Journal

The purpose of this paper is to provide research information on doctrinal convergence and divergence, and elaborate upon the role of language and culture in counterinsurgency operations.

A glimpse into the history of the Phillipines

Defining differences between design theory and design planning

Decolonization, insurgency, and nation and state building in Africa

Critique of OIF/OEF memoires

Knowing how insurgencies last so long can help to understand why they last so long

Any future framework for operational adaptation must incorporate the effects of technological change, while avoiding the seductions of strategic paralysis theory.

Why Better Information Operations are needed

Kyrgyzstan as a tipping point for charters?

Examining the structure and relationships between lines of operations (LOOs), measures, and indicators at various organizational levels

Sometimes in the course of military operations ill-conceived ideas survive to produce unacceptable outcomes.  When this happens, frustrated leaders might ask, “What made us think this would work?”

The importance of leadership in insurgent mobilization, recruitment, and expansion of the base

Better understanding the plight of the Fatah

How do we get the "Big Picture" right?

The Story of the Ultimate Counterinsurgent: An Interview with William Doyle, Author of A Soldier’s Dream: Captain Travis Patriquin and the  Awakening of Iraq. SWJ Interview by Octavian Manea.

Ditching Career Centric COIN:  Exhuming Robert Komer with the Drawdown in Afghanistan

Better understanding China

When is a child ready to fight?

Rebellion at sea

The creation of South Sudan leaves Sudan's doors open for the growth of terrorism, but the perilous situation is fertile with potential for focused U.S. engagement.

Smaller and weaker opponents do not have a monopoly on asymmetric warfare and it does not need to be left to Guerrilla movements for us to romantically read about in the future.   We need to become better at fighting with very few resources.

A review of the use of new media in recent insurgencies.

The practical application of the principles of VSO over 150 days of planning, operations, and refinement in Afgahnistan.

Reading the Evolution of Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency

Where does legitimacy derive from in the local populace?

Octavian continues his inquiry into Pakistan

A Contrarian’s Lament

Understanding how Egyptian's understand their past rebellions

Refining analytical methods for a better war

Better understanding the so-called Arab Spring

Imperatives for Confronting Irregular Challenges

A Revisionist Approach to Foreign Policy

Overcoming apathy through empowerment is the key to success in Afghanistan

Is the threat of AQAP overblown and sensationalized?

20 Articles of Effective Assessments in Counterinsurgency

Author describes operations in Iraq in 2008

Social Scientist explores human emotions and reactions in the conflict in Iraq

Theory of elasticity suggests gun control measures are ineffective without a corresponding increase in security.

Author describes his unit's methodology of measuring effectiveness in Afghanistan

Declassified outline of Rhodesian Tips, Tactics, and Procedures in COIN.

Nearly ten years into the war, the Afghan Army still struggles to learn basic soldiering skills.

A conversation on the United States military's history of manhunting.

Can local law enforcement use technology to deter riots?

Are Al Qaeda's piracy and raiding efforts merely disruption tactics or part of a larger strategy for control of the Middle East's waterways?

How does your organization think, and how does it not think?

Former Battalion Commander describes frustrations of command relationships in Afghanistan and offers recommendations.

Is Pakistan in a low-level equilibrium trap or simply too focused on India?  Octavian investigates for SWJ.

An American-designed strategy attempts to link counterinsurgency and traditional development programs in Yemen and thereby provide a model that can be applied elsewhere. Rapidly changing conditions with simultaneous multiple small wars impair the ability to design and implement such a challenge. At the same time, there are legitimate questions about the thinking that went into the original formulation.

Current doctrine framing Irregular Warfare is wron -- historically, semantically and conceptually -- and should be reexamined to enable decision-makers at all levels to better identify emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities, better allocate resources, and in the process, enhance our national defense.

Current doctrine fails to fully expound on the tactical leader's involvement in economic activity and the necessity for achieving sustainable economic development in the operating environment