: Insurgencia Criminal en las Américas

Organizaciones criminales transnacionales y las pandillas están amenazando instituciones estatales en todas partes de las Américas. En circunstancias extremas, los carteles, las pandillas o maras, las organizaciones de tráfico de drogas, y sus encargados de hacer cumplir paramilitares están librando de facto insurgencias criminales para liberarse de la influencia del estado.

Una gran variedad de pandillas criminales están librando una guerra entre si y contra el estado. La violencia criminal desenfrenada realizada por la corrupción y la debilidad de las instituciones estatales han permitido que algunas empresas criminales desarrollen estados virtual o correspondiente. Estas zonas disputados o "temporal autónomos" introducen lo que el teórico John Robb llama "estados vacios" con áreas donde la legitimidad del estado está severamente desafiada. Estas zona frágiles, a veces sin ley (o enclaves criminal) cubre el territorio que se extiende de las vecindades individuales, a favelas o colonias, hasta ciudades enteras—tales como Ciudad Juárez—a grandes segmentos de terrón afueras en la provincia de Guatemala, Petén, y en zonas escasamente vigiladas de la Costa Atlántica de Nicaragua.

Como consecuencia, las Américas son cada vez mas sitiado por la violencia y la influencia corruptora de los actores criminales explotando territorios sin estado (enclaves criminales y los municipios dominados por la mafia) vinculado a la economí­a criminal global para construir musculo económico y, potencialmente, la fuerza polí­tica.

Transfiera el Artí­culo Completo: Insurgencia Criminal en las Américas

This article was orginally published in English as Criminal Insurgency in the Americas on 13 February 2011.

John P. Sullivan es un oficial de policí­a de carrera. Al momento se desempeí±a como teniente con el Departamento de Sheriff de Los Ángeles. También es SeniorResearch Fellow en el Centro de Estudios Avanzados sobre Terrorismo (CAST). Es co-editor de Countering Terrorism y WMD (armas de destrucción masiva: Creando una Red Global Contra el Terrorismo (Routledge, 2006) y Bioseguridad Global: Amenazas y Respuestas (Routledge, 2010).

by Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol E. B. Choksy

Download The Full Article: Libya's Rebel Leaders and Western Assistance

Abstract. The U.S., Britain, and France are assisting poorly-known rebels in Libya in addition to defending civilians through a no-fly zone. This article discusses the rebel leadership, their political backgrounds and leanings, the escalating cost of intervention, and possible outcomes.

Download The Full Article: Libya's Rebel Leaders and Western Assistance

Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Central Eurasian, International, and Islamic studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. He is also a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities.

Carol E. B. Choksy is adjunct lecturer in Strategic Intelligence and Information Management at Indiana University. She also is CEO of IRAD Strategic Consulting, Inc.

The views expressed are their own.

by Dr. Tammy S. Schultz

Download the Full Article: "Penny Wise, Pound Foolish"

"Efficiencies" is the new Washington watchword as U.S government departments, agencies, and the Congress have begun slashing budgets. Unfortunately, some of these cuts are not being made with surgical precision, but with rusted hacksaws, specifically in the national security realm.

Two areas in particular that we cut at our peril are preventative/shaping operations and stability/counterinsurgency operations (or "phase zero" and "phase four" as they are called -- although the military has smartly moved away from this linear paradigm). Cases abound, but just three cases are illustrative of this "penny wise, pound foolish" mindset: The desire to cut or eliminate the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Download the Full Article: "Penny Wise, Pound Foolish"

Dr. Tammy S. Schultz is the Director of National Security & Joint Warfare at the U.S. Marine Corps War College where she is also a professor of strategy. These views are her own.

Understanding the Real War of Ideas

by Tony Corn

Download The Full Article: The Clash of the Caliphates: Understanding the Real War of Ideas

There are plenty of reasons to view with skepticism the claim that the current turmoil in the Middle East constitutes a progressive "Arab Spring." In Egypt alone, 82 percent of the population today support stoning for adultery, 84 percent are in favor of the death penalty for apostasy, and 79 percent would view the emergence of a nuclear Iran as a positive development. If that qualifies as an Arab Spring, one has to wonder what an Arab Fall would look like.

But the one issue that the West should not be unduly concerned with is the fact that 67 percent of Egyptians are in favor of the restoration of the Caliphate.

Download The Full Article: The Clash of the Caliphates: Understanding the Real War of Ideas

Dr. Tony Corn, a frequent contributor to SWJ, worked in public diplomacy at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, DC and at the U.S. Missions to the EU and to NATO in Brussels. The opinions expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of State.

by George R. Dimitriu

Download The Full Article: 'Holding' for Companies and Platoons in Counterinsurgency

In August 2010, the Dutch redeployed their forces after being active in Afghanistan for four years, aiding and abetting ISAF with around 2000 troops each rotation. Initially, the contribution after August had been discussed fiercely, but the collapse of the Netherlands' coalition government in February 2010 meant also the end of the discussion about prolongation of the mission of Task Force Uruzgan; the withdrawal of troops is definite and more or less completed by the time of writing.

In a recently published article about the performance of the Dutch forces in Uruzgan, which I wrote together with Dr. B.A. de Graaf, we considered the efforts, the operations and the lessons learned by analyzing three operations in Uruzgan: operation 'Perth' in July 2006; 'Spin Ghar' (White Mountain) in October 2007; and 'Tura Ghar' (Sabre Mountain) in January 2009, all three of which were conducted in the Baluchi valley in Uruzgan. One of our most important conclusions is that clearing operations had very limited positive effects and mainly negative effects, if carried out on their own. This comes as no surprise as troops throughout Afghanistan were confronted with the same effects when the cleared areas were not hold thereafter. Therefore, I thought it would be worthwhile to look once again, and more deeply, at the complexity of 'holding' areas after 'clearing'. In my view -- and views of many others - this is the most crucial phase, but also the one which is the most difficult to execute. Based on the Dutch experiences in Uruzgan I introduce a model for executing the hold-phase. I focus on the tactical level, but otherwise none of the principles I introduce is really new; it is simply a question of interpreting and applying the existing COIN principles.

Download The Full Article: 'Holding' for Companies and Platoons in Counterinsurgency

George R. Dimitriu is a research fellow at the Netherlands Defence Academy. The views in this article are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces.

Panama: Is Restructuring the Razor to Cut Out Corruption?

by Anthony Scheidel

Download The Full Article: Panama: Is Restructuring the Razor to Cut Out Corruption?

This work is an empirical article detailing the recent restructuring of Panamanian Service Groups and Governmental Ministries. It provides valuable analysis not only on how the organizations were physically reorganized, but also insight into the reasons why changes were made, including corruption and rising crime levels throughout the country. Although the two reorganizations are separate and independent of each other, it also touches on how they are intertwined from a national security aspect. The essay concludes with evidence revealing how Panama is now better prepared to counter these rising levels of insecurity by means of a stronger security plan, as well as possible future approaches, including more comprehensive and applied regional security cooperation initiatives.

Download The Full Article: Panama: Is Restructuring the Razor to Cut Out Corruption?

Anthony Scheidel is a research analyst on Latin America related issues at the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), an open source research organization that focuses on the foreign perspective of understudied aspects of the Operational Environment.

Type-I Dark Network: Opportunistic-Mechanical

by Ian S. Davis, Carrie L. Worth, and Douglas W. Zimmerman

Download The Full Article: A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part Two)

The purpose of this essay is to illustrate an example of a dark network whose design state is defined by moderate environmental hostility and a moderate requirement for secure coordination of work that yields what we call Type-I Opportunistic-Mechanical configuration. Based on our theory of dark network design, the example shows how an Opportunistic-Mechanical dark network is configured to achieve its purpose and how it is vulnerable to illumination and interdiction.

Major Ian Davis is a United States Army Special Forces officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis.

Major Carrie Worth is United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) aviator and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters in Defense Analysis.

Major Douglas Zimmerman is a United States Army Intelligence officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis.

Editor's Note: This essay is the second in a six-part series on a theory of dark network design. This series was originally submitted as a thesis graduation requirement for a MS in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Dr. Nancy Roberts served as the thesis advisor, and Dr. John Arquilla served as the second reader. An electronic version of the complete thesis is available here.

To Design or Not to Design (Part Three):

Metacognition: How Problematizing Transforms a Complex System towards a Desired State

by Ben Zweibelson

Download The Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Three)

FM5-0 Chapter 3 Design describes design's purpose as a methodology used to "make sense of complex, ill-structured problems." The term 'make sense' deals with explanation of the open system. The previous article of 'To Design or Not to Design' demonstrated how military institutions have a strong propensity for describing an open system instead of explaining it. To make sense of a complex system, humans instinctively attempt to categorize information through descriptive monikers and reductive classifications. Knowledge is usually "pursued in depth in isolation...Rather than getting a continuous and coherent picture, we are getting fragments- remarkably detailed but isolated patterns." FM5-0 Chapter 3 Design follows military institutional preference for reconstructive and mechanical methodology prevalent at the tactical level of war by misapplying it to the operational level with design. Army design doctrine does not articulate why and how to transform a complex system into a desired one.

Download The Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Three)

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer in the US Army. A veteran of OIF 1 and OIF 6, Ben is currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Air Force (Air Command and Staff College program). Ben deploys this June to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a planner.

Editor's Note: This is part two of a six part series on design. Parts one and two can be found here and here.

Download the Full Article: Hawaii and Guam: Strategic Convergence Zones for the United States Forward Defense Strategy in the Pacific Rim

Robert Kaplan had an article in the May/June 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs titled "The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?" His discussion of what the Chinese Navy calls the "first island chain" and the "second island chain" in the Pacific Ocean drew our attention. These two maritime constructs are not simply linear descriptions of the layout of islands but ones with value-added undertones for both Chinese and American geostrategists over the Pacific Rim. Among these undertones, three are discussed below. First is the general observation that geography trumps politics in dealing with the emergent Chinese power. Second is that Guam and Hawaii because of their critically important position in the second island chain are historically poised to benefit the nations of the Pacific Rim by becoming new convergence zones. Third the emerging trends and the actions needed to capture, benefit from and give leadership to these trends for the Pacific century are discussed.

Download the Full Article: Hawaii and Guam: Strategic Convergence Zones for the United States Forward Defense Strategy in the Pacific Rim

James A. Kent is a global community analyst with extensive experience with geographic focused social and economic development policy in Pacific Rim countries.

Dr. Eric Casino is a social anthropologist and policy consultant with a long-term interest in international business and development programs in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Operational Art is Not a Level of War

by Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege (US Army Ret.)

Download the Full Article: Operational Art is Not a Level of War

Operational art is not a "level of war" as our current western military doctrines assert. It is, rather, thinking and acting like an explorer before the days of Google Earth, The Weather Channel, and Global Positioning Systems. While tactical and strategic thinking are fundamentally different, both kinds of thinking must take place in the explorer's brain, but in separate compartments.

To appreciate this, think of the metaphor of an early American explorer trying to cross a large expanse of unknown terrain long before the days of the modern conveniences mentioned in the previous paragraph. The explorer knows that somewhere to the west lies an ocean he wants to reach. He has only a sketch-map of a narrow corridor drawn by a previously unsuccessful explorer. He also knows that highly variable weather and frequent geologic activity can block mountain passes, flood rivers, and dry up desert water sources. He also knows that some native tribes are hostile to all strangers, some are friendly and others are fickle, but that warring and peace-making among them makes estimating their whereabouts and attitudes difficult. He also knows that the snows are less likely to be deep in the south, and that some fur trappers have reported an extensive mountain range running north to south. They have also provided vague descriptions of several ways to cross them. Finally, the expedition must head west because turning back can only lead to shame and penury; even perishing in the attempt to cross the wilderness will bring honor; and reaching the ocean will mean certain fame and probable wealth.

Download the Full Article: Operational Art is Not a Level of War

Huba Wass de Czege is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general. During his career as an infantry officer, he served two tours in Vietnam and gained staff experience at all levels up to assistant division commander. General Wass De Czege was a principal designer of the operational concept known as AirLand Battle. He also was the founder and first director of the Army's School for Advanced Military Studies where he also taught applied military strategy. After retiring in 1993, General Wass De Czege became heavily involved in the Army After Next Project and served on several Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency v advisory panels. He is a 1964 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds an MPA from Harvard University.

by Ian S. Davis, Carrie L. Worth, and Douglas W. Zimmerman

Download The Full Article: A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part One)

Abstract

This study presents a theory of dark network design and answers two fundamental questions about illuminating and interdicting dark networks: how are they configured and how are they vulnerable? We define dark networks as interdependent entities that use formal and informal ties to conduct licit or illicit activities and employ operational security measures and/or clandestine tradecraft techniques through varying degrees of overt, or more likely covert, activity to achieve their purpose. A dark network must design itself to buffer environmental hostility and produce output to achieve its purpose according to its design state. The level of hostility in the environment and the requirement for secure coordination of work determine the dark network's design state. These factors yield four typological dark network configurations: Opportunistic-Mechanical; Restrictive-Organic; Selective-Technical; and Surgical-Ad hoc. Each configuration must allow the secure coordination of work between the dark network's directional, operational, and supportive components and should adhere to the six principles of dark network design we identify: security, agility, resilience, direction setting, control, and capacity. If a dark network's configuration does not fit its design state or violates the principles of dark network design, the network will be vulnerable to illumination and interdiction.

Download The Full Article: A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part One)

Major Ian Davis is a United States Army Special Forces officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Major Davis has over 23 years of active duty service with the majority of his career assigned to 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in key enlisted and officer operational billets. He is currently conducting an internship with CJSOTF-A en route to his next assignment at 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

Major Carrie Worth is United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) aviator and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters in Defense Analysis. After graduating from the United States Air Force Academy in 1997, Major Worth has accumulated over 4,800 flight hours in assignments throughout AFSOC community. She is currently en route to her next assignment at Special Operations Command Europe.

Major Douglas Zimmerman is a United States Army Intelligence officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Major Zimmerman has over 14 years of active duty service and spent the majority of his career supporting Special Operations forces with assignments in the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and USASOC Headquarters. He is currently conducting an internship in the Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Laboratory and the Naval Postgraduate School.

Editor's Note: This essay is the first in a six-part series on a theory of dark network design. This series was originally submitted as a thesis graduation requirement for a MS in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Dr. Nancy Roberts served as the thesis advisor, and Dr. John Arquilla served as the second reader. An electronic version of the complete thesis is available at here.

Book Review by F. G. Hoffman

Download the Full Article: Wrong War, Wrong Policy,or Wrong Tactics?

Bing West, The Wrong War, Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan, New York: Random House, 2011, 307 pg, $27.95. (maps and photographs)

The Long War against extremism has spawned an explosion in books on global terrorism and America's interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Operation Enduring Freedom was the first counter-blow, following quickly on the heels of 9/11, it has not garnered as much attention as the larger Iraqi conflict. In contrast, the protracted contest in Mesopotamia generated George Packer's Assassin's Gate, Tom Ricks' superlative Fiasco and The Gamble, and Linda Robinson's Tell Me How This Ends among others.

Afghanistan has produced some notable exceptions. Sean Naylor's Not a Good Day to Die topped the field until Sebastian Junger's War was issued last year. The former was an operational history of the ferocious fight against Al Qaeda in the Shahikot Valley during Operation Anaconda in March 2002. Junger's micro-epic focused more narrowly on a small unit over a longer period of time in 2008 in the Korengal Valley.

The imbalance in our bookshelves is starting to become rectified, and Bing West's latest book tops the list. Mr. West, a former Marine, Pentagon policy official and noted author, brings much insight and no small amount of prior experience to this particular subject. During the Vietnam War, he had the opportunity to closely examine creative approaches and political complications of modern conflict. His first book, the renowned The Village, captured the complexity of American efforts to provide local security assistance to a foreign population beleaguered by a fierce conflict.

Download the Full Article: Wrong War, Wrong Policy,or Wrong Tactics?

Mr. Hoffman is a retired Marine Reservist and frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal.

by Michael C. Sevcik

Download The Full Article: Moral Intuition and the Professional Military Ethic

As our Army faces the professional ethics challenges of ten years at war, we would do well to realize how central emotion is to morality. We should shift our training, education and Army learning programs to focus mainly on developing men and women of character and integrity. Our Army should place less emphasis on the moral reasoning and ethical decision making processes when it comes to training in both the institutional school house and operational units. This quandary ethics approach not only falls short in providing a process that does not work when the bullets are flying but this thin slicing is a formula for postmodern relativism. When it comes to morality and ethics, the "how to" decision-making process is never as important as what our Soldier's think morally, demonstrate in character and live by the example of uncompromising integrity. Three thousand years ago, Aristotle focused on the 'character" of the individual. His focus regarding Stoic moral philosophy and approach to ethics was to build character in men based on courage, justice, temperance and wisdom. Only after we develop men and women of character, can we hope to get our Soldier's to the proper "intuitive" moral response to the tough ethical challenges they face in both combat and garrison operations. With the understanding of how central the role of emotions is to morality, our commanders and leaders will able to better train their Soldiers and importantly, establish a command climate based on character, values and honor.

When it comes to morality and character, the human species has changed little during the past three millennia. Our approach as a professional organization ought to turn back from the quandaries of case studies and ethical decision making processes which lead moral relativism. Aristotle had it right -- let's get after the inculcation of morality, character and values in our Soldiers.

Download The Full Article: Moral Intuition and the Professional Military Ethic

COL. (Ret.) Michael C. Sevcik is an instructor at the School for Command Preparation, US Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served for 32 years as a Soldier, retiring in 2007.

by David N. Santos

Download The Full Article: Counterterrorism v. Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Algeria and Afghanistan

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States the terms of terrorism and insurgency have become part of the everyday American lexicon and for that matter much of the international community's as well. So common has the usage of these terms become that it would appear they are almost interchangeable if not the same. There is, however, a distinction between a terrorist and an insurgent. It is this distinction which lies at the heart of the difficulty in combating an enemy who does not look like or operate in the manner of a traditional conventional armed threat. If an enemy is identified as being irregular and not keeping with traditional enemy threat models what are the most effect methods for addressing this type of threat? Add to this complexity of combating an unclear and irregular threat the use of terrorism which adds a new dynamic to the situation. Does the presence of terrorist acts indicate those acts were committed by terrorists or some other type of group such as a revolutionary, an insurgent or a guerrilla?

Download The Full Article: Counterterrorism v. Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Algeria and Afghanistan

Major David N. Santos is an active duty Military Intelligence officer currently attending the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Download the Full Article: Building Relationships and Influence in Counterinsurgency: One Officer's Perspective

It is well understood that to be successful in counterinsurgency, the real goal must be to influence the local population, not just destroy the enemy combatants. It is also clear that non-military elements of power can be as or more efficacious than guns and planes. The difficulty is how to apply those two maxims. More times than not, the application of these two maxims intersect in the position of the apparent host-nation leader, be it at the village, regional, or national level.

The following vignette explains how a U.S. team of advisors managed their relationship with a Provisional Director of Police (PDOP), MG Khalid, in a northern province of Iraq in order to convince the general to move decisively against terrorists and develop his 27,000-man police force so that it had credibility with the Iraqi population.

Download the Full Article: Building Relationships and Influence in Counterinsurgency: One Officer's Perspective

Eric von Tersch is a retired U.S. Army colonel with service in Army Special Forces and as a Foreign Area officer.

Editor's Note: The names of most of the Iraqi officers mentioned in the narrative, as well as place names, have been changed since all of the Iraqi officials alluded to are still in positions of authority. Masking the names and locations does not take away from the essential arguments put forward.

by Matthew Ince

Download The Full Article: The EU's Afghan Police Mission: Failing to Meet Commitments

The publication of a report by the House of Lords' European Union Committee released on 16 February 2011 has served as yet another illustration of civilian under commitment within the international community's counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. If this trend is left unaddressed and civilian missions such as the EUPOL continue to fall short of meeting their commitments within the region, the international community may well find it increasingly difficult to address key grievances within Afghanistan and ensure that legitimate governance is maintained. Furthermore, this could fundamentally disrupt their ability to successfully train Afghan security forces and enable the Afghan Government to provide security to its citizens; a prerequisite for overcoming the excessive levels of corruption that must be addressed if stability is ever to be sustainable within the region.

Download The Full Article: The EU's Afghan Police Mission: Failing to Meet Commitments

Matthew Ince currently works as a Project Manager at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. He has an MA in Geopolitics and Grand Strategy and a BA (Hons) in International Relations from the University of Sussex.

by Scott Dempsey

Download The Full Article: The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer's Frustration

General Petraeus will be in Washington next week where he will inevitably continue to extol the progress of counterinsurgency (COIN) in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban's heartland -- and where our war to achieve sufficient stability to enable us to leave will be either won or lost. COIN doctrine argues that with the right combination of security, governance, and development, there will be transformational impact that can marginalize insurgents' control over local populations. Combined with multiple external factors mostly beyond our ability to influence, COIN was indeed part of the transformational improvement in Iraq -- and provided sufficient stability for American troops to withdraw in favor of Iraqi government forces. The Afghanistan surge seeks to create similar results-- which would ultimately create conditions for transfer of authority and responsibility to the Afghan government and security forces. A key component to GEN Petraeus's COIN talking points cites the Nawa District of restive Helmand Province as a "proof of concept" for counterinsurgency dogma, and that the "Nawa model" is durable. However, during my year in Helmand Province, including nine months as the U.S. development lead in Nawa District, I saw a variety of factors that led to Nawa's success -- none of which pass this test. Furthermore, to secure even the most basic degree of Afghan government-led stability will require a seemingly endless commitment to continue to fight and finance this effort.

Download The Full Article: The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer's Frustration

Until February 2011, Scott Dempsey was a USAID Foreign Service Officer, most recently with the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs in Washington. From July 2009 - August 2010, he served as a development officer in Helmand Province. He also previously deployed as a Marine on a civil affairs team in Fallujah in 2005.

A Critique of the Current Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategies in Afghanistan

by Metin Turcan

Download the Full Article: Seeing the Other Side of the COIN

Though the international visibility of Tribalized Rural and Muslim Environments (TRMEs) such as rural Afghanistan has dramatically increased for almost nine years with the efforts of Coalition Forces (CF) in Afghanistan, TRMEs have rarely been studied from Counterinsurgency (COIN) perspective. Although there has emerged a vast literature at the strategic level on the COIN efforts of the CF in Afghanistan and the prospective policies of the international community to resolve the current insurgency, unfortunately, we are still unable to see the other side of the COIN at the tactical level, or view on the ground.

The utmost aim of this article is to attack many "dogmas" currently exist in the COIN literature, and challenges traditional COIN wisdom available in the literature. It also aims to lay out a different perspective regarding the COIN efforts in rural areas at the tactical level, a rarely studied level from COIN perspective. This is, therefore, not an article of problem solver. It may be regarded, instead, as an article of problem setting at the tactical level and concerning Afghanistan in general. It claims that the current situation in rural Afghanistan do not conform to established frames or assumptions in the literature, and the current literature is, thus, far behind from figuring out what the real problem is.

Human beings are members of a whole, in creation of one essence and soul.

If one member is afflicted with pain, other members uneasy will remain.

If you have no sympathy for human pain, the name of human you cannot retain.

-Sa'adi Shirazi (13th century Islamic poet)

Download the Full Article: Seeing the Other Side of the COIN

Metin Turcan, who holds a MA Degree on Security Studies from Naval Postgraduate School, is currently working as a security advisor in the Interior Ministry of Turkey. He served in southeastern Turkey (1999,2004,2006,2008), Iraq (1999,2003,2005) and fulfilled liaison and training missions in Kazakhstan(2004), Kyrgyzstan(2004), and Afghanistan(2005).

To Design or Not to Design (Part Two):

The There Is a Problem with the Word 'Problem;' How Unique Vocabulary Is Essential to Conceptual Planning

by Ben Zweibelson

Download the Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Two)

Costello: "Well then who's on first?"

Abbott: "Yes."

Costello: "I mean the fellow's name."

Abbott: "Who."

Costello: "The guy on first."

Abbott: "Who."

Costello: "The first baseman."

Abbott: "Who."

Costello: "The guy playing..."

Abbott: "Who is on first!"

Costello: "I'm asking YOU who's on first."

Abbott: "That's the man's name."

FM5-0 Chapter 3 Design discusses a critical component to conceptual planning and phrases it with "solving the right problem." However, military doctrine and institutional culture already employ the word problem for an entirely different and valid reason. Should one ask any tactical-level member of a military unit what their understanding of the word problem is in a military setting, the majority will explain to you that a problem is 'something one solves.' The existing word meaning uses a short-term or tactical perspective that is divorced from the larger context in which design theory provides understanding on metaphysical processes. These processes exceed the artificial boundaries imposed by the military institution's valid definition of a tactical problem; the perspectives do not match.

Download the Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Two)

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer in the US Army. A veteran of OIF 1 and OIF 6, Ben is currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Air Force (Air Command and Staff College program). Ben deploys this June to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a planner.

Editor's Note: This is part two of a six part series on design. Part one can be found here.

A Case Study on the Maldives

by Jason Thomas

Download The Full Article: The Post-Afghanistan Threat Environment

The conflict in Afghanistan is one of the longest military engagements in modern warfare for Western governments and their partners. At the same time there is continued agitation and provocation from non-state actors, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous), based along the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. There is an unparalleled amount of human and technological surveillance focused on monitoring the flow of funds and fighters to Afghanistan. Yet, the next seed of radicalization to have regional and global consequences has been planted in small Islamic nation states or those who previously have not registered as potential breeding grounds. This paper argues that this is an asymmetric response by non-state Islamic actors to our superiority in surveillance and concentration of overwhelming force being applied in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan. By their very nature, non-state actors such as al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba are borderless movements. They do not rely on a one-dimensional front line and use impressionable segments of society or fragile nations with porous borders as hosts. One such nation is the Maldives. There is also a growth in al Qaeda networks within Mauritiania, Nepal, Bangladesh and Somalia.

Download The Full Article: The Post-Afghanistan Threat Environment

Jason Thomas is a former Regional Manager for a USAID Implementing Partner in Afghanistan. He has also worked extensively in the Civil War area in Sri Lanka, negotiating with the Tamil Tigers as well as being a senior political advisor in the British House of Commons. He is a PhD candidate at Curtin University, Perth W.A Australia -- in his spare time he takes disadvantaged kids up the Kokoda Track battlefield in PNG.

by Neoptolemus

Download the Full Article: "Mr. Gates Doth Protest Too Much"

Mr. Gates continued his farewell tour with a strong speech at the Air Force Academy last week. Unlike his talk at the US Military Academy he did not talk over the student's heads or treat them as tethered goats. Nor did he suggest that they'd wasted four years at the wrong Service academy or that their future profession was in doubt—as he unintentionally did at West Point. Instead he talked to them as the future Air Force leaders, the ones that will ultimately be "tackling the challenges of the 21st century head on." He spoke plainly but passionately about what the Air Force of the 21st century must look like -- as well as the challenges and moral issues they would face as leaders.

As at West Point, the Secretary candidly discussed the conservative culture of the Pentagon, noting that when he arrived he still found all the Services -- including the Air Force -- looking at the world "through the prism of the 20th century," preparing to win conventional and large scale fights against comparably armed competitors. His efforts, he noted, ran into a stone wall of cultural resistance and bureaucratic sacred cows, especially from the Air Force.

Download the Full Article: "Mr. Gates Doth Protest Too Much"

Neoptolemus, a retired infantry officer, is currently imprisoned as a senior defense official in the Pentagon. Neoptolemus was the son of the warrior Achilles and the princess Deidamia in Greek mythology.

by Franz-Stefan Gady

Download The Full Article: The Koepenick Syndrome: Is the United States the new Prussia?

January 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of Dwight D. Eisenhower's farewell address. In it, he warned the American people of the growing influence of the "military industrial complex" . An outgrowth of this "total influence", as Eisenhower put it, is the United States' reverence for its armed services and the men commanding it. While it is unlikely that the United States will ever take the path of Prussia, the dangers of the Koepenick syndrome are real—a disproportionate admiration for leadership and innovation in men and women wearing uniforms and minimizing civilian influence over tough policy decisions.

Download The Full Article: The Koepenick Syndrome: Is the United States the new Prussia?

Franz-Stefan Gady is a foreign policy analyst at the EastWest Institute. He served in the Austrian Army.

Optimizing Use of the Armed Forces in Combating Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations

by Braden Civins

Download The Full Article: Optimizing Use of the Armed Forces in Combating Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations

The drug war in Mexico threatens the stability of the Mexican federal government, catalyzes widespread border crossing by undocumented aliens (UDAs), and imperils U.S. citizens on both sides of the border. This note examines one proposal to address these concerns—additional deployment of the military along the southwest (SW) border—and the legal issues potentially raised by this response. Part I of this note provides background information on the nature of the problem. Part II traces the law governing military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA) with respect to counternarcotics (CN) operations along the southwest (SW) border. Part III examines how the law will either constrain or facilitate MSCLEA with respect to surveillance and detention operations. Part IV offers recommendations to improve the utility of military deployment to the border to combat drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).

Download The Full Article: Optimizing Use of the Armed Forces in Combating Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations

Braden Civins, a native Texan, is in his fourth and final year of study at The University of Texas, pursuing a J.D. from The School of Law and a Master of Global Policy Studies, with a specialization in Security Studies, from the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs.

George Bush's Rhetoric in the Global War on Terrorism

by Scott Cullinane

Download The Full Article: The World Hears Us

Nearly a decade after the September 11th attacks and the declaration of a War on Terrorism America is still struggling to more accurately define the nature and scope of this war. Debate continues because fundamental questions still remain: with who is the US at war, is it a war, and if so, how should it prosecute such a war? This ambiguity has many contributing factors, but one that is significant and has yet to be examined closely enough is the role and influence of rhetoric. The rhetoric of President George W. Bush shaped the perception of the American public and influenced US military actions and foreign policy. Likewise, events such as the sectarian and insurgent violence in Iraq influenced the words President Bush used. As the War on Terrorism developed the President's rhetoric changed in some ways, but it never sufficiently address al-Qaeda's motivations nor counter its narrative.

Words and phrases often carry multiple meanings and can have connotations that change with their context. Words people do not use or avoid using can equally carry weight by their absence. In an environment as complex as the War on Terror, words are no simple matter. During a conventional interstate war, rhetoric does matter, but it is ancillary to the use of force and the exercise of will. In conventional warfare the central and indispensible factor is the imposition of one nation-state's will on another by force. The words a leader speaks only matter so far as they affect force. Yet, in America's current situation, rhetoric matters a good deal more because the US is not in a conventional war, but something else entirely.

Download The Full Article: The World Hears Us

Scott Cullinane is currently a Staff Associate for the Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He is also a student of national security affairs at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC.

by Timothy Richardson

Ivan, Arreguin-Toft. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. Cambridge studies in International Relations, 99. New York: Cambridge University Press, 250 pages, 2005. ISBN: 0521548691 Paperback $41.00

Download The Full Article: Book Review: How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

The military prowess of the United States would seem to be unrivalled in the 21st century. Yet a decade into the new century, the United States is still engaged in the longest war of its history in Afghanistan against a weaker, non-state actor, with no end in sight. Why? In his 2005 book, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Ivan Arreguin-Toft offers insight into the reasons why strong actors, such as the United States, often lose to weak actors in an asymmetric conflict. He not only provides sound logic detailing his Strategic Interaction (STRATINT) theory to explain why weak actors defeat strong actors, but he also outlines the growing post-World War II trend marking the increased winning percentage of weak actors in asymmetric conflicts. Given the United States' efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq this past decade, few would argue against the prediction that the United States will continue to be engaged in small, asymmetric wars against militarily inferior adversaries for the foreseeable future. More importantly, one could perceive that because the United States has such an overwhelming military superiority that it did not plan for, or was not prepared for, the strategy of its adversary. As such, Arreguin-Toft's STRATINT theory is relevant, compelling, and well-supported. Moreover, it is a great follow-on to other prominent asymmetric conflict theories proposed by Andrew Mack and Gil Merom, and is an essential read for defense planners, as well as IR scholars and students.

Download The Full Article: Book Review: How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

Major Timothy Richardson is a career Air Force intelligence officer currently studying Irregular Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He has a B.A. in History from Mary Washington University and M.S. in International Relations from Troy University. He has deployed to four contingency locations since 9/11.

COIN in Mexico? A Response to Robert Culp's Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations

by Patrick Corcoran

Download The Full Article: COIN in Mexico?

It has grown fashionable in recent years to argue that the solution to Mexico's public security difficulties lies in treating organized crime within the context of counterinsurgency theory. Many have made this argument, one of the most recent being Robert Culp here at Small Wars Journal. This is an unfortunate misreading of the security problems that are plaguing Mexico. While COIN theory offers a handful of sensible ideas, as an overarching philosophical guide, it is an imperfect fit for Mexico.

Download The Full Article: COIN in Mexico?

Patrick Corcoran is a student of international relations at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies. He lived in northern Mexico from 2005 to 2010 and blogs daily about Mexican security and politics at Gancho.

by Boris Kogan

Download the Full Article: The Basmachi: Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of an Islamic Insurgency in Central Asia

Abstract. This paper delivers a short overview of the Basmachi insurgency in Soviet Central Asia, a conflict which spanned a quarter of a century (1918-approximately 1943) and the territory of a half-dozen of today's countries, foreshadowing many future Islamic insurgencies including those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Western China, Iraq and Chechnya. The "Basmachestvo" involved prolonged full-spectrum warfare fought by a fragmented insurgency with multiple centers of gravity against a multiethnic empire, whose ideology the insurgents perceived as a threat to their identity and way of life. The subject has been largely opaque to Western historians due to several reasons, including the remote and inaccessible theater of warfare (Soviet Central Asia having been denied to Western journalists and diplomats in the timeframe discussed,) the suppression of accounts failing to adhere to the official narrative by the Soviet Union and purges of those who participated on both sides of the insurgency and remained in the Soviet Union after the conflict's conclusion. Thus, a conflict with a high degree of relevance to the present-day international situation has been forgotten or ignored. This paper attempts to begin to remedy this situation.

Download the Full Article: The Basmachi: Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of an Islamic Insurgency in Central Asia

SSG Boris Kogan is currently serving in the Washington Army National Guard while completing his Bachelor of Arts degree at the University of Washington, Seattle. He previously served on active duty as a Special Operations Team Alpha leader. He was awarded the Jim & Anna Hyonjoo Lint Scholarship by the Lint Center for National Security Studies in August 2010.

To Design, or not to Design:

An Introduction to a Six Article Series

by Ben Zweibelson

Download The Full Article: To Design, or not to Design

Are the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) unable to address the growing complexities of modern, ill-structured conflict? Does the U.S. Army's design methodology provide the military institution a more effective structure, format, vocabulary, and process that are understandable to the force and applicable? Many military professionals charge that design is 'just MDMP's mission analysis on steroids,' while others claim design is merely 'Effects Based Operations (EBO) by another name.'

Download The Full Article: To Design, or not to Design

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer in the US Army. A veteran of OIF 1 and OIF 6, Ben is currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Air Force (Air Command and Staff College program). Ben deploys this June to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a planner.

Design and the Prospects of a Design Ethic

by Christopher R. Paparone

Download The Full Article: Design and the Prospects of a Design Ethic

Interestingly, if one examines how the issue of ethical reasoning is approached in the US military institution, the focus of attention seems to be more on the individual rather than the reflexivity of the institution as the frame of reference. The Vann story exposes that the institutional propensity is to orient on ethics of progressivism, compliance, and equality. Progressivism is revealed in the institutional portrayal of convergent and assimilative knowledge artifacts to include published doctrine and regulations and a vast array of organizations devoted to "lessons learned." The institutional ethic on compliance seems strongly favor that, under normal circumstances, an officer shall not question the decided stratagems of the hierarchy (perhaps the assumptive underpinnings are that the higher you go, the more you know and the more accountable you are). At the same time, there are institutional cross-pressures to accommodate equality -- (at least apparently) treating those of the same position and rank equally; albeit, the talents and wisdom are diverse. We will address these sequentially.

Download The Full Article: Design and the Prospects of a Design Ethic

Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia.

Editor's Note: This essay is the last in Paparone's series on design.

by Cliff W. Gilmore

Download the Full Article: The Second Battle of Hastings

Michael Hastings' most recent attempt to unseat a U.S. general alleges members of the military illegally used Information Operations (IO) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) activities to shape the perceptions of elected U.S. officials and senior military leaders. Many respondents quickly addressed a need to clarify lines between various communication activities including Information Operations, Psychological Operations (recently re-named Military Information Support Operations or MISO), Public Affairs (PA) and Strategic Communication (SC). Amidst the resulting smoke and fury both Hastings and his detractors are overlooking a greater underlying problem: Many in the military continue to cling with parochial vigor to self-imposed labels - and the anachronistic paradigms they represent - that defy the very nature of a rapidly evolving communication environment.

The allegations highlight two false assumptions that guide the U.S. military's approach to communication in an environment defined not by the volume and control of information but by the speed and ease with which people today communicate with one another. This article identifies these assumptions and recommends several actions to avoid yet another Battle of Hastings by eliminating existing stovepipes rather than strengthening them. The analysis presented here is grounded in two key established Truths.

Download the Full Article: The Second Battle of Hastings

Cliff W. Gilmore is an active duty Marine Corps Major assigned as Special Assistant for Public Communication to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cliff is a 2010-2011 Fellow with MIT's Seminar XXI. He holds an MS in Organization and Management with a Leadership specialization from Capella University and is a PhD Learner in the same field. The focus of his ongoing dissertation research is principle-based communication as a leadership practice and he is the author of "Principles, Credibility, and Trust", Appendix P ofthe U.S. Joint Forces Command Handbook for Strategic Communication (Version 3) (Appendix P begins on page 197). This opinions in this paper are Cliff's personal thoughts and do not reflect those of his commander or organization.

An Interview with Etienne de Durand

by Octavian Manea

Download The Full Article: Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion

How important were Charles Lacheroy and Roger Trinquier in shaping the French School of COIN compared to David Galula?

There was much debate and opposition within the French Army regarding the proper answers to guerre révolutionnaire, and no single school of thought ever prevailed. If there is such a thing as the French School of Counterinsurgency, its founding father undoubtedly is Charles Lacheroy, and with him the proponents of DGR (doctrine de guerre révolutionnaire or French Counterinsurgency Doctrine) to include Jacques Hogard. During the French Indochina and Algeria wars, they were extremely influential towards French policy and strategy leading conferences and lectures, contributing to doctrinal manuals, and advising on day-to-day operations. Lacheroy, for instance, had high-level contacts within the government and was able to implement his views in 1957, with the creation of 5e bureaux all over Algeria and the generalization of guerre psychologique (psychwar or psychological operations).

Roger Trinquier is at first more of a practitioner. He wrote on COIN at the end of the period and should therefore only in retrospect be included as a central, yet not foundational, figure of French COIN.

Contrastingly, David Galula was an intelligence officer and most of what he wrote was marginal in France. Nobody knew of him.

Download The Full Article: Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion

Etienne de Durand is director of the Security Studies Center at the Institut Franí§ais des Relations Internationales (IFRI) in Paris. He is also professor at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris and at the Ecole de guerre. He is the author of the chapter dedicated to France in "Understanding Counterinsurgency-Doctrine, operations and challenges" (Routledge, 2010) edited by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney. He is contributor to the Ultima Ratio (http://ultimaratio-blog.org/) a blog focused on debating contemporary security and defense issues.

Civilians in the Hold Phase

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the Full Article: Civilians in the Hold Phase

The second or "Hold" phase of a counterinsurgency will likely not be clear cut. It is generally the point at which the insurgents no longer can operate openly in any given area, and have to revert to the covert first stage of guerilla operations. The line is not easily recognized and may vary from locality to locality even within a single brigade or regimental operating area. The military will develop metrics to try to determine where they stand relative to the insurgency.

The civilian members of any Reconstruction Team (RT) will likely also develop their own measures, even if the process is less formal. I had a tendency to gauge progress in any given area by the quality of the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and of their manner of emplacement. As IED networks are rolled up in the clear phase and further degraded in the hold phase, the quality and quantity of the IEDs decreases with the replacement of skilled bomb makers and emplacers with less competent recruits.

Download the Full Article: Civilians in the Hold Phase

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Counterinsurgency from 2003-05. He served on an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq in 2009-10 and is currently an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Relations.

by Neoptolemus

Download the Full Article: Will the Real Robert Gates Please Stand Up?

It's hard not to like the provocative nature of the SecDef's speeches—which often have serious messages and outright swipes at sclerotic bureaucratic habits. For example in his West Point speech, he talked over the heads of the cadets in the room and railed about the future as an "opportunity to attack the institutional and bureaucratic constipation of Big Army, and re-think the way it deals with the outstanding young leaders in its lower- and middle-ranks."

Likewise, his advocacy for greater diversity and flexibility in careers and educational opportunities. "For example, instead of being assigned to new positions every two or three years," Mr. Gates opined that officers could "apply for job openings in a competitive system more akin to what happens in large organizations in the private sector." I really liked his public endorsement of Lieutenant General David Barno's proposals for Army reform and the need for tomorrow's smaller professional force to compete and retain the best talent as a "must do" for the incoming Army Chief of Staff.

But Mr. Gates has also a deliberate taste for rhetorical overstretch when he makes irritating if not dangerous comments on "likely" and implausible scenarios about the future use of military force.

Download the Full Article: Will the Real Robert Gates Please Stand Up?

Neoptolemus, a retired infantry officer, is currently imprisoned as a senior defense official in the Pentagon. Neoptolemus was the son of the warrior Achilles and the princess Deidamia in Greek mythology.

The February 2011

issue of Small Wars Journal (Vol. 7 No. 2) is now available.

Click here for the

full issue, or directly on these titles for single articles.

by Douglas Batson, Al Di Leonardo, Christopher K. Tucker

Download the Full Article: "Napoleonic Know-How" in an Age of Persistent Engagement

A bevy of prominent national security thinkers have suggested that the US has entered an era of persistent engagement with troubled regions of the world. From this perspective, failing or failed states are likely to lure the US into counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, foreign internal defense, and other modes of irregular warfare for decades to come. The sources of these difficult situations will inevitably vary greatly, from ethnic conflicts to natural resource grabs; predatory kleptocracies to narco-terrorist regimes; proxy wars to religious extremism; and more. Yet all of these situations owe their origins in large part to the absence of the same governance infrastructures that have enabled successful modern states since the days of Napoleon.

Douglas Batson joined the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in 2004.

Lieutenant Colonel Di Leonardo is a decorated combat veteran of US Special Operations.

Dr. Christopher K. Tucker thinks and works at the intersection of technology, strategy, geography, and national securi-ty. Dr. Tucker manages, Yale House Ventures, a portfolio of technology companies and social ventures across the domains of international affairs, defense/intelligence, and academe.